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Summary 
 
 
This thesis analyses the social impact of Payung Keluarga, an obligatory enhanced credit life 
microinsurance product launched by Allianz in Indonesia in 2006. Payung Keluarga automat-
ically insures micro-borrowers who take out microcredits from microfinance institutions. In 
case of death, the outstanding credit balance is canceled and the appointed beneficiary rece-
ives twice the original loan as an additional payout. 
Payung Keluarga is a clear development intervention. It was conceived to ameliorate the as-
sumed post-mortem financial crisis of low-asset families, and to prevent a drop in their al-
ready low asset base. Through qualitative-explorative field research from 2006 until 2008 I 
investigated if this developmental intention was realized. Research components consisted of a 
baseline-endline comparison with insured customers, beneficiary interviews, and ancilliary 
research components. Data analysis relies heavily on triangulation. It is the first impact analy-
sis on microinsurance in Indonesia and one of the few on non-health microinsurance. 
In the research process, I took the position of an observing participant. As the operational 
project leader for Allianz in Indonesia I was virtually doing research on my own work. The 
resulting challenge to research neutrality is primarily mitigated by the lack of financial re-
search support from Allianz and by the sobering to discerning social impact which my re-
search has eventually revealed and for which I hold myself responsible. 
The majority of insured were married female Muslim petty traders in urban and semi-urban 
areas around Jakarta. Socio-economically these women stand at the upper end of the low-asset 
stratum. Their husbands were generally the main bread-winners of the family, and it was 
mostly them who received the insurance payouts. It could therefore be said that Payung Ke-
luarga benefited the main breadwinner instead of insuring him. 
The study found that norms of a moral economy are still exerting significant clout on the in-
sured. The moral economy is a coercively egalitarian social structure prevalent in traditional 
societies. It aims at providing “subsistence insurance” for all community members through an 
intricate collective system of balanced exchanges. The corresponding “premium” is a de-
nouncement of self-interested material asset accumulation. Next to structural reasons, it was 
this moral restriction that saw the businesses of the women stagnate at low and socially in-
conspicuous levels. Despite microcredit and Payung Keluarga few women ever “made it big”. 
Payung Keluarga did not help to overcome the assumed post-mortem financial crisis. In reali-
ty, such crisis did not exist since community and family support among low-asset Muslim 
Indonesians is normally strong enough to largely cover funeral expenses and provide for the 
bereft family. This support is driven by the perception of death as a collective risk in the light 
of the moral economy and hinged on principles of balanced reciprocity. 
For cultural and religious reasons, the beneficiaries used most of the insurance payouts for 
funeral ceremonies and repayment of informal debt. With the advent of Payung Keluarga 
especially familial post-mortem assistance has been reduced. This makes for a clear case of 
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crowding out. Payung Keluarga has even contributed to an inflation of funeral costs. It has 
thereby promoted a long-term societal shift from equality-seeking balanced reciprocity to-
wards status-seeking and socially diversifying general reciprocity. In effect, Payung Keluarga 
has attacked cooperative social cohesion head-on where it is still strongest in a rapidly mod-
ernizing Indonesian society. The product has tackled the “wrong” risk and furthered social 
diversification. Unsurprisingly, coverage for education costs and expensive medical treat-
ments was more demanded by customers, not the least because traditional risk management 
strategies do not cover these relatively modern risks well. 
This discerning and unintended impact of Payung Keluarga is hardly offset by a positive in-
crease in financial literacy among the insured. Furthermore, the effect on “peace of mind” on 
the insured is ambivalent: while most insured stated to feel safer, some declared to feel less 
secure with their obligatory coverage for fear of interference with divine predetermination. 
Business risk affinity of the insured has not been changed due to the limited coverage of 
Payung Keluarga. Its overall developmental impact can be literally described as “micro”. 
Instead of protecting the status-quo of the family, Payung Keluarga has assumed the role of 
an actor of social change. Not only because it has changed the funeral pattern of the beneficia-
ries, but also because it promotes a far-reaching conceptual paradigm shift from balanced re-
ciprocity, which forms a core pillar of the insured’s social structure, towards general reciproc-
ity. As insurance is based on the principle of conditional general reciprocity, it requires an 
individualized frame of reference which knows clear winner and losers, something the moral 
economy with its carefully balanced exchanges has tried to suppress. In addition, microinsur-
ance furthers processes of financialization, commoditization, formalization, and legalization.  
The thesis hypothesizes that with sufficient insurance coverage provided, the insured will in-
creasingly opt out of the coercively egalitarian “subsistence insurance” system which the 
moral economy guarantees. Such opt out will allow the insured to pursue a more aggressive 
economic asset accumulation strategy, particularly in combination with micro-credit. For the 
individual, this can be seen as a “liberating fortune” that would induce more women to grow 
their businesses to significant sizes. In parallel, it would deal a blow to cooperative social co-
hesion. I propose to call this the “double fortune / double blow” dilemma of microfinance. In 
fact, the empirical evidence points at a strong preference for autonomous individual protection 
instead of socially intricate collective protection: Customer satisfaction was high, demand for 
more products very vocal, and the emic perspective on microinsurance more positive than my 
critical stance. In case of better alternatives, low-asset people opt out of the moral economy. 
Although this thesis is exemplary, some of its findings can be generalized: The impact of mi-
croinsurance is highly dependent on the cultural, religious and socio-demographic context. 
Any microinsurance intervention concerned with social impact should be preceded by a thick 
contextualization going beyond the usual demand assessments. In turn, microinsurance like-
wise impacts context as an actor of ambivalent social change. The complex influence of con-
text and the role of microinsurance as an actor of social change have so far been hardly dis-
cussed in the development discourse.  
 
v 
 
Content 
 
 
Summary ………………………………………………………………...………………………….…..… iii 
Content ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. v 
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………….………….…………….……... viii 
 
1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………...…… 1 
2  The socio-theoretical embedding ………………………………………………………………. 8 
2.1 On poverty and human aspirations ………………………………………………........... 8 
 2.2 The concept toolbox ………………………………………………………………..…... 11 
  2.2.1 Embeddedness ………………………………………………………………… 11 
  2.2.2 Moral economy ……………………………………………………………….. 13 
  2.2.3 Reciprocity and other modes of exchange …………………………….…….… 18 
  2.2.4  The traders’ dilemma ……………………………………………….……….… 29 
 2.3 On rationality ……………………………………………………….………..…………. 31 
 2.4 The expanded-asset-capital framework …………………….…………….…………….. 33 
3 The developmental embedding ……..-…………………………………………………………. 40 
 3.1 Development ……………………………………………………………………………. 41 
  3.1.1 Development and modernist thought ….………………………………………. 41 
  3.1.2  Phases of development …….………………………………………………..…. 44 
 3.2 Microfinance ….………………………………………………………………………… 52 
  3.2.1  What is microfinance? .…………………………………………………….….. 52 
  3.2.2  Why microfinance rose to prominence ….…………………………….………. 54 
  3.2.3 Microcredit ….…………………………………………………………….…… 56 
  3.2.4 Microsavings ….………………………………………………………….……. 61 
  3.2.5 Microfinance debates ….…………………………………………………….… 63 
  3.2.6 Microfinance impact ………………………………………………………..…. 71 
  3.2.7 Why ibu-ibu do not make it big ………….……………………………………. 76 
   - A glance at microcredit impact in Indonesia  
 3.3 Microinsurance …………………………………………………………………………. 82 
  3.3.1  What is microinsurance? ………………………………..……………………... 82 
  3.3.2 Why microinsurance rose to prominence …...…………...………………….…. 88 
  3.3.3 Microinsurance debates …………………………….………………….………. 90 
  3.3.4 Microinsurance impact ….…………………………………………………..…. 100 
  
 
vi 
 
4 The practical embedding ……………………………………………………………………….. 109 
4.1 Indonesia’s “Great Transformation” ……………………………………………………. 109 
4.2 Social protection in Indonesia …………………………………………………………... 117 
4.3 Microinsurance in Indonesia ……………………………………………………………. 121 
4.4 The Payung Keluarga project ……………....…………………………………………… 124 
4.4.1 Project background …………………....……………………...………………… 125 
4.4.2 My operational role ……………………………………………………………. 126 
4.4.3 Payung Keluarga product description …………………………………………. 127 
4.4.4 Causal model …..………………………………………………….…………… 129 
4.4.5 Customer education ……………………………………………………………. 130 
4.4.6 MFI partners …………………………………………………………………… 131 
4.4.7 Payung Keluarga performance ………………………………………………… 133 
5  The methodological embedding ………….…………………………………….……………….. 135 
5.1 My double role as observing participant …………………………….…………………... 136 
5.2 Hypothesis and objectives of research ………………………………………………...… 139 
5.3 Methodological approach ……………………………………………………………..… 140 
5.3.1  Basic considerations …………………………………………………………… 140 
5.3.2  Research components and locations …………………………………………… 141 
5.3.3  Research challenges and their mitigation ……………………………………… 145 
5.3.4  Research advantages …………………………………………………………… 157 
5.4 Critical assessment of research methodology …………………………………………… 158 
6  Key data from the field ….……………………………………………………….……………… 162 
6.1 Key tables: Risk perception, risk management and payout usage ………………………. 162 
6.2 Four exemplary claims ………………………………………………………………….. 164 
6.2.1  Claim 1: Ibu Zakiyah ………………………………………………….……….. 164 
6.2.2  Claim 2: Haji Mustani …………………………………………………………. 165 
6.2.3  Claim 3: Pak Wahyu ………..……………………………………………….… 166 
6.2.4  Claim 4: Lulu Setiawan ………………………………………………………... 167 
7 Findings and discussion ………………………………………………………………….……… 168 
7.1  Customer profile ….…………………………..……………….………………………… 168 
7.2  Risk perception ………….……………………..……………….……………………….. 177 
7.3  Risk management ……….……………………………………………………………….. 180 
7.3.1  Evidence from the ex-ante customer component ………………………………. 180 
7.3.2  Evidence from beneficiaries ………………..………….………………………. 184 
7.3.3  Utilization and understanding of insurance …..………….…………………….. 185 
7.3.4  Risk management revisited …………………………………………………….. 189 
 
vii 
 
7.4  Impact on the insured ……………………….…………………………………………… 191 
7.4.1  Awareness of Payung Keluarga ……………………………………………….. 191 
7.4.2  Peace of mind ……………………………………………………...…………… 193 
7.4.3  Business risk affinity …………………………………………………………... 194 
7.4.4  Financial literacy ………………………………………………………………. 195 
7.4.5  Impact on the insured seen from an expanded asset-capital perspective ……… 197 
7.5  Customer satisfaction  ………………………………….…….……..………….……….. 198 
7.6  Beneficiary profile …………………….………………………………………………… 204 
7.7  Perceptions of death and the insurance payouts …………….…………………………... 207 
7.7.1  Perceptions of death …………………………………………………………… 208 
7.7.2  Perceptions of the insurance payout …………………………………………… 213 
7.8  The payout usage pattern explained ……….……………………………………………. 215 
7.8.1  Slametan and other funeral ceremonies ……………………………………….. 215 
7.8.2  Debt repayment …………………………………………………………..…… 224 
7.8.3  Business investment ………………………………………………...……..….. 227 
7.8.4  Savings / remaining money ………………………………………………….... 228 
7.8.5  Other usages …………………………………………………………………... 228 
7.9  Impact on beneficiaries ……………….………………………………………………... 229 
8 Conclusion and outlook ………………………..……………………………………………...... 232 
 
Annex 1: Used questionnaires ……………………………………………………………………………. 242 
Annex 2: Data and photos of respondents ………………………………………………………………. 257 
Annex 3: Examples of exchanges ………..……………………………………………………………….. 286 
Annex 4: Essay on malu and gengsi ……………………………………………………………………… 287 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 291 
List of tables ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 308 
List of illustrations ……………………………………………………………………….……....……….. 310 
List of photos ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 311 
Acronyms and abbreviations …………………………………………………………………………….. 314 
Glossary …………………………………………………………………………………………….……… 317 
Exchange Rate …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 320  
 
viii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my wife, children, and parents for their enduring support and 
patience. I also thank my tutors Prof. Susanne Schröter and Prof. Tilman Schiel as well as my 
initial tutor Prof. Bernhard Dahm for their continuous encouragement and indispensable ad-
vice. My biggest thanks also go to all participants of my field research in Indonesia. Without 
them this thesis would have remained nothing but white paper. As their names are far too 
many to mention here, I have taken the liberty to list them in annex 2.  
 
I am also much indebted to  
Jens Reisch of Allianz for incessantly supporting the establishment of microinsurance in In-
donesia against all odds;  
the management and staff of the MFI partners of Allianz for supporting my research and al-
lowing me to strain their resources; 
Daniel Weiss, Lilian Lau, Mario Wilhelm and Wulan Wulandari for their assistance in hedg-
ing and growing my principal object of research: Payung Keluarga; 
François-Xavier Hay, Gaby Ramm, John Wipf, Liz McGuinness, and Michael McCord for 
endearing me to microinsurance and teaching me a lot about it;  
Bambang Ismawan, Chialee Wong, Michael Anthony, Dr. Michael Hamp, Ralf Radermacher, 
and Prof. Rüdiger Korff for their input and advice;  
Prof. Dietmar Rothermund, Gerald Leppert, Prof. Hans Dieter Seibel, Niklas Reese, Dr. Pa-
trick Ziegenhain, and Dr. Rolf Jordan for providing much appreciated literature tips;  
Sabbir Patel of ICMIF for his encouragement and for giving me the opportunity to publish 
some of my preliminary findings;  
Dr. Shafiq Dhanani of MBK Ventura for granting me access to his unpublished data;  
Christine Anna and Yosephina Elliana for helping me to scratch the surface of the malu and 
gengsi mystery;  
Muhammad for “culturally” checking my questionnaires;  
Dinah Hirsch for proof-reading and polishing my bumpy English;  
Christa Gottinger for all kinds of practical help and spirited advice; 
and the staff of the University of Passau, especially the library staff for guarding and main-
taining excellent studying conditions.  
 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the turn of the Millennium microinsurance has received increasing attention from de-
velopment practitioners and academics. Mosley (2003: 143) sees microinsurance as “one of 
the potentially most poverty-reducing of all services.” Microinsurance is a financial service 
which offers modern formal insurance to low-asset families in developing countries. Next to 
microcredit and microsavings, microinsurance is one of the three main pillars of what has 
become known as “microfinance”. Not microinsurance but rather microcredit is certainly the 
best known of these three services, not the least since in 2006 Muhammad Yunus and his 
Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their microcredit program in Bangla-
desh. In fact, much of the public and academic discourse on microfinance concerns microcre-
dit alone. For many observers the terms are still synonymous. Although a large number of 
impact studies on microcredit have been published, the question if and how microcredit con-
tributes positively to poverty alleviation is still debated today (Armendariz and Morduch 
2005: 199-230; Meyer 2007: 231; Leeuw 20009; Roodmann 2009). In comparison, the dis-
cussion on the impact of microinsurance has just started. Available evidence from microinsur-
ance implementations is much scarcer than for microcredit (Young et al. 2006: 1; Dercon and 
Kirchberger 2008: 7-9). Moreover, just as in the case of microcredit the nascent discussion on 
the impact of microinsurance is dominated by economists whose prime focus is on broad 
quantitative field surveys and statistical analysis. A more holistic view on microinsurance and 
its potential social impacts has received far less attention. Little attention is also paid to the 
close connection of microinsurance to the general discourse on development. Today, academ-
ics and practitioners working on microinsurance are - with notable exceptions - not particular-
ly concerned with the idea of microinsurance as an agent of social change and its relation to 
the general development discourse, especially the critical side of it (cf. Sachs 1992).  
Turning to Indonesia, microinsurance is starting to make some inroads in Indonesia as well. In 
September 2006, German insurer Allianz launched Payung Keluarga (Indonesian for “Family 
Umbrella”), the first insurance product in Indonesia to be explicitly labeled as “microinsur-
ance”. Payung Keluarga was a life insurance that was automatically attached to microcredits 
provided by local microfinance institutions (MFI) which cooperated with Allianz. Because 
Payung Keluarga was obligatory, the debtors of the MFIs could not opt out. Every microloan 
had to be insured. In case of the death of the debtor due to any reason, Payung Keluarga 
waived the outstanding credit balance and in addition paid the beneficiary an additional 
payout of twice the original loan amount. Technically speaking, such a product is called an 
enhanced credit life insurance because the extra payouts represent an enhancement over stan-
dard credit life insurance which only covers the outstanding loan. The applied distribution 
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model was based on a partner-agent arrangement whereby Allianz acts as the partner and the 
MFIs as the agent.1
This thesis is concerned with the complex impact processes of Payung Keluarga, a product 
which I helped to develop, implement and administer as the responsible project manager for 
Allianz in Indonesia. If the focal point of this thesis is the impact of Payung Keluarga, the 
corresponding backdrop consists of two major components: (1) The emerging discourse on 
the effectiveness of microinsurance as a development tool, (2) and the local context in Indo-
nesia. Indonesian society is still held to be in a largely embedded state (Evers and Schrader 
1994a: 5; Schiel n.d.,b: 2-3). The concept of embeddedness was first proposed by Polanyi 
(1944) and refers to societies where the spheres of culture
 
2, religion, politics and especially 
economics are embedded and not segregated as they are in Western industrialized societies. 
Polanyi holds that in the course of the industrial revolution, Western societies have undergone 
a process of disembedding, especially of the economic sphere, in what he called “The Great 
Transformation” (Polanyi 1944). However, despite a comparably high level of embeddedness 
contemporary Indonesia is undergoing rapid change. This change is characterized by a range 
of simultaneous and intertwined processes of modernization: the spread of the market econo-
my, monetarization, industrialization, increasing integration into the global economy, migra-
tion, urbanization, education and the consequent upheavals and reorganization of social struc-
ture (Evers and Schiel 1988: 14; Hefner 1998a: 3; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 7, 8; Ford and 
Parker 2008: 8). Since the fall of the New Order regime of former president Suharto in 1998, 
democratization and decentralization can be added to this list of “mega-concepts”3
                                                 
1 Payung Keluarga is still sold today. But in early 2008 significant changes have been made. A takaful version 
compliant with Islamic law has been added, as well as optional coverage of the debtor’s spouse and other cover-
age options. Throughout this thesis, I only refer to the original “standard” version of Payung Keluarga. 
. Hüsken 
and Koning (2006: 25) therefore speak of “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’”. It is up for 
debate, however, if the Indonesian transformation towards modernity is inevitably leading to a 
disembedded state in the sense of Polanyi and to the secularization and individualization of 
society which Max Weber has strongly associated with modernization (Appelbaum and 
Chambliss 1997: 333). Several scholars on South-East Asia caution against such unilinear 
determinism (Evers and Schiel 1987; Evers and Schrader 1994a: 4; Hefner 1998a). Hefner 
(1998a: 26) points out that capitalism in South-East Asia is developing in distinct and loca-
lized ways. He argues that forecasts of capitalism’s secularizing and individualizing impact in 
the region are premature. Hefner also points to the religious revival that the region expe-
riences. With particular focus on Indonesia and Malaysia, Schröter (2007) describes the re-
islamization process which the two countries are currently undergoing. My own experience 
from four years of living, working and doing research in Indonesia only confirms the assertion 
2 I understand culture in a holistic conception as presented by Geertz (1957: 33-34) and widely held in sociology 
and anthropology, whereby culture refers to an ordered system of meanings and symbols, in the terms of which 
social interaction takes place. Culture lays the normative foundation for social interaction. This definition differs 
decidedly from the popular definition of culture in largely disembedded societies like European societies, where 
culture is more confined to the realm of arts, theater and music. 
3 The term is borrowed from Clifford Geertz (2000: 23). 
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of a distinctively localized form of transformation and the ongoing and all-encompassing in-
fluence of culture and religion on everyday life, including its economic sphere. 
The problem statement of this thesis can consequently be summarized as follows: “Indonesia 
is in an ongoing process of transformation and social change. Now, modern microinsurance 
steps onto the scene; and what happens? And why does it happen the way it does?” This prob-
lem statement indicates that my approach to microinsurance impact research distinguishes 
itself from the current economics-leaning mainstream in three ways: (1) It takes a decidedly 
holistic and social perspective, (2) it seeks to understand the dynamics of impact processes 
rather than to exactly measure them, and (3) I take a strongly localized approach. The corres-
ponding fieldwork methodology is best described as qualitative-explorative, although I have 
used both quantitative as well as qualitative methods of data collection. Results and analysis 
are presented in form of narrative with occasional recourses on descriptive statistics.  
Regarding the scientific contribution of this thesis, a major aspect to be named is that it 
represents the first detailed analysis of the realized impact of a formal microinsurance product 
in Indonesia.4
Although these key analytical concepts seem to mark this thesis as a work of sociology, I per-
sonally consider it firmly rooted in South-East Asian studies, the discipline in which I have 
received my academic training. As a typical area study, South-East Asian studies have an in-
herent predisposition for a localized, rather than a universal research approach. Not surpri-
singly then, advocates of South-East Asian studies insist on its multidisciplinary or interdis-
ciplinary character. In order to analyze local South-East Asian phenomena the field relies 
heavily on the transfer and adaption of concepts and methods developed by other, more estab-
lished disciplines of the social sciences which were, moreover, often developed for different, 
predominantly Western contexts (Halib and Huxley 1996: 5, 7). One renowned example is 
 A second distinguishing feature is my broad and contextualized approach. For 
this approach, I rely heavily on the concept of embeddedness, as well as on the closely related 
concepts of the moral economy (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976), reciprocity (Mauss 1954; Sah-
lins 1965; Platteau 1997; Hüsken and Koning 2006), and the traders’ dilemma (Evers et al. 
1991; Evers and Schrader 1994a). None of these concepts has ever been applied to impact 
research on formal microinsurance, although mention should be made that various authors 
have drawn on these concepts when discussing informal risk management arrangements, for 
example Scott (1976), Ravallion and Dearden (1988), and Platteau (1997). These concepts 
serve as tools to analyze the context in which Payung Keluarga operated. However, my core 
analytical framework to pinpoint actual impacts is a combination of an asset-based approach 
(Moser 1998; Heitzmann et al. 2002) with the more general understanding of economic and 
symbolic capital proposed by Bourdieu (1977; 1986). This framework, which I call the ex-
panded asset-capital framework, has never been applied to impact research on microinsur-
ance.  
                                                 
4 To date, I have published one academic article (Hintz 2010) and two journalistic articles (Hintz 2009a; Hintz 
2009b) that already present excerpts of my findings. Wilhelm (2009) hypothesizes on the possible social impacts 
of flood-microinsurance in Indonesia before (!) its implementation.  
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Scott’s (1976) application of the moral economy concept to explain the causes of South-East 
Asian peasant rebellions in the colonial period. Originally, the concept had been developed by 
the historian Thompson to explain food riots in 18th
Because of its heavy emphasis on localization, my impact research is first and foremost ex-
emplary. I do not claim representativeness for other microinsurance products, other distribu-
tion models (for example mutual insurance), and conditions in other countries. In fact, I need 
to limit the scope even further: I only investigated the impact of Payung Keluarga as an obli-
gatory microinsurance (as opposed to voluntary coverage) on a rather specific segment of 
Indonesian’s low-asset population, namely micro-debtors, who for the most part were Muslim 
petty trading women living in urban or semi-urban areas around Jakarta, and who were far 
from being destitute. Only for this specific context does this thesis claim representativeness 
and validity of results. However, I hold that my non-standard methodology and some of my 
more general findings do bear relevance for microinsurance impact research at large. I there-
fore hope that this thesis on impact may itself exert a positive impact, however small, on the 
emerging academic microinsurance discourse and ideally even on microinsurance practice. 
 century England (Thompson 1971). As 
many scholars have rightly pointed out, such concept transfer bears the risk of ethnocentrism 
and ‘orientalism’. Today, however, both Western and local scholars routinely acknowledge 
and try to avoid these risks (Halib and Huxley 1996: 6; Schröter 2000: 25), as do I. I therefore 
take the liberty to make flexible reference to concepts and publications from various academic 
disciplines - mainly economics, sociology, and ethnology - wherever they help to enlighten 
the specific local context and raw findings of my research.  
My aspiration for a meaningful scientific contribution is complemented by a second, equally 
powerful personal aspiration: Through my research I want to investigate the impact of my 
own work and thereby - if possible - legitimize it. As I was the main person responsible for 
the way Payung Keluarga was designed and implemented, I am also the main person respon-
sible for its intended and unintended impacts. Naturally, this creates a potential conflict of 
interest between my role as key decision maker and my role as an academic researcher. Se-
rious concerns regarding the required academic objectiveness and neutrality of my research 
are understandable and need to be addressed. A more comprehensive discussion of my role as 
an observing participant5
                                                 
5 The term is an inversion of the popular ethnological research method of “participant observation” which is 
described, among others, by Schweizer (1982: 24-25). I owe this fitting idea to Professor Schiel. 
 is given in the chapter on methodology (see section 5.1). At this 
point I merely put forward two of the arguments as to how I think this conflict of interest is 
sufficiently mitigated: (1) Firstly, there was no extrinsic demand for impact research on 
Payung Keluarga and therefore no pressure for legitimization towards third parties. Neither 
the media, which often reported on the project, nor the involved MFIs ever demanded proof 
that Payung Keluarga was really as helpful in poverty alleviation. On the contrary, the project 
faced a situation where the positive impact of microinsurance was generally taken as an a pri-
ori fact. I was left with my own doubts whether I was doing the right thing, and whether I was 
doing things right. (2) Secondly, the results of my impact research, which received no dedi-
cated financing from Allianz or another party, are sobering. Even if I had wanted to, they do 
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not serve to legitimize my past doing. They only serve as an encouragement to do things bet-
ter next time. 
If I describe my research findings as sobering, why is this so? This is because the develop-
mental expectations that Allianz and myself had pinned to Payung Keluarga were by and 
large not fulfilled: Payung Keluarga has not helped to manage the death risk of low-asset mi-
cro-debtors in Indonesia significantly better than before. More precisely, Payung Keluarga 
has substituted rather than complemented the heavily institutionalized traditional forms of 
mutual post-mortem assistance. It has even contributed to the ongoing inflation of funeral 
costs. The original main purpose of collective funeral financing to provide “subsistence insur-
ance” (Scott 1976: 5) to the community members is thus increasingly replaced by individua-
lized financing which can be used for status production. Payung Keluarga has thereby accele-
rated a longue dureé process of a shift of scales from balanced reciprocity towards general 
reciprocity. The social equality and solidarity that is so rigidly enforced by traditional ar-
rangements of mutual assistance is thereby further pushed towards a new social structure of 
increased social inequality. With reference to the employed expanded asset-capital frame-
work, economic and protective assets have improved little while symbolic capital has risen. 
Responsible for this unintended result was a lack of consideration for the socio-demographic, 
cultural and especially religious context during the planning and implementation of Payung 
Keluarga, in short, a lack of thick contextualization6
Although Payung Keluarga does not have the capacity to do so on its own, positively seen, a 
more comprehensive individual microinsurance coverage which provides more complete pro-
tection than Payung Keluarga can disentangle customers from the still existing grip of the 
moral economy. This would allow for more aggressive and accelerated accumulation of eco-
nomic capital (something the connected microcredits alone have not been able to do). On the 
other hand, the character of social cohesion is bound to change towards a more status con-
scious and exclusive direction. In addition to the increased status producing function of funer-
. Nonetheless, customer satisfaction was 
high and frequent demands for additional insurance products were raised by the insured. Not 
surprisingly, this demand was most salient for relatively modern risks that traditional informal 
arrangements had not had the time to adapt to effectively, namely costs for education and ma-
jor medical treatments. Because death risk appears to be already rather efficiently covered by 
existing traditional arrangements, Payung Keluarga can be said to have tackled the wrong 
risk. The key reason why customer satisfaction ran high despite such apparent developmental 
mis-targeting seems to be a general preference of customers for reliable and affordable indivi-
dualized arrangements over the financially demanding and complex social systems of mutual 
assistance. This stands in contrast with the Western tendency to romanticize such showings of 
collective help (Scott 1976: 5; Newberry 2007: 1303). In fact, the emic assessment of Payung 
Keluarga by the petty trading customers, beneficiaries and even the involved MFI staff was 
much more positive than my own critical stance. 
                                                 
6 I derive the term by borrowing from Clifford Geertz’ concept of “thick description” (Geertz 2000: 3) and trans-
ferring it from the observing level of the ethnological researcher to the operational level of the developmental 
actor. 
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als, this liberation from the bound of the moral economy is a second and more significant 
process where microinsurance may foster social inequality. In summary, what this thesis tries 
to show are the two sides of microinsurance: It can be fortunate for individual progress and at 
the same time deal a blow to social equality. This is especially likely in combination with mi-
crocredit. Such a combination can be seen as a double fortune or as a double blow. Under 
certain conditions (and naturally depending on the preferences of the observers) the fortune 
may outweigh the blow, or vice versa. However, in general I propose to describe this condi-
tion as the “double fortune / double blow” dilemma of microfinance. Whatever the exact bal-
ance of fortune and blow, microinsurance in Indonesia is clearly a development tool and an 
actor of social change. I contend that this holds true for other developmental contexts as well. 
To date, this role of microinsurance as an actor of social change has been realized and re-
searched too little. Besides, microinsurance has not been sufficiently integrated into a critical 
discourse on development, where - now that private insurance companies are also enlisted as 
promoters of a development agenda - it actually renders a prime example of the ever expand-
ing scope of development. Korff and Tigges Lizarazo (2008b: 3) denounce this process as the 
“totalization of development”, in line with Sachs’ general critique of development as an out-
dated, meaningless and self-interested cast of mind (Sachs 1992). 
If we now take a closer look at the title of the thesis, “micro-impact” assumes multiple mean-
ings. First of all, the term neutrally refers to the thesis’ principal concern with the impact of 
microinsurance. At the same time it already carries the notion that the intended developmental 
impact of Payung Keluarga was literally “micro”, and that microinsurance nonetheless has a 
certain ambivalent impact on social change. Compared to major transformational processes 
like migration and urbanization, the scale of this social impact can again be said to be “mi-
cro”. The fact that the impact process of Payung Keluarga was complex, despite the simplici-
ty of the product itself, results from the embedded and nonetheless changing environment in 
which the product operated. Therefore, in this thesis process does not refer to a linear and 
deterministic succession of events that could be neatly depicted in a schematic illustration. 
Instead, it refers to a conglomerate of intertwining preferences, reasoning and actions of vari-
ous involved persons within an embedded and dynamic context. This warrants a careful and 
contextualized deconstruction of this process based on the unique methodology briefly out-
lined above and described in more detail below (see chapter 5). 
Coming to the structure of the thesis, this structure itself borrows from the concept of embed-
dedness. In chapter 2, relevant concepts of the socio-theoretical embedding of the thesis are 
introduced such as embeddedness, moral economy, reciprocity, the traders’ dilemma and the 
expanded assets-capital framework. I also question common perspectives on poverty, human 
aspirations and rationality. Chapter 3 provides the developmental embedding by outlining 
general considerations on development and the state of the art of microfinance and microin-
surance, especially with regards to impact research. Chapter 4 contains the broad practical 
embedding. It describes “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’”, gives a brief overview on In-
donesia’s social security system and current microinsurance market, and lastly provides the 
background of the Payung Keluarga project. Chapter 5 completes the embedding of the thesis 
into its academic and practical context by outlining the applied research methodology. Here, I 
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discuss at length my double role as actor and researcher. Moreover, rather extensive note is 
made of the various challenges which I faced during my field work. Chapter 6 presents key 
data from the field such as the narrative of exemplary claim cases. At this stage, no interpreta-
tion or discussion is provided. This is to highlight how little meaning field data provides if it 
is not properly contextualized. Only the discussion of my research findings in Chapter 7 
brings the relevant concepts and the field data together. The communal slametan feast held at 
several occasions after death assumes a particular prominent role here. This is because, 
somewhat unexpectedly, the gradually changing pattern of the slametan and the related role of 
Payung Keluarga came to form a linchpin for my analysis. Lastly, chapter 8 summarizes the 
thesis and provides an outlook. It reprises many of the issues mentioned in this introduction. 
At this point I would like to explain two particular wordings that I use throughout the thesis. 
Firstly, I prefer the term “low-asset” to the more common terms “poor” or “low-income”. 
Firstly, this avoids the patronizing connotations implied when talking about ‘the poor’ (Dich-
ter 2007c: 182). Secondly, it semantically underlines that welfare does not only depend on 
one’s income, but on one’s broadly defined asset-base (Moser 1998: 14; 2007a). Secondly, I 
use the term “family” instead of “household”, although the latter is the quasi-standard in eco-
nomics and development literature. This is because I found the concept of the household, 
which connotes a clearly delineated and homogenous social unit, too limited for what I expe-
rienced during my research. I rather encountered broad social networks comprising close and 
distant relatives, neighbors and friends with loose and blurry boundaries as to who was a fam-
ily member and who was not. Even the delineation between individuals was sometimes un-
clear. During my research I faced several proxy respondents; that is, relatives who had natu-
rally and without any notice assumed the role of the person I actually wanted to interview but 
who, for whatever reason, was not present. These fluid boundaries between the individual, the 
family and the external social network have also been noted by various authors writing on 
Indonesia (Alexander 1998: 215; Lont 2000: 162, 165; Witoelar 2005: 21; Newberry 2007: 
1314; Ford and Parker 2008: 4).  
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2 THE SOCIO-THEORETICAL EMBEDDING 
2.1 On poverty and human aspirations 
Its most fervent proponents regard microfinance as a magic bullet to poverty alleviation. The 
majority of observers, however, take a more moderate stance and argue that under certain 
conditions and in combination with other means of development, microfinance can contribute 
to poverty alleviation (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 4; Mahajan 2007a: 197; Matin et al. 
2007: 23). Even particularly critical commentators do not question the poverty alleviation 
potential of microfinance. They rather remark that microfinance practice is far from perfect. 
Harper (2007a: 46), for example, speaks out against the still prevalent group-based methodol-
ogy in microlending and clearly considers the provision of financial services on an individua-
lized basis as the better alternative. Dichter (2007b: 2) cautions that too much focus on micro-
finance may create significant opportunity costs as other answers to poverty reduction get less 
attention. These perspectives, from optimistic to critical, make it clear that microinsurance - 
via microfinance - is conceptually tied to poverty and development.  
It seems worthwhile to step back for a moment and briefly consider two paradigms that more 
often implicitly than explicitly underlie analyses on poverty and development, and research on 
microfinance in particular. The first paradigm holds that poverty exists. The second paradigm 
holds that people continuously want to achieve ever higher levels of welfare. I do not doubt 
that poverty exists almost everywhere in today’s world. However, I consider poverty as so-
cially constructed. I also acknowledge that many people are indeed driven by an incessant 
urge to attain ever higher levels of welfare. Here, welfare represents the equally socially con-
structed antithesis of poverty. And just as I hold poverty and welfare to be socially con-
structed, so I hold the urge for ever higher welfare levels as equally socially constructed. It is 
not an ever-constant natural human trait. Moreover, I assert that this second paradigm is even 
less universally applicable than a concept of poverty. 
Let us consider poverty in more detail. Gerke (2002: 6) tells us that “until today there is no 
definition of poverty that is generally agreed upon”. Pyatt (1999: 54) adds that considering the 
quantity of available poverty definitions it may be advisable not to be too precise on the mat-
ter. One of the most widely known definitions of poverty is provided by the World Bank 
(1990:29): “Poverty [is, M.H.] the inability to attain minimal standards of living.” In 1990, the 
World Bank tied such minimal standards of living to the infamous international “one dollar a 
day” poverty line which referred to US$ 1 of consumption (not income!) per day per capita 
measured at purchasing-power-parity (PPP). In 2007, after a major reassessment the World 
Bank readjusted the international poverty line to US$ 1.25 PPP (Ravallion et al. 2008; Econ-
omist 2008). Most governments define national poverty lines to better reflect local conditions. 
The Indonesian government, for example, defines its national poverty line as the total expend-
iture needed to satisfy 2,100 calories per capita per day plus basic needs for clothing and shel-
ter (Gerke 2002: 9-10). In 2008, this amounted to an average poverty line of IDR 182,636 
(US$ 19.21) per capita per month. For urban areas, the poverty line was higher at IDR 
204,896 (US$ 21.55), and in rural areas lower at IDR 161,831 (US$ 17.02) (BPS 2009). De-
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spite this widespread tying of poverty to specific values of monetary consumption or income, 
poverty is nowadays commonly accepted as a multidimensional phenomenon. The Human 
Development Index (HDI), which UNDP introduced in 1997, reflects this wider concept of 
poverty. The HDI is based on the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen (1981; 
1999) and combines three dimensions of life, namely longevity, knowledge, and living stan-
dards. Moreover, it is generally recognized that:  
(1) poverty can be perceived and measured on absolute and on relative terms (cf. Sen 1999: 6, 
22),  
(2) poverty is essentially a personal, not a “household” matter, and often significant differenc-
es in poverty within families and between genders exist (Pyatt 1999: 54-55), 
(3) poverty can be either involuntary (or as I maintain, sometimes just an unreflected) state, 
but also an explicitly voluntary state, for example in the case of religiously motivated ascetic-
ism (Dt. Bischofskonferenz 1997: 15), 
(4) poverty, however defined, can be chronic or transient (Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Alwang 
et al. 2001: 30; Pritchett et al. 2002: 17-18). Poverty traps, often attributed to repetitive unin-
sured shocks, are identified as the main reason for chronic poverty (Geertz 1968; Scott 1976: 
14-15; Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Carter and Barren 2006), while at the level of transient poor, 
“poverty is simultaneously created and destroyed” (Krishna 2007: 69).  
What can be summarized is that seen from whatever perspective and based on whatever defi-
nition, poverty is generally associated with a state of lack or deficiency (Rahnema 1992: 159). 
Upon the realization that ‘the poor’ are in fact a fluid, non-static group, in recent years the 
discussion on poverty has increasingly incorporated the notion of vulnerability (Holzmann 
and Sipos 2008: 3). While poverty is widely regarded as a static concept, vulnerability is seen 
as its dynamic twin (Moser 2001: 361). Very generally speaking, vulnerability is the probabil-
ity of a family to remain in or to fall into a particular defined poverty (Alwang et al. 2001: 29; 
Chaudhuri et al. 2001: 1; Cohen and Young 2007: 209). Just as with poverty, the definition 
and measurement of vulnerability is contested (Heitzmann et al. 2002: 53). Despite the obses-
sion of many researchers with measurement - and therewith better controlling and contain-
ment - of poverty and vulnerability, I prefer to follow the recommendation of Pyatt (1999: 54) 
not to be too precise on the matter. 
I take the complexity of the poverty concept and its many suggested definitions as a strong 
indication that it is socially constructed. The understanding of poverty clearly depends on 
historical and cultural conditions (Scott 1976: 17; Krishna 2007: 66). Rahnema (1992: 159) 
points out that in medieval Europe the “pauper” held a socially respectable position and that 
the modern understanding of the “poor” as living in a pitiful and deprived state was still un-
known. It only came to the fore with the rise of the mercantile economy, the monetarization of 
society and the start of a massive urbanization drive. Rahnema (1992) also provides a striking 
anecdotal example of how the modern concept of poverty has gradually taken root in develop-
ing countries. He recounts how social activist Helena Norberg-Hodge found the notion of 
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poverty to be hardly known in the north Indian region of Ladakh in the 1970s. However, sev-
eral years later, local villagers there were asking for assistance to overcome their abject pover-
ty. Rahnema concludes:  
Poverty is . . . a myth, a construct and the invention of a particular civilization. . . . Global poverty 
is an entirely new and modern construct. (Rahnema 1992: 158, 161) 
Much of the spread and internationalization of the concept of poverty has to do with the 
spread of the ideas of development and under-development. The need to be exposed to certain 
concepts first before any understanding and realization of certain constructed realities such as 
poverty and under-development can develop is underlined by Esteva (1992): 
In order for someone to conceive the possibility of escaping from a particular condition, it is ne-
cessary first to feel that one has fallen into that condition. (Esteva 1992: 7) 
If poverty - and in the same line of thought the idea of development and under-development - 
is socially constructed, how about the second paradigm, the principal human strive to over-
come poverty and attain ever new heights of welfare? Here again, this strive depends on local 
conditions and local norms, that is on social construction (cf. Buss 1985: 35-36). In a subsis-
tence economy untouched by the ideas of development and modernization where poverty and 
welfare are not conceptualized, how can the idea of an incessant struggle for increasing wel-
fare be conceived? From Evans-Pritchard (1937) and many other successive scholars, for ex-
ample Foster (1973: 36) and Platteau (1997: 768), we learn that in contrast to Western socie-
ties, traditional peasant societies regard available resources as finite and unexpandable. There-
fore one person’s overt fortune automatically means the misfortune of other community 
members. Excessive and especially self-interested asset accumulation was therefore frowned 
upon and socially sanctioned. Heryanto (1999) states that such attitudes were widely held in 
Indonesia until the early 1990s and still bear relevance today. Anderson (1972: 7) points out 
that the Javanese, the largest and culturally most dominant of Indonesia’s over 300 ethnic 
groups, even considered immaterial resources such as power as finite and unexpandable. He 
also asserts that in traditional Javanese thought, money in itself was never to be the object of 
active pursuit (Anderson 1972: 41). In contemporary Indonesia, of course, the concept of po-
verty and eager pursuit of personal well-being are widely present, and what is more, often 
socially accepted. However, with my above comments I have tried to raise awareness that 
both such concepts are socially constructed. Moreover, I hold that in contemporary Indonesia, 
at least among the surveyed microinsurance customers, alternative concepts of what a good 
life means and how far human aspirations could and should go are still relevant. As I will out-
line further below (see section 4.2.7), I contend that while the insured MFI micro-debtors 
strive for a higher welfare level, they only do so up to a certain point. Upon attainment of 
such a more comfortable and socially still acceptable level, the commitment for further 
achievements subsides. This observation can be attributed to the still heavily embedded social 
structure and the still palpable sway of the moral economy, two concepts which I will outline 
in detail below. 
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2.2 The concept toolbox 
At the moment I had concluded my fieldwork and was seriously starting to analyze my field 
data, I came to appreciate the concepts of (1) embeddedness, (2) the moral economy, (3) reci-
procity, and (4) the traders’ dilemma as invaluable tools of analysis, although I had hardly 
considered them beforehand. The four concepts are closely related to each other. While I was 
trying to make sense of what I had experienced in the field, these concepts helped me to real-
ize that, if put into the proper socio-cultural context, the seemingly confusing perceptions and 
actions I had witnessed among microinsurance customers and beneficiaries indeed followed 
clear reasoning. Now I find it hard to discuss microinsurance in Indonesia without reference 
to these analytical tools. This is why I outline them here at the start, although chronologically 
my “discovery” of them occurred rather late in the research process.  
2.2.1 Embeddedness 
The concept of embeddedness was first proposed by economic historian Karl Polanyi (1944; 
Polanyi et al. 1957) and is strongly associated with the substantivist school in anthropology. 
Polanyi maintained that in non-Western pre-capitalist societies, the economic system was 
embedded in man’s social relationships. To Polanyi, “the economic system is, in effect, a 
mere function of social organization” (Polanyi and Dalton 1968: 12). Embeddedness in the 
sense of Polanyi can be described as a state where the political, cultural and economical 
spheres are forming a compact, non-segregated unity (Schiel n.d.,a: 4), where all economic 
actions are at the same time social actions and vice versa (Schiel n.d.,b: 2). Similar ideas had 
been proposed before, but not under the term of embeddedness. Mauss (1954), for example, 
describes what came to be known as embeddedness as “total social phenomena”:  
In these 'early' societies, social phenomena are not discrete; each phenomenon contains all the 
threads of which the social fabric is composed. In these total social phenomena, as we propose to 
call them, all kinds of institutions find simultaneous expression: religious, legal, moral, and eco-
nomic. (Mauss 1954: 1) 7
According to Polanyi, Western societies experienced the disembedding of the economic 
sphere during a period of rapid industrialization which, following Polanyi, lasted from 1815 
until 1914, and which led to the subordination of society to impersonal economic powers. 
Polanyi refers to this process as the “Great Transformation” (1944). Rather than remaining an 
instrument of society as a whole, with the “Great Transformation” the economy begins to set 
the terms of its own operation and to dominate other spheres in society. Alternatively, Rah-
nema calls this process the “economization of society” (Rahnema 2007: 162). Material self-
interest begins to reign supreme (Schrader 1994: 28; Hefner 1998a: 9). The misery, exploita-
tion and social upheavals that the consequent unrestricted sway of the laissez-faire industrial 
capitalism caused, provoked “protective countermoves that blunted the action of this self-
destructive mechanism” (Polanyi and Dalton 1968: 37). Such countermoves consisted for 
 
                                                 
7 The original French version of Mauss’ seminal work “The Gift” was published in 1925. 
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example of government led efforts such as welfare policies and labor legislation. However, 
Polanyi contended that also fascism can be seen as an extreme countermovement to the dis-
embedding of the economy, because fascism aimed for (re)gaining extreme social control 
(Polanyi and Dalton 1968: xii). A notable feature of the process of embeddedness-
disembeddedness-re-embeddedness is that man, where embedded conditions persist, primarily 
acts to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, and his social assets, not his individual 
interest in the possession of material goods (Polanyi and Dalton 1968: 7). In the disembedded 
state, however, the picture looks entirely different. Here, the pursuit of individual economic 
gain becomes the norm. This fits well to my earlier remarks that the character of human aspi-
rations depends on the historical and cultural context (cf. section 2.1). Aspirations and espe-
cially realized economic behavior can look entirely different depending on whether we deal 
with an embedded or disembedded situation. 
Polanyi’s ideas of embeddedness have not gone unchallenged. The fiercest critique was 
launched by formalists who, instead of Polanyi’s holistic and highly socialized view of the 
economy, held that economic behavior follows a set of formal rules of choice between alter-
native uses of scarce means (Schrader 1994: 29). Most relevant for our discussion, however, 
is the position of American sociologist Mark Granovetter (1985). He regards the views of 
Polanyi as being oversocialized and those of the formalist neo-classical economists as being 
undersocialized. Granovetter sees society neither constituted by homo socious nor by homo 
oeconomicus. He therefore asserts:  
The level of embeddedness of economic behavior is lower in nonmarket societies than is claimed 
by substantivists and development theorists, and it has changed less with ‘modernization’ than 
they believe; but I argue also that this level has always been and continues to be more substantial 
than is allowed for by formalists and economists. (Granovetter 1985: 482) 
Granovetter proposes to conceptualize embeddedness as a middle ground between a view of 
economic action as determined by cultural norms on the one hand and rational choice analys-
es of economic behavior on the other. Thereby the social and the economic sphere have a cer-
tain life of their own. Both are mutually dependent and each exerts influence on the other. In 
the embedded states of Polanyi the weight of the social sphere may be stronger while in dis-
embedded states the weight of the economic sphere becomes stronger. Neither however, loses 
its influence completely. Granovetter (1985) and later Hefner (1998a) translate this into a call 
for “sociocultural economics” (Hefner 1998a: 7). Because the respective objects of research, 
the economy and the social life, are in a state of embeddedness, economic and social research 
should combine accordingly.  
My research data from Indonesia does not have the depth and breadth to soundly favor either 
Polanyi’s or Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness. Personally, I hold that both have their 
merit, especially since both renounce the idea of man as a purely economically motivated be-
ing. I can definitely assert from my research on microinsured low-asset families that norms of 
culture and religion continue to exert a strong influence on people’s economic preferences and 
behavior. It is this notion of a particularly strong socio-cultural influence on the economic 
sphere that I understand as embeddedness in the context of my research. 
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The question arises whether under these conditions microinsurance belongs more to the social 
or to the economic sphere. While for disembedded societies, the placement points towards the 
economic sphere, in the case of Payung Keluarga social preference and reasoning were clear-
ly dominant among customers and beneficiaries. For Allianz and the cooperating MFIs the 
picture was more balanced. A second, more general question arises as well, namely how - 
seen on a macro-level - “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’” (Hüsken and Koning 2006: 25) 
is influencing the present state of embeddedness? Will this transformation lead to a disem-
bedded state along the lines described by Polanyi? And, when seen from the perspective of 
“modernization” advocates like Rostow (1960), will Indonesia follow the footsteps of West-
ern societies and undergo the same development from a pre-modern state of segmented agra-
rian communities towards a modern society largely governed by the regime of market capital-
ism (cf. Többe Gonçalves 2005: 26-32)? The fact that such trans-contextual parallelism is 
being put to serious doubts by numerous South-East Asian scholars has already been men-
tioned. A closer look at Indonesia’s current transformation and its possible consequences fol-
lows in section 4.1. On a more micro-level, the dynamics and prospects of embeddedness 
among the surveyed microinsurance customers will be discussed in chapter 7. As noted above, 
it is this micro-level analysis, not a macro-level analysis of transformation, which is the key 
concern of this thesis.  
2.2.2 Moral economy 
The socio-historical concept of the “moral economy” was developed by leftist English histo-
rian Edward Thompson (1971). Thompson used it to conceptualize the motives of food riots 
in 18th
A consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of 
several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral 
economy of the poor. (Thompson 1971: 79) 
-century England. Thompson defines the “moral economy” as follows:  
Thompson found that perceived violations to the norms and obligations of the moral econo-
my, on top of actual deprivation, were the trigger for the food riots he was analyzing. Scott 
(1976) has applied the same concept to peasant rebellions in colonial Burma and Vietnam. 
However, Scott classifies that active violence was only the ultimate measure taken, and only 
occurred under certain conducive conditions, and that furthermore such uprisings were not 
forward oriented but backward oriented (Scott 1976: 203); that is they were not revolutionary 
in the modern sense of the word but in the literal sense of the word as seeking to restore an 
original state. 
Granovetter (1985: 482), Moser (1998: 4), and Schiel (n.d.,b: 4) closely associate the moral 
economy with the concept of embeddedness. In fact, the moral economy can be said to be 
pervasive in embedded societies.8
                                                 
8 Despite their conceptual similarities, the respective epistemological background of the two concepts is differ-
ent: The moral economy is rooted in historical sociology where according to Thompson it forms the counterpart 
 Similar to the process of disembedding described by Po-
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lanyi, Thompson (1971: 136) also postulates the slow demise of the moral economy in line 
with the rise of the new political economy of the free market. Where embeddedness breaks 
down, so does the moral economy. The moral economy is - even more so than embeddedness 
- associated with poor and rural societies (Scott 1976; Moser 1998: 4; Ravallion and Dearden 
1988: 43). In his definition, Thompson himself speaks of the “moral economy of the poor 
[emphasis added]” (Thompson 1971: 79). However, as pointed out above, the definition of 
‘the poor’ can be wide and blurry (cf. section 2.1). And just as embeddedness does not fade as 
you enter the city gates, so I hold that the moral economy is relevant to urban areas, too. Due 
to the apparent symbiosis of embeddedness and moral economy I propose to speak of “em-
bedded moral societies”, which is short for “embedded moral-economic societies”. 
The primary objective of the moral economy is to enforce minimum social standards to permit 
every community member a historically and culturally dependent decent level of subsistence. 
Scott speaks of a “subsistence ethic” (Scott 1976: 4). Many authors even ascribe an ideology 
of egalitarianism and solidarity to the moral economy, although opinions differ as to how 
strictly egalitarian they are (Scott 1976; Bourdieu 1977: 180; Evers et al. 1991: 1; Platteau 
1997: 768; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 18). All, however, agree that the egalitarian ideology 
did not arise based on altruistic idealism but based on the sheer necessities of agrarian socie-
ties immersed in a subsistence economy (cf. Geertz 1968). This correlates well to Polanyi’s 
assertion that in embedded states, preoccupation is more with the preservation of one’s social 
standing and social assets, rather than with individual interest in material goods (Polanyi and 
Dalton 1968: 7; cf. section 2.2.1). 
Sahlins (1965: 164) notes that for the purpose of “chiefly redistribution” individuals could rise 
to rank and power; that is, central authorities were functional in organizing the egalitarian 
state of their followers. Consequently, the egalitarian thrust of the moral economy focuses 
more on material than immaterial goods. Leaders are obliged by the very norms of the moral 
economy to share much of their accumulated material wealth. They are also morally hindered 
to display self-interest in wealth, status, and power too overtly (Mauss 1954: 69-70; Anderson 
1972: 39; Scott 1976: 42). The good of the community had to be visibly put before the good 
of the individual. In line with this, Zacher (1988: 27) maintains that in regards to power, tradi-
tional societies are far from egalitarian. Especially with hindsight to Indonesia, I nonetheless 
like to conclude that in embedded moral societies there is a strong and morally charged ten-
dency towards social equality, especially concerning material goods, and that this tendency is 
footed on practical reasons of survival. The ideology of egalitarianism brings with it a strong 
emphasis on social harmony or, more precisely, communal harmony, which in Indonesia is 
known as rukun (Geertz 1962: 243; Magnis-Suseno 1981: 37-53). The communal aspect is 
important here. Two neighboring traditional communities may apply the same norms of the 
moral economy, but they represent separate ‘jurisdictions’. The ideology of egalitarianism 
                                                                                                                                                        
to the political economy in a class based social analysis; embeddedness on the other hand originates from histor-
ical economics. I am grateful to Professor Schiel for pointing this out to me. 
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does not apply to virtual or complete strangers. In this sense, the moral economy is not uni-
versal but concrete and case-specific. It depends on who is dealing with whom.  
The enforcement of the egalitarian tendency of embedded moral societies is functionally sup-
ported by a number of interdependent norms (which are therefore hard for me to put into a 
sequential order):  
(1) The input-output consequence is suppressed. In order to maintain rukun and to prevent 
more successful community members from making claims on a larger share of material re-
sources, and in turn to avoid accusations against the incapable or lazy, the input-output conse-
quence in individual productive action is suppressed. Greater or lesser efforts of labor do not 
influence the eventual satisfaction of needs, and are even considered as suspicious and ab-
normal (Bourdieu 1977: 162, 176; Zacher 1988: 28). This point was vividly brought home to 
me when an MFI manager in Bali complained that his microcredit customers would often 
focus more on the input, namely the loan itself, than plan and work for an optimal output. He 
also noted that over-average efforts would be considered as strange (aneh).9
(2) Fortune and misfortune are explained exogenously. In line with the disconnection of input 
and output, ‘sudden’ riches or misfortunes are not attributed to personal skills or faults and 
also not to coincidence, especially when they occur repetitively. Instead, metaphysical expla-
nations are used. In consequence, the sharing of ‘sudden’ fortunes, which Indonesians refer to 
as rezeki (cf. Lont 2000: 166), is necessary to move back to communal equality and a ba-
lanced cosmic order. The same applies to mutual assistance in case a misfortune befalls a 
community member (Platteau 1997: 768; Forshee 2006: 39).  
 Obviously, such 
suppression stifles technical innovation. On the other hand, microfinance exerts considerable 
pressure to uncover and acknowledge a clear input-output consequence. Notably, input-output 
suppression only relates to personal productive actions garnered towards individual asset-
accumulation. It does not relate to inputs given into the social system. Here, on the notion of 
balanced reciprocity, a clear and equal return from others for personal inputs is expected. 
(3) Personal asset accumulation is discouraged. Just as nobody is supposed to fall below a 
certain subsistence limit, in order to maintain social equality one should not rise too much 
above it either, especially in material terms. Therefore, planned and sustained asset accumula-
tion is discouraged. If notable accumulation occurs, a considerable sharing is required - just as 
in the case of rezeki - to appease the collective conscience and preserve rukun. There is a wide 
variety of opinions on how permissive traditional societies were of wealth accumulation. 
Bourdieu (1977: 180; 1986) argues for very tight restrictions on economic asset accumulation, 
which therefore leads to more disguised ways of asset accumulation, for example in power or 
education. Also Armendariz and Morduch (2005: 162-163), by referring to Platteau (2000), 
consider that embedded moral societies allow asset accumulation only up to a certain limit in 
order to keep everyone dependent on collective arrangements and to prevent wealthier com-
munity members from opting out. Evers (1993: 2) and Evers and Schrader (1994a: 14) con-
                                                 
9 Interview with I Nyoman Putra Sukasana, Microcredit Program Manager of WKP, in Bali on 24 May 2008. 
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sider the influence of the moral economy and its consequent subsistence orientations as so 
strong that standard labor market theory does not apply, which in turn implies severe limits to 
economic asset accumulation. Alexander (1998) takes a more permissive stance. She takes the 
strong presence of female petty traders in Javanese markets as an indication that traditional 
Javanese values were indeed compatible with economic success. Rather than moral restric-
tions she holds structural constraints responsible for the stagnation of most petty trade. With 
the help of the traders’ dilemma concept I will later argue why I cannot fully support this ar-
gument (see section 2.2.4). Sahlins (1965), Anderson (1972), Hefner (1998a: 28), and Schiel 
(n.d.,b: 8) all hold that accumulation of assets in embedded moral societies is permissible as 
long as at least partial redistribution occurs and an excessive self-interest cannot be discerned. 
This is the position I prefer to support as it has been very consistently observed. Note should 
be made that the Qur’an, presumably the highest moral authority for the 87 percent Muslim 
population in Indonesia, also prohibits excessive self-interest and instead makes generosity 
the moral norm (Bobzin 2001: 43). In short, asset accumulation is not easily achieved and 
legitimized in a moral economy. I hold that for these reasons the majority of people refrain 
from trying. I even assert that this opposition against self-interested asset appropriation has 
been deeply internalized into the habitus (to use Bourdieu’s famous concept) of low-asset 
families in embedded societies. This reverts back to my initial comments on human aspira-
tions as being socially constructed. Under the impact of the moral economy human aspirations 
may well reach as far as a safe and comfortable limit only, safe from destitution and safe from 
social sanctions on exceeding the socially accepted asset limit.  
(4) Assets are considered limited. Material assets, or resources, may certainly have come to be 
regarded as limited in embedded moral societies because they were in fact objectively limited. 
But at least to some extent the idea of finite assets also makes functional sense because it legi-
timizes the reproach against asset accumulation. If an increase of assets for some community 
members automatically means fewer assets for other community members, discontent is sure 
to follow unless carefully managed power differentials and generosity can maintain the notion 
of justice (Anderson 1972; Foster 1973: 36). Also the call for the distribution of spoils of re-
zeki can be legitimized this way.  
Something should also be said about the dynamics of the moral economy. Although in the 
dichotomy of tradition and modernity, tradition is often constructed and displayed as static 
and modernity as dynamic, we should guard ourselves against considering traditional norms 
as completely unchanging (Schiel 1985: 13; Matis and Bachinger 2004). Life changes and so 
do norms. Nonetheless, processes of change in embedded moral societies are slow. The idea 
of maintaining social equality and the consequent suppression of innovation do not lend them-
selves well to rapid and potentially destabilizing changes (Geertz 1968). Bourdieu (1977: 162) 
even asserts a strong adversity to change. Menike (1993) reminds us of the contemporary re-
levance of such adversity when she comments that the comparably short time frames of mod-
ern development projects and the pressure to deliver quick and tangible results can be stress-
ful for ‘project beneficiaries’ who are used to much slower longue durée changes, and, as 
some say, to a rather cyclical rhythm of time (cf. Anderson 1972: 19-20). Zacher (1988: 29) 
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contends that modern development usually overstrains the adaptive capacity, or resilience, of 
‘old rules’.  
As embedded moral societies move forward slowly and with a strong subsistence orientation 
and egalitarian tendency, the entire system can be conceptualized as nothing different but - to 
use Mauss’ terminology - a ‘total’ collective risk management mechanism, a description that 
bears a close resemblance to Scott’s “subsistence insurance” (Scott 1976: 5). This helps to 
enlighten more holistically than standard economic perspectives why low-asset people in de-
veloping countries (most of whom I consider to still being influenced to some extent by a 
moral economy) are said to be risk averse. Holzmann et al. (2003) give a prime example of 
such standard economic explanations when they outline the rationale behind the Social Risk 
Management Framework (SRM) which the World Bank introduced in 2001 (World Bank 
2001):  
The basic thrust of the SRM framework is based on two important assessments: (i) The poor are 
typically most exposed to diverse risks ranging from natural (such as earthquake and flooding) to 
manmade (such as war and inflation), from health (such as illness) to political risks (such as dis-
crimination), and (ii) the poor have the fewest instruments to deal with these risks (such as access 
to government provided income support and market-based instruments like insurance). These as-
sessments have important consequences: (i) the poor are the most vulnerable in society as shocks 
are likely to have the strongest welfare consequences for them. For welfare reasons, therefore, they 
should have increased access to SRM instruments; and (ii) the high vulnerability makes them risk 
averse and thus unable or unwilling to engage in higher risk/higher return activities. Access to 
SRM instruments would allow the poor more risk-taking and thus provide them with an opportuni-
ty to gradually move out of poverty. Hence providing risk management instruments to individuals, 
and in particular to the poor, is both an end as well as a means to development. (Holzmann et al. 
2003: 5). 
Roth (2001: 25) reasons even more bluntly why low-asset people are risk averse: “It is often 
the case that when one has very little, one becomes very careful with the little that one has.” 
Such explanations rightly identify a correlation between high risk exposure, limited assets and 
being risk averse. To their credit it should also be mentioned that Holzmann, Roth and practi-
cally all others who argue along the same line of thought are well aware that informal risk 
management mechanisms exist, and even clamor for their preservation, although they consid-
er them insufficient, particularly in the face of large-scale shocks (Alwang et al. 2001: 19; 
Holzmann et al. 2003: 3, 6; Dercon 2005a: 5; Cohen and Young 2007; Heydel et al. 2009: 1). 
Nonetheless, such scarcity focused explanations fall short of integrating two additional points 
brought home by the moral economy concept: (1) Low-asset people have very elaborate risk 
management tools and the resources mobilized to cope even with large scale risks should not 
be underestimated (cf. Wilhelm 2009). In fact, the entire social structure of embedded moral 
societies, albeit under heavy transformational pressure, is geared towards the management of 
risks. (2) A great deal of risk averseness is not caused by having too few assets but also for 
fear of having too many. The latter constitutes the premium paid for the social guarantee of 
subsistence. The threat from below (falling into destitution) is complemented by a threat from 
above (raising suspicions and risking social sanctions). Moral and economic conditions both 
conspire against asset accumulation. Neutralizing just one of the two may not be enough to 
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switch into risk affine gear. Consequently, giving microcredit to low-asset people (entrepre-
neurial skills assumed) does not necessarily unleash frantic profit-maximizing investments 
and significant business expansion. This is what the MFI manager in Bali was struggling with. 
To facilitate this, a ‘moral economy of self-interest’ would have to be created first. The provi-
sion of comprehensive individual risk coverage would have to be an integral part of it because 
only then would the moral economy have outlived its purpose of providing collective “subsis-
tence insurance”. This leads to the conclusion that microcredit may only unfold its full deve-
lopmental potential if it is backed up by comprehensive microinsurance (or formal social se-
curity for that matter). As long as the moral economy continues to exert some influence, it 
should not surprise MFI managers that their customers cannot but divert much of the business 
related microcredits they receive to non-business purposes. The requirements of the moral 
economy have to be fulfilled first to legitimize economic investment. For the same reason, 
business profits are continually being siphoned off and invested in other areas, as Alexander 
(1998: 216) notes in her study on Javanese markets, albeit missing out on the moral obliga-
tions underlying this behavior. I believe that much of our surprise as researchers, development 
experts and microfinance practitioners stems from the fact that we, with our middle-class and 
highly educated background, apply a Western “frame of reference” to the phenomenon rather 
than fathoming the depth and breadth of the local moral economy. Personally, I was initially 
perplexed as to why the surveyed microcredit cum microinsurance customers and their bene-
ficiaries behaved as ‘uneconomically’ as they did; and I still cannot claim to have decon-
structed and understood the relevant socio-cultural setting completely, if this is ever possible 
(cf. Geertz 2000: 7; cf. Schröter 2000: 27, 30).  
2.2.3 Reciprocity and other modes of exchange 
What is easy to recognize even for the more perplexed observer of embedded moral econo-
mies is the importance of reciprocity and other modes of exchange. Polanyi (Dalton and Po-
lanyi 1968) and others (Mauss 1954: 1; Sahlins 1974: 183; Scott 1976: 176; Schiel 1994: 16) 
have noted a strong connection between embeddedness and reciprocity. In fact, norms of reci-
procity can be regarded as a core pillar in the social structure of embedded moral societies. 
Scott (1976: 176) describes reciprocity “as the central moral formula for interpersonal con-
duct” in embedded moral societies. Gouldner (1960) supports this claim at the universality of 
reciprocity as a fundamental norm: 
The norm of reciprocity may be conceived of as a dimension to be found in all value systems and, 
in particular, as one among a number of ‘Principal Components’ universally present in moral 
codes. (Gouldner 1960: 171) 
Just as the moral economy at large serves risk management purposes, so does reciprocity in 
particular. The academic break-through of the concept of reciprocity is widely attributed to 
French sociologist and ethnologist Marcel Mauss (1925), although other scholars have been 
concerned with systems of reciprocal exchanges before him, for example Malinowski (1922, 
reprint 1987). Mauss’ seminal work “The Gift” was originally published in French in 1925 
(English in 1954). Therein he analyzes the processes of exchange and the process of reciproc-
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al gift-giving in particular within the context of traditional societies. Mauss identifies a three-
staged process consisting of the obligation to give, the obligation to receive and the obligation 
to make a counter gift (1954: 37-41). Most important is his identification of gifts as obligatory 
instead of voluntary. He states:  
In . . . many . . . civilizations contracts are fulfilled and exchanges of goods are made by means of 
gifts. In theory such gifts are voluntary but in fact they are given and repaid under obligation. 
(Mauss 1954: 1). 
The details of the gift-giving process and its related obligations are governed by the particular 
cultural norms of the respective society. However, just like Sahlins and Gouldner after him, 
Mauss nonetheless contends that the basic principle that gifts create obligations is universal.  
In short, every gift creates a debt for the recipient and, as Robinson (2001: 244) rightly adds, a 
saving for the giver. Furthermore, Mauss (1954: 71, 72) contends that gifts are never free of 
self-interest. This assertion is later supported by other authors such as Sahlins (1974: 180) and 
especially Bourdieu (1977: 173). To Mauss, even Malinowski’s ‘pure’ gifts (Malinwoski 
1987: 177), such as gifts given among spouses, are to some extent imbued with self-interest 
(Mauss 1954: 71), and so are charity and act of generosity. Mauss explains charity to be dri-
ven by the moral obligation not to appear selfish and greedy in a society where excessive 
wealth and individual happiness are held to draw a vengeance from spiritual forces. Charity 
therefore contributes to maintain the minimum balance of justice in a society. Generosity on 
the other hand, such as displayed in lavish feasts, is essentially status creating and status 
maintaining (Mauss 1954: 15-16, 41, 72), which is another of many assertions adopted and 
furthered by later authors, for example Bourdieu (1977: 192). Notably, Mauss’ groundbreak-
ing thoughts on exchange have continued to fascinate scholars of anthropology and ethnology 
and led to further diversification and specifications of the concept of exchange (cf. Hüsken 
and Koning 2006: 16). 
Reminiscent of Mauss, Polanyi classifies three forms of exchange: reciprocity, redistribution 
and market-exchange (Polanyi and Dalton 1968). Polanyi defines reciprocity as obligatory 
gift-giving between kin and friends, and redistribution as obligatory payments to a central 
political or religious authority, which uses the receipts for (1) its own maintenance, (2) to pro-
vide community services, and (3) as an emergency stock in case of individual or community 
disaster. For Polanyi, reciprocity and redistribution are socio-economic transactional modes 
and the dominant forms of exchange in embedded societies. Market exchange, on the other 
hand, dominates in disembedded societies and differs from reciprocity and redistribution in 
that it is not an expression of social obligations. This makes it appear especially economic 
(Polanyi and Dalton 1968: xii, xiv). Sahlins (1965), departing from Gouldner (1960), provides 
an even more nuanced classification. He subdivides reciprocity into general, balanced and 
negative reciprocity (Sahlins 1965: 147-149). General reciprocity designates transactions 
which are putatively altruistic such as Malinowski’s ‘pure’ gift or the care of parents given to 
their children. Such acts are not explicitly accounted for and create no counter-obligation. 
This does not mean, however, that a return may not be implicitly expected in the distant fu-
ture. Such return, however, may take whatever form, does not need to be matching and is only 
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appropriate if conditions allow for it. Sahlins also considers the relationship between assis-
tance given today and assistance returned much later - if possible and necessary - as ex-
changes of general reciprocity. To Sahlins, traditional mutual assistance arrangements would 
therefore be exchanges of general reciprocity; a conclusion, which I would like to challenge in 
a moment. According to Sahlins, balanced reciprocity takes the middle ground between gen-
eral and negative reciprocity (cheating, chicanery, theft). It also takes a middle ground be-
tween social and the economic interests. Ideally, in balanced transactions accounts are evened 
immediately or within a short time-frame. The counter-obligation is not left unfulfilled for 
long, and the value of the return has to match the value of the initial prestation. Here, it is im-
portant to note that transactions of general and balanced reciprocity are usually understood as 
non-monetary transactions, where goods and services in the broadest sense are exchanged for 
other goods and services without the intermediation of money. This does not mean that mone-
tary prestations such as the parents’ financing of their child’s university studies cannot be 
subject to the rules of balanced or generalized reciprocity. In the sense of Sahlins, monetary 
market exchanges can be seen as the strictest form of balanced exchange,10
Regarding redistribution, Sahlins defines redistribution as a “collection from members of a 
group, often under one hand, and redivision within this group.” (1965: 141). For Sahlins, redi-
stribution is pooling that can assume large scales. Moreover, he regards redistribution as “a 
system of reciprocities” (1965: 141) which I take to understand as an aggregate of reciproci-
ties, or, more precisely, an aggregate of generalized reciprocities. The boundaries between 
generalized reciprocity and redistribution are therefore fluent (Sahlins 1965: 163; Spicker 
2003: 6). Sahlins’ understanding of redistribution closely resembles Polanyi’s. The difference 
relevant to our discussion is that he strongly, but not as exclusively as Polanyi, attaches redi-
stribution to a central political or religious power. This opens the door for insurance as a non-
political, non-religious instrument to be considered in the context of reciprocity and redistri-
bution, a question to which I will return in a moment.  
 although he insists 
that however strong the utilitarian value of a balanced exchange is, there is also always a 
‘moral’ purpose to it (1965: 175). Sahlins adds another twist to balanced reciprocity in that he 
emphasizes that (in the absence of money as an intermediary) the accounts in a balanced 
transaction are only getting close to even, but are never exactly equivalent. He uses bride 
prices as an example where women move against hoes or cattle, goods of exchange which can 
hardly be called perfectly comparable. A “shadow of indebtedness” therefore remains and is 
socially endorsed (1965: 177). Otherwise balanced reciprocity would tend towards self-
liquidation. Long term arrangements such as the Indonesian slametan or other “rotating com-
munalism patterns”, as Geertz (1962: 245) calls them, could not function properly. At a tradi-
tional slametan for example, the visitors help with food preparation, give moral support, and 
hold prayers in return for a lavish meal (Muhaimin 1995: 137). This constitutes an immediate 
balanced reciprocity of labor and services in return for food, and would, if a “shadow of in-
debtedness” would not remain, not necessitate the assistance of the original slametan holder at 
a future slametan of any of the participants. 
                                                 
10 I am grateful to Professor Schiel for pointing this out to me. 
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As we have already moved from Mauss over Polanyi to Sahlins, we even need to take a fur-
ther step to arrive at the concept of reciprocity and redistribution that I would like to employ 
for the further discussion. Firstly, Hüsken and Koning (2006: 16), who analyze local ways of 
managing insecurities in Indonesia, expand on the time dimension of reciprocity in that they 
propose the idea of “indirect balanced reciprocity”. Indirect balanced reciprocity means that 
the expected balancing of accounts does not necessarily have to take place over the short-
term, as Sahlins maintains, but can be postponed into a distant future. Koning (2006: 29, 50) 
consequently regards traditional forms of collective assistance arrangements in Indonesia, 
such as gotong royong (mutual assistance, doing things together), sumbangan (contribution) 
and bawon (harvest share), as transactions of indirect balanced reciprocity, while according to 
Sahlins’ definitions they would have to be described as general reciprocity. Koning and 
Hüsken do not only base this diversion from, or rather this further specification of Sahlins’ 
exchange concepts on their own research in Indonesia but also on a seminal work by Platteau 
(1997). In his research on communities of Senegalese fishermen Platteau found their so-called 
informal insurance or risk-sharing arrangements to be both heavily institutionalized and based 
on (indirect) balanced reciprocity:  
When they enter into such arrangements members of these communities are guided by a principle 
of balanced reciprocity (they expect a return from any contribution or payment they make) rather 
than by a true logic of mutual insurance. More precisely, they do not conceive of insurance as a 
game where there are winners and losers and where income is redistributed between lucky and un-
lucky individuals. (Platteau 1997: 764) 
Platteau found the same concept to be prevalent among slum dwellers in Nairobi and there-
fore asserts that (indirect) balanced reciprocity is the pervasive norm in traditional societies. 
However, Platteau softens his stance somewhat in that he understands balanced reciprocity in 
a rather loose sense allowing, not unlike Sahlins, for some discrepancy to arise between gifts 
and counter-gifts (1997: 770, 782, 785). I indeed prefer the position of Platteau (1997) and 
Hüsken and Koning (2006) over Sahlins’. This is because (and here I have to foreclose some 
of my more specific research results) the question of a premium refund at contract end in case 
of ‘non-usage’ of Payung Keluarga, that is, in the absence of a claim, was in fact the most 
frequently asked customer question. This is a clear expression of the customers’ expectation 
of a return from any contribution or payment they make, especially because the premium it-
self was not perceived as expensive. It was a question of principle rather than a question of 
economic need. 
Spicker (2003) adds a last specification to the concept of exchange. He outlines that in reci-
procity, or generalized exchange, as he calls it, the recipient of the return gift does not neces-
sarily have to be identical with the original giver:  
In generalised exchange, the people to whom a return is made are not necessarily those who have 
contributed, and the people who receive are not necessarily those who have given. The circle of 
exchange does not have to be completed. (Spicker 2003: 2) 
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He uses family care as an example where direct reciprocity (original giver is recipient of 
counter-gift) and generalized reciprocity (original giver does not have to be same as recipient 
of counter-gift) are closely interwoven:  
People are responsible for the care of their elderly relatives both because of direct reciprocity, and 
because of a generalised obligation because the old people cared for their parents before them. 
They have an obligation to look after children - and, even, in some views, to have children because 
their parents looked after them. Once more, however, these relationships are complicated by other 
factors and other norms. (Spicker 2003: 4). 
This quotation again indicates how reciprocity is always cast into a moral framework, and, as 
Gouldner (1960: 170) already noted, constitutes only one of several principal norms that in-
fluence human actions and transactions. 
In summary, if we speak of exchanges, three classifying variables seem to be of particular 
importance: (1) the type of exchange, (2) the timing of the counter-gift, and (3) the recipient 
of the counter gift. Table 1 summarizes the various combinations of these variables. 
Table 1: Classification of exchanges 
Type of exchange Timing of counter-gift Recipient of counter-gift 
Reciprocity     
    Negative direct or indirect direct 
    Balanced direct or indirect direct or indirect 
    General indirect only direct or indirect 
Redistribution direct or indirect largely indirect, only condi-
tionally direct 
Market direct or indirect direct or indirect 
 
Examples for each combination are provided in annex 3. Here, I limit myself to two examples 
only: An example for an exchange of negative reciprocity with indirect timing and direct reci-
pient would be a false marriage entered into by the spouse with fewer assets with the goal of a 
later profitable divorce. The second example is more intricate and shows how market-
exchanges are used to fulfill the norms of general reciprocity: Here, a grown-up child pays for 
a professional nursing service to provide care for his elderly parent. The child does this in 
order to make up for the child rearing provided by the parent much earlier, which makes for a 
case of general reciprocity of indirect timing and with a direct recipient. However, following 
Spicker (2003), this will also obligate the child to take care of the grand-children, which 
makes the grand-children indirect recipients of the counter-gift for the original child rearing 
between parent and child. And thus this chain of interwoven general reciprocities of direct and 
indirect recipients is perpetuated. The involvement of a professional nursing service adds a 
market exchange to the picture. This market exchanges is characterized by direct timing 
(payment and delivery of nursing service occur more or less simultaneously) and by the par-
ent as an indirect recipient of the counter-gift, which is of course no longer a gift but a formal 
debt. Correspondingly, Schiel (1994: 17) notes that the dividing lines between gift and debt 
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are rather blurry. It also needs to be noted that each of the various presented classifications of 
exchange represents in fact an idealtypus in the sense of Max Weber (1988: 191), namely an 
exaggerated, simplified and idealized reflection of a complex social phenomenon, which does 
not occur in such pure form in the social reality. Accordingly, Sahlins speaks of reciprocity as 
a “continuum of forms” (1965: 144). As our second example illustrates, even multiple forms 
of exchange can intertwine. It is therefore often difficult to discern what kinds of single or 
multiple types of exchange we are really dealing with. 
Generally, the applied type of exchange depends on social distance, which in traditional socie-
ties is often equivalent to spatial distance. The closer the social and spatial distance, the more 
we see general reciprocity. General reciprocity is particularly dominant within the family and 
the immediate social network. Balanced reciprocity is more salient in dealings with distant 
relatives or unrelated community members. Negative reciprocity is most likely to occur in 
exchanges with complete strangers from outside the community (Sahlins 1965: 144; Bourdieu 
1977: 173-174). The cheating of a kin is not accepted, but the cheating of a stranger may well 
be. As in the case of the moral economy in general, in traditional societies, the moral stan-
dards applied to exchanges are therefore not universal but concrete.  
Sahlins (1965) and Bourdieu (1977) note the special role that trade plays in this interplay of 
social distance and reciprocity. Trade can overcome the spatial boundaries connected to social 
distance. For example, informal long-distance trade strongly depends on balanced reciprocity 
or even market-based exchanges. In fact, trade is best done with relative strangers because the 
exchanges can assume a more calculating and economic character (Bourdieu 1977: 173; Kon-
ing 2006: 39). However, traditional market exchanges cannot do without at least a limited 
showing of general reciprocity. The occasional generous gift helps to integrate a basically 
balanced trading relationship into a long-term social relationships, into a “good faith econo-
my” as Bourdieu calls it (1977: 173). Gouldner (1960: 176-177) and Sahlins (1965: 161) re-
gard gifts as the ideal “starting mechanism” to initiate social relations, not the least relations 
of trade: “If friends make gifts, gifts make friends” (Sahlins 1965: 139). Generous gifts in 
trading relationships serve to mitigate the risk of negative reciprocity. They create a moral 
obligation to reciprocate on equal or even better terms. Evers and Schrader (1994b: 64) cap-
ture this well in saying that “trust is costly, but lack of trust is even more so.” I argue that 
much of the above still holds true even in highly globalized and formalized modern market 
economies. Notion should also be made that general reciprocity is not only capable of foster-
ing trade relationships with external parties, but that within a group, generosity creates leader-
ship. The greater the generosity shown the smaller is the likelihood that the respective reci-
pients can live up to their counter-obligation and the more they remain indebted to the bene-
factor. In this sense, Bourdieu (1977: 195) concludes that “giving is also a way of possess-
ing.” Strongly connected to this status creating function of general reciprocity is its inflatio-
nary tendency. Already Mauss notes that general reciprocity, accumulated to redistribution, 
has a strong inflationary drive when used in showings of status. As he describes the redistri-
butive potlatch ritual, Mauss (1954: 40) maintains that “normally the potlatch must be re-
turned with interest like all other gifts. The interest is generally between 30 and 100 per cent a 
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year.” Also Schrader (1994: 38) attests to this tendency, as does Haar (1948) when he writes 
on adat (traditional law) in Indonesia:  
An over-balance accrues to the advantage of the person who gives more than he receives. There-
fore, giving more than you receive comes to be a desire, a duty, or even an act of preservation of 
your own respectability. (Haar 1948: 131) 
Price inflation is only kept in check by the scarcity of valuables (Schrader 1994: 38). Under 
scarce conditions (duly acknowledging that the idea of scarcity is constructed), common 
people of traditional societies are more concerned with the maintenance of their carefully ba-
lanced assistance systems for their own “subsistence insurance” (Scott 1976: 5), rather than 
with status production. However, for those who have the means to show generosity, such as 
the leading political figures, generosity becomes ever more important the more they are able 
to show it. General reciprocity therefore increases with social inequality and vice versa. Sah-
lins (1965: 165) speaks of a certain richesse oblige, namely that the rich are morally obligated 
to assist relatives and community members in need. In that sense, even when occupied with 
status production, the wealthier community members of traditional societies are still tied to 
the rules of the moral economy. This means that, as noted above, excessive and self-interested 
asset accumulation is frowned upon and socially sanctioned, especially regarding material 
assets (cf. Scott 1976: 41). 
So far, the discussion has focused on exchanges between humans. In embedded societies, 
where religion is not separated from the economic sphere, exchanges have a strong spiritual 
element as well. Exchanges work on a horizontal axis between humans as well as on a vertical 
axis towards the spiritual realm. A first indication is the already stated example of the slame-
tan visitors who offer prayers and receive food in return. Mauss (1954) goes even further:  
Among the first groups of beings with whom men must have made contracts were the spirits of the 
dead and the gods. They in fact are the real owners of the world's wealth. . . . Sacrificial destruc-
tion implies giving something that is to be repaid. . . . This is expressed typically by the Toradja of 
the Celebes. Kruyt tells us that the 'owner' can 'buy' from the spirits the right to do certain things 
with his or rather 'their' property. (Mauss 1954: 13-14, referring to Kruyt 1923) 
Based on the Maori exchange customs that he has analyzed, Mauss (1954: 8-10) even assigns 
a spiritual life to the gifted items themselves. In a similar line of thought, Bourdieu refers to 
the subjective and personalized character of arable land when he reports on the Muslim Ka-
byle in Algeria:  
The land is never treated as a raw material to be exploited, but always as the object of respect 
mixed with fear (elhiba): it will ‘settle its scores’, they say, and take revenge for the bad treatment 
it receives from a clumsy or over-hasty farmer. . . . ‘Give to the earth and the earth will give to 
you’, says a proverb. This can be taken to mean that in obedience to the logic of gift exchange, na-
ture bestows its bounty only on those who bring it their care as a tribute. (Bourdieu 1977: 175) 
Sahlins (1974: 156), however, criticizes Mauss’ analysis of Maori exchange customs, and 
doubts that there is anything particularly spiritual about them. Also on a general level, Sahlins 
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questions the spiritual component of reciprocity and suggests a more rational and secular ap-
proach:  
Since Mauss, and in part by way of rapprochement with modern economics, anthropology has be-
come more consistently rational in its treatment of exchange. Reciprocity is contract pure and 
mainly secular, sanctioned perhaps by a mixture of considerations of which a carefully calculated 
self-interest is not the least. (Sahlins 1974: 180) 
Therefore, seen from an etic perspective, the spirituality of exchange may well be interpreted 
as a vehicle and disguise for worldly pursuits. The question is a tricky one and I refrain from 
delving too deeply into it. What I can certainly contend based on my observations in Indone-
sia is that seen from an emic perspective the vertical spiritual axis is definitely important. Al-
though it is a well-known sociological perspective that religions are not decreed by God but 
socially constructed by human beings to fulfill certain human needs (Appelbaum and Cham-
bliss 1997: 331), this disenchanted perspective was certainly not consciously reflected by the 
interviewed Payung Keluarga customers and beneficiaries. Even if much of the autochthon-
ous spirit beliefs in Indonesia have been supplanted by Islam, this world religion asserts a 
different, but no less strong existence of spiritual reciprocity. Mauss (1954) and Bobzin 
(2001: 42) underline this point. Mauss refers to Sura 64:  
The famous Sura LXIV, 'Mutual Deception', given at Mecca to Mohammed, says: 15. Your pos-
sessions and your children are only a trial and Allah it is with whom is a great reward. 16. There-
fore be careful [of your duty to] Allah as much as you can, and hear and obey and spend (sadaqa), 
it is better for your souls; and whoever is saved from the greediness of his soul, these it is that are 
the successful. (Mauss 1954: 75) 
In fact, throughout the Qur’an the idea is constantly promoted that good deeds, good faith 
exchanges and even more so charity will be rewarded by worldly and even greater - and clear-
ly inflationary - after-worldly benefits.11 Just as frequent are the admonishments which the 
Qur’an gives on the divine retribution should a man engage in acts of selfishness and negative 
reciprocity.12
A last point to be made on reciprocity is that the norms that govern balanced, maintenance 
oriented reciprocity and general, status oriented reciprocity, are not necessarily liked by eve-
 Not surprisingly then, the giving of alms as the religiously sanctioned obligation 
for general reciprocity is one of the five pillars of Islam. The other four are the Confession of 
Faith, the daily prayers, the fasting during Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, 
Geertz (1960: 122) concludes that all five obligations taken together serve the purpose of 
avoiding an adverse decision on Judgment Day. The idea of balanced accountability at Judg-
ment Day is very strong in Islam. All worldly deeds are done under divine vigilance and will 
be exactly reciprocated in the afterlife, although the ideas of mercy and, as noted, even infla-
tionary rewards exist (Bobzin 2001). By and large, this makes a system of vertical balanced 
reciprocity with indirect timing, and a system that believing Muslim are doubtlessly con-
vinced of. 
                                                 
11 See for example Sura 2, 272-273; Sura 9, 71-72; Sura 10, 26; Sura 19, 76; Sura 92, 5-7. 
12 See for example Sura 9, 67-69; Sura 92, 8-11. 
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ryone living under their reign. Rankin (2006) illustrates this observation on the basis of her 
research on the Newar in Nepal. The Newar are known for their highly active religious and 
cultural associations called guthi which at times also distribute microcredit. Rankin poignant-
ly summarizes her interviews with guthi members:  
[They] often describe the norms of association entailed in mandatory membership as exacting 
onerous, if not unbearable, costs in terms of time, labor, and money. These costs accrue most nota-
bly through the feasting obligations that punctuate all life cycle rituals, ancestor worship, festivals, 
and other occasions for propitiating the deities. Members endure these obligations, often at the ex-
pense of basic material comforts, only to escape the even more burdensome social sanctions 
against nonconformity - tantamount, in some cases, to excommunication from Newar social life. 
(Rankin 2006: 101-102) 
Along the same lines, Scott (1976: 6) contends that in South-East Asia the observance of reci-
procity norms is based on necessity, not on altruism. This reprises the point earlier made on 
the necessity-based emergence of an egalitarian ideology in embedded moral societies (cf. 
section 2.2.2) Regarding Indonesia, Hüsken and Koning (2006: 14) as well as Haar (1948) 
make the same point. Haar (1948: 133) speaks of “the dictates of what is at times a scrupu-
lously controlled equivalence.” Nonetheless, mutual assistance networks governed by rules of 
balanced reciprocity are often the only option for people to maintain adequate living stan-
dards. There are simply no better alternatives available. But if there are, people can be quick 
to leave the system. As soon as they are confident to get by on their own over the long term, 
their adherence to moral norms of reciprocity weakens drastically. Schrader (1994: 38) notes 
that “with increasing surplus production successive distributions lose their function.” Increas-
ing living standards in developing countries, coupled with migration and urbanization and 
other symptoms of modernization, do create such opportunities for escape.13
After this elaboration of concepts of exchange and reciprocity it is time to turn to the two 
questions I have already raised before in connection with embeddedness: (1) How does micro-
insurance fit into the concept of exchange in embedded moral societies, and (2) in what way is 
the concept relevant in contemporary Indonesia in general and on microinsurance impact in 
particular? First, I return to the question regarding the placement of microinsurance within the 
presented classification of exchanges. Here, to be clear, I refer to microinsurance as a formal 
risk management arrangement that relies on a true system of resource pooling and risk pool-
ing financed by premium contributions which produces ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, to stick with 
Platteau’s terminology (1997: 764). ‘Winners’ are those who receive a compensatory payout 
during the contract term based on the occurrence of the insured risk. This payout is far larger 
than their original premium contribution. ‘Losers’, on the other hand, are those who do not 
experience the insured risk during the contract term, who therefore cannot lay claim on a 
 
                                                 
13 In support of this line of thought, I am thankful to Professor Bernhard Dahm for providing the account of a 
Vietnamese student of his at the University of Passau, who, upon return to his home village, refused to hold the 
traditional feast of reception and preferred the consequent social ostracism - simply because he could afford it. 
He moved to Hanoi and took up work as a well paid university lecturer. I experienced a similar incident in Indo-
nesia where a business man from Nias explained to me that he had not returned to his home village for twenty 
years because his relatives would demand an outrageous share of the fortune he had made ‘abroad’. 
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compensatory payout, and who consequently ‘lose’ their initial contributions. The number of 
‘winners’ has to be much smaller than the number of ‘losers’. Otherwise the described insur-
ance principle wouldn’t work, and the pool would run dry quickly. The ‘losers’ however, 
could consider themselves fortunate not to have experienced the insured risk in the first place. 
According to Spicker (2003: 2) “systems of social protection, insurance and pooled risk 
commonly work on norms of generalized rather than balanced reciprocity: the people who 
receive are not necessarily the people who pay.” Schrader (1994: 38) and especially Platteau 
(1997) argue accordingly. Platteau (1997: 767-768) speaks of “conditional reciprocity” to 
distinguish insurance from the traditional mutual assistance arrangements that he found to be 
firmly based on balanced reciprocity. Platteau also identifies insurance as a redistributive sys-
tem that follows from the operation of a mechanism of “conditional reciprocity”. I therefore 
consider microinsurance to consist of a great number of conditional reciprocities accumulated 
to a system of conditional redistribution. In line with the classification system suggested in 
table 1, the timing of the counter gift in insurance is indirect because in general payouts (if 
any) occur considerably later than the premium payments. The recipient of the counter-gift 
can be a direct or indirect recipient. In case of most non-life insurance and many health insur-
ance contracts, the insured directly receives the compensation. In case of life insurance (with-
out a savings element) not the insured, but the beneficiaries receive the payouts. Conditional 
reciprocity itself occupies a place somewhere along the continuum between general and ba-
lanced reciprocity. This is because generally speaking the individual insured cannot expect a 
payout due to the low frequency of payouts, but under specific and well-defined circums-
tances an exceptionally high return-gift, the payout, is guaranteed and therefore conditionally 
and explicitly expected. In fact, because of the higher likelihood of ‘losing’ than ‘winning’, 
conditional reciprocity seems to be closer to general than to balanced reciprocity.  
If we only looked at mutual insurance in its purest form where a defined social group gathers 
to pool risks without external intermediation and without a for-profit objective, the discussion 
would be finished here. However, in case of the commercial variant of insurance, as 
represented by Payung Keluarga, an element of market-exchange slips in as well in two ways: 
(1) On top of the premium used to cover the insured risks, the insurance company is paid an 
additional fee in return for certain management, administration, and marketing services. This 
arrangement is therefore a pure market-exchange which facilitates the underlying conditional 
redistribution system. (2) In order to understand the second influence of market-exchange on 
insurance we have to recall that both Polanyi (Polanyi and Dalton 1968: xii, xiv) and Sahlins 
(1965: 148) regard the presence of a social component as a necessary characteristic for ba-
lanced reciprocity and even more so for general reciprocity. But where is the social element in 
formal microinsurance? This depends a lot on the way microinsurance is marketed. Commer-
cial insurers do not usually emphasize the collective element inherent in the risk pooling me-
chanism. Instead, they put individual protection in the foreground of their marketing. The 
marketing of conventional insurance is mostly targeted at middle- and upper-class customers 
who supposedly respond most positively to images that display the individualized happiness 
of well-protected middle-class families living in nice houses with pretty lawns. Instead, im-
ages invoking the feeling of belonging to a great ‘standardized’ mass of people sharing exact-
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ly the same aspiration, would only mar the picture. Consequently, customers of the same in-
surance company usually develop even less of a group feeling than taxpayers do. On the other 
hand, providers of Islamic insurance, which is also known as takaful insurance or syariah 
insurance, tend to put more emphasis on the collective risk pooling element of insurance. Not 
surprisingly, they also add a religious touch to their marketing. These efforts render the insur-
ance to appear more social because the social horizontal and the spiritual vertical axis of con-
ditional redistribution are appealed to. Not least of all, this also serves to distinguish takaful 
providers from their conventional competitors. Although Payung Keluarga was not a takaful 
but a conventional product, Allianz also tried to emphasize the social asprect of risk pooling 
in the marketing of the product. This was done in order to mitigate the strong expectations of 
a premium refund which I have already mentioned. Moreover, the fact that microinsurance 
was mostly distributed to low-asset female micro-borrowers organized in groups only seemed 
conducive to conveying microinsurance as a collective social experience. On a technical level 
then, microinsurance is certainly operating as a system of conditional redistribution. Socially 
speaking, however, microinsurance can oscillate from conditional redistribution to pure mar-
ket-exchange. It can be perceived as a collective or individualized risk management tool. The 
overwhelming practice, however, is to regard microinsurance as an individualized risk man-
agement tool (Wilhelm 2009: 20). I will generally follow this practice. 
This brings us to the second question, namely how reciprocal patterns are changing in Indone-
sia in general and under the influence of microinsurance in particular. I will consider the gen-
eral trends on a macro-level in section 4.1. Regarding microinsurance, however, what should 
have already become clear is the magnitude of change to key norms of social life which the 
advent of microinsurance brings with it. Traditionally, balanced reciprocity was the norm of 
collective risk management arrangements. Moreover, such arrangements form a key element 
of the embedded moral societies and therefore of social structure. Now, with microinsurance, 
the idea of conditional reciprocity akin to generalized reciprocity is introduced, moreover in 
highly formalized, legalized and commoditized form, and added with an individualized touch. 
Even in the case of mutual insurance or in the case of socially marketed commercial insur-
ance, the paradigm shift in reciprocity principles is clear. The fact that such a major paradigm 
shift does not leave the underlying embedded social structure unaffected is obvious. On a ra-
ther theoretical level we have therefore already identified microinsurance as an agent of social 
change.  
Unfortunately, there has been little discourse so far on how microinsurance affects social 
structure. It is not that the question has not been asked, but it has been barely discussed and 
even less researched (Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000: 1257; Dercon 2005c: 444; Armendariz 
and Morduch 2005: 195; Wright 2006: 155). One of the few to have touched on the issue in 
more detail is of course Platteau (1997) with his conclusion that traditional collective risk 
management is based on balanced reciprocity rather than the conditional reciprocity of proper 
insurance schemes. He notes that the two approaches make for an entirely different “frame of 
reference” which made it challenging for him to discuss insurance with the Senegalese fi-
shermen (Platteau 1997: 770). Unfortunately, Platteau’s clear cut analysis stops short of pos-
ing the question what social impact a shakeup of the fishermen’s frame of reference may 
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have. Here, Wilhelm (2009) goes further when he hypothesizes what impact the introduction 
of flood microinsurance could have on collective risk management and social cohesion among 
low-asset urban kampung dwellers in Jakarta. In an urban Indonesian context, kampung is a 
synonym for generally low-asset neighborhoods with a high population density, small houses 
and narrow alleys which have nonetheless preserved a village-like atmosphere somewhat re-
moved from the big city bustle (cf. Newberry 2007: 1300-1301). Severe flooding is an ever-
recurring event in the kampung surveyed by Wilhelm. This has led its inhabitants to develop 
sophisticated mechanisms of risk adaptation and collective risk management. Wilhelm casts 
his analysis into a framework of integrated vulnerability analysis rather than a framework of 
embedded reciprocity. Moreover, unlike me, he has no opportunity to analyze actual impacts 
of the introduction of mircoinsurance but can only speculate on its potential impacts. With 
this different approach and research setting it is telling that he nonetheless arrives at conclu-
sions similar to my own. He forecasts flood microinsurance to largely substitute rather than 
complement effective collective risk management strategies. According to Wilhelm, this 
crowding out effect will promote erosion of cooperative social cohesion and even on collec-
tive participatory involvement in administrative and political affairs.14
2.2.4 The traders’ dilemma 
 In chapter 7, I will 
present the empirical substance to support my similar conclusions, which - it should be noted 
- can also be framed positively as liberating the insured from collective norms and pressures. 
Evers and Schrader (1994a) define the traders’ dilemma as follows:  
. . . the dilemma faced by traders . . . out of their moral obligation to share proceeds with kinsfolk 
and neighbors, on the one hand, and the necessity to make profits and accumulate trading capital, 
on the other. (Evers and Schrader 1994a: 5).  
The traders’ dilemma as an analytical concept was introduced by sociologist and South-East 
Asian scholar Hans-Dieter Evers (Evers et al. 1991). It is one of the few analytical concepts 
that have originated from South-East Asian studies which hold the potential, although to date 
only tentatively realized, to be applied to other areas of research (cf. Van der Grijp 2003; cf. 
Korff and Schröter 2006: 65, 68). For my own analysis on the impacts of Payung Keluarga, 
the traders’ dilemma is especially relevant because most insured were female petty traders. 
Here, the traders’ dilemma can enlighten further why the businesses of these traders’ tended 
to get stuck on a certain economic level, despite their access to microcredit (see section 3.2.7). 
I suppose that a great many development experts, economists and microfinance practitioners 
would benefit and overcome some of their surprise when analyzing this question from a trad-
ers’ dilemma perspective. Evers and Schrader (1994a) rightly point out:  
                                                 
14 It is noteworthy that a recent microinsurance market study on disaster risk commissioned by GTZ and Mu-
nichRe (Heydel et al. 2009) in the same areas where Wilhelm undertook his research comes to directly opposite 
conclusions: A high demand for flood microinsurance among low-asset kampung dwellers is asserted and bene-
ficial development impacts are forecast. Wider social impacts are not discussed. Based on these findings, the 
recommended index-based flood microinsurance was introduced by MunichRe and GTZ in May 2009 (GTZ 
2009b). 
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The traders' dilemma does not arise when the traders' position is seen with purely economic eyes. 
This is due to the embeddedness (Polanyi) of economic activities into the society as a comprehen-
sive whole. (Evers and Schrader 1994a: 5) 
Therefore, the traders’ dilemma is clearly a sub-concept of embeddedness and the moral 
economy. It can only be applied successfully in such a larger analytical framework. Moreo-
ver, it is closely aligned to the concepts of reciprocity and other exchanges outlined above. 
Only where egalitarian tendencies among kin, friends and neighbors exist and generosity is 
obligatory can the traders’ dilemma arise in the first place. The good thing, and the real 
strength of his proposition, is that Evers (1994a) does not stop at outlining the traders’ dilem-
ma; he also presents five distinct options for overcoming it:  
(1) Immigration of trading minorities. Jews and Chinese are classic examples of trading mi-
norities who can conduct business on more explicitly economic terms because the norms of 
the non-universal moral economy do not apply to them, which in turn comes at the price of 
new risks such as discrimination.  
(2) Formation of ethnic or religious groups. One example for this solution are the fervently 
Muslim santri traders who are renowned for their business acumen (Geertz 1963; Alexander 
1998: 204). In fact, it may well be that in general their business skills are not above average, 
but their exposed religious orthodoxy insulates them from suspicions of economic self-interest 
and enables them to leverage their business skills especially well. I hold that such functionali-
ty may, as one of many other factors (cf. Hefner 1998b; cf. Schröter 2007), contribute to the 
recent revival of Islam in Indonesia. It legitimizes the more assertive pursuit of increasing 
economic opportunities. In the more extreme case of the formation of an entirely new religion 
or ethnicity, the moral economy would lose its ‘jurisdiction’ on its members due to its non-
universal character. 
(3) Accumulation of status honor. This relates to general reciprocity and redistribution. Gene-
rosity can allow for considerable leeway in trading transactions and accumulation of econom-
ic assets. Even more so, it allows for accumulation of honor, status and power; that is, assets 
which Bourdieu (1977) calls symbolic capital and which he considers interconvertible with 
economic capital. However, the risk of a sudden loss in legitimacy looms in case overt self-
interest (pamrih) is detected and socially sanctioned (Anderson 1972). Moreover, the display 
of generosity requires sufficient means and significant skills in economic management and 
power management, which after all makes this solution a rather restricted one.  
(4) Emergence of a cash-and-carry petty trade. Establishing and remaining in a state of petty 
trade helps to keep a low profile. This in turn guarantees that at least a small economic profit 
can be accumulated without being subjugated to the redistributive pressures of the moral 
economy. This is the solution most relevant to the microinsured petty traders. It explains why 
they do not aspire for unlimited growth. According to the “double fortune / double blow” di-
lemma of microfinance this could only change if sufficient risk insurance is provided from 
other sources, for example microinsurance in combination with microcredit. The contentment 
with petty trade also explains the extreme differentiation of trading networks in terms of the 
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number of traders offering similar or often identical goods and services. This is because com-
pared to the other options, petty trading is the easiest solution to at least partially solve the 
traders’ dilemma. It does not require many resources and much collective action, but it also 
does not lead very far. This is why I differ from Alexander (1998) when she claims:  
The main reason Javanese, by and large, remained mired in petty commerce until very recently 
was nor a lack of desire or ability bur the practical difficulties in effectively appropriating the 
finance and labor of others. (Alexander 1998: 215) 
I maintain that this explanation is valid but does not display the full picture. Through the im-
pediments of the moral economy and the resulting traders’ dilemma, voluntarily stagnation 
was certainly also involved, in addition to more immediate structural constraints like access to 
labor and finance. 
(5) The depersonalization (disembedding) of economic relations. The disembedding of the 
economy is of course the most thorough solution to the traders’ dilemma. It is also a large and 
longue durée process which individual actors can hardly influence. In a way it is the most 
collective solution to the traders’ dilemma. 
Finally, our discussion has come all the way from the overarching concepts of embeddedness 
and the moral economy to reciprocity and the sub-concept of the traders’ dilemma. Although I 
have so far revealed little of my detailed research findings, the importance and complexity of 
the socio-cultural context in which Payung Keluarga was implemented should already have 
become clear. This context is decidedly different from highly modernized and industrialized 
societies in Western Europe and North America. As the two respective “frames of reference” 
encounter via Payung Keluarga, a certain irony arises: The petty traders covered by Payung 
Keluarga, a product that Allianz perceives as a social business (see section 4.4.1), are actually 
engaged in heavily socialized businesses. Following the “double fortune / double blow” di-
lemma of microfinance, Allianz’ social business will eventually contribute to making these 
businesses more economic. The ‘social business’ of a multinational cooperation will, to a cer-
tain extent, de-socialize the activities of its customers. 
 
2.3 On rationality 
Where does the surprise stem from that external observers, including myself, experience when 
microfinance customers make unanticipated and apparently uneconomic uses of their micro-
credits and microinsurance payouts? Why are we tempted to denounce such behavior as irra-
tional? Here the question of rationality deserves some scrutiny. As researchers and microfin-
ance practitioners, we often approach the interpretation of observed behavior with a totally 
different “frame of reference” than the customers. Our “frame of reference” is not the embed-
ded moral economy with its reciprocity norms and particular dilemmas. I hold that our “frame 
of reference” is rather conditioned by a disembedded state that I associate with Western socie-
ties. If we are not clear on the matter of rationality, the interpretation of the behavior of the 
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microfinance customers (and thereby microfinance impacts) may be ethnocentrically skewed 
and at worst terminate in the condescending classification of the customers’ behavior as irra-
tional and instinctive (cf. Bourdieu 1977: 177-178). My concern follows that of Thompson 
(1971: 76-77) and Scott (1976: vii) who strove to refute the widely held impression that food 
riots and peasant rebellions were spontaneous, irrational, and instinctive outbursts of violence.  
The rationality that we usually have in mind during impact assessments is a singular means-
end rationality. The rationality that the customers apply to the matter can be very different. In 
fact, many types of rationalities exist and could, even simultaneously, be at play. Max Weber 
maintains that our reality is socially constructed, and so are our concepts of rationality (Bayer 
and Mordt 2008: 20). Next to customs and emotions, Weber classifies value-oriented-
rationality and means-end-rationality as ideal types of action motivators. Actions motivated 
by value-oriented-rationality are guided by external norms and expectations which the actor 
perceives to be imposed on him. A weighing of possible consequences does not take place. 
The action is an end in itself. On the other hand, actions driven by means-end-rationality in-
clude a careful evaluation process of the means that could be applied to achieve a certain end 
and of what intended and unintended consequences may arise. The end to be achieved by 
means-end-rationality may be defined by norms and values, but not necessarily. In absence of 
norms and values, means-end-rationality tends towards a maximization of subjective individ-
ual utility. Weber notes that from a perspective of means-end-rationality value-oriented-
rationality is actually irrational, and increasingly so the more absolute the subscribed values 
are set (Buss 1985: 11; Bayer and Mordt 2008: 87). Weber also notes that the process of mod-
ernization brings with it an increased dominance of means-end-rationality over the other three 
action motivators. According to Weber, this eventually leads to the disenchantment of society, 
a process not least promoted by modern scientific research (Bayer and Mordt 2008: 16).  
Disenchantment and disembeddedness do not only bear a certain phonetic resemblance, but 
also strong conceptual similarities along historic and spatial lines. Where disembedding in 
Polanyi’s sense occurs, so does disenchantment in Weber’s sense. As researchers, our strong 
coding on means-end-rationality causes the temptation to declare value-based actions as irra-
tional. Fortunately, awareness of this caveat and efforts to mitigate it are supported by many 
researches, especially in the field of sociology and ethnology. Korff (1994: 213) therefore 
proposes a much broader definition of rationality: “Rationality means . . . that what a person 
does makes sense to him or her.” I would like to follow this more culturally sensitive defini-
tion and modify it slightly by replacing “rational” with the more neutral term “reasonable”. 
Reasonable is what makes sense to people. Moreover, making sense does not mean that 
people have to consciously reflect their actions beforehand, for example routine actions. Such 
reflection can also occur in hindsight, for example when the field researcher asks people why 
they did certain things the way they did. Such self-reflection may of course still not be capa-
ble of enlightening the complete context of an action. Otherwise the researcher’s job would be 
much easier. Even in hindsight, context and individual preferences are not easily uncovered, 
neither by the actor nor the researcher. Bourdieu (1977: 79) speaks of the habitus, the obscure 
part of practice which is nonetheless sensible or reasonable. In order to capture the reasoning 
behind the answers of the respondents as comprehensively as possible (with full enlighten-
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ment being questionable), an in-depth knowledge and appreciation of the relevant socio-
cultural context, the habitus, and ideally a familiarity with the individual preferences and cha-
racter of the interviewee are needed. In line with Geertz’ postulate for “thick description” in 
ethnography (Geertz 2000: 7, 16), we would otherwise be left with rather meaningless thin 
descriptions, instead of thick descriptions. Besides Geertz, Granovetter (1985) and Hefner 
(1998a: 26) are also strong proponents of contextualized research. Granovetter writes:  
What looks to the analyst like nonrational behavior may be quite sensible when situational con-
straints, especially those of embeddedness, are fully appreciated. (Granovetter 1985: 506) 
Another relevant point made by Korff (1994: 213), Geertz (2000) and Sen (1977) is that the 
coherence of behavior is an illusion. This is because of the different preferences, and the vary-
ing, even simultaneous social positions - or different overlapping fields with different habitus, 
as Bourdieu puts it (1977: 83) - which are simultaneously at work when individuals formulate, 
however consciously, their reasoning for action. Sen (1977) argues that those whose actions 
are guided by a single, consistent, individual, and utility-maximizing means-end-rationality 
are actually ‘rational fools’. They are devoid of freedom and flexibility of choice. According 
to Sen (1977), economic rational choice theory, which heavily relies on exactly such concep-
tualization of man as a homo oeconomicus, does not live up to social reality. Neither does it 
take account of context nor of multiple preferences, nor of a time horizon, nor of the collec-
tive dimension of choice which the prisoner’s dilemma so clearly uncovers. 
In summary, if we make due reference to a framework of moral embedded societies, the rules 
of reciprocity, and the traders’ dilemma, then we can hope to fruitfully advance on our way to 
the deconstruction or de-mystification of the complex impact processes of Payung Keluarga 
as perfectly reasonable and meaningful occurrences. 
 
2.4 The expanded-asset-capital framework 
The sociological concepts introduced earlier provide the tools to analyze the context of my 
impact analysis. The expanded asset-capital framework I would like to present here forms its 
theoretical core. Put another way, while so far we have looked at structure, now we move 
closer to agency. The expanded-asset-capital framework is a combination of an asset based 
approach and Bourdieu’s more general understanding of economic and symbolic capital. Like 
the contextual concepts discussed earlier (cf. section 2.2), I only “discovered” and merged the 
asset based concept and Bourdieu’s capital theory after the end of my field work. 
The terms “asset” and “capital” are often synonymously used (Moser 2007b: 84) and I follow 
this practice. I nonetheless speak of an expanded asset-capital framework to indicate an “asset 
footing” on the so-called asset based or asset-vulnerability approaches and a “capital footing” 
on Bourdieu’s capital definitions. The expanded-asset-capital framework defines the concrete 
tools that low-asset actors have at hand to manage daily life, not only regarding risk manage-
ment but in the same breath also regarding status and power management. The expanded as-
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set-capital framework helps to identify which assets at the disposal of low-asset families have 
improved through the introduction of microinsurance, which have remained unaffected, or 
which have decreased, and how this impacts options of risk management and status manage-
ment. From there, we can later continue to consider the wider social impacts. Closely follow-
ing the OECD's general impact definition I define microinsurance impact as positive and neg-
ative, primary and secondary changes produced by a microinsurance intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended over the short-term and long-term (cf. OECD 2007: 24). 
When classifying the asset base of low-asset families, I follow the asset approaches presented 
by cultural anthropologist Caroline Moser (1998; 2007a; 2007b) and socio-economist Karin 
Heitzmann (Heitzmann et al. 2002). They, in turn, draw on the extensive works of Sen (1981), 
Swift (1989), Davies (1993), Putnam (1993) and others. Closely aligned to Heitzmann et al. 
(2002: 16), I decompose a family’s asset base into the following seven components:  
(1) labor, 
(2) human assets such as health status, education, skills, information and psychological states 
such as peace of mind and optimism,  
(3) physical assets, especially productive assets such as land, equipment, livestock, and hous-
ing,
(4) social assets such as ties and networks within the family and between families and even 
extending to the community and state (e.g. access to safety net mechanisms),  
  
(5) financial assets such as cash, savings, social security coverage, and insurance, 
(6) location and infrastructure such as proximity and access to water and sanitation, educa-
tional facilities and markets, and  
(7) political and institutional assets such as participation in family decision making as well as 
in organizations at the community, civil or political level.15
I have expanded Heitzmann’s list of assets only slightly by adding psychological states such 
as optimism and peace of mind to human assets. I have done so because I hold that optimism 
and peace of mind help to facilitate daily life in similar ways as does good health. Moreover, 
peace of mind is seen as one of the immediate benefits provided by microinsurance. When I 
later want to assess which assets have been positively impacted by Payung Keluarga, it of 
course makes sense to have peace of mind included in the list of potential variables. Naturally, 
the addition of such rather subjective and soft assets renders the asset base even less inaccess-
ible to econometric measurement than before. Although Moser (2007a: 3) aims for the devel-
opment of an econometric methodology for constructing an asset index, I am more concerned 
  
                                                 
15 Like Moser’s original five-fold asset classification (1998) my own classification largely limits itself to the 
individual and family level. Heitzmann et al. (2002) also include collective assets at the community and extra-
community level, which for their tenuous definitions and for reasons of simplicity I have chosen to exclude here. 
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with qualitative than quantitative analysis. My further expansion of an already broadly de-
fined asset base therefore enriches rather than constraints my research options. 
Common wisdom has it that the more assets a family can draw on the higher its welfare level. 
However, as with poverty before I prefer not to be too precise and normative on the matter. 
Again, I question if human aspirations naturally aim for an ever increasing asset base. Moser 
(2007b) herself notes, based on her longitudinal research project on intergenerational asset 
accumulation and poverty reduction in Ecuador, that aspirations between the parents and 
children can differ due to changing conditions:  
Today, their adult sons and daughters, better educated but with greater expectations and aspira-
tions, face different challenges in a globalized context. (Moser 2007b: 85) 
Besides becoming less measurable, my further expansion of the asset base definition also af-
fects the convertibility of assets. The broader and more subjectively assets are defined, the 
less convertible they become. By and large, however, I consider the different assets as inter-
convertible. Peace of mind, for example, can be achieved through investment in insurance or 
social relations. However, important disclaimers need to be added. The different asset classes 
are clearly interdependent and convertibility may bring with it certain offsetting effects. For 
example, credit may be invested in productive assets such as machinery. This, however, may 
add to the worry about repayment of the credit and decrease peace of mind. This example also 
adds a time dimension to asset management and asset convertibility. A decrease in assets to-
day may be strategically planned in order to increase the asset base of the long term (Banerjee 
et al. 2009: 20). Another constraint on convertibility is that under certain conditions the giving 
of one additional unit of an asset A may render decreasing additional quantities of the sought-
after asset B. Hunger rents or agricultural self-exploitation may be fitting examples (Geertz 
1968; Scott 1976: 14-15). Economies of scale are the opposite example. In this case, for every 
stable unit of asset A given one receives increasing quantities of the sought-after asset B. This 
brings us to the conditional contingencies of assets. In general, the value and comparability 
assigned to assets is historically and culturally dependent and therefore socially constructed. 
As mentioned above, in certain societies women can move against hoes or cattle and are 
therefore tradable and convertible assets (Sahlins 1965: 177), even if Sahlins points to the 
importance of non-perfect comparability in connection with “the shadow of indebtedness”. 
Today, trade in women is something morally restricted (and nonetheless happening) in West-
ern societies. The assignment of certain goods to the asset classifications as outlined above is 
also socio-culturally dependent. For example, I already noted that in embedded moral socie-
ties savings and credit may be regarded more of a social rather than a financial asset (Geertz 
1963: 36; Dichter 2007a: 13; 2007c: 182) However, with an increasing modernization of so-
cieties, the monetarization of the economy, and the accompanying processes of disembedding 
and disenchantment the importance of financial assets is growing. This facilitates and speeds 
up the conversion between assets, as is noted by Mahajan (2007a: 198-199). Mahajan takes 
education costs and medical costs as an example for the financialization of human capital or - 
an extreme case for the financialization of human assets - the enormous sums paid for football 
players. Also social capital, he argues, can today be instantly accessed by paying the member-
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ship fee of country clubs or golf clubs. Even most natural and public goods like clean air are 
undergoing a financialization process through the introduction of pollution credits. An ob-
vious example I would add to this list is the financialization of protection through insurance. 
Instead of the labor, asset, and time intensive social process of building up and maintaining 
social capital as a safety net against adversity, microinsurance can ease and abbreviate this 
process significantly, although as noted this needs the application of an entirely different 
“frame of reference” (cf. section 2.2.3). In any case, neither microinsurance nor social capital 
nor any of the other assets is free of costs. There is, modernly speaking, a maintenance fee 
attached. Social capital, for example needs careful maintenance which can be very costly 
(Mahajan 2007a: 199). In summary then, the issue of convertibility of assets as well as their 
protection, maintenance and furtherance are complex issues and need sophisticated manage-
ment. Accordingly, Moser regards low-asset families as “managers of complex asset portfo-
lios” (1998: 1), which is a far cry from the outdated but not entirely shelved perception of ‘the 
poor’ as passive and helpless creatures, a perception which seems especially persistent among 
proponents of microfinance and microinsurance interventions (McCord et al. 2006: v; Dichter 
2007c: 182; Heydel et al. 2009: ix).  
In the face of risk, the asset base serves as the tool box from which risk management strate-
gies can be constructed and applied. The asset base therefore heavily influences the vulnera-
bility, or positively seen, the resilience of low-asset families. I would like to conceptualize 
this point in some more detail. It was already stated that generally speaking, vulnerability is 
the probability of a family to remain in or to fall into poverty, however defined (cf. section 
2.1). According to Heitzmann et al. (2002: 6), vulnerability can be decomposed into a risk 
chain. Mainly building on Heitzmann et al. (2002) and also Borst (2004: 8-10), I decompose 
the risk chain into four consecutive steps:  
(1) Risk appearance: Risk is a probability distribution of events which - if they materialize - 
can become downward shocks and might cause severe asset losses.  
(2) Risk analysis: This involves the identification and assessment of risks, as well as taking 
stock of available response options and their possible consequences. The availability of re-
sponse options depends on the asset base. The greater the breadth and depth of the asset base, 
the more response options can be applied. 
(3) Risk response: A risk response decision is made and applied. Application strategies may 
occur before the materialization of a risk (ex-ante) or after the risk materializes as a shock 
(ex-post). However, the broad decision on which strategy to use is usually taken before the 
materialization of a risk. Typical ex-ante strategies are risk avoidance (e.g. moving out of a 
malaria affected area), risk eradication (e.g. elimination of malaria transmitting mosquitoes), 
risk reduction (e.g. malaria pills or mosquito nets), and risk mitigation (e.g. informal assis-
tance arrangements or health insurance). Risk mitigation is also called risk transfer and has an 
ex-post component to it as well (e.g. insurance claim after a malaria bout). Typical ex-post 
strategies are risk coping (e.g. taking emergency credit to pay for medical treatment) and risk 
adaptation (e.g. building up bodily resistance against malaria over the long term). In theory as 
in practice the distinction between these strategies is not always clear cut. Several slightly 
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varying classifications are proposed in the literature (Moser 1998: 5; Alwang et al. 2001: 2-3, 
12; Moser 2001: 364; Heitzmann et. al. 2002: 4, 9; Holzmann et al. 2003: 7; Dercon 2005b: 
10; Cohen and Young 2007: 210-211). 
(4) Risk impact: Risk impact is the asset loss due to the costs of the risk response (which may 
accrue without the risk ever occurring) and the eventual materialization of a risk.  
Risk analysis and risk response are commonly summarized together as risk management. Risk 
management always comes at a cost. The cost for insurance, for example, is called premium. 
The price paid for “subsistence insurance” in moral embedded economies through balanced 
reciprocity consists of the more restricted options for personal asset accumulation. Therefore, 
risks produce strains on the asset base even before they have materialized as shocks. But of 
course, the highest asset losses are attributed to the shocks themselves. The asset base there-
fore provides both the means for the risk response as well as the objects of protection. The 
options for a risk response are contingent on the available assets (illustration 1).  
Illustration 1: The relation between risk chain and asset base 
 
Source: author, based on Heitzmann et al. (2002: 6) and Borst (2004: 8) 
Cohen and Sebstad (2003: 3) distinguish between low, medium and high stress risk responses, 
depending on how much the asset base is strained by the risk response. Depletion of discre-
tionary savings, for example, is a relatively low stress risk coping strategy. Reducing food 
consumption or removing kids from school are high stress coping strategies with long term 
consequences. Scott (1976: 14) describes such extreme coping measures as mortgaging the 
future. Because risk management basically serves to protect the status quo of the asset base, it 
is easier to connote better risk management as positive than it is to connote an increasing asset 
base as positive. This is because nobody wants to be worse off than before, but at least some 
people may be quite happy with the current state of their personal affairs. 
Next to the concern with asset protection through risk management, the asset approach is 
equally concerned with asset accumulation, for example through carefully planned risk taking 
(Brainard and Farias 2007: vii; Moser 2007b). Moser therefore distinguishes between the pro-
tective, preventive and promotional character of assets (Moser 2007b: 96). I could criticize 
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that the approach somewhat unquestioningly subscribes to the notion of (measurable) poverty 
and even more so to the notion of a universal and incessant human asset accumulation drive 
(cf. Moser 2007: 4). Nonetheless the asset approach is useful for my impact research. It clear-
ly puts low-asset families into an acting position and it clearly identifies their tools for action. 
It is therefore easier to operationalize for research than related but more complex approaches 
such as the sustainable livelihood approach or the more normative capabilities approach de-
veloped by Sen (1981; 1999) and Nussbaum (2006). This is why I have given the asset ap-
proach preference over these alternatives.  
However, what the asset approach as well as the other related analytical frameworks fail to 
fathom is the ambivalent character of assets, or rather the ambivalent usage that one can make 
of them. These frameworks display assets as generally a good thing and claim that asset ac-
cumulation helps furthering progress and - importantly - reducing inequality (cf. Brainard and 
Farias 2007: vii). Rankin (2006: 89, 98), on the other hand, rightly criticizes current develop-
ment discourse to focus too much on the benign qualities of social capital after research by 
Putnam (1993; 1995) has boosted the notion of social capital as an agent for positive social 
structures of cooperation. Using the example of the guthi associations of the Newar in Nepal, 
she illustrates how social capital also lends itself to the preservation of social inequalities. 
Similarly Wright (2006) reports on “the darker side of microfinance” (2006: 154) where she 
exemplarily illustrates how credit-group leaders in Bolivia make use of their superior social 
capital to cheat on their fellow credit-group members, and that the rules of the game even in-
duce the cheated to keep quiet (2006: 159). Along the same lines, Sen and his capabilities 
approach has been criticized for his simplistic concept of man and naïve belief in “good go-
vernance” (Matis and Bachinger 2004). If only sufficient capabilities were bestowed on eve-
ryone, inequality would cease to exist. With Sen, the inherent potential of assets, also of 
broadly defined assets such as rights and freedoms, to be turned against others does not make 
a strong showing.  
This is where Bourdieu’s concept of economic and symbolic capital comes in as a counterbal-
ance (1977; 1986). Bourdieu more clearly captures the ambivalence of assets, even leaning 
towards the conflictive social potential of assets. Bourdieu argues that any kind of tangible or 
intangible asset has an inherent economic (or material) value and an inherent symbolic value 
which he accordingly distinguishes as economic and symbolic capital. Depending on the asset 
and context at hand, either the economic or the symbolic aspect of an asset can be more im-
portant. Consequently, Bourdieu also distinguishes between material and symbolic profits that 
can emerge from any asset usage (1986: 249). Economic capital such as material assets or 
property rights can be easily converted into money. Symbolic capital, on the other hand, is 
associated with notions of honor, status and prestige. It is more tenuous, less transparent and 
measurable, but under certain conditions it can nonetheless be converted to economic capital 
(Bourdieu 1977: 67, 177-179; 1986: 243). In addition to economic and symbolic capital, 
Bourdieu also speaks of cultural capital such as education and social capital such as group 
memberships (Bourdieu 1986: 243). Bourdieu is not particularly consistent and explicit in his 
definitions of the different capital forms, or rather, he adapts his concepts to specific academic 
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contexts. However, I hold that by and large cultural and social capital can be subsumed under 
symbolic capital. 
In line with above discussion Bourdieu argues that in embedded moral societies the accumula-
tion of material assets is suppressed to maintain visible equality and cohesion of the commu-
nity. Armendariz and Morduch (2005: 163) more directly relate this suppression of material 
asset accumulation to the dependency of mutual assistance arrangements on the participation 
of all community members: “In order to keep the arrangement together, your surpluses thus 
get ‘taxed’ by the community making it difficult to save over the long term.” Bourdieu con-
cludes that such heavily moralized ‘taxation’ of material assets leads to symbolic capital be-
coming the only recognized, legitimate form of asset accumulation (Bourdieu 1977: 180). 
Symbolic capital hinges on its acceptance by others much more than economic capital does. 
The dependent, namely those relying on reciprocity arrangements to maintain their subsis-
tence, as well as the powerful both need the group. There is no incentive to opt out and leave. 
Bourdieu therefore strongly connects symbolic capital with notions of power and domination 
of others. He emphasizes the inequality vector of assets much stronger than the equality vec-
tor which development proponents put to the foreground. Following Bourdieu and the empiri-
cal evidence cited above, social capital lends itself to much more ambivalent uses than main-
stream development discourse contends. In parallel, political and institutional assets, which 
Heitzmann et al. (2002) positively frame as participation, are likewise strongly connected to 
the question of power. Political participation may foster social equality or its polar opposite, 
social inequality. Especially for embedded moral societies with little social and political diffe-
rentiation, I hold that social assets and political assets are very much overlapping in character 
and usage.  
Bourdieu also analyzes the way that symbolic capital is maintained. He argues that this is 
largely done through institutionalization such as family names and titles of nobility:  
The title of nobility is the form par excellence of the institutionalized social capital which guaran-
tees a particular form of social relationship in a lasting way. One of the paradoxes of delegation is 
that the mandated agent can exert on (and, up to a point, against) the group the power which the 
group enables him to concentrate. (Bourdieu 1986: 251) 
Here again the ambivalent character of symbolic capital in the form of power is evident. 
Another characteristic which Bourdieu assigns to capital is that despite the huge expenditures 
needed to maintain symbolic capital, nonetheless “capital go[es, M.H.] to capital” (Bourdieu 
1977: 181). There are clear economies of scale at work which tend to accentuate inequalities. 
It is in fact often commented by researchers that the social networks of higher-asset families 
are stronger than those of lower-asset families and that the low-asset families tend to seek the 
material assistance of the high-asset families in return for their loyalty and support (Kozel and 
Parker 2000: 66; Miguel et al. 2002: 10; Dercon 2005a: 4; De Weerdt 2005). Bourdieu (1977: 
182) also notes that preoccupation with status and prestige does not only lead to acts of gene-
rosity but also to acts of violence and revenge, such as when the family name has been in-
sulted and the good reputation of the family has to be restored, at often exorbitant economic 
costs and nowadays even at the risk of legal punishment. When seen from a narrow economic 
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perspective, such actions would be regarded as a pure wastage of assets. With regards to the 
question of rationality, therefore, Bourdieu (1977: 177-178; 1986: 253) calls for a holistic 
accountability of economic and symbolic capital and profits. This is in line with the earlier 
discussion on the need for socio-culturally contextualized research and a thick description of 
the actors’ reasoning. Such holistic accountability would underline even more clearly that the 
actions of the microinsurance customers and their beneficiaries were not only reasonable on a 
footing of moral norms but also, in their specific context and seen over the long term, made 
economic sense. Just as I outlined earlier that the often praised solidarity of traditional socie-
ties is not footed on ideal altruism but on practical needs and best self-interest, similarly the 
concept of symbolic capital - as the example of violent revenge illustrates - brings home the 
point that assets are not necessarily benignly and altruistically used to promote social equality.  
In summary, the asset approach of Moser (1998; 2007a; 2007b), Heitzmann et al. (2002) and 
others gives us a clear and detailed classification of the asset base and an idea of how it can be 
positively used to manage risks and to promote equality. Bourdieu, on the other hand, contri-
butes the notion that assets have both economic as well as symbolic value and that assets may 
not only be used benignly but also to assert and perpetuate power differentials and inequality. 
This is what I call the two vectors simultaneously inherent in assets, the equality leaning and 
the inequality leaning vector. In the further discussion, I will apply the outlined classification 
of assets and the accompanying understanding of their ambivalent character when I decon-
struct and interpret the impact process of Payung Keluarga. 
 
3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL EMBEDDING 
In the previous chapter I have provided the socio-analytical tools for the analysis of the socio-
cultural context in Indonesia as the first back drop of this thesis. This chapter provides the 
developmental embedding of this thesis, which is the second backdrop. In contrast to the pre-
vious chapter, this chapter focuses more on transfer of knowledge and the outlining of current 
discourses rather than on the positioning of analytical tools. It is more narrative in nature. The 
history and related discourses of development, microfinance and microinsurance will be con-
secutively presented. As Payung Keluarga was mostly attached to group-based microcredits, 
these represent the “natural microfinance environment” for Payung Keluarga and are there-
fore discussed in particular detail. 
3.1 Development 
3.1.1  Development and modernist thought 
Microfinance is deeply rooted in development discourse and practice. It is even regarded as 
one of development’s favorite tools (Dichter 2007b: 2; Harper 2007a: 47). A general under-
standing of development discourse and practice is necessary to comprehend why microcredit 
has risen to prominence since the 1990s and why microsavings and microinsurance have fol-
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lowed suit since the turn of the Millennium. This will also reveal the background of related 
optimism and critique.  
Korff and Tigges Lizarazo (2008a) provide a general definition of development:  
Development is the attempt to modify or influence processes of change (economic, political, social 
and cultural) through interventions towards a goal understood as positive. . . . In other words, de-
velopment is contrasting what is with what should be, or it works at tensions between a present 
and possible future. (Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a: 1) 
Although a number of alternative development definitions have been proposed, I prefer the 
suggestion by Korff and Tigges Lizarazo. It is neutral and flexible because it leaves the posi-
tive goals undefined whereas others insert normative values such as “freedom” (Sen 1999) or 
“economic sufficiency and social egalitarianism” (Hooker 1978: 8). On the other hand, Korff 
and Tigges Lizarazo are specific in that development refers to active interventions. These in-
terventionist attempts at active change distinguish development from transformation as a 
process of gradual and undirected change. Development tries to manage change while trans-
formation is any kind of change, whether purposely influenced or not. The equation of devel-
opment with directed interventions fits well with the earlier definition of impact as the broad-
ly defined changes induced by directed interventions (cf. section 2.4). In this sense, the defini-
tion of impact can be further specified as the broadly defined changes induced by develop-
ment. 
As the following historical outline of the different phases of development will show, the 
mainstream notion of what exactly should be the positive goal of development interventions 
has changed over the decades since the idea of development first hit world stage in 1949. 
Moreover, these goals have always been contested, as the reference to “tensions” in Korff and 
Tigges Lizarazo’s definition already indicates.  
When I refer to the mainstream of development I refer to the ‘modernist’ school of develop-
ment, which, as its name implies, proposes modernization as the positive goal of develop-
ment. Modernization theory postulates development as a natural, unilinear long-term trans-
formation process from “tradition” to “modernity” (Matis and Bachinger 2004). The best 
known modernization theory is the five-stages model of development proposed by economic 
historian Walt Rostow (1960). According to Rostow, all societies must chronologically pass 
through the same five stages from “tradition” to “modernity” (Többe Gonçalves 2005: 28). 
Western societies have already reached the highest stage of development which Rostow calls 
the “age of high mass consumption”. There is no generally accepted definition of what “mod-
ernity” and its antithesis “tradition” mean in fullest detail (cf. Schiel 1985: 2). These concepts 
are best fathomed through certain aspects that have been generally ascribed to this dichotomy. 
Diversification of labor and a consequent social diversification are certainly important socio-
economic aspects of modernization (Evers and Schiel: 1988: 20). Max Weber, who viewed 
modernization processes rather skeptically, regarded rationalization, secularization and the 
rise of an impersonal bureaucracy as the antipodes of “tradition” (Bayer and Mordt 2008: 17). 
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Matis and Bachinger (2004) provide a general overview of “traditional” and “modern” va-
riables in developmental modernist thought (table 2):  
Table 2: Traditional - modern: aspects of a dichotomy 
  Traditional Modern 
Economy agrarian subsistence industrialized market 
economy 
Technology low high 
Productivity low high 
Income low, large variation high, low variation 
Social stratification hierarchical, nobility egalitarian, skill based 
Mobility low high 
Conflicts open institutionalized, ritualized 
Social control direct, personal indirect, bureaucratic 
Communication personal media 
Family extended family and 
clan 
nuclear family 
Settlement rural urban 
Life expectancy low high 
Governance local, personal centralized, anonymous 
Political participation low high 
Norms concrete universal 
Religion dogmatic, linked with 
governance 
secularization, laicism 
Source: Matis and Bachinger (2004) - translated and slightly adapted by author 
As mentioned, modernist thinkers regard development towards modernity as an inevitable 
historical transformation process. In theory, modernist thinkers hold transformation, devel-
opment, and modernization to be the same. In fact, the influence of modernist thought has 
been strong enough to equate “developed” and “modern” in common parlance. Many of the 
attributes of “traditional” and “modern” as displayed in table 2 have become deeply imbued in 
public conscience, not only in the West but also in the so-called developing countries them-
selves (cf. Sachs 1992: 2). Particularly relevant is the more or less overt association of mod-
ernity with capitalism (Matis and Bachinger 2004). This association permeates development 
discourse until today.  
The equation of transformation and development by the modernists differs from the explicit 
distinction between development and transformation proposed here. This asymmetry can be 
resolved if we focus on actual development practice as advocated by modernists. Modernist 
development practice is highly interventionist because it holds that the development process 
can be actively accelerated. Obstacles for modernization, such as the persistency of traditional 
customs, are endogenously defined and need to be overcome (Matis and Bachinger 2004). 
Due to the strong conviction of the unilinearity of development, negative side effects do not 
preoccupy modernization advocates. If development projects go wrong and produce unin-
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tended results, such failures are attributable to persistent endogenous blockades to moderniza-
tion.  
Today, orthodox modernist thought has been widely discredited and gone out of academic 
fashion. Criticism is most loudly voiced by dependency theorists and post-development advo-
cates (Sachs 1992; Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a; 2008b). Both schools will be further 
discussed below. However, also generally modernism is regarded as too unilinear, too deter-
ministic, too focused on economic growth, ethnocentristic, and insensitive to the complexities 
and differences of historical and social processes (Sachs 1992; Többe Gonçalves 2005: 30-32; 
Matis and Bachinger 2004). Modernist thought leaves no room for an intertwining and persis-
tent coexistence of both “traditional” and “modern” elements in society although this pheno-
menon is often observed (Buss 1985: 40; Mulder 2005). Moreover, Matis and Bachinger 
(2004) point out that the modernist concepts of “modernity” and “tradition” are highly con-
structed. In a first step, “modernity” is being defined as the positive and well-known, and then 
“tradition” is constructed as the negative opposite. For Indonesia, Van Bruinessen (1996: 165) 
regards the absence of an indigenous Indonesian term for tradition as an indication that the 
present awareness of tradition as such is relatively recent. Time has moved on and several of 
the values which the modernists depicted as modern and positive have been changed or aban-
doned. For example, a high degree of industrialization is no longer a necessary benchmark for 
modernity. Thriving urban centers like Dubai are built on services, not on heavy industry. 
Knowledge, not industry, is being invoked as the most important resource of the 21st
3.1.2  Phases of development 
 century 
societies (Cerroni 2007). And the belief in the benefits of mass consumption is coming under 
heavy attack from environmentalists who maintain that the resources of multiple earths would 
be necessary if all humanity were to consume as much as Europeans and US-Americans do 
(Sachs 1992: 2; Herrmann 2009). In this sense, it could be said that orthodox modernist de-
velopment thought is a thing of the past. However, this does not mean that it has not been 
modified and adapted as development discourse and practice have moved on. In fact, I still 
hold that the conviction that “modern” Western concepts and solutions are per se superior to 
current ‘irrational’ traditional solutions still forms a powerful substratum of many develop-
ment projects. Here, I explicitly include the Payung Keluarga project and my initial thinking 
at the commencement of the project. Neither has the strong connection between development 
and economic growth been entirely cut. Instead, just as the concept of poverty has become 
multidimensional (cf. section 2.1), development has increasingly expanded its scope to in-
clude additional supporting factors of modernization such as provision of education and 
health care. And lastly, the basic belief that developmental interventions can influence trans-
formational processes in a positive way is certainly still going strong (Korff and Tigges Liza-
razo 2008a: 6). Otherwise, development as such would be a thing of the past.  
So far, I have outlined the conceptual underpinnings of how development was initially con-
ceived. I now turn to describe the phases of development which lead up to the how and why 
of the emergence of microfinance. It is striking that the phases of development are commonly 
and conveniently constructed as “development decades”. This speaks of the faster, more li-
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near, more precise, and more interventionist attitude regarding the concept of time as applied 
by development discourse in comparison to the longue durée gradual transformations that 
embedded moral societies are accustomed to (Anderson 1972: 19-20; Menike 1993: 177-179). 
(1) 1948-1960 - The invention of development and under-development 
In 1948, in one of its first reports, the World Bank defined countries with an average per capi-
ta income of less than US$ 100 as poor and underdeveloped (Rahnema 1992: 161). For the 
first time, entire nations were considered as underdeveloped. Thereby, under-development 
and income related poverty as the antitheses of development were constructed and spread on a 
global scale (cf. section 2.1). The political break-through for development came with the in-
augural speech of US-President Truman in 1949 (Sachs 1992: 2). Truman promised American 
help for underdeveloped countries along modernist lines. Consequently, the first development 
interventions were conceived and they heavily focused on promoting GDP growth and indu-
strialization. Belief in the merits of technological progress was unfaltering while the Cold 
War added a political dimension to development. Western governments rushed to ‘assist’ pro-
western developing nations through the transfer of Western technology. These efforts, howev-
er, met with limited success (Kuhnen 1987: 158). 
(2) 1960 - 1970 - The first development decade 
The 1960s were officially declared by the UN as the “First Development Decade” (Kuhnen 
1987: 158; UN 2009c). Faced with the limited success of a purely growth-focused develop-
ment approach, the consensus on modernization theory began to crumble. Social aspects of 
development were brought into focus, and development was redefined as “growth with 
change,” referring to economic and cultural change. Development projects consequently ex-
panded their scope to also intervene in political and social transformation processes (Korff 
and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a: 6-7). Nonetheless, poverty was still constructed as income pover-
ty. The 1960s also saw the rise of dependency-theory as an academic counter-theory against 
modernism. Dependency theorists argued that under-development was caused by the domin-
ance of the industrialized nations in the world market. Due to this structural constraint depen-
dency theorists saw little chance for under-developed nations to ever reach the level of the 
industrialized countries. In hindsight, dependency theory has seen more academic than prac-
tical impact. It is sometimes described as a “theory without strategy” (Matis und Bachinger 
2004). Moreover, dependency theory is being denounced for uncritically accepting the exis-
tence of under-development and poverty which only lend further academic legitimization to 
these concepts, although dependency theorists had originally set out to oppose them (Esteva 
1992: 11). One achievement of dependency theory, however, is the weakening of the academ-
ic dominance of modernization theory and the push for a more multidimensional and less eth-
nocentristic approach to development (Matis and Bachinger 2004). 
(3) 1970-1980 - The second development decade 
While the first development decade had tackled economic and social dimensions of develop-
ment separately, at the beginning of the second development decade, real integration of these 
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dimensions became the watchword. GDP was finally dethroned as the undisputed develop-
ment indicator and the call for a more broadly defined decent standard of living measured by 
human development indicators was raised. In 1970, World Bank President Robert McNamara 
launched his “war on poverty”. In the same year, the UN proposed a global strategy for a uni-
fied approach to development. This strategy called for an inclusion of all sectors of society in 
development, the creation of employment opportunities and the promotion of social equality. 
The scope of development had therefore further globalized and broadened. One of the meas-
ures taken was the large scale provision of cheap credit by state-owned banks to smallholders 
and low-asset families with the aim to promote growth and alleviate poverty (Armendariz and 
Morduch 2005: ix, 9-10). In 1972, the “discovery” and conceptualization of an informal sec-
tor of employment by the ILO was another consequence of this broadening scope (Dichter 
2007b: 3). The importance of social welfare for ‘the poor’ was emphasized, as well as the 
fiscal incapability of developing nations to establish full blown social security systems as in 
developed societies (Zacher 1988: 30; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 10). This led to a limitation 
of governments to a “basic needs” approach to poverty alleviation which focused on ex-post 
coping measures such as food aid (Rankin 2006: 89). It also led to a search for alternative 
measures such as the emphasis on non-statutory traditional self-help institutions and lastly to 
the fallback on NGOs which at the time made a forceful appearance on the main stage of de-
velopment. NGOs were considered to reach the poor more effectively than the cash-strapped 
governments of under-developed nations (Hüsken and Koning 2006: 10; Dichter 2007b: 3) 
According to Dichter (2007b: 3), after NGOs got involved in poverty alleviation and in the 
hatching of the informal sector, the appearance of the first microcredits was only a further 
logical step. In 1976, later Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus started his group-
based microcredit program in Bangladesh on an NGO basis. Much later, this project turned 
into a commercial bank, the Grameen Bank. 
Despite the significant expansion of development in terms of scope, methods and actors, a 
unified consensus on development did not emerge during the 1970s. Instead, the decade saw a 
successive chain of the newly identified dimensions of development rising to prominence. 
Concerns with environment, population, hunger, women, habitat or employment, were suc-
cessively brought to the forefront and disappeared again from collective development con-
science (Esteva 1992: 13-15). The decade therefore saw the final break through of a still on-
going pattern in development which Ellermann (2007) calls “development fads”:  
One response to failing organizational effectiveness in . . . development assistance is chasing er-
satz 'solutions' or fads that promise to quickly address long-standing problems or at least their 
symptoms. Over the course of time, there is indeed some 'learning' but it is a kind of breathless 
pseudo-learning as one fad after another is taken up and dropped. (Ellermann 2007: 150) 
On a political level, moderately authoritarian forms of government in developing countries 
were considered advantageous. Such governments were held to have the means and power to 
quickly push through the ever new development initiatives proposed by international donors 
(Hofmann and Schröder 2003: 14; Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a: 7). 
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(4) 1980-1990 - The lost decade of development 
During the 1980s, the World Bank and its related international financial institutions embarked 
on rigorous restructuring programs in developing countries. These Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams (SAP) called for a deregulation of markets, privatization of state enterprises and severe 
cut-backs of government spending. This induced frequent scale-backs of the already weak 
public social protection systems in developing countries. The trigger for restructuring was the 
debt crisis of the early 1980s. The driving rationale was that in face of the failure of even 
moderately authoritarian governments to promote the planned economic and social changes 
this task should now be taken over by the free market (Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a: 7). 
Again, much as in the 1950s, the main concern of development was economic and market-
based growth. Efficient markets were considered instrumental, necessary and sufficient for 
income generation and thus, by way of the infamous trickle-down effect, to poverty allevia-
tion. Although poverty alleviation was still upheld as the main development objective, in 
practice the potential environmental and social side effects of SAPs were hardly considered. 
The results of readjustment were severe. In many developing countries SAPs led to rising 
unemployment, real wage reductions, deteriorating social indicators and growing in-country 
inequality (Hofmann and Schröder 2003: 13-14). According to some observes the SAPs de-
stroyed much of the development achievements of previous decades. The 1980s therefore 
came to be called the “lost decade of development” (Esteva 1992: 16; Korff and Tigges Liza-
razo 2008a: 7). One of the criticisms against microfinance is based on this period of break-
neck deregulation. The argument runs as follows: market-based microcredit, which received 
increasing attention during the 1980s, is criticized for privatizing the costs of readjustment, 
for privatizing public debt (Kron 2004: 16). However, one of the more positive aspects of 
readjustment policy was the halt to government credit programs which had left a legacy of 
inefficiency, corruption, millions of dollars of squandered subsidies and, if any, limited posi-
tive impacts on the low-asset credit takers (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: ix, 10). Those 
programs had, with a few exceptions, ended up with default rates between 40 to 95 percent. 
Now, public banks were reorganized to take a market-based approach. One successful exam-
ple is the reorganization of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) that was started in 1984 and has 
turned the grossly loss-making bank into a highly profitable microfinance enterprise with over 
27 million low-asset customers. Today, BRI is sometimes considered the largest MFI in the 
world (Robinson 2001: 59; Simtowe 2008: 29; Heydel et al. 2009: 15). Consequently, the 
focus on market-based microfinance gained significant strength in these years (Rankin 2006: 
99). 
 (5) 1990-2000 - The fourth decade of development 
The upheavals which followed the SAPs caused the World Bank to adjust its own adjustment 
agenda towards “adjustment with a human face” (Hofmann and Schröder 2003: 14). In prac-
tice this meant the continuation of deregulation and privatization efforts. However, the market 
based approach was expanded to also include investment in infrastructure, human assets and 
social protection. In what has become known as the Washington Consensus this was a reaf-
firmation of market based solutions as the panacea to development in its now greatly ex-
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panded scope (Fischer and Burchhardt 2003: 4). Noteworthy is the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Report of 1990 (World Bank 1990). It outlines a three pronged development strat-
egy consisting of (1) economic growth, which - among other measures - was to be promoted 
by intensively using the poor’s labor as their most important asset; (2) investments in basic 
health and education to enable the poor to use their labor productively; and (3) the provision 
of - still ex-post coping oriented - social safety nets to protect vulnerable groups and the very 
‘poor’ (Moser 1998: 2). Moser (2001: 361) criticizes that in practice this strategy amounted to 
a “two and a half leg” approach to poverty alleviation, with safety nets as the poor relation. At 
the time, social risk management had still not been recognized as a crucial component for 
achieving the commonly accepted goals of development. However, something that gained 
rapid acceptance and quickly turned into a new “development fad” was microfinance. Micro-
finance, which at the time still exclusively meant microcredit, fit well into the market-based 
thrust to poverty alleviation of the time, especially because it appeared to offer an easy “silver 
bullet” solution to a world tired of the complexity of the poverty problem and the lack of suc-
cess in resolving it (Mahajan 2007a: 197; Cohen and Young 2007: 208). More scathingly, 
Kron (2004: 16) speaks of microcredit as the “neoliberal panacea in the fight against poverty.” 
Consequently, a surge in funding and subsidies propelled the Grameen Bank and other MFIs 
to stellar growth (Morduch 1999b: 229; Dichter 2007b: 3). If microfinance had started off as a 
socially oriented small-scale NGO movement, it now turned into a rapidly expanding and 
professionalizing industry, with many NGOs converting to MFIs (Mosley 1996; Dichter 
2007b: 3-4). Robinson (2001: 10) calls this process of rapid expansion and professionalization 
the “microfinance revolution”. Again, microfinance is therewith a clear development tool. I 
consequently agree with Rankin (2007: 99) who considers “the recent flourishing of microfin-
ance as a development strategy.”  
The widely acknowledged failure of structural adjustment policy in the 1980s saw the rise of a 
new academic challenge to the foundations of development. In 1992, Sachs and other devel-
opment critics launched a call for the complete abandoning of development and the ushering 
in of an era of post-development. According to Sachs (1992: 2), development had outlived its 
four founding premises: (1) the placement of the United States and other industrialized na-
tions at the top of the evolutionary scale in line with Rostow’s five-stages model (today se-
riously challenged by the multiple-earths paradigm); (2) the East-West conflict as the political 
background of development (which was quickly subsiding since the late 1980s); (3) the (un-
fulfilled) promise of rapid ‘modernization’ and abolition of poverty; and (4) the alleged self-
perpetuating tendency of development which does not strive for abolition of poverty but for a 
continuation of poverty. Sachs considers development as bereft of meaning, without a proven 
track record, and as a threat to cultural diversity. Esteva (1992: 19), in reference to Polanyi’s 
concept of embeddedness and to Sahlins’ reciprocity concept, adds that the threat of market 
based development was most serious to the social structure of societies in which non-
economic assumptions governed lives and which renounced the idea of scarcity. Sachs and his 
fellow post-development advocates perceived development as an ever-expanding cast of 
mind:  
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By now development has become an amoeba-like concept, shapeless but ineradicable. Its contours 
are so blurred that it denotes nothing - while it spreads everywhere because it connotes the best of 
intentions. (Sachs 1992: 4) 
Korff and Tigges Lizarazo (2008a: 9; 2008b) describe the expanding scope of development in 
terms of issues, actors and spatial spheres as the “totalization of development” (2008b: 3). 
They also acknowledge that in hindsight - and similar to the fate of dependency theory - post-
development has not had much practical influence:  
Certainly, development like it was conceived during the fifties as modernization is over, but does 
this mean that development has lost its appeal? In fact, speaking with people in developing coun-
tries, development is still alive and kicking. . . . Thus, the end of development is perhaps a post-
modern meta-narrative shared among the blasé cynics of the developed world. (Korff and Tigges 
Lizarazo 2008a: 6) 
Interestingly enough, Max Weber had already formulated much of the rationale of post-
development advocates before the modernist development agenda had even been invented. 
Weber regarded history as a “chain of circumstances” (Weber 1920: i, cited by Bayer and 
Mordt 2008: 81) which renders efforts at predictions and planning of the future futile. Moreo-
ver, Weber dreaded the consequences of too much development in Western societies. He did 
not consider them as a role model for other societies (Buss 1985: 28, 32).  
With regards to the question of the role model function of Western societies, another critical 
stance towards development, the “Asian Way” concept, should be noted. Since the early 
1980s, this concept had been gaining an ever-growing political clout in the rapidly growing 
Asian “tiger economies”. It was politically spearheaded by Singapore and Malaysia. Their 
governments maintained that the adoption of Western technology to drive economic growth 
was welcome, but that the adoption of Western culture was not. Asian leaders argued for a 
strong reliance on ‘traditional’ Asian values such as family, community and national unity. In 
effect, they argued for a combination of “the best of two worlds” (Buss 1985: 37-38). Natural-
ly, these Asian “traditions” were just as constructed and idealized as was the modernist idea 
of “tradition”. Moreover, the “Asian Way” concept has often been criticized for being a polit-
ical excuse for poor human rights track records (Reding 1999). Nonetheless, the rapid eco-
nomic rise of some Asian nations despite the little outreach of externally funded development 
interventions in these areas has left development practitioners and academics wondering and 
debating as to the underlying causes (cf. Ellermann 2007: 149).16
Despite the sharp intellectual critique of post-development advocates and the increasing eco-
nomic, social and political emancipation of the Asian “tiger states”, development continued to 
go strong in the 1990s. But it soon faced new challenges. The Asian financial crisis that 
erupted in 1997 brought home the fact that the singular focus on economic growth and the 
simultaneous neglect of social protection was responsible for a sharp rises in Asian poverty 
rates in the crisis’ wake (Dercon 2005b: 13; Koning and Hüsken 2006: vii). Therefore, the 
 
                                                 
16 For an introduction to these debates see Appelbaum and Chambliss (1997: 177-180). 
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softened continuation of market based adjustment came increasingly under fire. In addition, 
academic research had furthered the multidimensional understanding of poverty, to now also 
incorporate considerations of vulnerability and risk management. Lastly, a series of major UN 
conferences raised political concern for poverty alleviation and for more “good governance”. 
“Good governance” can be understood as a benign regulatory involvement to smooth the dis-
ruptions caused by a market economy on the loose (Hofmann and Schröder 2003: 12; Holz-
mann et al. 2003: 18; Schramm et al. 2005: 51; Grusky and Kanbur 2006: 2; Korff and Tigges 
Lizarazo 2008a: 8).  
(6) 2000 up to today 
In the face of the resurging international attention on poverty alleviation, the UN did not even 
wait for its fourth development decade to end before launching the next development decade 
under the label of the “decade of the eradication of poverty” in 1997 (cf. UN 2009c). This 
indicates the gradually increasing time pressure put on the development agenda. UNDP intro-
duced its multidimensional Human Development Indicator index in 1997 to reflect an ex-
panded conception of poverty. In continuation, the 2000/2001 World Development Report of 
the World Bank also took up the concerns which had been boiling since the late 1990s (World 
Bank 2000). The report re-emphasized the importance of the three pronged poverty alleviation 
strategy of the 1990 World Development Report, namely spurring economic growth, creating 
jobs and focusing on social protection. However, the decisive difference was that this time 
around the Bank’s focus on social protection and the related issue of vulnerability and risk 
management was taken more seriously. Other major organizations such as the ILO and UNDP 
quickly followed suit and adopted risk management as a major theme in their work (Morduch 
2006: 338). In 2001, the World Bank presented its Social Risk Management (SRM) frame-
work in a social protection strategy paper (World Bank 2001). The paper outlines the three 
principal features of SRM: (1) it conceptualizes risk management strategies much the same 
way as outlined above (cf. section 2.3); (2) it stresses that risk management efforts should go 
beyond public social protection and include informal and market-based risk management so-
lutions;17
As the World Bank moves toward a broader understanding of poverty reduction and the relation-
ship of risk to poverty, the standard concepts and interventions of social protection are no longer 
sufficient. This first sector strategy paper for social protection reflects this view and argues for the 
development of social protection programs that not only help poor women and men cope with the 
result of downturns (a safety net), but proactively help them take on higher return activities with 
less concern about the risks (a springboard). (World Bank 2001: iii)  
 and (3) it recognizes that good risk management can be an important driver for eco-
nomic growth. This led the World Bank to call for developing public social protection and the 
broader social risk management from a safety net into a springboard, from the previous mini-
malist ex-post focus on risk coping into an active and economically conducive ex-ante risk 
management drive:  
                                                 
17 A more detailed definition of social protection, social security, social insurance and safety nets is provided in 
section 3.3.3.  
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The paper continues to explicitly mention the potential of market-based risk management so-
lutions and the World Bank’s commitment to support microsavings and microinsurance: 
Specifically, the strategic directions would expand the World Bank’s support for informal and 
market-based social protection arrangements . . . The World Bank will support pilot programs that 
better integrate social protection interventions with microfinance products, especially microsav-
ings and microinsurance. (World Bank 2001: iii, 37) 
Moser (2001: 361, 362) concludes that by 2000, the World Bank had finally expanded its pre-
vious two and a half leg approach to a full-blown three leg approach to development. This 
created conducive conditions within the development discourse to throw its financial and po-
litical clout at the promotion of microinsurance and microsavings. Several years before, mi-
crocredit had been boosted by the development community’s drive for market-based, growth 
oriented, and poverty focused initiatives. Now that risk management had moved to center 
stage, the time had come for microsavings and microinsurance to follow the pathway of mi-
crocredit and to grow far beyond their feeble beginnings in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, inter-
est in microcredit rose to a crescendo when the United Nations declared 2005 as the “Year of 
Microcredit” (UN 2009c); notably not as the “Year of Microfinance” (which may be yet to 
come). Public attention rose even further when Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen bank 
were awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. 
A number of other buzzwords, or “development fads”, accompanied this “reinvention of de-
velopment” that became known as the Post-Washington Consensus (Chaves and Guttal 2003: 
33; Fischer and Burchardt 2003: 4). These buzzwords were good governance, sustainability, 
empowerment, gender, capacity building, participation and the already critically discussed 
emphasis on strengthening social capital (cf. section 2.4). The simultaneous appearance of 
such a concentrated number of “development fads”, instead of appearing successively as be-
fore, further demonstrates the ever increasing speed and totalization of development discourse 
and practice. As usual, critics were quick to denounce the new development buzzwords as 
window-dressing efforts masquerading a continued neo-liberal agenda (Chaves and Guttal 
2003: 33). For example, the World Bank’s understanding of participation was denounced as 
friendly listening instead of addressing existing power-differentials and rights-based inclusion 
of development “beneficiaries” in decision making processes. In parallel, the claim for “good 
governance” was considered as a mere tool to produce an enabling environment for the pri-
vate sector and for protecting the rights of corporate, usually foreign, investors (Chaves and 
Guttal 2003: 31, 33; Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a: 8). 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) probably make for the greatest proof of the tota-
lization of development. The MDGs were endorsed by the UN in 2000 and set eight specific 
development goals to be achieved, mostly until 2015 (UN 2008):  
(1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 
(2) achieve universal primary education, 
(3) promote gender equality and empower women, 
(4) reduce child mortality, 
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(5) improve maternal health, 
(6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 
(7) ensure environmental sustainability, 
(8) develop a global partnership for development. 
These eight targets are further broken down into over 20 sub-targets and finally over 60 con-
crete and measurable indicators (UN 2008: 4). The most famous of these indicators relates to 
MDG1 and calls for the reduction of extreme poverty by half (taking the US$ 1 PPP poverty 
line) until 2015 as compared to a 1990 baseline. Almost all of the mentioned buzzwords make 
their appearance in the MDG agenda. Its proponents openly acknowledge the MDG agenda to 
be the most ambitious but nonetheless achievable developmental undertaking ever embraced 
by the international community (Sachs 2005: 25; McGillivray 2008; UN 2009b). The MDG8 
on a global development partnership explicitly aims to include the private sector. One institu-
tionalized form of this expansion of development onto the private sector is the United Nations 
Global Compact. The Global Compact initiative was established by the United Nations in 
2000 to better align the activities of private businesses with its own agenda in the areas of 
human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption, and last but not least to catalyze private 
sector action in support of the other seven MDGs. Today, over 5200 businesses have joined 
the Global Compact, among them, since 2002, Allianz (UN 2009a). Next to development’s 
recent refocus on risk management, this simultaneous integration of the private sector into the 
development agenda has certainly contributed further to the conducive environment for mi-
croinsurance to flourish since the turn of the Millennium. In addition, at this time the idea of a 
double bottom line (DBL) of socially responsible and profitable investments started to gain 
increasing currency within the private sector. Sometimes, the idea is even expanded to refer to 
a triple bottom line (TBL) of socially, environmentally and economically sustainable invest-
ments. The realization that profitable business and poverty focused development were no po-
lar opposite but could be congruent was further expanded by a seminal paper of Prahalad and 
Hart (2002) called The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid. This paper triggered a lively 
debate among business leaders and development advocates known as the “Bottom of the Py-
ramid” debate or BoP-debate. Not surprisingly, it was under such conditions that at the turn of 
the Millennium the first public-private development partnerships were conceived. The life 
cycles of development interventions had meanwhile sufficiently shortened to match the aver-
age three-years planning horizons of private enterprise. 
Now, after six decades of development it needs no fortune-telling to foresee that intervention-
ist development practice will continue, as will the debate on its veils and merits. Using the 
MDGs as their new yardstick, supporters of continued and reasserted development efforts 
point to the measurable progresses already made, such as the reduction of extreme poverty 
from 28 percent of the world population in 1990 to 21 percent in 2002, and that, moreover, 
this trend is consistent with non-monetary indicators such as the declining percentage of 
stunted children or the increasing enrollment rates in schools (Holzmann and Sipos 2008: 4). 
Furthermore, Holzmann and Sipos (2008: 4) contend that recent rigorous impact evaluations 
of World Bank-led development interventions in the social protection and labor sector have 
confirmed the positive impacts of these interventions on poverty, malnutrition, access to 
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health services and access to education. On the other hand, development critics like Sachs 
(1992), Chaves and Guttal (2003: 33), Dichter (2007b), Ellermann (2007: 150, 152) and Har-
per (2007a: 47) argue that by and large much of the recent progress has been made not be-
cause of development efforts but in spite of them. This relates to the post-development argu-
ment that the development industry is primarily interested in its own self-perpetuation. Even 
the most rigorous impact evaluations on development project are not spared from critique. 
The standard critique questions the neutrality and objectivity of impact evaluations since the 
implementing organizations and research funding organizations are often identical or closely 
related. Moreover, impact evaluations regularly take “doing nothing” as a counterfactual in-
stead of analyzing through a cost-benefit-analysis whether the deployed resources could have 
been put to better use. Not surprisingly, comparing “doing something” against “doing noth-
ing” often meets with positive results. (Ellermann 2007: 154-155; Armendariz and Morduch 
2005: 224).  
This thesis is too localized and too focused on a singular development intervention to provide 
a general answer as to where the pendulum is heading, towards the veils or the merits of de-
velopment. However, I reiterate my stance that concepts of poverty and human aspirations are 
socially constructed and context specific (cf. section 2.1). A globalized measurement of po-
verty and development progress as epitomized by the MDGs should therefore be regarded as 
idealized and highly simplified at best. What a careful analysis of development’s six decades 
of history can definitely reveal - in line with Sachs (1992) and Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 
(2008b) - is that a totalization of development has occurred in terms of issues, actors and 
spaces. Whether this totalization is devoid of meaning and aimed at self-perpetuation as Sachs 
(1992) contends or whether it is necessary to tackle pressing development issues through a 
global partnership for development (MDG8) remains up for debate. This history of totaliza-
tion, however, has definitely provided the conducive conditions for a public-private-
partnership like the GTZ-Allianz PPP on microinsurance to materialize. In hindsight, it ap-
pears perfectly sensible as to why this has occurred at the turn of the Millennium and not any 
earlier or later. 
 
3.2 Microfinance 
3.2.1  What is microfinance? 
Microfinance is the provision of small-scale financial services to low-asset people, in particu-
lar to those who do not have access to financial services through established channels like 
conventional banking or conventional insurance (cf. Robinson 2001: 9; cf. Karmakar 2009: 
21). Until the 1990s, microfinance was largely synonymous with microcredit, in particular 
with credits for working capital and very small investments to farmers, fishers, petty traders 
and small scale service providers. Since the turn of the Millennium, microfinance has widely 
broadened in scope. Today, it refers to an array of financial services, the three major ones 
being microcredit, microsavings and microcredit (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 14; Leeuw 
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2009: 2). Payment services, such as remittances, mobile micro-banking, and micro-business 
consulting are sometimes considered as additional ancillary microfinance services. Customer 
numbers of microfinance services are somewhat hard to calculate as there are no standard 
definitions and many local variations exist of what is considered a microcredit, microsavings 
or microinsurance. The Indonesian Central Bank considers all credits below IDR 50 million 
(US$ 5,270) as microcredits (Bank Indonesia 2009). Generally, however, the cap for micro-
credits is set much lower; in Africa, Asia and the Middle East at US$ 300; in Latin America 
and the Caribbean at US$ 400 and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia at US$ 1,000 (Sinha 
2006: 9). For microcredit, market measurement has been most unified and institutionalized, 
especially by the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) market initiative. For 2005, 
MIX market reports 50 million microcredit customers worldwide with an outstanding gross 
loan portfolio of US$ 18 billion. For 2007, MIX market already reports 72 million microcredit 
customers with an outstanding gross loan portfolio of US$ 36 billion (MIX Market 2009). 
This points to the strong growth and to the significant size of today’s microfinance industry. 
As not all MFIs report to the MIX market, the number of actual microcredit customers is like-
ly to be several millions higher. Dieckmann (2007: 18) estimates them at around 100 million 
for 2007. And the hopes for the future are exceeding the stellar growth of the past. All micro-
finance practitioners agree that the microcredit market is currently far from saturated. Optim-
ists like Dieckmann (2007: 18) put the potential demand at approximately one billion micro-
borrowers.  
The number of microsavings customers is harder to define and calculate. That is because 
group-based credit as the dominant form of microcredit usually comes with an attached com-
pulsory savings component. Therefore, most microcredit customers automatically have some 
form of microsavings. However, these savings are not voluntary. It is therefore debatable if 
they can be fully reckoned as microsavings. On the other hand, BRI alone has 27 million vo-
luntary savings accounts (and much less credit accounts) and in general the importance of 
voluntary microsavings is growing. Therefore, the number of microsavings accounts is defi-
nitely amounting to several million.  
Regarding microinsurance, customer numbers for 2007 were calculated at 78 million world-
wide. They are assumed to have since risen to 135 million customers (Roth et al. 2007: ii; 
Creagh 2009). Although the number of microinsured seems to be in the same range as the 
number of the microcredit customers, this is largely due to the definitions applied and the fact 
that most microinsurance is provided in form of credit life insurance, which - like compulsory 
savings - is tied to microcredit. However, it is commonly held that microcredit is by far the 
most dominant of the three major microfinance services and that the number of voluntarily 
microinsured low-asset families is very low in comparison. 
Microfinance services are mostly offered and distributed by so-called microfinance institu-
tions (MFI). The MIX market captures information from over 1,100 MFIs worldwide, many 
of which are more or less replicating the group-based Grameen model. The actual number of 
MFIs is likely to be much higher. Allan (2007: 205) and Dieckmann (2007: 5) both estimate 
their total number in the range of 10,000 worldwide. Those who do not report to the MIX 
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market, however, are generally of small size. MFIs can appear in a wide range of institutional 
forms, such as NGOs, cooperatives, credit unions, specialized microfinance banks, or - in 
increasing numbers - microfinance units of commercial banks. If commercial insurance com-
panies engage in microinsurance, they prefer to distribute their products with the help of 
MFIs, rather than through their own agents (see section 3.3.1). MFIs do not only come in a 
variety of institutional flavors but take an even wider variety of methodological approaches. 
Some MFIs lend exclusively to women, some do not follow a gender focus; some provide 
group-based loans only, others take a mixed approach or, like BRI, even limit themselves to 
the provision of individual credit only; some MFIs restrict themselves to a no-frills credit-only 
approach, others pursue a wider agenda of financial services, capacity building and other de-
velopmental campaigns. MFIs can either operate on a non-profit or a for-profit basis. Today, 
most MFIs are seeking to at least achieve financial sustainability. Sinha (2006: 4) fittingly 
concludes that “every MFI is different”. 
3.2.2  Why microfinance rose to prominence 
Above discussion on development (cf. section 3.1) has already alluded to how development 
history provided increasingly conducive conditions for microfinance’s rise to prominence. 
The “war on poverty” of the 1970s initiated the first NGO-driven trials at microcredit. The 
simultaneous large-scale failure of government credit programs and the following market-
leaning SAP policies of the 1980s pushed microcredit further ahead. With the continuing 
structural adjustment of the 1990s and an increasing emphasis on sustainability and participa-
tion microcredit rose to ever higher levels of donor support and public attention. So much so, 
that at the first microcredit summit in 1997, Muhammad Yunus famously declared credit to be 
a human right and predicted that microcredit would make poverty history (Kron 2004: 16; 
Dichter 2007c: 180). In the wake of the Asian financial crisis and several big UN conferences, 
the Post-Washington consensus or the “reinvention of development” brought social protection 
and risk management to more earnest attention of development proponents. As donor prefe-
rence for market-based solutions to development problems remained unshaken and corporate 
awareness of the potential “Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” grew, this provided the 
springboard for voluntary microsavings and especially for microinsurance to follow the foot-
steps of microcredit.  
However, this is very much a development and supply side perspective. The demand of low-
asset families for financial services, including insurance, has not developed in line with grow-
ing donor and corporate enthusiasm, but was, however latently, present long before that. After 
all, in many developing countries, low-asset families eager for a safe place to save were even 
paying fees to informal deposit collectors for guarding their savings, naturally with no interest 
being paid or expected (Rutherford 1999: 13). If the microfinance market was therefore out 
there “untouched” all along, why have private financial companies not tried to serve low-asset 
customers any earlier? This leads to the standard challenges which bankers mention with re-
gards to the low-end market. Traditionally, low-asset families were considered as “unbanka-
ble” because of the perceived high business risks involved. This risk was attributed to low-
asset families’ lack of conventional collateral for credits, such as housing, cars or land with 
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the proper legal documents. Moreover, transaction costs were considered prohibitively high 
due to information asymmetries, anti-selection18
Today, the involvement of multinational finance companies in microfinance is no longer 
hinged on donor support. According to Dieckmann (2007: 10), private sector investments in 
microfinance amounted to US$ 2 billion in 2006 and are forecast to increase tenfold to US$ 
20 billion by 2015. Large multinational companies (MNC) like Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and 
HSBC are now directly providing loans to MFIs or engage in the securitization of the MFIs’ 
loan portfolios (Economist 2005; Dieckmann 2007: 6). Today, it is not only the puplic rela-
tions (PR) compatible message of a DBL and the prospect of short-term profits which drives 
the MNCs on, but also the prospect of developing new markets (where old ones are often sa-
turated) and the goal of creating customer loyalty “from early on”. High hopes are pinned on 
the further rapid economic growth in developing countries. It is reckoned that sooner or later a 
significant number of today’s microfinance customers will ‘emancipate’ or ‘develop’ to be-
come normal profitable mass market consumers. This business rationale is not only held by 
MNCs, but also among smaller microfinance players, as a case study by Seibel and Parhusip 
(1999: 7) on the Indonesian commercial rural bank BPR Bank Shinta Daya’s reasons for get-
ting involved in group-based lending shows. What resounds here is the old modernist idea of 
incentivizing humanity with ever increasing aspirations and bringing everyone up to Western 
consumption levels. The notion that such consumption levels are dangerously high and in fact 
over-developed quickly fades behind the electrifying effect which the prospect of stellar 
growth exerts on big and small companies alike, all the more as public opinion is much in 
favor of their ‘socially responsible investments’.  
, moral hazard, insufficient infrastructure and 
weak judicial systems (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 2, 6-8). In general, ‘the poor’ were 
considered to have no money. Bankers referred to microcredit as financial “suicide in install-
ments” (Buse 2008: 55). Moreover, until the 1980s, government programs offered credit at 
subsidized interest rates which was an additional entry barrier for private financial service 
providers. This attitude only began to change when NGO-led and heavily donor-funded mi-
crocredit programs proved that the poor in fact did have money to spare and even showed 
remarkably high repayment rates. These experiments made it clear that the challenges of mi-
crofinance were not “lack of market” and “access” combined, but in fact only “access”. The 
microfinance bottleneck lies with the supply side, not with the demand side. Group-based 
lending methodologies proved that by innovative means the “access” challenge could be 
overcome. The resulting tenuous interest of private financial companies was greatly pampered 
by generous donor support. This allowed private companies to establish low-risk, low-cost 
pilot projects. 
Microfinance could have developed earlier from a technical point of view. The market was 
there before the 1970s and joint liability and group-lending methods are nothing new either. 
                                                 
18 Anti-selection refers to the tendency of “bad risks”, for example chronically ill people, to seek insurance cov-
erage and moreover try to hide their condition from the insurer, while “good risks”, such as young and healthy 
people, opt against insurance. Having too many “bad risks” in the risk pool can quickly threaten the financial 
stability of insurance companies. 
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They have been recorded for Ireland since the early 18th century and for Germany since the 
19th century (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 140; Simtowe 2008: 27). Dichter (2007c: 187) 
regards the US-Morris Plan thrifts of the early 20th
3.2.3 Microcredit 
 century, which also used joint liability, as 
perhaps the first true microcredit precursors. However, for microfinance to be conceived as 
feasible and to “take off”, it needed the particularly conducive circumstances of the overall 
development discourse. Therefore, development initiatives have definitely had an enormous 
business impact in hedging a whole new industry. Whether the impact on poverty alleviation 
can be seen just as positively is up for debate. Section 3.2.5 on microfinance debates and sec-
tion 3.2.6 on microcredit impact discusses this question further. 
The rationale of donors and MFIs to support microcredit is simple. They hold that many low-
asset people have significant entrepreneurial skills and need credit to realize their business 
potential, but that they were credit constrained before the advent of microcredit (Sadoulet 
2005: 390). The principal challenge is therefore “access”, not “affordability” or “lack of mar-
ket”. Once sufficient credit is provided for working capital or small-scale investments, the 
small scale businesses of low-asset borrowers will grow and flourish to provide their families 
with higher and more stable incomes. Until today, most microcredits are short-term loans of 
up to one year duration which are targeted at business purposes. However, some MFIs have 
started to provide microcredits free of any usage restrictions (Banerjee et al. 2009: 4).  
Who are the recipients of microcredits? Robinson (2001) provides a good summary:  
People who farm or fish or herd; who operate small enterprises or microenterprises where goods 
are produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; who provide services; who work for wages or commis-
sions; who gain income from renting out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or machi-
nery and tools; and . . . other individuals and groups at the local levels of developing countries, 
both rural and urban. Many such households have multiple sources of income. (Robinson 2001: 9) 
In fact, most microcredit borrowers today are women, and the main supported business activi-
ty is petty trade (broadly defined). The character of these micro-businesses deserves some 
attention. Usually, these are family run business without any non-family employees. In Indo-
nesia, most petty trades are in fact one-person nano-enterprises. The female petty traders do 
not account for their working time and have few other fixed and variable costs. Consequently, 
these businesses often show extremely high rates of return (Schrader 1994: 45-46; Banerjee et 
al. 2009: 20). Moreover, as the businesses are very small, the “principle of diminishing re-
turns” works in their favor. This principle says that enterprises with relatively little capital 
should be able to earn higher returns on their investments than enterprises with a great deal of 
capital (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 5). The female petty traders often achieve and sur-
pass profit margins on invested capital of 100 percent per year. Such high returns help to ex-
plain part of the high credit repayment rates which MFIs have constantly been reporting. 
However, this favorable situation starts to disappear once the business starts to grow beyond 
its original nano-size. As soon as employees, rent, inventory keeping and diminishing returns 
get involved, an entirely different from of business management is needed. Most petty trades 
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never make it to that level of complexity. They rather remain stagnant on a low economic 
level. The fact that this may even be in the interest of the petty trading women as a low-profile 
solution to the traders’ dilemma has already been mentioned above (cf. section 2.2.4).  
High repayment rates are often mentioned when speaking of the success of microcredit. The 
Grameen Bank has long reported loan recovery rates of over 98 percent (Morduch 1999b: 
229). ASA, another large MFI in Bangladesh, even reported a loan recovery rate of 99.9 per-
cent in 2003 and full cost coverage since 1993 (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 1). Several 
authors, however, rightly point out that such spectacular figures are only representative of the 
better-known and better-managed so-called “top tier” MFIs, while financial sustainability is 
elusive for over 90 percent of MFIs (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 4; Allan 2007: 49; Ma-
hajan 2007a: 205; Dieckmann 2007: 6). Morduch (1999b: 231) adds that the definition of re-
payment rates varies widely across microfinance institutions. In any case, the “top tier” MFIs 
have proven that microcredits can achieve near perfect repayment rates, and that seen from 
this perspective, low-asset families can represent a lower credit risk than conventional cus-
tomers (Simtowe 2008: 27). It also needs to be considered that interest rates for microcredits 
are much higher than for conventional credits in Western countries. Effective interest rates 
often amount to over 30 percent per year and can easily be as high as 50 percent or more. Al-
though this is still considerably less than what informal moneylenders usually charge, the high 
interest rates nonetheless add a significant additional financial burden onto the loan to be re-
paid. 
Besides the fact that the loan portfolios need to be well managed and that the micro-debtors 
can indeed afford timely installment payments despite high interest rates, the success of mi-
crocredits is attributed to five distinct features: (1) group-based lending, (2) incremental loan 
sizes (or progressive lending), (3) short installment frequencies, (4) the disconnection of in-
stallment payments from actual business success, and (5) lastly the much commented gender 
focus on women.  
(1) Group-based lending. Most microcredits today are provided on a group basis rather than 
on an individual basis(Harper 2007a: 36). Group-based loans work on the principle of joint 
liability. Loans are provided to anywhere from five to forty members of a credit group. If one 
credit group member does not repay the loan, the fellow group members have to step in for 
her19
                                                 
19 As the majority of microcredit customers are female, I refer to them in female terms. 
. If this is not done, all group members are considered to be in default and none of the 
group members can apply for a follow-up loan (Sadoulet 2005: 390). The joint liability prin-
ciple therefore replaces the material collateral of conventional credits with social collateral. 
Out of their best self-interest, the group members exert the necessary social pressure on their 
fellow members to ensure timely loan repayments. Joint liability groups are often equated 
with solidarity groups (IDB 1998: 27; Simtowe 2008: 27). It should be clear, however, that 
joint liability in group-based lending does not work on altruistic solidarity but on solidarity 
motivated by self-interest (Rankin 2006: 102). This reprises the pattern that we have observed 
earlier regarding the balanced reciprocity arrangements in embedded moral societies (cf. sec-
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tion 2.2.2). Some MFIs even use public repayments to heighten the ability to generate stigma 
or, more powerfully, the threat of stigma in case of non-repayment (Armendariz and Morduch 
2005: 138). Moreover, the women self-assess the character and the business prospects of their 
fellow members and only allow “reputable” and “reliable” women to join the group. This re-
solves much of the information asymmetry problems previously associated with lending to 
low-asset customers. In its most traditional form, group credits are disbursed at the same time 
to all group members and repaid following exactly the same installment schedule over the 
course of a few months to a year. However, there are many different varieties of the group-
based lending methodology. Dian Mandiri (DIMAN), one of the MFI partners of Allianz in 
Indonesia, requires the credit group members to pledge some soft collateral such as refrigera-
tors or TV sets to the group. In case of default, the group is entitled to confiscate and sell the 
soft collateral instead of providing cash assistance. PPKM Bina Swadaya, another of Allianz’ 
MFI partners, provides individual credits but nonetheless uses group meetings for efficient 
loan installment collection. Moreover, PPKM Bina Swadaya does not provide credit to any 
group members if other members, who had taken an earlier turn at disbursements, were not 
up-to-date with their credit installments. Instead of a direct contractual joint liability obliga-
tion, this creates an indirect liability and still seems to generate the required level of social 
pressure.  
(2) Incremental loan sizes (progressive lending). Microcredit programs often operate on a 
sequence of loan cycles. With every successfully completed loan, the women can apply for 
higher loan amounts than before. The prospect of increasing loan sizes, and the threat of not 
receiving any loan upon default, serves as another strong incentive for timely repayments 
(Sadoulet 2005: 388-389; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 122). The micro-debtors thereby 
prove their reputability and create their own credit-history, which is again a measure to reduce 
information asymmetries. Although credit group members typically start with the same or 
very similar loan amounts, later on, as the group moves from cycle to cycle, some members 
are granted higher loans than others, depending on business prospects and credit history. This 
leads to increasing disparities and potential conflicts. MFIs often try to resolve this problem 
by splitting the larger initial credit group into several smaller groups. Many MFIs also offer 
the possibility of eventually “graduating” to larger individual loans. Nonetheless, most MFIs 
have certain limits regarding the maximum loan size provided. When group-based customers 
reach this limit (not all do, and many who do are content with the achieved limit), the incen-
tive of incremental loan sizes diminishes. Consequently, repayment discipline often tends to 
weaken after several loan cycles.  
(3) Short installment frequencies. Group-based loans are typically repaid during weekly group 
meetings. Some loans are even repaid on a daily basis, while for larger and individual loans 
monthly installments are often used. The lump-sum repayments of investment credits which 
are common in conventional banking are unknown in microfinance. Such short repayment 
frequencies suit low-asset borrowers because of the volatility of their income and their limited 
possibilities to save for upcoming loan installments over the long term. Moreover, frequent 
meetings generate more opportunities to exert social pressure on late payers. Therefore, the 
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short installment frequencies of microcredits have also been linked to high repayment rates 
(Harper 2007a: 44).  
(4) Disconnection of installment payments from business success. Typically, loan installments 
start immediately after the microloan has been disbursed. This is because the repayment ca-
pacity of the micro-debtors is evaluated on a “without the loan” basis; that is, microloans are 
not provided on the basis of expected revenues from the loan in question but based on the 
current repayment capacity of the entire family (not only the credit taker). The MFIs want to 
make sure that the loan can be repaid even if the planned investment fails; and they want to 
put this obligation into practice as timely as possible (Von Pischke 2002: 374; Armendariz 
and Morduch 2005: 132). Agricultural micro-loans to farmers differ somewhat from this pat-
tern as they in fact differ from many other of the generalizations presented here. Farmers 
usually borrow for seeds and fertilizers at the beginning of the planting season while repay-
ments are often postponed until the harvesting season when money is more easily available. In 
general, loans for agricultural activities are considered to be more risky. As they only played a 
minor role among Allianz’ MFI partners they are not further dealt with here. 
(5) Gender focus on female borrowers. Next to group-based lending, the fact that most micro-
credit customers are women is certainly the best known peculiarity of microcredits. In the 
beginning, however, there was no particular focus on women. Initially, Grameen lent to a 
large number of men as well. Only when Grameen realized that repayment rates of female 
customers were higher than those of male customers did it start to focus on women (Armenda-
riz and Morduch 2005: 138). Many other MFIs have made the same experience and followed 
suit. The gender focus of microfinance therefore originated from logistical reasons, not be-
cause of an inherent agenda of “female empowerment”. This was only attached to microfin-
ance when the gender and empowerment concerns became more salient in the development 
discourse. Several reasons have been suggested why women show higher repayment rates in 
group-based programs (not in individual lending): In most cultures, women hold the main 
responsiblity for maintaining social networks and for guarding family welfare. They are there-
fore said to be more sensitive to social pressure, more cautious in their investment decisions, 
and - unlike men - more reliable to invest in ultimately welfare enhancing activities rather 
than risky businesses or even gambling, tobacco and alcohol. Women are generally also more 
confined to the home than their more mobile husbands. It is therefore considered easier to 
involve women in the highly social and time consuming group-lending methodology with its 
frequent meetings (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 139; Rankin 2006: 99). Regarding Indo-
nesia, the female focus of most MFIs there is supported by the fact that most petty traders, at 
least on Java island, are women. In a sample of petty traders in Java, the female ratio was over 
80 percent (Evers 1994b: 74). Moreover, many authors have commented that Javanese wom-
en are the principal responsible not only for social relation management but also for domestic 
financial management (Papanek and Schwede 1988: 71, 89; Lont 2000: 162; Forshee 2006: 
161). My own research findings confirm this (see section 7.1). Naturally, this makes Indone-
sian low-asset women very suitable microcredit customers. 
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Apart from the outlined five main features of primarily group-based microlending, it should 
again be noted that most microcredit programs have a compulsory savings feature. As much 
as 5 to 10 percent of the loan is withheld by the MFIs as compulsory saving. Upon successful 
loan repayment, the withheld money is either paid out or retained for the next loan cycle, most 
often at no interest. Some MFIs require customers to save for a certain time before the first 
loan is disbursed in order to prove their credit-worthiness. However, such compulsory savings 
are generally not used as a financial tool of the debtors but rather serve as a way for the MFIs 
to acquire relatively cheap capital and to secure a form of collateral from borrowers (Dercon 
2005c: 447; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 149; Hulme 2007: 19). Also the frequently in-
built insurance feature against death of the debtor or natural disasters should be mentioned. 
For example, the Grameen methodology waives the outstanding loan balance in case the deb-
tor dies (Simtowe 2008: 28). However, extra payouts are not provided. This self-insurance is 
often financed through internal provisioning of the MFIs. Typically, 0.5 to 1 percent of the 
disbursed loan amounts are accounted for as emergency reserve. Such arrangements are usual-
ly calculated by rule of thumb and not properly assessed from an actuarial risk management 
perspective. Especially in case of disasters, the customers have no clear contractual claims 
against the emergency fund. This gives the MFIs great flexibility to make use of their emer-
gency reserves at their own discretion. Although customers are generally informed of their 
“life” protection, the word “insurance” is not mentioned. MFIs prefer to speak of a “service” 
or “feature” in order to avoid the negative connotations and questions that insurance arises in 
many low-asset societies.  
The typical group-lending process starts with the formation of the credit group. Usually, the 
loan officer of an MFI enters a low-asset area or a kampung and identifies potential group 
leaders. These are women of high social repute, extensive social connections and a thriving 
micro-business. Naturally, these women also need to be interested in obtaining microcredits. 
The group leader then starts to gather other interested women to form a credit group. Before 
the loans are disbursed, the loan officer provides some upfront training and information. Part 
of the preparation process is the formal election of the group leader, who may be supported by 
a deputy and a treasurer. The group leaders are not paid for their work. Their compensation 
therefore consists of symbolic capital only. The groups also choose a group name. In Indone-
sia, names of flowers such as “Bougainville” are popular, as are names of near or far away 
locations such as “Kampung Daun” or “Eiffel Tower”. When the moment of loan disburse-
ment approaches, the loan officer makes a formal loan assessment. One of the purposes of the 
loan assessments is to verify that the applying women really have an existing micro-business 
and a credible intention to invest in that business. Another purpose is to match the loan 
amount with the repayment capacity of the women. Loans which exceed the borrower’s ab-
sorption capacity can quickly lead to defaults and spirals of debt (cf. Robinson 2000: 31). 
Most MFIs require all women to already have a microenterprise running for some time. Be-
cause of the high associated risk, the establishment of entirely new businesses is rarely sup-
ported. Upon successful completion of the loan assessment, the loans are disbursed. Repay-
ment meetings usually start immediately the following week, always at the same time on the 
same weekday. This routine is important in order to make repayment a habit. The loan offic-
ers, who generally have senior high school or higher education and are often male, make their 
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daily rounds on motorcycles and sometimes even on foot to visit four to five groups per day. 
Roughly speaking, from Monday to Thursday the loan officers of Indonesian group-lending 
MFIs can serve 15 to 20 credit groups with a total of 200 to 300 members. Unlike the Gra-
meen Bank in Bangladesh, Indonesian MFIs often do not require all group members to be 
present at every group meeting. Sometimes the group leader has already collected the due 
installments and just passes them on to the loan officer; or the loan officer spends a good hour 
at the house of the group leader and the group members drop in at any time during that visit to 
pay their installments. On Fridays, loan officers often dedicate themselves to administrative 
work, training and other internal MFI activities. Few MFIs open on Saturdays.The fact that 
the loan officers go out to visit their low-asset customers, a process very different from con-
ventional branch-based banking, explains a good part of the generally high transaction costs 
in microcredit and consequently the relatively high interest rates. The small loan amounts, 
which in Indonesia can start as low as US$ 50 and rarely exceed US$ 500, are another reason 
for high interest rates. It would be cheaper to process a single large loan than to take the same 
amount of money and partition it into many small microcredit portions.  
It was already noted that every MFI is different. In addition, the MFIs and their credit groups 
are very dynamic. MFIs constantly try to improve their lending methodology; changes are 
made to the customer selection and loan assessment process; new branches are opened, others 
are closed; loan officers join and leave again; new products are developed and launched while 
others are abandoned et cetera. Moreover, in the field, the rules of the prescribed lending me-
thodology are often bent and interpreted in different ways. The credit groups themselves are 
even more dynamic than the MFIs. Members leave the group and others join; some groups 
disband quickly, others survive over several loan cycles; some groups show very good re-
payment performance, others get stuck quickly; young groups are still intimidated by the 
threat of sanctions on late repayments, while more experienced groups already find ways to 
negotiate and influence the MFIs’ terms to their favor. This dynamic process is thrilling to 
observe. However, the constantly changing conditions in the field pose a challenge to impact 
research, especially to longitudinal research that runs for several months or years, as was the 
case with Payung Keluarga (see section 5.3.3). 
3.2.4 Microsavings 
Microsavings has taken a long time to emancipate itself from its former role as a compulsory 
assistant of microcredit. Microsavings is now being recognized by development advocates as 
a highly demanded microfinance service and an effective risk management tool. However, 
Dercon (2005c: 447) reports that “with few exceptions, [microsavings, M.H.] initiatives re-
main relatively thin on the ground.” He refers to initiatives by classic grassroots MFIs who 
have previously specialized in microcredit alone. Outside the classic developmental MFIs, 
small-scale savings have been popular for a long time. For example, informal rotating credit 
and savings associations (ROSCAs) like the Indonesian arisan have often been described by 
economists and anthropologists (Geertz 1962; Bouman 1989; Von Pischke 1991; Low 1995; 
Rutherford 1999; McCord et al. 2006: 10-11, 89; Heydel et al. 2009: 35-37). Formal credit 
unions and cooperatives have had strong savings elements all along (Dichter 2007b: 5); not to 
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forget the 27 million microsavers of BRI. I should also reiterate that, following Bourdieu 
(1977), savings (and debts) are not only accumulated in material economic terms, but also in 
form of symbolic capital such as reciprocal obligations. It is nonetheless true that until today 
much less is known about the workings and impacts of monetary microsavings than about 
microcredit (Meyer 2007: 226). Several opinions have been brought forward as to why micro-
savings have not emerged more strongly in mainstream microfinance practice before the 
“reinvention of development”. After all, unlike microcredit, from the perspective of the MFIs 
microsavings are not beset by problems of information asymmetry, anti-selection and moral 
hazard (Dercon 2005c: 447). Moreover, as with any conventional bank, savings can be used 
as a relatively cheap source of capital which can be lent on in form of microcredit. As a possi-
ble explanation, Dercon (2005c: 447) refers to the still remaining challenge of transaction 
costs. Collecting minute savings by way of door-to-door collection, as has been pioneered by 
SafeSaving in Bangladesh (Rutherford 1999: 17-19), is more expensive than auto-debit de-
ductions in conventional banking. Dichter (2007b: 4) and Kiviat (2009) rightly point out that 
many MFI are prevented by regulations to mobilize savings. Institutions that safeguard 
people’s money have to fulfill much higher regulatory requirements and scrutiny than those 
that only distribute money to people. In Indonesia, several MFI have pointed out this problem 
to me. In this respect, the compulsory savings attached to microcredits often operate in a ra-
ther grey legal area.  
Again, as with microcredit, some additional constraints are not technical but discourse related. 
Microsavings need less development intervention to be set up and need longer to accumulate. 
Unlike with microcredit, few restrictions can be put on the use of microsavings. Customers 
may use their savings for investment, but they may also use them to buy TV sets and refrige-
rators. Microsavings therefore do not lend themselves as well as microcredits to the interven-
tionist and short-term agenda of development. In short, microsavings has less development 
appeal than credit. Consequently, even the business models and product design of many MFIs 
who could legally mobilize savings are fully geared towards donor-financed expansion of 
their loan portfolio (cf. Dichter 2007b: 5; cf. Hulme 2007: 20). 
Much better understood than microsavings products and their impact is the demand for micro-
savings. Churchill (2002: 381) remarks that micro-savers and micro-borrowers are often dif-
ferent people, because thoroughbred entrepreneurs are not noted for their savings habits since 
they often plow excess cash back into their businesses. Churchill is certainly correct that bor-
rowers and savers do not have to be the same person, although some MFIs demand exactly 
that and exclude customers who do not want to continue borrowing but just want to continue 
with their savings (Hulme 2007: 20). However, as the discussion on embedded moral societies 
and the resulting traders’ dilemma has shown, not all petty traders plough their profits back 
into their business; quite the contrary, profits are often siphoned off for consumptive purposes 
and eventually for savings in symbolic capital (cf. section 2.2.4). Whether savers are micro-
entrepreneurs or not, in any case demand for savings is high and widespread. Morduch (2006: 
353) reports of a high demand for savings in Indonesia. My own research findings also show a 
particularly high demand for saving products, especially those geared towards education sav-
ings (see section 7.3.1). Several authors regard the demand for savings as higher than for mi-
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crocredit (Robinson 2001: 31; Allan 2007: 49; Dichter 2007c; Mahajan 2007a: 200). Lont 
(2000: 167-168) explains the high demand for savings products, moreover for particularly 
rigid savings product, with the illiquidity preference of low-asset customers. As “cash is vul-
nerable to erosion through . . . the simple inability to keep temptation at bay” (Armendariz 
and Morduch 2005: 160-161) low-asset families, especially women, prefer self-imposed obli-
gations to save, such as in ROSCAs and arisan rather than keeping money at home. This 
fends off personal temptations of quick consumption, but also helps to circumvent the fre-
quent financial claims by husbands, children and the social network. Illiquidity preference and 
preoccupation with savings even go so far that people prefer to borrow rather than to deplete 
their carefully accumulated savings (Lont 2000: 167; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 137). 
As noted above, low-asset families are willing to pay for savings services and do not expect 
interest payments (Rutherford 1999: 13; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 137; Harper 2007a: 
40; Mahajan 2007a: 200). Karmakar (2009: 24) even describes low-asset families as generally 
“interest insensitive”. Seen from a pure economic perspective this is an expensive strategy. 
However, as soon as a risk management perspective is added and the absence of cheaper risk 
management means is assumed, such preferences appear more reasonable (cf. Churchill 2002: 
382). This is because savings, just as much as microcredit, are often regarded as consumption 
smoothers and safety cushions for a rainy day rather than as business capital. 
3.2.5 Microfinance debates 
As alluded to before, microfinance has many fervent proponents, but also an increasing num-
ber of more moderate observers and a small but noteworthy minority of critics. However, few 
people doubt that financial services for low-asset families are generally a good idea. Moderate 
and critical observers rather question the exaggerated hopes which are put towards microfin-
ance. They also question the way microfinance is practiced today. Generally, most debates 
focus on intermediate and technical issues, while a fundamental discourse on the long term 
social impacts and its relation to development is, with a few notable exceptions such as on the 
issue of empowerment, more subdued. This again may be due to the fact that the positive po-
tential of microfinance and the underlying paradigms of poverty’s existence and unlimited 
human aspirations are rarely put to doubt. Due to the imbalance in microfinance towards mi-
crocredit, most debates range around this particular component. In the following I will present 
some of the contested issues, starting from the more general issues towards more technical 
debates. As usual, the advocates of the various positions each refer to empirical evidence, 
where available, which confirms their respective positions. Indeed, the problem of impact 
research in microfinance is tricky. I will outline some of the major challenges and some gen-
eral findings on microcredit impact in section 3.2.6. Later, in section 3.3, I focus on microin-
surance in particular. There, several of the debates and impact research challenges outlined in 
the following will show up again.  
The most general of the debates on microfinance concerns the question whether microfinance 
only helps to sooth the symptoms of poverty and social inequality or if it really helps to cure 
the cause of poverty and to change social structure towards a more inclusive and egalitarian 
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society. Development and microfinance advocates clearly favor the first position. The UN’s 
“Year of Microcredit” in 2005 and the Nobel Peace Prize for Muhammad Yunus in 2006 are 
institutionalized proof of this stance. Critics like Kron (2004) contend that microfinance is a 
picture book example of the neo-liberal development agenda that seeks to spread Western 
capitalism. Menike (1993) and Wright (2006) speak of the tensions that can arise when group-
based microcredit methodologies collide with local culture. This can lead to a change from 
conciliatory social practices to negative social coercion as Menike (1993: 181) observes in Sri 
Lanka, and to the reaffirmation of power differentials as Wright (2006: 168) reports from Bo-
livia. More generally, Rankin (2006: 97) criticizes that microcredit leaves low-asset families 
alone “as agents of their own survival” and excuses the withdrawal of the state from public 
protection provision and from efforts to reduce social inequalities. Kron (2004: 16) and Har-
per (2007b: 258) raise similar concerns of less government engagement in public welfare after 
the advent of microfinance. The same discussion also affects market-led microinsurance as we 
will see below.  
A range of studies point out that microcredit can in fact leave some debtors worse off than 
before. Armendariz and Morduch (2005: 200) refer to Mosley (1996) who reports that in one 
study of Bolivia's BancoSol, for example, staff estimated that in any given cohort roughly 25 
percent of the microcredit customers showed spectacular gains after borrowing, 60-65 percent 
stayed about the same, and 10-15 percent went bankrupt. Mahajan (2007a: 205) reports that a 
study on the Indian MFI BASIX revealed that “only 52 percent of its three-year-plus micro-
credit customers reported an increase in income; 23 percent reported no change, while another 
25 percent actually reported a decline.” Interestingly, further analysis showed that the main 
reasons for the declining incomes were poorly managed risks, low productivity in crop culti-
vation and livestock rearing, and inability to get good prices from the input and output mar-
kets. This strongly points to the importance of risk management and prevalent market condi-
tions, and it confirms Hulme (2007: 21) when he claims that “providing effective microfin-
ance services to poor people is part of a poverty reduction strategy, but only a part.” 
Critics also argue that microfinance, in the form of microcredit, integrates micro-businesses 
further into the global economy and advances the commoditization of products and services, 
which - while potentially resolving old dependencies - can create new ones. With microinsur-
ance for example, the insured need to trust the prudent management and stability of the insur-
ance company, something that is much harder to assess for them than the resources, reputabil-
ity and assistance obligations of their neighbors. Moreover, businesses that start to produce 
for the world market instead of focusing on traditional home markets become dependent on 
market fluctuations far beyond their control. Development critic Rahnema (1992: 169) notes 
that “the modern economy . . . , in the name of poverty alleviation, . . . only forces the poor to 
work for others rather than for themselves.”  
A related debate concerns what low-asset families need most urgently, credit or savings and 
insurance, and whether credit is actually good for promoting low-asset business or whether 
credit rather promotes consumptive habits. In 1997, Muhammad Yunus claimed - based on 
the assumption that microcredit would unleash frantic business growth among low-asset fami-
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lies - that microcredit would make poverty history (Kron 2004: 16). Dichter (2007c) takes the 
opposite view. Using the history of economic growth in industrialized countries as an exam-
ple, he claims that economic growth came first, along with savings and insurance, and that 
credit, when it eventually made headways among low-asset families, was largely used for 
consumptive purposes (Dichter 2007c: 180-181). Dichter (2007c: 191) contends that, almost 
following modernist thinking, this historical lesson from Western countries still holds true for 
the developing world today. However, it may be cautioned that the economic development of 
today’s developing countries does not look like a perfect repetition of the Western past. For 
example, despite high economic growth rates the informal sector in developing countries is 
hardly giving way to formal employment; on the contrary, as more young people in develop-
ing countries enter the labor markets than the formal sector can absorb, the informal sector is 
even growing (Barta 2009). But Dichter (2007c: 181) certainly has a point when he asserts 
that “the distribution of entrepreneurial characters is pretty much the same everywhere in the 
world. Some people have it, others do not.” The notion that all so-called micro-entrepreneurs 
are business savvy and prefer self-employment over other forms of employment needs to be 
abandoned. This argument runs along the lines pointed out earlier, namely that low-asset fam-
ilies have various motives of engaging in business, and that aggressive business expansion is 
not on everybody’s agenda, whether due to structural, normative or skill-based constraints. 
Along with Dichter, Ellermann (2007: 152) claims that apart from a few well publicized cas-
es, the bulk of microcredits goes to consumption. This claim is at least partly supported by 
other authors (Lont 2000; Churchill 2002: 382). In a large quantitative survey on the custom-
ers of an Indian MFI, which puts no restriction on the usage of its credits, Banerjee et al. 
(2009: 8) found that only 52 percent of the respondents used at least part of their credit to ex-
pand existing businesses or establish new ones. 30 percent repaid existing loans, 15 percent 
bought durable household goods and the 15 percent used funds to smooth consumption.20
                                                 
20 Multiple choices were possible. Totals therefore add up to more than 100%. 
 
Lont (2000) notes that, comparable to India, in the Yogyakarta kampung where he did his 
anthropological field work a significant portion of formal and informal credit is used to repay 
other debts. Indonesians have even coined an idiom for this practice: gali lobang tutup lobang 
(literally: dig a hole, fill a hole). However, due to the negative connotations associated with 
being indebted in general, and with repaying old debt by taking on new debt in particular, few 
of his interviewees would admit to it. This leads to another of Dichter’s objections against 
excessive microcredit provision, namely that it can lower the previously morally reinforced 
objections against indebtedness (Dichter 2007c). This in turn may eventually lead to consu-
merism and potential spirals of debt. He gives the striking example of the United States, 
where consumers held 1.2 billion credit cards in 2006; and approximately half of US-
consumers do not pay off their balance on a monthly basis. They are therefore perpetually 
indebted (Dichter 2007c: 190). Dichter scathingly remarks that such democratization of credit 
was certainly not what Muhammad Yunus had in mind when he proclaimed credit a human 
right. Dichter, like many others, therefore strongly advocate the promotion of savings instead 
of credit. With the “reinvention of development”, this urgent call is increasingly being heard. 
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The insight, and certainly the customer demand, has been out there for grabs all along. As 
early as 1962, Geertz remarked:  
Unless the basic savings habits of the people of a country can be altered, the prospects for sus-
tained economic growth are dim indeed. (Geertz 1962: 241) 
If we consider the portion of microcredits which is in fact used for business investments, I 
have to add that even these investments do not necessarily need to follow a clear profit-
maximizing strategy. Along the lines of the discussion above on the traders’ dilemma (cf. 
section 2.2.4), business investments may also be geared towards limited growth only, towards 
the establishment or furthering of social relations and towards the pursuit of a micro-business 
as just an interesting pastime. It is also startling that some studies suggest that microcredit, 
although probably being the only form of formal credit available, may only account for a 
small portion of the overall budget of the supported families (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 
208; Wilson 2007: 105). In other words, microcredit may be too small to make a significant 
difference. It may only represent one of many sources of financing for low-asset families. In 
addition, Ellermann (2007: 154) holds that where microcredit does indeed support business 
investment, it is used for the establishment of easy-entry petty trades that face cut-throat com-
petition and lack a unique business proposition that could guarantee sustained growth. This 
argument is very much in line with the petty trading solution of the traders’ dilemma. Again I 
add that this also entails that such investments are geared at petty trade not only for structural 
reasons, but also due to moral constraints. Ellermann goes on to claim that an expansion of 
microcredit-financed nano-enterprises may crowd out other petty traders, and, even worse, 
undercut efforts aimed at long-term business expansion. More recently, Karnani (2009: 1) 
comes to the same conclusion. Ellermann calls for more efforts at developing larger scale 
businesses which may create employment opportunities. He concludes:  
In many ways, microfinance programmes may be like fast-growing weeds that will choke the 
ground before the slower ('development oriented') crops can grow. . . . In this sense, microfinance 
may be an anti-development intervention. (Ellermann 2007: 154) 
Ellermann’s point certainly has some merit to it. However, Robinson (2001: 110) directly 
responds to such claims of stagnant growth. She contends that by and large microcredit-
backed businesses are indeed growing significantly. To underline her case she presents sever-
al individual success stories from various countries, which nonetheless cannot evade the criti-
cism of being anecdotal. Banerjee et al. (2009: 3, 20) provide more representative empirical 
evidence in their quantitative study on Indian microfinance customers: For those loans that 
were invested in new or existing businesses (52%), on balance their results show significant 
and not insubstantial impact on both how many new businesses get started and the profitabili-
ty of pre-existing businesses. They also find no indication that newly established businesses 
crowd out existing ones.  
Banerjee et al. (2009) also investigate on another debate surrounding microfinance, namely 
whether microfinance helps to empower low-asset families and women in particular, and 
whether microfinance enhances positive social capital. This debate is the only major issue 
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where current microfinance discourse is frequently touching upon social impact, probably 
because the notions of positive social capital and empowerment have been heavily propagated 
by mainstream development proponents since the “reinvention of development”. However, 
Banerjee et al. (2009: 14) do not find evidence of female empowerment: “Women in treat-
ment areas were no more likely to make decisions about household spending, investment, 
savings, or education.” One study on a large Indonesian MFI, however, finds positive signs of 
female empowerment (MBK Ventura 2009: 43-47), although I contend that Indonesian wom-
en have always been pretty much financially empowered. The negative sides of the invocation 
of social capital in group-lending have already been mentioned above (Menike 1993; Wright 
2006), while others regard credit groups as a positive addition to social capital (McGregor 
2000: 5).  
Something that microinsurance advocates and skeptics surprisingly agree on is that microfin-
ance does not reach very low-asset families. It is commonly said that microfinance is serving 
the ‘working poor’ and excluding the ‘poorest of the poor’ (Moser 2001: 365; Kabeer 2003: 
112; Rankin 2006: 103; Heydel et al. 2009: x). While microfinance proponents consider this 
failure to reach the real bottom of the pyramid as a temporary obstacle yet to be resolved, crit-
ics consider it a permanent situation which leaves the very low-asset population behind and 
increases social inequalities instead of resolving them (Kabeer 2003: 112). The exclusivist 
character of group-based microcredit has in fact often been noted (Miguel et al. 2002: 10; 
Mahajan 2007a: 204; Lont 2005). Churchill (2002) describes how exclusion is promoted from 
three sides: by the excluded themselves, by the MFIs, and by the credit-group members:  
The poorest households exclude themselves from microcredit programmes because they are not 
willing to risk being unable to repay and the public censure that often accompanies delinquency. 
They may also be excluded by the MFI because they do not have existing businesses, which is a 
requirement for many institutions, or by borrower groups because they represent bad credit risks. 
(Churchill 2002: 382) 
This exclusivist character is clearly driven by the rules of balanced reciprocity. All group 
members should be able to reciprocate evenly. Therefore, by tendency, such exclusivist traits 
can not only be observed in formal (and informal) financial arrangements but also in mutual 
risk sharing arrangements (Kozel and Parker 2000: 66; Pan 2008: 6). A related observation is 
that families which already command a considerable asset base, the ‘not so poor’, benefit the 
most from microcredit support (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 206; Mahajan 2007a). This pheno-
menon seems to be related to their generally higher education levels, larger social network, 
and lastly their better material asset position which allows for taking on relatively higher 
business risks which in turn tends to reap higher returns. Moreover, it may also be likely that 
because “subsistence insurance” is not as pressing an issue for higher-asset families, the 
bounds of the moral economy on asset accumulation may be easier to ignore. Kabeer (2003: 
112) and Dichter (2007a: 9) take the discussion further when they illustrate that formal micro-
finance, through its exclusivist arrangements and accentuation of social inequalities, may ne-
gatively influence informal safety-net arrangements and ultimately erode social cohesion. 
These concerns represent one of the rare examples where microfinance is being critically re-
flected in terms of its wider social impacts. Some observers note this lack of a more holistic 
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view on microfinance as a research gap (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 3; Wright 2006: 
155), while the majority of observers is either content with not looking too closely at the mat-
ter or simply assumes the social impacts to be positive. In fact, the further the discussion on 
microfinance moves away from the micro-level of individual customers towards more general 
social questions, the less discussion occurs and the less evidence is available. Hardly ever is 
the question of the effect of microfinance on patron-client-relations discussed although these 
relations have been noted as being pervasive in many low-asset settings (Mackie 1998: 139; 
cf. Casino 1988: 54). In short, as with microinsurance, the magnitude of change from infor-
mal, heavily socialized forms of financing towards commoditized, formalized, and legalized 
financing is hardly ever fathomed and its consequences are poorly understood today. Micro-
finance is not just about changing from the moneylender to an MFI. Microfinance induces an 
entirely new “frame of reference”, to reprise Platteau’s expression (1997). Microfinance 
changes the way low-asset people interact with their environment. Microcredit and microsav-
ings, just as microinsurance, have to be recognized as actors of social change. Social changes 
induced by microfinance may not only be restricted to empowerment and increases in social 
capital, but can also mean unintended changes which can be viewed rather critically. 
If the debates outlined so far were rather general in nature, a number of more intermediate and 
technical debates are derived from them. One such debate relates to the question if microfin-
ance should be offered on a no-frills basis or if it should be combined with educational mes-
sages, usage restrictions, business consulting et cetera. MFIs can be placed along a continuum 
that spans between these polar opposites (Buse 2008). In Indonesia, most MFI partners of 
Allianz were leaning more towards the latter integrated model. A fervent debate also sur-
rounds the issue of group-based versus individual credit. While group-based methods help to 
significantly reduce transaction costs and thereby often make microcredit possible in the first 
place, Harper (2007: 35) argues that methods for individual lending should be explored fur-
ther and that “groups should be regarded as a regrettable short-term second-rate expedient.” 
Much of his argument rests on the fact that the principle of joint liability is not liked by the 
customers. This line of thought is supported by several other authors (Menike 1993; Simtowe 
2008: 5), and is moreover in line with the earlier observation that mutual assistance arrange-
ments are entered to due to need and lack of alternatives, not because of altruism (cf. 2.2.2). 
Churchill (2002: 383) reports that several group-lending MFIs have experienced an exodus of 
borrowers as soon as a competitor with individual lending entered the market. An MFI man-
ager in Indonesia commented that his customers did not like the joint liability scheme but had 
they had no other option than to accept it.21
                                                 
21 Interview with Mickey Felder, Operational Manger of MMS, as part of the MFI management component in 
Jakarta on 20 October 2008. 
 In addition, Buse (2008: 57) argues that group-
lending leads to tensions when successful customers are held back by less successful group 
members. Armendariz and Morduch (2005: 114) declare that in this matter empirical research 
once again lags far behind theory. It should also be borne in mind that there are many varia-
tions of group-based and individual lending. Von Pischke (2002) even argues for individual 
lending that is no longer secured by collateral but by sound individual cash-flow analysis or 
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even by propensity scoring as it is already used by credit card companies based on a statistical 
default risk analysis. In general, market observers note that individual microlending is gaining 
ground, especially in sparsely populated areas or in situations were more established clients 
are seeking greater flexibility (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 119; Harper 2007: 44).  
One particularly disturbing realization for microfinance practitioners seems to be that the mo-
neylenders, which microcredit had set out to make obsolete, have still not disappeared. Num-
bers on the “moneylending market” are hard to obtain because moneylending is often illegal 
and operates in hiding. However, Rahman (2007: 193) reports that even in Bangladesh, the 
country with the highest microfinance density in the world, moneylenders are still a dominant 
force in rural financial markets. Many of the MFI customers which I interviewed in Indonesia 
confirmed that moneylenders were operating in their area just as before, and some even ad-
mitted using their services every now and then. There are several reasons why there is still a 
demand for moneylenders, despite their particularly high interest rates of as much as 20 per-
cent per day (cf. Robinson 2001: 204). Most importantly, moneylenders are often used for 
different purposes than microcredit. Moneylenders are not used to finance business expansion 
or normal consumption. Moneylenders are rather used in times of emergency when money 
needs to be on hand quickly and without much paperwork (Ingelson 1996: 578; Lont 2000: 
171). MFIs and even informal arrangements like ROSCAs are often not able to provide cash 
on hand as quickly as moneylenders can. Not only are moneylenders more flexible than MFIs 
at the moment of loan provision, they can also be more flexible when it comes to loan repay-
ment. Although often veiled as merciless credit sharks, moneylenders have been noted to flex-
ibly extend credit term in case of repayment difficulties - at no additional interest (Armenda-
riz and Morduch 2005: 171). In addition to flexibility and convenience, many customers are 
very familiar with moneylenders and trust these relationships more than relationships to more 
distant and formal institutions like MFIs and banks (cf. Samik-Ibrahim 1963: 38). Lastly, 
Harper (2007) notes that the continued presence of moneylenders may also be promoted by 
the preference of low-asset families to have several financing options on hand:  
Microfinance loans are still costly, and microfinance services do not generally replace moneylend-
ers or the ubiquitous 'friends and family', but they do complement them and enable their customers 
to spread their risks and access a wider range of services. (Harper 2007: 40) 
Both, the presence of moneylenders and the general ability of their customers to cope with 
their high interest rates once again points to the surprising resourcefulness and intricate asset 
management of low-asset families. The mentioned studies which show that microfinance may 
often only represent a small portion of the overall family finances further confirm that micro-
finance assumes more of a complementary rather than a replacing function. This in turn rela-
tivizes earlier concerns that microfinance may lead to the demise of informal arrangements 
and social cohesion. The less portion microfinance assumes in family finances, the less strong 
this potential replacement effect, if any, is going to be. I will later argue along similar lines in 
the case of microinsurance (see section 3.3.3). This makes the example of microcredit versus 
moneylenders particularly relevant for the discussion. 
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The interest rates charged by MFIs are generally significantly lower than those of moneylend-
ers. MFIs usually state interest rates as “flat” monthly interest rates, for example 2.5 percent 
“flat” per month. 2.5 percent “flat” is a typical interest rate for the MFI partners of Allianz in 
Indonesia. This would mean that a for a US$ 100 microcredit of 12 months duration, 30 per-
cent or US$ 30 of interest would have to be paid over the course of the year (12 x 2.5% = 
30%). Stated in the effective terms which are common in conventional banking this amounts 
to an effective annual interest rate of 49.90 percent.22
Politicians, journalists, social workers, and the general public often have a difficult time under-
standing why interest rates on microloans need to be higher than those on larger loans. This is after 
all, somewhat counterintuitive. (Robinson 2001: 30) 
 Adding various administrative charges 
the loans become even more expensive (cf. Harper 2007: 38). For many microfinance observ-
ers, these costs of borrowing are still too high. Ways are sought to reduce interest rates. It is 
noteworthy that the critique of the high interest rates is not coming from the side of the micro-
credit customers, but from concerned observes in the donor countries, as Robinson illustrates:  
The high interest rates of microfinance can of course largely be explained by the peculiarities 
of the business such as the labor intensive training, disbursement, and collection process, as 
well as the small loan amounts. The question of interest rates, however, is closely related to 
the question of how much money can potentially and morally be made from the poor. In pure 
economic terms, a lot of money can be made with business from the poor. Prahalad (2004: 11-
12) demonstrates that compared to high-asset consumers low-asset consumers pay a hefty 
premium on many of their daily needs, for example municipal water, medication, rice and not 
least of all, credit. Much of this premium is due to having these products served in small por-
tions and under worse infrastructural conditions. After all, the price for 100 one milliliter 
shampoo sachets is intuitively higher than a single bulk purchase of a 100 milliliter package; 
and this does not account for opportunity costs such as the time spent on going to the corner 
shop several times instead of dropping by the supermarket once a month for bulk shopping. 
Compartamos, a Mexican MFI that went public in an initial public offering (IPO) worth US$ 
450 million in April 2007, at times charged interest rates of over 100 percent and is the most 
profitable Mexican bank today. With a return of 55 percent, Compartamos is an investor’s 
favorite (Economist 2005; Buse 2008: 58). Also BRI’s microfinance unit has been highly 
profitable after restructuring started in 1984, even throughout the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/98 (Robinson 2001: 34; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 164). Now that Wall Street is 
starting to get excited about microfinance, Saltmarsh and Contiguglia (2009: 1) report of fears 
for “the profit motive to trump poverty efforts in microfinance.” 
High profits from microfinance are therefore not a question of feasibility, but a moral question 
that is intensely discussed in microfinance circles (Buse 2008; Saltmarsh and Contiguglia 
2009). If microfinance would be just business as usual for investors and MFIs this discussion 
would probably not raise much attention. However, as microfinance continues to be deeply 
                                                 
22 Conversion of flat interest rate to effective interest rate done with Loanwala (http://www.loanwala.com/calcul 
ators/flat-interest-rate.html). 
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enmeshed in development discourse, which itself is a highly moralized discourse (Korff and 
Tigges Lizarazo 2008a), the question of how high interest rates and profit margins can be re-
mains salient. The situation is especially acerbated by development’s obsession with mea-
surement and its rejuvenated focus on market-based solutions. As this draws in private inves-
tors, “development profits” have to be made more transparent. Back in the 1950s, large scale 
dam projects did not make it particularly easy to discern who of the involved contractors and 
bureaucrats profited how much in legal and illegal ways. With microfinance, the profit dimen-
sion behind development initiatives has been dragged into the open. And eventually, Kron 
(2004) may be increasingly proven right that after all microfinance has a tendency to further 
global capitalism and promote a neo-liberal agenda, albeit without really liberating low-asset 
people. 
3.2.6 Microfinance impact 
Many of the above discussions relate to the question of microfinance impact. However, there 
is still more debate than empirical impact evidence in microfinance (for this reason I have 
outlined the debates before the evidence). This can partly be explained by the methodological 
intricacies of impact research, but for the larger part, as I hold, because the rock bottom of 
microfinance discourse is moral, not technical. Fortunately, however, the interest in microfin-
ance impact research is growing. An increasing number of academic studies are published. 
Roodman (2009) outlines the situation well:  
Thirty years into the movement, it might seem strange that researchers are still asking whether mi-
crofinance reduces poverty. In fact, by the standards used to judge whether drugs are safe and ef-
fective in the bloodstreams of people, the safety and effectiveness of microfinance injected into the 
fabric of villages and barrios remains unproven. Somewhat by chance, 2009 is turning out to be a 
pivotal year in the study of the impacts of microfinance. A new generation of studies is emerging 
that promises to give us a clearer view of the effects. (Roodmann 2009) 
Unfortunately, much of these studies come too late for the inclusion in this thesis, for example 
the first systematic review on quantitative and integrated microcredit impact studies which 
follows a standardized review protocol (Leeuw 2009). Here, the final version is due for pub-
lishing at the end of 2009. However, it is not that we have known nothing until today. In the 
following discussion I will successively present the main disciplinary and methodological 
approaches taken to date and lastly summarize the respective findings. As most impact re-
search naturally focuses on microcredit (Meyer 2007: 225), and because microinsurance im-
pact will be dealt with separately in section 3.3.4, I limit my review to microcredit only.  
Seen from a disciplinary perspective, research into microcredit impact is dominated by econ-
omists (cf. Armendariz and Morduch 2005: x; cf. Leeuw 2009: 2). Leading scholars like Jona-
than Morduch, David Roodmann, Abihijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo are all economists. In 
contrast, sociological and anthropological research only occupies a marginal position. Note-
worthy is the work of anthropologist Thomas Dichter that I am frequently referring to. I espe-
cially appreciate his reflections on the symbolism of debt (Dichter 2007a) and the historical 
relationship of economic growth, savings, credit and consumption (Dichter 2007c). Also Ran-
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kin (2006) and Wright (2006) approach microcredit from an anthropological perspective. 
Other sociologists and anthropologists do not focus on formal microcredit in particular, but 
rather discuss formal and informal financial management as a part of the daily life of low-
asset families, for example Geertz (1962), Ardener (1964), Smets (1992), Sullivan (1994), 
Lont (2000; 2005), and Koning (2006). As can be noted from my references so far, the stance 
of anthropological research on formal microcredit is particularly critical. These concerns re-
late to the wider impacts of microcredit on social structure and social inequalities, and to the 
conceptualization of poverty in the first place. It could be critically remarked that sociologists 
and anthropologists may have a tendency to romanticize the past while economists focus more 
on the economic benefits for individual actors. It is consequently not surprising that socio-
anthropological research into microcredit receives less attention and less funding from main-
stream development proponents and donors, whose primary objective is to prove the positive 
impacts of microfinance. 
If the dominant discipline in microcredit impact research is economics, it is also not surprising 
that with regards to methodology, quantitative survey-based research takes precedence over 
qualitative methods. For quantitative surveys, randomized experimental approaches such as 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), where people are absolutely randomly allotted to treat-
ment and control groups, are considered the optimum to estimate project impact (Baker 2000: 
2). If randomized approaches are not possible, which is often the case in microfinance, the 
quasi-experimental double difference (or difference in difference) method is considered 
second best choice (Rao and Woolcock 2003: 175; Leeuw 2009: 8). In this method, a treat-
ment group and a control group, which should closely match the treatment group in its charac-
teristics, are surveyed before the start of an intervention (baseline survey) and again after the 
intervention has started or already finished (endline survey). The differences between the 
treatment group and the control group over time are then used to calculate the impact of the 
intervention on the treatment group (Ravallion 2001: 138).  
I have already stressed the importance of context in order to understand impact, especially if 
context is at least partly influenced by notions of the moral economy, a concept which is  not 
necessarily familiar to the researcher. In line with Geertz (2000: 7, 16), Bamberger (2000) 
notes that conventional quantitative impact research does not lend itself well to the contextua-
lized understanding of impact: 
Conventional quantitative research approaches have not been able to capture the subtleties and 
complexities of culture. Culture is either ignored in the modeling, or it is reduced to one or more 
dummy variables in what Obermeyer (1997) describes as the ‘add fieldwork and stir’ approach. 
(Bamberger 2000: 18, referring to Obermeyer 1997) 
Therefore, several authors are proposing an earnest integration of quantitative and qualitative 
methods as a middle ground to impact research, or - to reuse a phrase derived from the “Asian 
Way” debate - as combining the best of two worlds (Bamberger 2000: 5; Kozel and Parker 
2000: 67; Baker 2000: 9). Nonetheless, most impact research on microcredit to date is still 
quantitative research. There are a number of related challenges. Some of these are common to 
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all kinds of quantitative and in part also to qualitative research, while others are more particu-
lar to impact research and microcredit: 
(1) Neutrality and objectivity: Ellermann (2007: 154) notes that the neutrality of impact re-
search is frequently obstructed by the close alignment of MFIs, donors and research institu-
tions. Funders and researchers may therefore have vested interests in positive outcomes. Mey-
er (2007: 230) cautions that even respondents may want to please researchers in replying “as 
expected” (which I found to be very true during my own field research).  
(2) Selection bias: Microcredit customers are often different from their neighbors. Credit-
groups usually self-select their members along certain criteria which the excluded do not ful-
fill. In short, it is difficult to build valid control groups and execute truly randomized surveys 
(Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 200-201; Rankin 2006: 103; Banerjee et al. 2009: 1). This 
makes it difficult to establish a valid counterfactual; that is, a proof of what really happens 
without the intervention.  
(3) Poverty and welfare proxies: Many different definitions and perceptions of poverty exist 
(cf. section 2.1). As poverty is essentially understood as a multidimensional state of being, 
quantitative research must identify and agree on proxy indicators for poverty and welfare, 
such as income, asset value, health status, education level. And even such decomposed prox-
ies may be difficult to measure in practice (Meyer 2007: 226). 
(4) Causality and attribution: It is difficult to trace the impact of a particular loan on family 
welfare or even on enterprise profit; that is, to establish a clear correlation and attribution. 
Moreover, it is hard to establish causality. The entrepreneurial skill or individual preferences 
of the debtor may have been more influential than the loan itself (Armendariz and Morduch 
2005: 223; Meyer 2007: 228). Moreover, as microfinance coverage grows, the so-called 
“overlapping” of MFIs is an increasing problem, not only for attribution in impact research. 
Overlapping refers to a condition when various MFIs are active in an area and customers bor-
row from several MFIs simultaneously (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 128; Banerjee et al. 
2009: 2). 
(5) Fungibility and additionality: Fungibility is a finance-related phenomenon. It refers to the 
fact that particular funds cannot be exclusively tied to particular expenditures. As a conse-
quence, additional funds from microcredit inevitably become interchangeable with other 
monetary flows (Leeuw 2009: 3). Even if microcredit funds are used for business investment, 
it is well neigh possible that such investment had already been scheduled before and that the 
originally designated funds for this purpose, for example from family contributions, are now 
used for educational purposes. The addition that the loan makes in this situation is therefore 
not on the business side, but on the consumptive side (Meyer 2007: 228). 
(6) Effects beyond the unit of analysis: Impact research may take the microenterprise of a fe-
male borrower as the unit of analysis. However, other entrepreneurs may be negatively or 
positively affected as well, for example by the mentioned crowding out effect (negative) or by 
spillovers such as increased customer numbers in a particular business location (positive). The 
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composition of family finances (and family structure on a broader perspective) may also be 
affected (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 202; Meyer 2007: 227; Banerjee et al. 2009: 20). 
Lastly, we have the question of wider social impacts on community structure and norms (Ka-
beer 2003). 
(7) Attrition and drop-outs: Unsuccessful customers may drop out of a microfinance program 
while the more successful customers remain. Particularly successful customers may also leave 
to obtain larger loans for commercial banks. In addition, customers may move and migrate. If 
impact research neglects such drop-outs, there will be a serious attrition bias. By tendency, 
attrition bias in microcredit impact research skews results towards the positive since generally 
more unsuccessful and unsatisfied customers leave than successful customers graduate to 
banks (Ravallion 2001: 128; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 209; Meyer 2007: 227). I have 
noticed this particular flaw of attrition neglicence in impact assessments that were done on 
two MFIs that work with Allianz in Indonesia which both consequently present very positive 
impact results (DIMAN 2006; MBK Ventura 2009). 
(8) Differential impact by poverty level: It has been mentioned above that families with a fa-
vorable starting position in terms of their asset-base tend to make more use of microcredit 
offerings and by and large also benefit more from them. Impact research may need to be sen-
sitive to such differential impacts and analyze impacts for various customer segments (Meyer 
2007: 228). 
 (9) Influence and dynamics of exogenous factors: Exogenous factors such as the regulatory 
environment, educational or advertisement campaigns, new infrastructure projects and not the 
least culture may all influence the impact of microcredit interventions. Such factors are often 
condensed into control variables, which, as noted, do not fully reflect reality. Moreover, ex-
ogenous factors can be highly dynamic. Therefore, consideration of exogenous factors is es-
pecially critical for longitudinal research. 
(10) Questionnaire design: Most surveys use questionnaires. Here, the challenge is to make 
sure that questions are not ambiguous and can be easily and correctly understood by the res-
pondents. The given answers have to be likewise correctly understood by the surveyor. Ques-
tionnaire design is especially difficult if the research designer and the respondents are from 
different socio-cultural backgrounds. Another difficulty is that written questionnaires are of-
ten not understood by illiterate respondents and questions therefore asked orally. This adds a 
further interpretative and blurring element to questionnaires. 
(11) Measurement error: Errors inevitably occur during data collection, especially for large 
scale surveys. Customer replies may be recorded erroneously or incompletely, numbers are 
easily switched et cetera. Measurement error is especially acute if recalls are involved, for 
example when customers are asked to recall the results of a long ago investment. The longer 
the recall period, the less valid the provided information will be (Baker 2000: 36). 
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(12) Statistical analysis: The application of different statistical methods on the collected raw 
data can lead to varying and even opposite results (Ravallion 2001: 135; Armendariz and 
Morduch 2005: 212, 217; Meyer 2007: 236). 
(13) Benchmarking: As every MFI is different, comparison of impact results over various 
MFIs is extremely challenging (Meyer 2007: 229). 
I have explained these intricacies at some length because to a certain extent they also apply to 
impact research on microinsurance and have influenced my methodological approach (see 
section 5.3.3). Secondly, such overview makes it more understandable as to why Armendariz 
and Morduch (2005: 207) can claim that “there have been few serious impact evaluations of 
microfinance so far, . . . so a collection of definitive results is still awaited.” As mentioned the 
situation is gradually improving, and the often cited study by Banerjee et al. (2009) on the 
Indian MFI Spandana is a recognized example for methodically sound quantitative impact 
research based on an RCT approach (Roodmann 2009). Other highlighted studies are those by 
Coleman (1999; 2002) on Northern Thailand and an extensive longitudinal study by the 
World Bank on Bangladesh (Khandker 1998; cf. Meyer 2007: 233). Armendariz and Morduch 
(2005) aptly summarize the impact findings to date: 
The number of careful impact studies is small but growing, and their conclusions, so far, are much 
more measured than the anecdotes would suggest. . . . The results to date are decidedly mixed, 
with some evidence of modest positive impacts of microfinance on income, expenditure, and re-
lated variables, while other studies find that positive impacts disappear once selection biases are 
addressed. (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 199, 207) 
Even Roodmann’s still ongoing review on the most recent robust impact studies indicates that 
this sobering picture is not changing (Roodmann 2009). In effect, the optimistic expectations 
of microfinance proponents like Muhammad Yunus have for the most part been greatly exag-
gerated. Harper (2007: 41) is therefore certainly right when he resumes that “the problem is 
one of exaggerated expectations rather than with microfinance itself.” In particular, the fol-
lowing general conclusions can be deducted from existing acclaimed impact research: (1) On 
the positive side, microcredit can, under certain conditions, boost micro-business. Conducive 
conditions are accessible markets and sales channels, sufficient entrepreneurial skills and a 
high propensity to invest and accumulate capital. Initial loans have the highest likelihood of 
achieving significant results compared to later loans. With consecutive loans, results start to 
flatten out if other constraints to improving business performance are not resolved. It also 
needs to be recognized that a fair portion of customers sees no long-term effects or is even left 
off worse than before. (2) Positive effects on gender equality, health status, education and 
human capital are less confirmed than the potential for positive business impact. (3) Micro-
credit impact is strongly hinged on context and does not work on its own. (4) Microcredit ex-
cludes very low-asset families. Instead, it favors families close to or above the so-called po-
verty line. (5) A significant proportion of microcredit, even when explicitly disbursed for 
business purposes, goes to risk management, consumption and the repayment of other debt. 
(6) Microcredit does not fully replace other forms of financing such as moneylenders and 
family and friends but rather complements them. In fact, the overall contribution of microcre-
 
76 
 
dit to overall family cash-flows can to be quite small. (7) No robust quantitative empirical 
findings exist as to the long term social impacts of microfinance. 
Identified research gaps relate to: (1) the profiling of who has improved his asset base through 
microcredit, and who has not (Dichter 2007b: 4), (2) the relationship of gender and social cap-
ital in microfinance, (3) the impact of microfinance on skill acquisition, education and wom-
en’s access to the formal sector, (4) the effect of microfinance on intra-family income distri-
bution, (5) the extent to which microfinance can contribute to changes in social norms, rather 
than being a vehicle for reinforcing existing norms (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 195; 
Wright 2006: 155).  
This overview of microfinance and the intricacies and sobering results of impact research 
shows how complex, dynamic and contested the field of microfinance is. The understanding 
and awareness I have tried to convey is intended to more fully understand the context of 
Payung Keluarga as a product that was symbiotically tied to microcredit interventions.  
3.2.7 Why ibu-ibu do not make it big - A glance at microcredit impact in Indonesia 
Although Indonesia boasts a large microfinance sector which is considered as one of the 
world’s most diverse, little research on microfinance impact in Indonesia is available. Hulme 
and Mosley (1996: 102) report that credits of BRI were effectual in creating non-family em-
ployment. However, BRI caters to a relatively high-asset clientele well above the national 
poverty line. This supports the point made by several observers that support of medium sized 
enterprises may indirectly lead to more poverty alleviation through the sustained creation of 
employment opportunities when compared to direct support for nano-businesses (Ellermann 
2007: 154; Mahajan 2007b: 243). Two grassroots MFIs working with Allianz, DIMAN and 
MBK Ventura, have done quantitative impact studies of their microcredit customers. The im-
pact study of DIMAN was done in-house (DIMAN 2006) while MBK Ventura’s study was 
executed by an independent US-university team (MBK Ventura 2009). Both studies report 
significant income increases for customers. MBK also reports increases in housing index and 
empowerment of women. DIMAN, for example, records that 62 percent of new customers in 
2004 earned less than US$ 1 per day. Among mature customers in 2006, this figure had 
dropped to 43 percent (DIMAN 2006: 2). MBK Ventura reports that the percentage of cus-
tomers living above the poverty level rose from 19 percent prior to joining the program to 61 
percent by their fifth year of participation (MBK Ventura 2009: 5-6). However, both studies 
show serious methodological flaws which diminish the validity of these positive findings. 
DIMAN’s study was done internally and is therefore not independent. Moreover, the custom-
ers surveyed in 2004 and 2006 are not the same, there are no control groups, and drop-outs are 
not dealt with. While MBK Ventura’s study is more independent and has a control group, 
attrition is nonetheless not considered. Results are therefore likely to be seriously skewed to-
wards the positive. I do not put to doubt, however, that microcredits in Indonesia lead to some 
observable increases in the asset-base. But I claim that few businesses ever grow to medium 
or large scale. 
 
77 
 
87 percent of the microcredit customers of the MFI partners of Allianz in Indonesia were 
women. The great majority of these women were married with children and had passed 30 
years of age. Indonesians respectfully refer to such socially accomplished women as ibu or, in 
its plural form, ibu-ibu. Here, I want to pull together some of the issues and observations men-
tioned so far and add some of my own empirical findings to investigate the question: Why do 
so few of these micro-borrowing and generally petty trading ibu-ibu turn their micro-
businesses into mid-scale or even large-scale enterprises? Why do so few of them become 
“big boss”, as one credit group member jokingly said, using the little English she knew? This 
question was nowhere to be found in the original scope of my field research plan (see section 
5.2). And I do not claim any particular robustness and representativeness for my following 
train of thought and the underlying observations. However, I hold that these considerations 
are relevant, especially in combination with my findings on the impact of Payung Keluarga 
regarding the “double fortune / double blow” dilemma of microfinance. Specifically, I hold 
that a number of social, structural and moral reasons accumulate to form the key constraint to 
business success, namely that the majority of ibu-ibu lacks the aspiration and commitment to 
make it big. Their main target is to achieve a somewhat higher income level. Beyond this 
comfortable level aspirations quickly fade. Not the least of the underlying reasons is the con-
tinued impact of the moral economy and the related lack of sufficient alternative risk man-
agement options outside the moral economy.  
First, why do I claim that few ibu-ibu make it big? That is because all staff from various MFIs 
who I talked to admitted that this was in fact so, despite their assumed vested interest in 
claiming the opposite. MFI managers and loan officers noted that the number of full-blown 
success cases was indeed very low. However, they could not name any specific criteria for 
success or a percentage of customers who fulfilled them. Moreover, none of the hundreds of 
microcredit customers I have met in Indonesia struck me with a particularly palpable success 
story. Admittedly, there may be the possibility that successful micro-entrepreneurs diversify 
their businesses somewhat clandestinely while keeping a low profile, as Robinson (2001: 110) 
asserts. Nonetheless, I trust the honest feedback of the loan officers; I also do so when they 
claim that modest progress was much more frequent than outlier success stories. One MFI 
manager phrased it this way: “With microfinance, people no longer have to ask: Will I eat 
tomorrow? Now they can ask: What will I eat tomorrow?”23
Secondly, what lets me conclude that the ultimate reason for this at best modest advancement 
is ultimately a motivational constraint? When I asked a number of credit group leaders on 
their motivations to borrow, the unanimous immediate answer was their intention to use the 
 I would add to this that microfin-
ance in Indonesia does not push people so far as to ask: “Where will I eat tomorrow? In a res-
taurant or at home?” 
                                                 
23 Interview with Yoseph Arihadi (CEO) and Didit Wijayanto (CFO) of LKM Bina Arta as part of the MFI man-
agement component on 20 October 2008. The particular comment was made by Didit Wijayanto. 
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loans for working capital.24
Table 3: Loan officers’ opinion on customers’ motivation to borrow 
 This was naturally the expected answer, especially as the MFI 
partners of Allianz wanted to disburse their loans for business purposes only. However, as the 
discussion went on, other motives emerged as well. Most frequently, the credit group leaders 
mentioned the aim to assist the husband in securing the family income. A few women men-
tioned that the ultimate intention of their business endeavors was the financing of their child-
ren’s education. Singular references concerned: (1) low interest rates, (2) having an indepen-
dent income from the husband, (3) looking for a pastime, and (4) becoming rich. It is telling, 
that the women mentioned assistance to the husband more often than the motive of becoming 
rich. Even the one woman who initially claimed that becoming rich (kaya raya) was her goal 
later said in passing that being rich would certainly be stressful and that a good and secure life 
would actually be preferable. Although the women did not expressly refer to consumptive 
objectives (for good reasons), this motive emerged when I asked 19 loan officers on the bor-
rowing motives of their customers (table 3):  
Question: Why do your customers take out a loan from you? (n=19) 
Motive no customer  
(weight: 0%) 
few  
(25%) 
some 
(50%) 
many  
(75%) 
all  
(100%) 
total 
votes 
weighted 
average 
% frequency 
Supporting the hus-
band in making a living 
0 0 2 15 2 19 75% many 
Passing the loan to the 
husband 
0 6 8 5 0 19 49% some 
Getting rich (kaya raya) 2 6 3 8 0 19 47% some 
Looking for a pastime 
(kesibukan) 
0 9 4 6 0 19 46% some 
Consumption 1 16 1 1 0 19 28% few 
1
The loan officers (n=19) were asked to assess the frequency of each of the pre-given borrow-
ing motives among their customers. Their answers confirm that consumption motives indeed 
play a role for a few of customers. However, the most frequent reason is in line with the feed-
back of the group leaders, namely the support of the husband in making a living. This does 
not imply, however, that husband and wife are working together in a joint business (this was 
in fact very seldom the case); it only indicates that the women want to contribute to the total 
family income. It is interesting that taking up business as a pastime (kesibukan) is at least as 
important a motive as becoming rich, and also that many loans are passed on straight to the 
husband (something the MFIs often seek to prevent). If we combine the two actor perspec-
tives of group leaders and loan officers, indications are strong that women overwhelmingly 
see themselves in an economic support function rather than as main agents of the economic 
 The options for borrowing motives were already pre-set. 
                                                 
24 The data collection with the credit group leaders was mostly in form of open-ended group questioning. I did 
not record the exact number of motives mentioned per person, which keeps me from stating any precise frequen-
cies here. 
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welfare of their families. Becoming rich is, if anything, just one among several motives for 
taking out microcredits. 
Thirdly, what are the underlying reasons for this aspirational restraint? First of all, I am 
strongly in favor of Dichter’s claim (2007c: 181) that the majority of micro-enterprising 
women are not natural born business savvy Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. This may of course 
not keep the women from dreaming of riches, but probably from considering their achieve-
ment a realistic option. Secondly, I see a continuing influence of the moral economy on Indo-
nesian petty traders. This continuity may be partly considered a mere persistence of old tradi-
tions, but I hold that it still bears some of its practical value today, namely to secure minimal 
protection for all community members. In the absence of other risk management options 
which the women may consider sufficient, the norms of the moral economy still need to be 
followed to some extent in order to participate in its still needed benefits. Although the situa-
tion may not be quite as rigid as observed by Scott (1976), and although the setting has 
changed from a homogenous rural to a more heterogeneous urban setting, I hold that the es-
sence of his remark on the effect of the moral economy is still relevant:  
If treating the peasant as a would-be Schumpeterian entrepreneur misses his key existential di-
lemma, so do the normal power-maximizing assumptions fail to do justice to his political behavior. 
. . . It is this ‘safety-first’ principle which lies behind a great many of the technical, social, and 
moral arrangements of a precapitalist agrarian order. (Scott 1976: 4-5) 
With the persistent influence of the moral economy, its various norms also continue to func-
tion (cf. section 2.2.2), for example the suppression of a rigid input-output consequentiality in 
individual labor and the denouncement of aggressive self-interested wealth accumulation. 
This blocks, or at least blurs the perspective of a gradual individual wealth accumulation 
through hard work. In addition, as much as the moral still economy continues to extend some 
clout, so does the traders’ dilemma, and so are its various solutions still relevant today. Ibu-
ibu have practically chosen the easiest option of establishing and maintaining low-profile 
trades. Thirdly, the womens’ lack of commitment to making it big is not only caused by often 
limited entrepreneurial skills and the overall social structure of the moral economy but also by 
family structure. Here, Hefner (1998a) and Alexander (1998) certainly have a point when they 
describe that Javanese, unlike Chinese-descent business people (who dominate the Indonesian 
economy until today), have difficulties in effectively and cheaply appropriating the labor of 
others, most importantly the labor of their own family members:  
Quite unlike their Chinese counterparts, Malay and Javanese youths are reluctant to submit to pa-
triarchal authority, at least when it comes to economic affairs. Working adolescents do not readily 
pool their incomes to meet family goals or contribute unpaid labor to family enterprises. . . . In-
deed in some cases, as among the Javanese merchants described by Alexander, even husbands and 
wives regard their partner’s enterprise as a separate concern . . . . The result is that Malays, Java-
nese, and many other indigenous Southeast Asians cannot, as Li puts it, ‘rely upon the nuclear 
family as a business resource.’ . . . Malay and many other Southeast Asian families look more in-
dividualistic than their Chinese counter parts. (Hefner 1998a: 13, referring to Alexander 1998 and 
Li 1998) 
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Alexander adds: 
This inability to use ‘the nuclear family as a [cost-free] business resource’ (see Li, this volume), let 
alone draw on the resources of a larger kinship group, is one constraint on the growth of Javanese 
enterprises. (Alexander 1998: 216, referring to Li 1998) 
Hefner and others attribute this individualistic trait among most native South-East Asians to 
their mostly cognatic (bilateral) decent system which differs from the Chinese patrilinear des-
cent system (Hefner 1998a: 22; Mackie 1998: 143; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 19; Setiadi 
2006: 370; Ford and Parker 2008: 7). I also consider the issue of balanced reciprocity strongly 
related to this point. Just as wider traditional labor exchange arrangements (bawon, gotong 
royong) and informal mutual assistance arrangements (sumbangan) are based on balanced 
reciprocity (Platteau 1997; Koning 2006), so do intra-familiar labor arrangements among Ja-
vanese, Indonesians and South-East Asians in general for the most part rely on balance reci-
procity rather than on general reciprocity. A further point related to the moral economy, to 
cognatic kinship, and to the balanced reciprocity principle is noted by Hefner, namely an 
aversion towards the “economization” of family ties:  
Kinship is insulated from the vicissitudes of the market and the volatile pursuit of self-interest. 
Numerous researchers in insular Southeast Asia have noted a similar antipathy toward the explicit 
‘economization’ of family ties. (Hefner 1998a: 23) 
If kin stay out of each other’s business, the economization of family ties, which balanced re-
ciprocity would require, is avoided and familiar harmony, so important to Indonesians, is pre-
served. The fact that I only found two of the 24 interviewed Muslim beneficiaries to have had 
joint businesses with the insured micro-borrower somewhat confirms that Indonesian low-
asset families still show a tendency to keep separate business activities. Most MFI customers 
whom I visited likewise ran their petty trade as a one-woman affair. Only among the microin-
sured rice farmers in Bali and Sumba (the only farming customers I visited) did I find that 
husband and wife generally shared the work of rice cultivation. 
While the constraints on appropriating gratuitous labor of kin apply to men and women alike, 
one further constraint to the business expansion of female petty trades relates to the role of 
women in particular. It has often been noted that, with some qualifiers added, Indonesian 
women enjoy more liberties than women in other Muslim societies, especially in terms of 
finance and small business (Papanek and Schwede 1988: 72; Lont 2000: 162; Ford and Parker 
2008: 7; Forshee 2006: 44). After all, most petty traders in Java are women. During my field-
work I noted little opposition of husbands against the economic activities of their micro-
borrowing wives, mostly under the condition that their domestic obligations would not suffer. 
This assessment may be somewhat biased because the MFIs require the spouse’s consent for 
the credit transaction, which automatically excludes families were husband and wife are in 
disagreement. However, Papanek and Schwede (1988: 88) reach similar conclusions in their 
more general investigation on gender and business in Indonesia. I have also mentioned the 
central role that women play in the family’s domestic money management. There are, howev-
er, two opposing forces at work here: economic and risk management perspectives support 
female labor, especially when the family’s asset base is so low that productive female labor is 
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required to maintain subsistence levels; on the other hand, status considerations and tradition-
al gender roles speak against independent female self-employment. Ironically, this latter force 
becomes ever more salient the more successful businesses expand because then economic and 
risk management necessities lose their influence. Alexander (1998: 211) and Forshee (2006: 
152) note that petty trading, heavy bartering and money management do not lend themselves 
well to status production in Indonesian society. Such activities are regarded as coarse and un-
harmonious and are therefore “considered beneath the concerns of men”, as Forshee (2006: 
152) puts it. These activities are therefore better left to women. Moreover, women’s produc-
tive roles are generally considered subordinate to their reproductive roles in the home. Being a 
good housewife accrues more status than petty trade. The New Order regime has contributed 
its fair share in reinforcing such orthodox gender notions (Papanek and Schwede 1988; Alex-
ander 1998: 214; Forshee 2006: 44; Ford and Parker 2008: 9). Among the female MFI cus-
tomers who I surveyed, 16 percent (n=209) described their principal occupation as “house-
wife” despite having a petty trade. Among the group leaders (n=30), which generally hold 
higher social status than the average member, even 30 percent considered themselves princi-
pally as housewives. Although day-to-day domestic money management is the responsibility 
of women, the role of the family head and main income earner is clearly assigned to the hus-
band (Papanek and Schwede 1988: 88; Setiadi 2006: 374). Among the female married MFI 
customers who I surveyed (n=111), only nine percent openly admitted to earn more than their 
husband. Ten percent reported more or less even earnings. 81 percent reported their husband 
to be the main income earner. These answers may be biased because they are culturally ex-
pected. However, my field observations and the data from the beneficiary interviews strongly 
support the fact that among the micro-insured low-asset families men generally contribute 
more to the family income than their wives (cf. table 26 in section 7.6). The already men-
tioned conditional approval of men to their wives’ economic activities, which is lenient com-
pared to other Muslim societies, is strongly hinged on the continued acceptance of the hus-
band as the family head and main income earner. Another consequence of the emphasis on 
female reproduction instead of female production is the preference for petty trade to be car-
ried out at home or close to the home (Ford and Parker 2008: 13). Most of the micro-
businesses which I observed during my fieldwork fulfill this requirement. They were located 
in the home or close to it. Lastly, as economic activities are subordinated to domestic duties, 
female economic activities should be held flexible enough to be quickly discontinued and 
reestablished depending on domestic demand (Papanek and Schwede 1988: 88). These factors 
strongly speak against a long-term commitment to entrepreneurial expansion. The better the 
asset situation of the family as a whole, the more do status considerations and orthodox gend-
er roles suppress self-organized economic activities. As businesses expand and as business 
conduct becomes more sophisticated and sublime, they become a male domain. Evers (1994b) 
notes:  
As soon as business expands, as in the case of petty traders who start to act as wholesalers, men 
take over the trading enterprise. In Jatinom most of the wholesalers in agricultural produce and all 
cattle traders were men. (Evers 1994b: 74) 
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As noted, these men are often identified as good Muslim or belong to a different ethnic group 
such as the Chinese. These two alternative solutions of the traders’ dilemma are no option to 
Indonesian female petty traders. After all, orthodox Islam only supports the domestic con-
finement of women. 
In summary, for reasons of (1) lacking entrepreneurial character, (2) continued influence of 
the moral economy and its related norms and the traders’ dilemma, as well as for reasons of 
(3) family structure and (4) gender roles, long-term business expansion of female headed mi-
cro-enterprises in Indonesia, even when supported by microcredit, is severely hampered. This 
explains why many micro-borrowers experience significant initial asset increases but then 
stop their expansion and content themselves at an acceptable socio-economic level where the 
various contextual constraints put to them are in an agreeable balance. This is the reason why, 
as the result of a complex mesh of accumulated underlying reasons, stagnant growth of female 
headed micro-business in Indonesia is a motivational issue. Ibu-ibu do not envision to make it 
big. I contend that the women do indeed enjoy the independence of their work and moreover 
regard their work as a helpful, sometimes even urgently necessary, contribution to family in-
come. However, it does not present any long term growth options to them. Interestingly, simi-
lar to Moser (2007b: 85) for Ecuador, Papanek and Schwede (1988: 89) note that in Indonesia 
rising asset levels and rising status produce new consumptive aspirations. These heightened 
consumptive aspirations induce women to continue seeking employment to secure appropriate 
financing, but this time around not as self-employed petty traders but as status-accruing for-
mal sector employees. This also helps to avert the impression that petty trading women are 
fatalistic and passive. Quite the contrary; in my experience they are rich in ingenuity and full 
of vigor and enthusiasm. After all, they actively seek out microcredits as a new alternative to 
various other financing options. But such vigor and activity does not automatically make ibu-
ibu self-interested capitalists free of moral and structural bonds (cf. Evers 1994b: 71; cf. Al-
exander 1998: 215). As Schiel (1994) explains: 
There has to be a specific sociocultural environment, initially brought about by social change, until 
an option to become a pure trader, to adopt the role of homo oeconomicus, becomes attractive or 
makes sense. (Schiel 1994: 18) 
It is apparent that the necessary disembedded sociocultural environment has not yet fully 
emerged where ibu-ibu are living and trading. However, microinsurance in combination with 
microcredit is bound to hasten its break-through. 
 
3.3 Microinsurance 
3.3.1  What is microinsurance? 
Closely following Churchill (2006b: 12), I define microinsurance as the protection of low-
asset people against specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate 
to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved. Where Churchill uses “low-income people”, I 
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refer to “low-asset people” instead. It is the focus on low-asset people that distinguishes mi-
croinsurance from conventional insurance, because - technically speaking - all basic insurance 
principles of conventional insurance also apply to microinsurance. For a description of the 
basic insurance principle of risk and resource pooling see section 2.2.3 where insurance is 
defined as a system of conditional reciprocities accumulated to conditional redistribution. 
Another basic principle to be added would be the law of large numbers; that is, the stochastic 
principle that as the number of observations increases, the sample mean will tend to approach 
and stay close to the expected value. A simple example is the distribution of men and women 
in a population. From past experience, we would expect the distribution of men and women in 
a population to be roughly 50/50. However, if we randomly step into a school class, it is un-
likely that we will exactly find one boy for every girl. If we look at the entire school, this 
probability increases. If we finally look at the entire city where the school is located we can 
be fairly sure to get close to a 50/50 ratio. An insurance related example is the number of 
deaths in a population in a given year. If we take a small village, there may be few deaths this 
year and many the next. However, if we consider a much larger population the number of 
deaths will remain fairly stable across the years with only slowly changing patterns. The law 
of large numbers implies that resource and risk pooling in insurance works best the larger the 
risk pool is. With large risk pools the frequency and the value of insurance claims become 
more predictable. Insurance contributions can consequently be calculated more precisely and 
sufficient reserves can be maintained. 
Regarding microinsurance, Heydel et al. (2009: ix) rightly point out that microinsurance 
products cannot simply be determined through absolute numbers such as premium and sum 
insured, although insurance regulators are sometimes trying to do so, for example the Indian 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) (IRDA 2005: 13). I would add to 
that, that microinsurance is strongly connected to a developmental intention on the side of the 
insurance provider. The microinsured themselves do not refer to their insurances as “micro”, 
but simply describe them as affordable insurance; and affordable insurance products have 
been sold to low-asset families long before the term “microinsurance” was coined in the wake 
of the “reinvention of development”. In short, the “micro” in microinsurance refers to its de-
velopmental intention. 
Microinsurance, just as conventional insurance, is generally split into life and non-life micro-
insurance. Non-life microinsurance protects material assets such as huts, machinery or lives-
tock. Health insurance is positioned somewhere in between. Microinsurance can be provided 
on a commercial basis by a corporate insurer or on a mutual basis by a mutual insurer. Micro-
insurance products can either be offered to individuals or to groups. While individual micro-
insurance is nearly always voluntary, group microinsurance is often mandatory, for example 
credit life insurance such as Payung Keluarga. Microinsurance products can be short-term or 
long-term. By and large, life microinsurance contracts tend to be long-term while non-life and 
health microinsurance contracts tend to be short-term. However, in general, microinsurance 
contracts have started with relatively short durations. Only gradually long-term products are 
making their appearance.  
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A crucial distinction needs to be made between microinsurance on the one hand and micro-
credit and microsavings on the other hand. The latter two are based on balanced reciprocity 
and involve definite lump sum payouts, either at the start (credit) or at the end (savings) as 
well as more or less regular small intermediate (re)payments. Microinsurance also involves 
regular intermediate payments, but there is no guaranteed payout. This makes insurance inhe-
rently more complex than savings and credit (McCord et al. 2003: 73), and, as Platteau (1997: 
767) puts it, “implies a rather abstract mode of thinking” unfamiliar to many low-asset fami-
lies in developing countries. Because of their already noted strong reliance on balanced reci-
procity in traditional informal collective risks management practices (Platteau 1997; see sec-
tion 2.2.3), they often do not understand the basic insurance principles and do not undertake 
the required conceptual “paradigm shift”. Low-asset people therefore often mistake microin-
surance for a savings arrangement with a guaranteed return on premiums; that is, a balanced 
reciprocity arrangement. In fewer cases, they mistake it for a gratuitous support or aid from 
the insurance company; that is, a general reciprocity arrangement (Heydel et al. 2009: 53; see 
section 7.7.2). One consequence of this phenomenon is that, at least as far as Indonesia is 
concerned, low-asset people are reluctant to take out insurance that has no repayment feature 
or no-claim bonus (Heydel et al 2009: 11). Not surprisingly, education endowments have so 
far been the most popular insurance product with low-asset people in Indonesia, because these 
are essentially savings products with additional insurance features (Heydel et al. 2009: 48). 
Microinsurance products can therefore be further distinguished into those with a savings ele-
ment and those that are pure insurances. Where the former are popular it is even more difficult 
to explain insurance principles to low-asset people.  
Indeed, next to technical challenges, the low understanding of insurance principles among 
low-asset families and even among insurance agents, banks, and MFIs is frequently identified 
as the biggest obstacle to the marketing of microinsurance (Churchill 2002: 384; Cohen and 
Sebstad 2006: 42; Cohen and Young 2007: 209; Heydel et al. 2009: x, 48). So far, Churchill 
(2002: 384-385), who refers to Platteau, seems to be the only observer who has conceptually 
connected this educational challenge to the widespread notions of balanced reciprocity. This 
connection, which I want to reiterate here, is therefore not new but still little acknowledged. 
On top of the difficulties in understanding the general principle of insurance, difficulties in 
understanding the insurance contracts themselves can be added as a further complexity. De-
spite the frequent calls for simple policy contracts, microinsurance policies nonetheless use to 
contain several exclusions and special provisions, coupled with heavily formalized legal 
wordings and special insurance terminology (Cohen and Sebstad 2003: 54; McCord et al. 
2005: 35). I assume that also the readers of this thesis will be aware of the length and intrica-
cies of their own insurance policies. How is it for the often illiterate or semi-literate microin-
surance customers then? Moreover, MFIs and insurance providers have been criticized for not 
taking customer education seriously enough (McCord et al. 2005: 17-28, 22; Churchill and 
Cohen 2006: 182; Young et al. 2006: 10). 
As mentioned, microinsurance is strongly characterized by its footing in developmental prac-
tice. There are four principal developmental hopes connected to microinsurance:  
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(1) Protection. The most frequently stated hope assigned to microinsurance is that it improves 
the risk management capabilities of low-asset families. In case of shocks, microinsurance 
should compensate for the lost assets and thereby prevent the application of high stress ex-
post coping mechanisms and a further descend into ‘poverty’. Here, microinsurance is essen-
tially seen as a safety net to maintain the status quo. If connected to microcredit and microsav-
ings, as it frequently is, microinsurance can protect the gains produced by these sister services 
(Cohen and Young 2007: 222; Mahajan 2007a: 203). 
(2) Promotion. Microinsurance is also seen as a springboard for asset growth. Insurance 
makes it easier for people to tolerate risks by replacing the uncertain prospect of large losses 
with the certainty of small, regular payments (Mosley 2003: 143). More risk taking usually 
implies higher returns. Over the long-term, microinsurance therefore fosters asset growth 
(Cohen and Young 2007: 222). This relates to the “double fortune / double blow dilemma” 
where comprehensive insurance coverage may induce the insured to loosen their traditional 
growth-limiting risk management networks and to pursue a more individualistic and assertive 
asset accumulation strategy. However, this way the excluded and uninsured may be faced 
with decreasing risk management capacities. It should also be noted that microinsurances 
which contain savings features are per se asset-building (Mahajan 2007a: 203).  
(3) Easier credit access. Comprehensive insurance coverage may reduce the applicants’ credit 
risk in the eyes of the MFIs and therefore provide easier access to credit (Mosley 2003: 
144).25
(4) Boosting institutional investment. In industrialized countries, insurance companies are 
important institutional investors. In developing countries, the insurance market has so far not 
fulfilled this role to the same extent. With the large-scale accumulation of microinsurance 
premiums, insurance companies are hoped to better fulfill this role and to ideally invest their 
funds in local infrastructure and other ‘modernizing’ projects.
 This point is especially relevant in agricultural microfinance. Due to high risks of 
droughts, floods and plagues and highly volatile incomes, microcredits to low-asset farmers 
are considered particularly risky. The relatively recent innovation of index-based microinsur-
ance products is hoped to better manage these risks and promote agricultural lending. 
26
Resuming these four hopes, their respective weight and perceived feasibility in the microin-
surance discourse decreases from (1) protection over (2) promotion and (3) easier credit 
 Although this hope seems 
somewhat farfetched, on a small scale this is what is already happening. In 2009, for example, 
Allianz’ Indian subsidiary BajajAllianz Life Insurance acquired a small stake in its MFI part-
ner SKS (Financial Express 2009). Despite the fungibility of money and the problem of attri-
bution, it could be considered that this direct equity investment into the microfinance sector 
was partly paid for by microinsurance premiums. 
                                                 
25 This hope was also expressed by Bambang Ismawan, founder of the Indonesian MFI Bina Swadaya, in an 
interview on 2 February 2007. 
26 This hope was explicitly expressed by Ir. B. Munir Sjamsoeddin, principal of the Indonesian Institute of Risk 
Management and Insurance (STIMRA), during an informal talk on 31 October 2008. 
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access to (4) boosting institutional investment. The first two hopes are graphically combined 
and explained in illustration 2. 
Illustration 2: Two hopes: poverty protection and welfare promotion through microin-
surance 
Source: author, based on Cohen and Sebstad (2006: 25). 
Regarding distribution, there are four basic distribution models for microinsurance. Largely 
building on Radermacher and Dror (2006) these basic models, of which several variations and 
hybrids exist, are:  
(1) Partner-agent model: The partner-agent model is certainly the most popular model for 
large scale commercial microinsurance operations. In this model, a commercial insurance 
company acts as the partner who provides the insurance products and assumes the associated 
risks. One or more MFIs act as the agents and distribute the products to their customers. Apart 
from distribution, customer education and administrative tasks such as premium collection are 
often “outsourced” to the MFIs. The MFIs are compensated with a commission or a profit 
share. In this scheme, the insurance company benefits from low transaction costs as well as 
the outreach and the trust that the MFIs have already established in the target market. The 
MFIs benefit from the insurer’s technical know-how, its risk absorption capacity and its 
access to reinsurance. Payung Keluarga was distributed through a partner-agent model.27
(2) Community-based or mutual model: Here, a larger social group gathers to pool their re-
sources and risks in a formal insurance arrangement. This way, ownership and control re-
mains with the insured. This model is renowned for its flexibility and customer centeredness. 
However, mutual schemes become increasingly complex, anonymous and capital-constrained 
as they expand. Mutuals therefore tend to remain small. Those that expand often convert into 
 
                                                 
27 Formally speaking, Allianz Indonesia was “the partner” in the partner-agent arrangement. However, this thesis 
consistently speaks of the involved MFIs as “partners” because seen from an Allianz perspective, the MFIs were 
the partners in a teamwork arrangement. The two different usages of “partner” should not be confused. 
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publically listed commercial insurers in order to overcome management complexities and to 
gain access to capital markets. 
(3) Full-service model: Here, the MFI runs its own insurance operation with full control over 
the scheme. In this model, it is important that insurance risk and insurance accounting are 
strictly separated from the credit and savings side. Ideally, a separate insurance unit is estab-
lished or eventually a professional insurance partner is sought who can contribute the neces-
sary technical know-how and - most importantly - provide access to reinsurance. 
(4) Provider-driven model: In this case, an insurance provider runs the entire microinsurance 
scheme including its distribution. This could be done through the establishment of an own 
network of insurance agents. As such a network is expensive insurers usually prefer the part-
ner-agent model instead. 
In terms of products, life microinsurance has so far certainly been the most widely spread and 
most profitable. This holds especially true for credit-life products like Payung Keluarga 
which the MFIs attach to their microcredit on a compulsory basis. Credit-life, however, offers 
little value to the customer unless it provides additional benefits like Payung Keluarga does. 
Otherwise credit life largely benefits the MFIs because their entire loan portfolio is protected 
against individual and catastrophic death risks and the MFIs can moreover gain a commission 
or profit share (Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 166, 168; Cohen and Young 2007: 213-214, 
220). Credit life has also rightly been criticized for only providing coverage while customers 
have a loan (Cohen and Young 2007: 220). Health microinsurance, on the other hand, is per-
ceived as being in highest demand and has consequently received most donor attention. How-
ever, health insurance is significantly more complex than life insurance. The related schemes 
are often small and profitability is still elusive for many health microinsurance schemes 
(McCord et al. 2005: 9; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 168; Roth et al. 2007: 25; Wipf and 
Garand 2008: 42). Compared to life microinsurance, non-life microinsurance products are 
scarcer. Especially in India, there have been efforts that combine non-life and life products 
into so-called composite products.  
The already mentioned index-based approach to non-life microinsurance is a relatively new 
innovation. Index-based products tie the payout to a proxy index instead of directly tying it to 
the actual shock. For example, index-based draught insurance would pay claims when rainfall 
for the respective area drops below a certain critical threshold which makes the occurrence of 
a draught highly likely. In May 2009, German reinsurer MunichRe and GTZ, a development 
organization owned by the German government, together with a local insurance partner 
launched a flood-index microinsurance product for low-asset kampung dwellers in Jakarta. 
For a premium of US$ 4.72 per year, the product pays US$ 23.60 in the case that water-levels 
at a nearby flood gate rise to 950 cm which is a good proxy for severe inundations in the area 
(GTZ 2009). In the recent past, such severe inundations in Jakarta have occurred every five 
years (1997, 2002, 2007). As I will outline later I am highly critical of this product, not only 
because of its low payout-to-premium ratio (see section 4.3). However, it is the first index-
based microinsurance product in Indonesia and one of very few index-based microinsurance 
products worldwide. High hopes are pinned to the index-based concept for a timelier and 
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more effective dealing with natural disasters, especially as their frequency is predicted to rise 
as climate change progresses. There are even considerations to securitize such index-based 
risk pools on the world capital market which after all has greater financial resources than all 
available reinsurance capacity combined (Hess and Syroka 2005; Manuamorn 2007; Skees et 
al. 2007). 
The microinsurance market is rapidly expanding. From 78 million microinsurance customers, 
which one global study found in 2007 (Roth et al. 2007: ii), customer numbers are estimated 
to have risen to approximately 135 million by 2009 (Creagh 2009). Similar to microcredit, 
optimists put the total global demand for microinsurance at one billion people (Von Canstein 
2009). India is the largest and most active microinsurance market. This can largely be attri-
buted to an IRDA regulation from 2002 which obliges life and non-life insurance companies 
in the country to derive some portion of their business from rural or disadvantage sectors, 
which in effect meant from microinsurance (IRDA 2002). This unique regulation is known as 
the Indian quota system. Consequently, virtually all insurance companies in India have, either 
optimistically or grudgingly, become involved in microinsurance. This has certainly boosted 
the quantity of microinsurance. However, the quality of products and services has often suf-
fered (Roth and Ramm 2006: 5-6). Another highly active microinsurance market is the Phil-
ippines. The Philippines have a special microinsurance regulation that favors the establish-
ment of small but regulated mutual insurance schemes. The microinsurance market in Africa 
is characterized by a large number of mutual health insurance schemes which, however, are 
often of minuscule size (Roth et al. 2007: ii). Indonesia, on the other hand, can be considered 
a sleeping giant on the microinsurance landscape. Despite its highly active and diverse micro-
finance sector, microinsurance schemes other than credit life are scarce (McCord et al. 2006; 
Heydel et al. 2009: x). 
3.3.2 Why microinsurance rose to prominence? 
I have repetitively drawn the connection between the “reinvention of development” which 
occurred around the turn of the Millennium and the rise of microsavings and microinsurance 
(cf. section 3.1.2 and section 3.2.2). The first microinsurance trials started almost as a charity 
initiative when the ILO began to experiment with very cheap insurance policies in the early 
1990s. After all, this was the time when the no-frills readjustment policy of the 1980s adopted 
a ‘human face’. A number of local insurance companies, mutuals, and NGOs also started to 
decidedly target the low-asset market with low-cost insurance services since the early 1990s. 
A cooperation between American insurer AIG and the MFI FINCA in Uganda started in 1996 
without any donor involvement. It is commonly regarded as the first partner-agent implemen-
tation (McCord et al. 2005; Churchill 2006a: 6-9; Creagh 2009). As these first tentative steps 
occurred on a local basis without much donor involvement, they only received wider attention 
around the time of the “reinvention of development”. Even the term “microinsurance” makes 
its first documented appearance in literature only by 1999 (Microinsurance Network 2009a). 
Parallel to microsavings, and following the footsteps of microcredit, interest in microinsur-
ance has been continuously rising since 2000 (Churchill 2002: 382; Armendariz and Morduch 
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2005: 150). In 2006, alluding to Robinson’s famous phrase of the “microfinance revolution” 
(Robinson 2001), Morduch (2006) entitled one paper “Microinsurance - The next revolu-
tion?” And the speed of public and academic recognition seems to be increasing. Creagh 
(2009) cites an insurance specialist at the World Bank: “Interest in microinsurance has been 
exploding throughout the world.” Large insurance companies like AIG, Allianz and Zürich 
have become engaged in microinsurance. In 2007, Zurich even established its own microin-
surance unit at headquarters level in Switzerland (Insurance Journal 2007). In 2009, “Leap-
forg”, the first private investment fund dedicated to microinsurance, was established (Creagh 
2009).  
With the meteoric rise of microinsurance to global attention now firmly documented, and a 
rough connection with the “reinvention of development” already drawn, we can turn to a more 
detailed analysis of the driving reasons behind the rise of microinsurance. The first reason is 
certainly the substantial donor support which set in after the turn of the Millennium. The 
World Bank and the multi-donor CGAP group that works under its auspices have financed a 
substantial amount of research into microinsurance, albeit more on the practical than on the 
academic side. Since 2004, for example, CGAP has financed more than 20 case studies of 
microinsurance implementations. CGAP has also drawn up donor guidelines (CGAP 2003) 
and established a microinsurance working group, which has meanwhile spun off to form the 
Microinsurance Network. The World Bank is involved in multi-million-dollar microinsurance 
implementations in India, Mongolia, Morocco and elsewhere. It especially focuses on index-
based projects. Private donors have become active as well. In 2008, the ILO could establish 
its Microinsurance Innovation Facility thanks to a US$ 34 million donation from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (MicroCapital 2007; ILO 2009). The facility now gives grants and 
technical assistance to microinsurance projects worldwide. It also offers research grants to 
academics working on the issue. In fact, as is usually the case with every new “development 
fad”, over the course of time a very active consultancy industry has evolved around the issue 
of microinsurance.  
Heavy donor involvement and co-financing made it particularly easy for private insurance 
companies, wary of the unfamiliar risks involved but keen to improve their public image, to 
become involved. Such involvement of the private sector is particularly needed with microin-
surance. Microinsurance is inherently more complex than microcredit and microsavings. The 
necessary skills are often not available with NGOs and MFIs. Moreover, large scale microin-
surance operations almost always require expensive and heavily regulated insurance licenses 
which neither donors nor MFIs can provide. In addition, although still a somewhat dormant 
issue, microinsurance schemes may eventually need access to reinsurance. This access can 
only be provided through regulated first-line insurers. Lastly, with microinsurance issues such 
as contract enforcement, anti-selection and moral hazard are even more salient than with mi-
crocredit and microsavings. This has kept private insurance companies hesitant for a long 
time; not to forget the universal microfinance concern with transaction costs (World Bank 
2000; Armendariz and Morduch 2005: 166). However, from the turn of the Millennium on-
wards, not only was co-financing from donors and market knowledge from consultants avail-
able, but there was also rising excitement with the “bottom of the pyramid” market that prom-
 
90 
 
ised new growth potentials at a time when most developed insurance markets had reached 
high saturation levels (cf. Creagh 2009). Moreover, “business with the poor” not only prom-
ised a single bottom line but even better, a double bottom line. What is more, microcredit 
could be taken as a leading and encouraging example, apart from the fact that it had estab-
lished a potential distribution network of MFIs who already had won the trust of millions of 
customers. Just as donors, many MFIs became eager to expand their product portfolio and 
approached commercial insurers for assistance. 
3.3.3 Microinsurance debates 
As with microfinance in general, there are both fundamental and technical debates on micro-
insurance. These run along similar lines as with microfinance (cf. section 3.2.5). Nonetheless, 
the debates on microinsurance do have their own specifics. For example, more than microcre-
dit, microinsurance finds itself caught in the middle between public social protection meas-
ures and informal risk management arrangements. Many observers are concerned that micro-
insurance may crowd out informal schemes; fewer observers are worried that microinsurance 
could induce the state to cut back its safety net and social protection measures. To complete 
the picture, although less relevant for the focus of this thesis, public social protection meas-
ures may also directly crowd out informal schemes. The opposite is also thinkable (cf. Jowett 
et al. 2003). This results in a mutually influencing triangular constellation which I call the 
social risk management (SRM) triangle (illustration 3).28
Illustration 3: The social risk management triangle 
 The basic question with the SRM 
triangle is by how far do the three risk management measures of informal schemes, social 
protection, and microinsurance complement, substitute or even promote each other? 
Source: author 
                                                 
28 Other authors have noticed very similar triangular relationships in welfare policy before. Neubourg and Wei-
gand (2000: 20) speak of “the social welfare triangle of which markets, families and public authorities form the 
cornerpoints.” 
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As noted above (section 3.2.5), concerns about the crowding out of informal schemes have 
also been raised regarding microcredit, for example by Kron (2004), Rankin (2006: 97); Dich-
ter (2007a: 9), and Harper (2007: 258). With microinsurance, however, the debate is unders-
tandably more salient because microinsurance is even more about risk management than mi-
crocredit. It is also noteworthy that this most fundamental of microinsurance debates, just as 
most of the others, is taking place among academics and development experts of mostly 
Western background. In the developing ‘beneficiary’ countries, debate among media, civil 
society and microfinance customers is more subdued, although not totally absent. Naturally, 
the MFIs and insurance companies are least concerned with this matter as they focus more on 
the immediate customer demand and business prospects than the societal pro and contra of 
microinsurance. 
Regarding the SRM triangle, let us focus on the relationship between informal risk manage-
ment arrangements and microinsurance first. Informal risk management arrangements consist 
of individual precautions such as savings or income diversification, and collective arrange-
ments such as mutual assistance (on balanced reciprocity basis) or patron-client relationships 
(Scott 1976; Casino 1988; Dercon 2005b: 12). Both can involve ex-ante and ex-post meas-
ures. The large majority of scholars agrees that informal risk management arrangements alone 
do not cover all risks low-asset families are facing, especially in case of repetitive shocks or 
large-scale covariant29
                                                 
29 In the literature, the terms “covariant” and “covariate” are synonymously used at about the same frequency. I 
chose to consistently use the term “covariant” when referring to large-scale collective risks (flooding, drought, 
earthquakes, epidemics) as the opposite of idiosyncratic risks, which are risks that only affect one or few indi-
viduals at a time (death, non-epidemic illness, injury, theft). 
 shocks that affect the entire community (Scott 1976: 9; Alwang et al. 
2001: 19; Holzmann et al. 2003: 3, 6; Dercon 2005a: 5; Cohen and Young 2007: 222; Dercon 
and Kirchberger 2008: 5; Pan 2008: 6; Heydel et al. 2009: 59, 69). Repetitive and covariant 
shocks can quickly deplete the asset base of small family based or community based risk 
pools where the effect of the law of large numbers is limited. In a somewhat alternative 
stance, Townsend (1994; 1995) finds - based on a longitudinal panel survey on three low-
asset South Indian villages - that these communities are well able to share their risks and 
strive towards full collective insurance. Townsend’s findings, however, have been criticized 
for their over-simplicity (Morduch 2006: 341-342) and methodological faults (Pan 2008: 7). 
Interestingly, Pan finds no communal risk sharing taking place in her remote analysis of sur-
vey data from rural Ethiopia (Pan 2008: 7). I find this startling because anthropological on-
site research has found communal risk sharing to take place in just about every traditional 
society (Sahlins 1974; Scott 1976). Morduch (1999a: 191), on the other hand, rightly remarks 
that migration can spatially spread informal risk management networks and thereby make 
them more resilient in case of covariant shocks. This seems to be especially relevant in Indo-
nesia, where a lot of migration, especially to urban centers, is occurring. In my own ex-ante 
customer survey, 53 percent of all respondents declared to have a migratory background. In 
urban areas, it was 87 percent (see table 14 in section 7.1). Dercon (2005c) rightly points out 
that the effectiveness of informal risk management differs depending on the exact nature of 
the risk or shock, not only on whether it is covariant or idiosyncratic. Another concern with 
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informal collective risk management networks relates to the already mentioned observation 
that the lower the asset-base the more restricted is the access to such networks. In other 
words, such collective arrangements are exclusivist. They are strongest among better off fami-
lies (Kozel and Parker 2000: 66; Miguel et al. 2002: 10; Dercon 2005a: 4; De Weerdt 2005). 
In summary, by and large, researchers agree that informal risk management does not provide 
full risk coverage to low-asset families, especially to the most destitute among them. In turn, 
this absence of “full insurance” hampers the asset accumulation strategies of low-asset fami-
lies and may even lead to so-called poverty traps (Morduch 1994; Dercon 2005c). Dercon 
describes this potential vicious cycle:  
In the presence of insurance and credit market failures, there is a further problem: the poor may 
enter into activities and asset portfolios with low risk, but also low returns. This in turn affects 
their long-term income and their ability to move out of poverty. Furthermore, shocks may have 
long-lasting effects: productive assets may be destroyed or sold off to survive, health may be un-
dermined or children may be taken out of school. The result is higher poverty that may persist. 
This suggests that uninsured risk may lead to poverty traps. (Dercon 2005c: 439) 
Reiterating one of my principal arguments of this thesis, I would add to this rationale that 
even if informal collective risk management arrangements do not provide perfect risk cover-
age in all cases (and they certainly do not), one part of the premium that low-asset families 
have to pay for their membership are the moral restrictions that the moral economy imposes 
on material asset accumulation. The obstacles to asset accumulation are therefore not only due 
to individual choices of income diversification, but also due to collective hindrances. 
I find a certain irony here in the way microinsurance is supposed to assist low-asset families. 
If it is the very low-asset families who are most excluded from informal networks but at the 
same time microinsurance is closely knit with microcredit (which we have discussed to not 
reach the very bottom of the pyramid (cf. section 3.2.5)), then microinsurance may in fact be 
applied at the wrong leverage and leave very low-asset families more excluded and worse off 
than before (cf. Morduch 2006: 351). Several authors note that by tendency the better edu-
cated and economically richer and urban low-asset families are most likely to seek microin-
surance coverage (SyncConsult 2006: 17; Asfaw and Jütting 2007: 850; Heydel et al. 2009: 
48). However, the concern that microinsurance may leave those that need most protection 
worse off is less often raised than the more general concern that microinsurance may general-
ly crowd out informal risk management schemes with possible negative side effects (Chur-
chill 2002: 385; Dercon and Kirchberger 2008: 9; Heydel et al. 2009: 1). In terms of empirical 
evidence, systematic data on the existence and scale of crowding out caused by private micro-
insurance has previously not been readily available, but significant crowding out of familial 
assistance is evident in the case of Payung Keluarga (see section 7.8.1). In the absence of 
broad empirical evidence on microinsurance itself, we may alternatively look at public social 
protection measures. Here, the introduction of public social protection systems in developing 
countries have often been found to crowd out informal schemes to some extent (Dercon 
2005c: 444). It therefore appears reasonable to assume a crowding out effect for private mi-
croinsurance implementations in general. This worry has induced calls to aim for perfect 
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complementarities of microinsurance with informal insurance risk management networks. 
Microinsurance should exactly fill those gaps which are left uncovered by informal schemes 
(and public schemes) (Dercon 2005c: 444; Heydel et al. 2009: 1, 61). However, I hold that 
such calls are largely illusory. Even if the risks covered by microinsurance are indeed differ-
ent from those which informal traditional arrangements cover, indirectly and over the long 
term the introduction of individualistic risk protection is highly likely to weaken the social 
structure of such informal arrangements. As with microcredit and microsavings, there are cer-
tainly some complementarities, but there is also substitution; and I hold that with microinsur-
ance, the substitution effect is even greater than with microcredit. Why so? Regarding micro-
credit, it has been already mentioned that microcredit adds to a family’s array of financing 
options while family financing, moneylenders and other financing ways remain strong (cf. 
section 3.2.5). This may be due to the fact that these different financing channels serve differ-
ent purposes; and even if microcredit crowds out some moneylenders, the remaining money-
lenders can pursue their business as usual in a more limited market. Moneylenders do not de-
pend on the law of large numbers. Of course, also informal risk management arrangements 
continue to operate after the advent of insurance as Cohen and Young (2007: 221) observe. 
However, informal risk management arrangements cannot continue to operate at the same 
strength and scope when the better off members decide to opt out in pursuit of more individu-
alistic risk management options such as microinsurance. The extent of substitution is therefore 
going to be greater than with microcredit. As mentioned, Payung Keluarga has by and large 
substituted rather than complemented family assistance (see section 7.8.1). Due to my mostly 
qualitative research approach in this matter I cannot prove my point with statistical figures, 
especially as parallel measures on the crowding out effect of microcredit in Indonesia (and 
elsewhere) are lacking. This must be left to further quantitative research. Nonetheless, Mor-
duch (2006: 352) and Dercon and Kirchberger (2008: 7) rightly caution that holistically seen 
the mere introduction of microinsurance may not always be what serves low-asset families 
best. Other alternatives should be seriously considered, such as leaving informal arrangements 
untouched or, if possible, strengthening such arrangements. Also the promotion of microsav-
ings and special emergency credits may be appropriate alternative options (cf. Churchill 
2002:382). Lastly, Dercon (2005c: 448) alludes to the possibility that the crowding out of 
informal schemes may be evaluated positively if it breaks down old power relations. Howev-
er, he does not consider that new and more formalized dependencies may emerge instead (cf. 
Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988: 17). 
Now, let us look at the second relation of the SRM triangle, namely the relation between so-
cial protection and microinsurance. Although social protection has been touched upon several 
times already, it is best to first define social protection more clearly. Following Norton et al. 
(2000) and Moser (2001: 363), social protection refers to public actions taken in response to 
levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a 
given polity or society.30
                                                 
30 Other authors use an even wider definition of social protection to also include community based and private 
measures. In effect, this equates social protection with social risk management (Heydel et al. 2009: 75). Howev-
 This means the protection of those who fall temporarily, or persis-
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tently, under a level of livelihood deemed acceptable. It does not entail the promotion of a 
general standard of opportunity and livelihood for all citizens. It is important to note that so-
cial protection means public, not private action, or more specifically, government policies and 
government backed systems and measures (cf. Holzmann and Sipos 2008: 1). Typical compo-
nents of social protection include (Moser 1998: 365; Churchill 2006b: 21-22): 
(1) unemployment and disability benefits, 
(2) universal healthcare, 
(3) maternity benefits, 
(4) old-age pensions, 
(5) protection for children and the disabled, 
(6) workfare programs,  
(7) social funds, 
(8) public microfinance programs,  
(9) cash transfers, 
(10) emergency aid. 
Social protection is generally more broadly understood than social security. Social security is 
a specific, highly institutionalized subset of social protection. Those social security programs 
which rely on direct contributions from members are also called social insurance programs. 
Unemployment benefits and old-age pensions are typical examples of social security / social 
insurance measures. On the other hand, public food aid after flooding or draught is a clear 
social protection measure, but not part of social security. Such latter measures are also re-
ferred as safety net measures. 
As mentioned, the principal concern is that microinsurance may induce the state to cut back 
on social protection or refrain from expanding it. This way, private microinsurance may 
crowd out public social protection and leave the financing of risk management at the hands of 
low-asset people “as agents of their own survival”, as Rankin (2006: 97) has expressed similar 
criticism in relation to microcredit (cf. section 3.2.5). However, as alluded to, such concerns 
are less salient in the discourse than concerns of the crowding out of informal schemes. The 
most widely held position seems to be a pragmatic, or rather a developmental one, namely 
that microinsurance simply fills the gap that the generally weak and cash-strapped social pro-
tection systems in developing countries cannot fill (Schuck 2005: 34; Churchill 2006b: 21; 
McCord et al. 2006: vi; Heydel et al. 2009: 75). Some authors are quick to add that this does 
not principally relieve the government of its social protection responsibilities (Schuck 2005: 
34; Churchill 2006b: 21). Heydel et al. (2009:ix) as clear market-leaning proponents even 
imply that microinsurance can help low-asset people to take matters into their own hands in-
stead of passively waiting for government assistance. Churchill (2006b: 21) and Jacquier et al. 
(2006) take an optimistic and conciliatory stance by considering the possiblity that microin-
surance can create delivery mechanisms to extend government programs and subsidies to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
er, for the current discussion it is important to have a clear distinction between public, informal and market-
based risk-management solutions which is why I prefer the definition presented here. 
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informal economy, and in doing so microinsurance may even help to integrate informal risk 
management and formal social protection systems. Therefore, critical voices on microinsur-
ance crowding out social protection are hard to find in the academic discourse. Moreover, 
such crowding out would be somewhat hard to verify. It is interesting then that particularly in 
Indonesia, where microinsurance is hardly ever critically discussed, such concerns briefly 
flared up in connection with the already described GTZ-MunichRe flood-index microinsur-
ance product in Jakarta (cf. section 3.3.1). The launch of the product in May 2009 was at-
tended to by high-ranking government officials. Consequently, NGOs have criticized the gov-
ernment because it apparently supports privately financed microinsurance instead of being 
serious about reducing the causes of the notorious flood problem in the city (Kurniasari 2009). 
Because of its very low payout-to-premium ratio, which I consider inadequate, and because 
low-asset people in Jakarta have found effective ways to adapt to the flood risk (Wilhelm 
2009) I predict this voluntary product not to sell well. This will, at least temporarily, thwart 
the suspected public-to-private transfer of risk management responsibilities. Payung Keluarga 
is less susceptible to such concerns because it tackles the risk of death of micro-debtors. This 
is generally not considered as interfering with the domain of social protection. 
Some note has to al least be made of the possible direct crowding out of informal risk man-
agement by social protection (and vice versa). Although this third relation of the SRM triangle 
is of less relevance for this thesis, it is quite salient in the general debate on vulnerability and 
risk management (Devarajan and Hammer 1998; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000:1226; Gertler 
and Gruber 2002:68; Heitzmann et al. 2002:11; Jowett et al. 2003; Dercon 2005a: 5; Dercon 
2005b: 21). This is most likely due to the fact that the issue of social protection vis-à-vis in-
formal risk management had been around long before microinsurance entered the scene. 
Going back further in history, it would be interesting to see how social protection, market 
based insurance and informal risk management have evolved in industrialized countries. Con-
cepts and empirical evidence might be available here which may prove useful for the current 
discussion on the SRM triangle in developing countries. Yet, reference to the “Western” expe-
rience is hardly ever made in the microinsurance literature. In fact, during my literature study 
I found no works that specifically deal with the social impacts that the popularization of in-
surance may have had in industrialized countries. From the few available remarks in the mi-
croinsurance literature it seems to be clear that the mass popularization of insurance, particu-
larly of life insurance, in today’s industrialized countries started off with very cheap insurance 
policies which, going by today’s terminology, would be called microinsurance. These were 
either offered by commercial insurance companies or by highly popular mutual benefit socie-
ties (Koch 1967; Van der Linden 1996; McCord 2006: 357; Microinsurance Network 2009a). 
These microinsurance forerunners were targeted to low-asset factory workers who had appar-
ently been bereft of informal risk management mechanisms by the social upheavals that ac-
companied the “Great Transformation”. This indicates that these insurances only made their 
appearance after, or at best, parallel to the rapid industrialization and formalization of work in 
the era of industrialization, just as has been the case with formalized savings, and even later 
with (consumptive) credit (Koch 1967: 3; Dichter 2007c: 187). The name, with which these 
early insurance policies were referred to, further underlines this point: They were called “in-
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dustrial insurance” (McCord 2006: 357). While industrial insurance seems to have been a 
reaction to the demise of informal risk management strategies, microinsurance, at least by 
tendency, seems to take a more pro-active approach of “preparing” its beneficiaries for mod-
ernization. Moreover, industrial insurance clearly aimed at workers of the formal sector, while 
microinsurance mostly targets the informal sector. According to orthodox modernist thought 
this may be considered as not according to sequence. Also Dichter (2007c:187) notes that “in 
the current microfinance movement, everything seems to have been done the other way 
around.” However, it has already been noted that apparently modernization in developing 
countries is not leading to the same ubiquitous formalization of work that has occurred in 
Western societies, and that, on a more general level, modernization is running along different 
paths than in the West. It may therefore be reasonable to consider formal insurance for the 
informal sector and not wait until low-asset people may eventually enter the formal sector. In 
fact, this historical asymmetry may be held as a reason why I consider pro-active microinsur-
ance as an agent of social change while in Western history, reactive insurance was never seen 
in such way, which in turn led to a lack of academic interest in the social consequences of 
industrial insurance.  
Regarding the historical development of insurance in Indonesia, the largest local insurance 
company Bumiputera was established in 1912 as a mutual insurer by the teachers' union Per-
satuan Guru Hindia Belanda (PGHB). Initially, Bumiputera only provided support to families 
on the death of members. At first, Indonesian teachers employed by the Dutch colonial gov-
ernment could become members. In 1915, membership was opened to all local government 
staff and later, when it had already lost much of its mutual character, to all workers. Other 
mutual insurers and later commercial and government insurers were also established but did 
not reach the scale of Bumiputera (Ingelson 1996). Ingelson notes: 
The better paid and higher status urban workers were the predominant participants and beneficia-
ries. It was much more difficult to enroll the unskilled workers and the urban poor in casual em-
ployment or in the informal sector of the urban economy. In general, mutual benefit societies wi-
dened the economic gap between the small minority of skilled and literate Indonesians and the vast 
majority of unskilled urban workers. (Ingelson 1996:585-586) 
Ingelson’s observation illustrates that until the advent of microinsurance, insurance in Indone-
sia seems to have followed the same path as in Western societies in that it emerged only after 
a certain degree of labor formalization had taken place. Interestingly enough, Ingelson notes 
the exclusivist character of insurance and the fact that it helped to further socio-economic 
inequalities. It therefore seems reasonable to also be concerned about similar effects with mi-
croinsurance. Even more astonishing is that according to Ingelson the leaders of the nascent 
indigenous worker’s movement in Indonesia were concerned that mutual societies may sooth 
the symptoms of poverty and social inequality instead of curing their underlying causes: 
Many labour union and political leaders . . . while supporting the creation of mutual benefit socie-
ties . . . argued that this must not be allowed to divert attention from questioning the structures of 
society that led to such feeble economic and social conditions for the people. Worker militancy 
must not be blunted by action which could only alleviate poverty and not remove its fundamental 
causes. (Ingelson 1996: 580) 
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This resounds, or rather historically forecloses, the concern put towards modern microfinance 
as a mere symptom soother that was discussed in section 3.2.5. 
Moving to more intermediate and technical debates on microinsurance, it has already been 
noted that the general understanding of insurance principles and insurance contracts among 
low-asset people is low. Therefore one debate concerns how (prospective) customers may be 
educated about insurance. This debate has been far more subdued in regards to microcredit 
and microsavings because these two financial services do not require such a large “paradigm 
shift” in conceptual thinking. Generally, it can be observed that discussing insurance and risk 
management is not directly touching any taboos among low-asset families. The overwhelming 
majority of (prospective) customers whom I questioned in Indonesia stated that they were 
openly discussing insurance matters with their family, friends and neighbors. However, insur-
ance may collide with certain beliefs, such as the belief in the divine predetermination of all 
fortune and calamity (takdir), and also with religious norms, such as the Islamic prohibition of 
gambling (maysir), uncertainty in business contracts (gharar), and interest taking (riba). In 
addition, I found that some low-asset people who had bought relatively expensive education 
endowment policies for their children were not admitting this during group discussions, pre-
sumably in order not to be regarded as show-offs. Roth (2001:16) notices that in South Africa, 
where formal and semi-formal life insurance is much more widespread among low-asset fami-
lies than in Indonesia, people preferred to keep information on their insurance policies a pri-
vate matter; firstly to keep relatives from demanding part of the payouts, and secondly to pre-
vent widows being accused of having murdered their husbands through witchcraft in order to 
“cash in” on their husbands’ life insurance policies. In general, however, in line with other 
authors I found that low-asset people are generally open to discuss insurance related informa-
tion (cf. McCord et al. 2005: 17-18). The debate on microinsurance education therefore cir-
cles not so much around how to get low-asset people interested but around how to get the in-
tended messages across in the face of substantial illiteracy rates, low understanding of condi-
tional redistribution and low familiarity with legal documents. There seems to be little doubt 
among observers, however, that microinsurance customers need to be educated and adapt the 
‘right attitudes’. In this respect, I find a comment by Cohen and Young (2007: 221) particular-
ly revealing when they discuss microinsurance and financial education: 
Designing the right product is essential, but it is not enough. Financial education offers a way to 
address this gap in consumer knowledge. Financial education is teaching the knowledge, skills, 
and attitudes required to adopt good money-management practices for earning, spending, saving, 
borrowing, and investing. (Cohen and Young 2007: 221) 
In effect, this comment implies that so far, low-asset people have gotten it mostly wrong and 
that their attitudes need to be changed. Korff and Tigges Lizarazo (2008a) are scathingly criti-
cizing such notions of underdeveloped capacities:  
The popular training courses that are always an integral part of any development project, imply al-
ready that the “target groups” lack capabilities and capacity . . . . The message is that only with de-
velopment will they be able to become functioning members of ‘world society’. Interestingly, this 
arrogance is not only limited to official development practice, but is wide spread among NGOs. 
(Korff and Tigges Lizarazo 2008a: 9) 
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The point I want to make here is that just as microinsurance itself, any kind of education on it 
is also a driver of social change. I do not doubt that customers have a need and even a right to 
be well informed on the policies they are intending or obliged to buy, but I want to reiterate 
that much of the customers’ frame of reference and many of their attitudes are reasonable if 
the specific contextual conditions and social structures are taken into account. Customer edu-
cation is walking a thin line between providing factual information and efforts at social engi-
neering. This tightrope walk has so far not been sufficiently acknowledged and critically dis-
cussed in the microfinance discourse and in particular in the debate on microinsurance. 
Another debate on microinsurance concerns the question of compulsory vis-à-vis voluntary 
coverage. Payung Keluarga, for example, was a compulsory product which customers had to 
accept if they wanted to get access to the MFIs’ microcredits. For insurance companies and 
MFIs, compulsory products have a number of advantages: They reduce anti-selection because 
“good risks” cannot opt out. Moreover, they greatly reduce marketing and transaction costs, 
and lastly they greatly enlarge the number of customers covered (cf. Heydel et al. 2009: 68). 
In case of credit life insurance, the MFIs are of course interested in having their entire loan 
portfolio covered, which is why credit life is almost always sold on a compulsory basis. For 
the customers, compulsory coverage may bring the following benefits: Reduced premiums 
due to less administrative complexity, and a reduced risk of mis-selling. Mis-selling refers to 
the denounced but nonetheless frequent practice that sales agents misinform customers about 
their policies in order to sell insurance more easily and receive the corresponding commis-
sions. Usually, customers are provided little information on compulsory microinsurance prod-
ucts but at least the risk of this information being skewed is reduced. Voluntary coverage, on 
the other hand, offers the customers freedom of choice. Here, customers need to be actively 
won for the product which promotes more customer focus in product development. It also 
increases the amount of information provided but may encourage mis-selling. Voluntary cov-
erage comes at the disadvantage of higher anti-selection, higher administrative costs and 
higher marketing expenses such as commissions which eventually results in higher premiums 
(cf. Heydel et al. 2009: 68). In 2002, Churchill found that most microinsurance available 
through MFIs at the time was mandatory (Churchill 2002: 384). With the continuing domin-
ance of credit life microinsurance this is unlikely to have changed until today. McCord et al. 
(2005:9) report that AIG and FINCA in Uganda switched their partner-agent group accident 
product from voluntary to mandatory coverage because of increasing concerns with MFI staff 
fraud. It is noteworthy that this compulsory AIG-FINCA policy returns less than 35 percent of 
the total collected premium as claim payouts and is highly profitable for AIG, FINCA and 
other involved MFIs (McCord et al. 2005: iv, 26, 36). This speaks for suboptimal customer 
value and shows that the potential benefits that compulsory coverage could theoretically bring 
for customers are often thwarted by low service quality and high profit objectives of the in-
volved MFIs and insurance companies. Consequently, Rahman (2007: 199) clearly speaks out 
in favor of self-determined voluntary coverage. Enarsson et al. (2006: 126-127) and Wipf et 
al. (2006: 173) take a more moderate case-dependent stance.  
If compulsory credit life microinsurance is generally considered profitable, sometimes even 
overly profitable to the disadvantage of the insured, the same cannot be said for other micro-
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insurance products such as health microinsurance. Here, the discussion still relates more to 
how microinsurance can be made profitable in the first place. Compulsory coverage is natu-
rally regarded to greatly enhance prospects of profitability (Churchill 2002: 384; 2006a: 3). 
Therefore, the moral discussion on how much profit could be decently extracted from low-
asset people is still not as salient in microinsurance as it is for microcredit.  
Lastly, looking at the debates surrounding microinsurance to date, little notice has been made 
of just how large a paradigm shift microinsurance induces. The situation is similar to micro-
credit, and - because of the even more abstract and ‘modern’ thinking needed - even more 
severe. Microinsurance is not just about simply buying insurance coverage from an agent or 
MFI instead of asking your neighbor for help. Microinsurance entails switching from social 
rules of balanced reciprocity to legalized rules of conditional redistribution. Microinsurance 
needs the insured to think more “straight” about probabilities, as Morduch (2006: 345) puts it, 
which eventually means more pervasive application of means-end rationality. Microinsurance 
commodifies risk management. Instead of reliance on social cohesion and carefully managed 
social relationships, protection becomes a straight-forward, formalized, and legalized affair 
with a clear-cut price tag attached. Especially for low-asset people with low functional litera-
cy, new dependencies are created. Low-asset people have to trust the benevolence of MFIs 
and the financial stability of insurance companies, something which is far beyond their means 
of control. Claiming legally enshrined rights is still no easy matter for low-asset people in 
developing countries with their often weak judicial systems. Moreover, microinsurance con-
tracts may require new social delineations which were previously unknown. Health microin-
surance contracts, for example, often require the entire family to join the insurance scheme in 
order to avoid anti-selection; that is, to avoid that only the elderly and sick join while the 
young and healthy do not. The question arises who belongs to the family and who does not? 
Thus, nuclear families become more formally defined than before. Insurance companies and 
local MFIs are of course aware of this problem on a technical level. Sometimes, even indi-
genous definitions are used to define families and their dependents (Wipf et al. 2006:164). 
However, the general fact of a further formalization and legalization of what a “family” is, is 
not resolved by this. With Payung Keluarga, only members of the nuclear family could be 
named as beneficiaries. Technically, this was done to ensure an insurable interest on the side 
of the beneficiary and to avoid - negatively thinking - crimes in order to avail insurance bene-
fits. However, socially this sometimes led to tensions at the moment of beneficiary choice 
because the insured themselves did not distinguish between in-laws and the nuclear family, 
between foster children and natural children, and so forth.  
References to these matters within the microinsurance discourse are still extremely scarce. As 
indicated above, Platteau (1997) and Wilhelm (2009) have made some tentative inroads here. 
Another noteworthy exception is Mosley (2003), who concerns himself with the wider social 
impacts of microinsurance. His astonishingly positive findings will be discussed below (sec-
tion 3.3.4). By and large, however, microinsurance is hardly connected to the overarching 
discourse on development where arguments on social change and modernization are frequent-
ly discussed. So scarce are qualified remarks that I have to turn to a quotation from Zacher 
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(1988) on the social impact of social legislation, to indicate that the same holds true for micro-
insurance: 
Social legislation can change the situation within the family unit. In some circumstances the pay-
ment of an educational grant to a child tends to separate this child from the family unit. Payment of 
children's allowances to the head of the family increases the children's dependence. Generally we 
find that the laws referring to social security establish completely new structures and standards of 
behaviour for the life of the individual, and the groups and the society to which he or she belongs. 
(Zacher 1988: 26) 
Naturally, just as with microcredit (cf. section 3.2.5) the extent of social impact of microin-
surance depends on the extent by which it is integrated into the families’ and individuals’ risk 
management practices. The more it substitutes other risk management practices, especially 
informal collective strategies, the higher the impact is going to be. However, I reiterate here 
that I hold microinsurance to be more substitutive than microcredit. 
3.3.4 Microinsurance impact 
To date, little sound empirical evidence on the realized impacts of formal microinsurance im-
plementations is available. This is especially true with regards to commercial microinsurance 
implementations, and when compared to the relatively vast (and yet still inconclusive) impact 
research available on microcredit. In 2005, Dercon noted:  
In general, there is surprisingly little research on microinsurance, at least compared to the vast mi-
crocredit literature. (Dercon 2005c: 446) 
In a more recent literature survey on microinsurance, Dercon and Kirchberger (2008) still 
have to conclude: 
It is in any case correct that there are few studies that can really credibly evaluate the welfare or 
other benefits from insurance. (Dercon and Kirchberger 2008: 9) 
It has been noted that in general the development of microinsurance closely traces the pre-
vious development of microcredit; this applies to the interest in impact as well. Just as the 
question of microcredit impact was only asked more insistently long after the industry had 
firmly established itself, the same seems to be occurring with microinsurance. As microinsur-
ance is currently still a young concern of development, the principal thrust at the moment is to 
get microinsurance “up and running” first and worry about impacts later. However, with mi-
croinsurance the timeline seems to be somewhat more condensed than with microcredit. Dur-
ing the last two years the question of impact has already received increasing, if yet still li-
mited, attention. Apart from its relative newness, another reason for the scarce amount of con-
cluded impact research lies with the respective technical intricacies which I will outline in 
further detail below. Different from microcredit, however, the discourse on microinsurance is 
far less morally charged than microcredit. With microcredit, both available research and mor-
al arguments are relatively manifold. With microinsurance, on the other hand, both research 
and moral arguments are rather scarce, although I have tried to outline above that microinsur-
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ance and related customer education as agents of social change hold clear potential, even the 
necessity, to be critically discussed. 
In terms of regions, microinsurance impact research naturally follows the path of microinsur-
ance implementations. As those are most frequent in South Asia and in Africa, it is here 
where most impact surveys are located. Neither Central and Latin America nor South-East 
Asia have found particular attention so far. Regarding Indonesia in particular, there is so far 
no known academic research on the impact of realized microinsurance impacts. Wilhelm 
(2009), as noted, only hypothesizes on the possible impacts of a flood microinsurance in Ja-
karta, such as has been recently introduced by MunichRe and GTZ.  
In terms of products, health insurance has received most attention, especially the numerous 
mutual health schemes in Africa. The few available relevant studies that can be named are 
Dong et al. (1999); Jütting (2001; 2004); Ranson (2001); Preker et al. (2002); Mosley (2003); 
Ekman (2004); Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005); Diop et al. (2006); Dror et al. (2006); Asfaw 
and Jütting (2007); Schneider and Hanson (2007); Wagstaff et al. (2007). The focus on the 
impact of health microinsurance runs in line with health being considered the most demanded 
and the most donor supported field of microinsurance. Moreover, the impact of government 
financed health insurance schemes has received considerable attention, too. Relevant studies 
were done by Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000), Jowett et al. (2003) and Thornton et al. (2009). 
However, public health schemes are not formally included in the scope of market-based mi-
croinsurance. Interest in the effectiveness in index-based schemes for disaster prevention is 
also high although here the number of schemes which could be surveyed is still small. Two 
such studies on India and Malawi are Gine et al. (2007) and Gine and Yang (2007). Life in-
surance and conventional non-life insurance have attracted far less attention (Dercon and Kir-
chberger 2008: 11). In fact, apart from my own preliminary publications on Payung Keluarga 
(Hintz 2009a, 2009b, 2010), I could only find two impact studies which to some extent deal 
with commercial, non-mutual, non-public life insurance: SyncConsult (2006) and Young et al. 
(2006). These two come closest to my present study in terms of product, context, and distribu-
tion arrangement. They also show methodological similarities.  
A clear sign of the rising interest in microinsurance impact analysis is the fact the ILO Micro-
insurance Facility has made impact research a pillar of its overall microinsurance research 
strategy (ILO 2008c). The facility has already awarded one small impact research grant and 
more are to follow soon (ILO 2009). Unfortunately, the maximum funding of US$ 10,000 per 
grant may only suffice for small scale, exploratory studies. The Microinsurance Academy 
(MIA), which was established in New Delhi in 2007, is also investing considerable resources 
into the investigation of microinsurance impact, especially health microinsurance. Further-
more, CGAP has recently spun-off its microinsurance working group to form the Microinsur-
ance Network as an independent legal entity. The Microinsurance Network in turn now has its 
own “Impact Working Group” (formally the CGAP sub-working group on microinsurance 
impact) which is taking first steps to seek funding for impact research. Moreover, the Impact 
Working Group is currently compiling the first review of available publications on microin-
surance impact following a standardized research protocol. The first preliminary results con-
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firm that full-fledged academic publications on microinsurance, except in case of health in-
surance, are indeed still extremely rare (Microinsurance Network 2009b). If anything, most 
material is available in form of journalistic articles or consultancy reports (such as SyncCon-
sult and Young et al. 2006). Moreover, the impact results reported by these sources are gener-
ally found to be seriously tainted by methodological flaws. 
If literature on realized microinsurance impact is generally scarce, the situation looks natural-
ly better for the scoping of microinsurance. Quite a number of academic studies and reviews 
that analyze risk and vulnerability in low-asset contexts have done so by explicitly consider-
ing the potential of introducing formal insurance solutions; to mention just a few noteworthy 
examples: Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Townsend (1994; 1995), Morduch (1995; 1999a), 
Dercon (2005b); Elbers et al. (2007), Pan (2008), and Wilhelm (2009). As already alluded to 
(cf. section 3.3.3), by and large these studies and reviews find that a significant portion of 
low-asset families’ risks remains uninsured, especially for frequent and covariant risks, and 
therefore conclude that sufficient scope and need for microinsurance or public social protec-
tion interventions exist (cf. Dercon and Kirchberger 2008: 6). A noteworthy exception, also 
methodologically, is Wilhelm (2009), who by way of qualitative sociological field research 
finds that low-asset kampung dwellers in Jakarta have already adapted well to flood risk. He 
consequently cautions against the introduction of flood microinsurance as a socially disinte-
grative measure.  
With regards to the academic disciplines involved, just as with microcredit, microinsurance 
impact research is dominated by economists. As noted, there are also a number of less formal 
reports by microinsurance practitioners without a specific academic agenda. The favored me-
thodological approach is large scale randomized studies, ideally in form of quantitative longi-
tudinal panel surveys or RCTs (cf. Dercon 2005b: 10). However, especially in the more ex-
plorative and practice oriented researches, for example Young et al. (2006: 6), qualitative data 
collection methods such as focus group discussions and key person interviews have also been 
used. An ongoing longitudinal impact survey on a health microinsurance pilot project of the 
Aga Khan Foundation in Pakistan is explicitly employing a parallel integrated approach of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Research of other academic disciplines into the impact 
of actual microinsurance implementations is even scarcer than on the economics side. In fact, 
I know of none - not even of currently ongoing research. As the impact research field is fortu-
nately becoming increasingly dynamic it may nonetheless be that some non-economics re-
search is being undertaken or at least planned. However, major research players like the ILO 
Microinsurance Innovation Facility are clearly favoring quantitative econometric research, 
although Dercon and Kirchberger (2008), in concluding their microinsurance literature review 
(undertaken for the Facility), note the need for a wider disciplinary approach to microinsur-
ance: 
A study of the understanding of risk and of insurance may well have to go beyond standard eco-
nomic, business or insurance analysis into the realm of psychology or anthropology. (Dercon and 
Kirchberger 2008: 19) 
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Even though anthropologists and sociologists are still to make a stance at microinsurance im-
pact research, in terms of more general works on the financing and risk management of low-
asset families, practically the same works as on microcredit can be named because informal 
financial management and informal risk management very much overlap in embedded moral 
societies. Some noteworthy examples are Evans-Pritchard (1940), Geertz (1962), Ardener 
(1964), Sahlins (1968), Scott (1976), Sullivan (1994). More recent noteworthy work along 
anthropological or sociological lines was done by De Weerdt (2002; 2005) in a network anal-
ysis of a village in Tanzania, by Goldstein et al. (2005) on inclusion and exclusion in mutual 
insurance networks in southern Ghana, and - most relevant to the current study - by Lont 
(2000; 2005) on “juggling money” in a Yogyakarta kampung, by Koning (2006) on mutual 
arrangements in Java, and by Wilhelm (2009) on the complexities of flood risk management 
in low-asset kampung in Jakarta.  
The challenges that microinsurance impact research faces are largely the same as those for 
microcredit noted above (cf. section 3.2.6). In addition, microinsurance impact research often 
faces the challenge of low claim frequencies. I will first revisit the microcredit research chal-
lenges to scrutinize in how far they apply to microinsurance impact research. Afterwards, I 
will outline the specific microinsurance research challenge of low claim frequency. I will re-
visit these challenges once more in section 5.3.3 when I discuss their specific influence on my 
own research methodology. 
(1) Neutrality and objectivity: This challenge holds true for microinsurance just as it does for 
microcredit.  
(2) Selection bias: It has been noted that customers who take up microinsurance hold different 
attitudes and have higher education than their immediate neighbors, especially in case of vo-
luntary insurance (SyncConsult 2006: 17; Young et al. 2006: 9; Asfaw and Jütting 2007: 850; 
Heydel et al. 2009: 48). This makes the establishment of control groups difficult. Regarding 
microinsurance, in case of compulsory credit life products, perfect control groups are well 
neigh impossible because all MFI loan customers have credit life insurance (unless some are 
excluded for reasons of age or for the purpose of research). Comparing insured micro-
borrowers with non-insured non-borrowers would actually lead to a double selection bias. 
Selection bias is therefore as much of an issue with microinsurance impact research as it is 
with microcredit. 
(3) Poverty and welfare proxies: It is often argued that one principal benefit of microinsur-
ance is buying “peace of mind” (Churchill 2002: 384; Mosley 2003: 151; Young et al. 2006: 
10). This is a notoriously subjective benefit and consequently hard to measure. Another hope 
connected with microinsurance is increased risk appetite through better protection (cf. section 
3.3.1). This is likewise an intangible benefit that is hard to conceptualize, measure, and 
attribute. In case of actual claims, there are two opposite forces at work: The shock itself 
which exerts downward pressure on the asset-base and the insurance payout which stems 
against it. These two forces are somewhat difficult to detangle and measure separately. The 
problem of establishing and measuring poverty and welfare proxies is therefore quite similar, 
if not more complex, than with microcredit. 
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(4) Causality and attribution: This problem is also related to intangible factors like “peace of 
mind” and increased risk appetite. How much of a change of “peace of mind” or risk appetite, 
if observable, can be attributed to the insurance? In case of a claim, how much did the insur-
ance contribute to the risk management and how much was provided by other sources, such as 
mutual assistance. These complexities are difficult to tackle, much the same as with microcre-
dit. 
(5) Fungibility and additionality: Fungibility of funds seems to be less of a problem than with 
credit because usually claims are paid to compensate for a specific condition. In case of cash-
less health insurance, where claims are directly paid to the health care provider, the problem is 
entirely absent. However, in case of cash payouts, such as with Payung Keluarga, at least the 
problem of additionality remains. Maybe money has already been saved for the funeral and is 
now being put to a different use. 
(6) Effects beyond the unit of analysis: This issue is as relevant for microinsurance as it is for 
microcredit, and probably for all types of impact research. One example would be the worse 
off position of non-insured if the advent of microinsurance weakens informal collective risk 
management arrangement. The wider social impacts of microinsurance may affect entire 
communities and society at large. Such effects are difficult to discern and measure. 
(7) Attrition and drop-outs: The problem of drop-outs does not seem quite as relevant for mi-
croinsurance as for microcredit because omission of drop-outs, especially if they have not 
raised a claim, may not skew impact assessment (of claims) as much to the positive side as in 
the case of microcredit. Moreover, for compulsory coverage, the issue of drop-outs is likely to 
be related to the underlying reason of group membership, such as having a microcredit, rather 
than to the insurance itself. Nonetheless, the following up of drop-outs could reveal where 
microinsurance may have collided with religious and cultural norms, not least with the expec-
tation of a premium refund and therewith the continued importance of balanced reciprocity 
thinking. Attrition through moving or dropping out of the surveyed group may cause a strain 
on the sample size in longitudinal impact research. 
(8) Differential impact by poverty level: Along the lines of what has already been noted on the 
matter of selection bias, the appreciation and ultimately the benefit of microinsurance may 
differ by different social strata. 
 (9) Influence and dynamics of exogenous factors: This challenge holds true for microinsur-
ance as it does for microcredit.  
(10) Questionnaire design: This challenge holds true for microinsurance just as it does for 
microcredit. In addition, the understanding of insurance principles and insurance contracts 
may be lower than the technicalities of microcredit. 
(11) Measurement error: This challenge holds true for microinsurance just as it does for mi-
crocredit.  
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(12) Statistical analysis: Also this challenge holds true for microinsurance just as it does for 
microcredit. Pan (2008) recounts a vivid example of how different statistical methods and 
assumptions may render opposite results with regards to microinsurance scoping: 
Elbers et al. (2007) find that insurance will be effective in asset accumulating and growth in rural 
Zimbabwe. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) conclude the opposite. The cause of the difference is 
the assumption on informal arrangements. (Pan 2008: 127, making reference to Elbers et al. (2007) 
and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)) 
(13) Benchmarking: It has already been noted that every MFI is different. Similarly, every 
microinsurance product is different. Several of the dimensions in which products can differ 
have been outlined above (cf. section 3.3.1), for example group versus individual contracts, 
compulsory versus voluntary coverage and of course the exact risk insured. Contractual spe-
cifics like the number of exclusions, minimum and maximum entry age, or the sums insured 
make it even more difficult to compare microinsurance products, even those of the same 
product type. For example, Payung Keluarga is hard to compare with other credit life prod-
ucts because it somewhat uniquely offers additional payouts directly proportionate to the loan 
amount. With microinsurance, comparing different products is often a classical “apple to 
peaches” comparison; and due to different product configuration options, the same may even 
hold true for the same product being applied across several MFIs. I was therefore fortunate 
that Payung Keluarga was applied in a single standard configuration across all MFI partners 
(before the product later diversified). 
(14) Low claim frequency: This is a specific challenge for microinsurance impact research on 
claims. Insured risks like death, disability, accident, fire, or natural disasters do not occur fre-
quently among a given population. The impact of claim payments for these risks is therefore 
difficult to survey within a scheduled research window. Ideally, impact research on life insur-
ance or non-life insurance should be longitudinal; that is, running over several months or 
years in order to accumulate sufficient cases for robust and representative analysis. Claims 
should ideally be investigated shortly after the claim payout; that is, on the go. If beneficiaries 
are all asked at the same time, the respective recall periods may be different and render im-
precise results (Asfaw and Jütting 2007: 840). With certain risks, like death or disability, the 
challenge of low claim frequency may be reduced if particularly large populations are sur-
veyed. However, life insurance beneficiaries are sometimes hard to track down, especially in 
highly dynamic low-asset settings (cf. Young et al. 2006: 10). With catastrophic risks like 
earthquakes it is impossible to survey claims in a planned survey. Surveys would have to be 
executed right after the earthquake. Randomized sampling and double-difference methods are 
rendered impossible by the unpredictability of most catastrophic risks. More regular occur-
rences like draughts and flooding may lend themselves easier to well designed claim impact 
research. The problem of low claim incidence rates does not apply to health insurance where 
claim experience usually builds up fairly quickly, even among smaller populations. The prob-
lem is also less salient when qualitative research methods are used. However, interviewing 
just a handful of life insurance beneficiaries, for example, exposes such research to the risk of 
being dismissed as anecdotal (cf. Young et al. 2006; cf. Armendariz and Morduch 2005:199). 
Of course, non-claim related impact research, such as research focusing on benefits like 
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“peace of mind”, changes in business risk affinity, or general changes to the way how families 
and communities manage risks ex-ante (!) are possible at any given time.  
As noted, by and large microinsurance scoping studies and reviews assert a need for microin-
surance (or public intervention) to cover uninsured risks of low-asset families. In line with 
this assertion, empirical findings from the scarce research on actual microinsurance imple-
mentations have generally reported positive impacts. Due to being the most intensely studied 
field, research on health insurance shows the most robust results. For example, Asfaw and 
Jütting (2007) draw positive conclusions from a quantitative impact assessment of health in-
surance provision in Senegal, although they are not specifically referring to health microin-
surance:  
All these results reveal that insured respondents were more likely to get health care given need, to 
use in-patient services more frequently and to be admitted to a hospital sooner, less likely to raise 
the affordability issue as a reason for not seeking health care and not getting the full medicine pre-
scribed to them, and so on. (Asfaw and Jütting 2007: 841-842) 
Young et al. (2006) report similar findings from their explorative qualitative research on 
health microinsurance in Uganda. However, they do not find indications that being health 
insured encourages the insured to incur higher business risks. Jowett et al. (2003: 337) note on 
their study of voluntary public (!) health insurance in Vietnam that the correlation between 
being insured and seeking medical advice earlier was weakly positive. Interestingly, their 
study also notices that where informal networks are particularly strong, this may hinder the 
uptake of new insurance products. This makes for a case of informal networks crowding out 
voluntary social protection, which is therefore also thinkable in case of private microinsur-
ance. Going by the available evidence, health insurance does seem to reduce precautionary 
savings for health shocks, induces more timely consultation of medical facilities in case of 
illness, and ultimately has beneficial impacts on the insured’s health. However, where positive 
outcomes are noticeable, they may still be relatively moderate.  
Regarding the impact of a personal accident insurance provided by AIG and FINCA in Ugan-
da which Young et al. (2006) were trying to survey in an explorative qualitative research (one 
of the two studies closest to my own), only a few beneficiaries could be tracked down and 
interviewed. The beneficiaries were reported to be grateful for having received payouts from 
the insurance company (AIG) via the MFI (FINCA). But the evidence remains highly anec-
dotal. The insured themselves reported to feel more “peace of mind” but they apparently did 
not change their business risk affinity either. Interestingly, Young et al. (2006: 9) notice a 
certain fatalism among non-insured and the influence that religious believes have on attitudes 
on insurance. In absence of insurance, praying was regarded as an effective risk management 
strategy. 
Next to Young et al. (2006), an impact study conducted on behalf of CARE International in 
Ghana is closest to my own impact research (SyncConsult 2006). The study investigates the 
impacts of a voluntary life microinsurance policy which contains a savings element and ap-
parently also a hospitalization benefit. Coverage is available for the policyholder and option-
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ally also for the spouse and two children. The product is provided by a private insurance com-
pany and distributed through several rural banks in a typical partner-agent arrangement. 
CARE International had earlier incentivized and consulted the insurer for the product devel-
opment. The study follows a similar single difference approach to mine in that a baseline 
study on prospective customers was conducted in 2004 and an endline study with similar 
questions was done in 2006, when 119 customers were interviewed. The study draws very 
positive conclusion on the impact of microinsurance. Apparently, the vulnerability of the in-
sured to life cycle risks has been greatly reduced. The preoccupation with risks such as health, 
education costs and old age seem to have been mitigated by the savings component (2006: 
21). Also the acceptance of insurance as an adequate risk management tools seems to have 
risen dramatically (2006: 22) and the reliance on informal risk management was somewhat 
reduced, which indicates some crowding out (2006: 25). However, the study also notices that 
death risk, which is the basic risk that the product covers, is not perceived as a major risk fac-
tor compared to the other risks. Interestingly, the report attributes this to the strong informal 
assistance of the family after death and the belief that any precautions against death would 
only lead to its premature occurrence (2006: 21). Thus, similar to Young et al. (2006) this 
study indicates the importance of religious beliefs and cultural practices on the perception and 
application of insurance.  
However, despite its very positive results, the CARE study has a number of flaws. The study 
was financed by CARE which had initiated the microinsurance project in the first place. Neu-
trality is therefore questionable. The study presents the narrative of only two claim cases 
which moreover make perfect show-case examples of the positive impacts that microinsur-
ance payouts may have (2006: 31-32). It is not explained and remains questionable why not 
more than these two cases are presented. Moreover, the ex-ante and ex-post interviewees of 
the customer research component were not the same. In fact, the 119 interviewed customers 
of the endline survey seem to be compared to all prospective customers of the baseline sur-
vey. As many prospective customers may have chosen not to take out insurance, much of the 
reported positive impacts seem to be due to self-selection; that is, selection bias. In fact, the 
study notes that especially formal employees with regular incomes and higher than average 
education had opted for the product. In short, the results of the CARE studies are interesting 
but the highly positive results need to be taken with considerable caution. 
The impact work mentioned so far hardly ever touches on the wider social impacts of micro-
insurance. Here, one review by Mosley (2003) on the impact of health microinsurance is 
noteworthy. Among other impacts, it is expressly concerned with the wider social impacts of 
health microinsurance. In particular, Mosley summarizes impact findings from two health 
microinsurance implementations in Bangladesh and Uganda. The respective impact studies 
are stated to have employed a conventional control group approach. Mosley’s highly positive 
results are astonishing because they are somewhat counterintuitive and sound almost too good 
to be true, most importantly with respect to social cohesion: 
Microinsurance . . . protects social capital by preventing groups, including families, from breaking 
up due to stress over unpaid debts. (Mosley 2003: 144) 
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There is some evidence that [these microinsurance schemes, M.H.] improve repayment rates; in-
surance appears to have a positive impact on physical and human capital expenditures, apparently 
mediated via higher absorptive capacity for loans; insurance clients perceive themselves as less 
vulnerable than non-clients; and several of the ‘wider impacts’ on which we speculated above do 
indeed materialize, including, in Bangladesh, higher stability of income of expenditure and incor-
poration of the ultra-poor and lower exposure for the lender. (Mosley 2003: 150) 
Within local communities there is compelling evidence that ‘bonding’ social capital in the sense of 
trust, has indeed been strengthened as a consequence of the advent of insurance. In many cases this 
was as a consequence of expenditure and liability becoming more predictable, so that individuals 
had an increased incentive to trust one another. A particular aspect of this predictability was re-
duced reliance on informal emergency borrowing. (Mosley 2003: 151) 
What appears somewhat counterintuitive here is the implication that the introduction of mi-
croinsurance and the corresponding reduced reliance on mutual assistance has positive effects 
on social capital. Thought further this would mean that in societies with high insurance pene-
tration, like Western societies, social capital would be stronger than among low-asset embed-
ded moral societies, which is something I seriously question (cf. Putnam 1995; cf. Mahajan 
2007a: 199). Maybe Mosley refers to positive forms on social capital as opposed to those that 
rely on coercion and stifling collective norms. Unfortunately, methodology and context of the 
respective studies in Bangladesh and Uganda are not described. As this study is rarely men-
tioned in other microinsurance literature, it is likely that they have not found widespread ac-
claim. Nonetheless, Mosley (2003) can at least be credited for being explicitly concerned with 
the social impacts of microinsurance where others simply note this as a research gap or do not 
mention the issue at all. 
In conclusion, the available evidence on microinsurance impacts is encouragingly positive, 
especially regarding health microinsurance. However, impacts are depicted more moderately 
than fervent optimists may have hoped for, particularly in those studies which have found 
wider acclaim in the microinsurance debate for their methodological rigor. Many of the par-
ticularly positive studies are tainted by methodological flaws and doubtful objectivity. In gen-
eral, microinsurance seems to be catering to those of relatively high education and asset levels 
within the heterogeneous group of low-asset people. This tendency is in line with the some-
what exclusivist character of microcredit. Some crowding out of informal schemes seems to 
be occurring as well, although this occasionally may also work the other way around as Jo-
wett et al. (2003) have shown. No study has found microinsurance to completely replace in-
formal risk management strategies. Therefore, the argument of complementarities as dis-
cussed above (cf. section 3.3.3) certainly holds some merit. Nonetheless, I do maintain that 
substitution is likewise taking place; and to a greater extent than with microcredit. Those stu-
dies which have relied on more qualitative methods such as customer interviews and focus 
group discussions notice the importance of religion and cultural practice on the way microin-
surance is perceived and used. This seems to be most salient in the case of life insurance.  
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4 THE PRACTICAL EMBEDDING 
This chapter shifts the focus from theory towards the broader research setting in Indonesia. It 
provides the practical embedding of the thesis in terms of the general situation in Indonesia 
and the background of the surveyed microinsurance project.  
4.1 Indonesia’s “Great Transformation” 
In the past, the different ethnic groups in Indonesia were living an embedded state characte-
rized by a relatively slow-moving dynamism of change (Anderson 1972; Evers and Schrader 
1994a: 5; Chambert-Loir and Reid 2002: xxv). Contemporary Indonesia, on the other hand, is 
rapidly changing. Like elsewhere in South-East Asia this change is characterized by a range 
of simultaneous and intertwined processes of modernization: spread of the market economy, 
monetarization, industrialization, increasing integration into the global economy, migration, 
urbanization, education and the consequent upheavals and reorganization of social structure 
(Evers and Schiel 1988: 14; Hefner 1998a: 3; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 7, 8; Ford and Parker 
2008: 8). Since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, democratization and decentralization 
can be added to the list (cf. Heitzmann et al. 2002: 1). In reference to Polanyi (1944), Hüsken 
and Koning (2006: 25) therefore speak of “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’”. Schröter 
speaks of the “intrusion of modernity” (2000: 16). This process of change is most salient in 
urban areas and on Java (Koning and Hüsken 2006: vii-viii; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 8). To 
put things into proper perspective, I need to stress that in this large-scale transformational 
process, microinsurance assumes only a relatively minor role as a driver of social change. 
More precisely, microinsurance is but one of many ingredients of the spread of the market 
economy. It is one of many tangible examples for monetarization, formalization and legaliza-
tion. Microinsurance pales in importance in the face of other large scale processes such as 
migration and urbanization. In order to capture the velocity and scope of change in Indonesia, 
table 4 presents a number of descriptive indicators of transformation. Afterwards, I will ana-
lyze the major drivers of change and lastly discuss the social consequences of such change. 
Table 4 shows that the gross national income (GNI) per capita has more than doubled from 
1990 to 2005 to reach $ 3,050 measured in international PPP. This indicates a strong growth 
in national wealth, although it does not show which segments of the population are benefitting 
most. The sharp decrease in the national expenditure poverty rate from 40 percent in 1975 to 
16 percent in 2005 - with an intermediate bump during the Asian financial crisis - shows that 
low-asset people have by and large been able to reap some of the benefits of rapid economic 
growth. Nonetheless, in absolute numbers a sizeable 36 million of Indonesia’s 220 million 
inhabitants were still defined as poor in 2005 (BPS 2009). Because modern employment op-
portunities in services and industry are concentrated in urban centers, poverty rates are lower 
in urban areas compared to rural areas (cf. BPS 2009). Not surprisingly, urban centers exert a 
pulling attraction upon the rural population. A strong migratory move towards urban centers 
is discernable. 
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Table 4: Transformation indicators for Indonesia 
 
 
Compared to an urbanization rate of 19 percent in 1975, today slightly more than half of In-
donesians live in urban areas. By 2015, this number is estimated to reach 59 percent. It should 
be added, however, that the spatial size of urban centers has greatly expanded over the last 
decades. Moreover, large parts of formerly rural Java could today be better described as semi-
urban, or as McGee (1991) notes, as desakota regions.31
                                                 
31 The term desakota is a combination of the Indonesian words for village (desa) and city (kota). McGee (1991: 
7) defines desakota regions as “regions of an intense mixture of agricultural and nonagricultural activities that 
often stretch along corridors between large city cores. These regions were previously characterized by dense 
populations engaged in agriculture, generally but not exclusively dominated by wet-rice.” 
 The change of the labor force struc-
ture is closely interrelated with a change in employment opportunities, migration and urbani-
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zation. Agriculture is rapidly losing its dominant position as the largest employment sector. In 
1965, 71 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture. By 2005, this figure had 
dropped to 44 percent. On the other hand, services (38% in 2005) and especially the industrial 
sector (18% in 2005) are experiencing high growth rates of employment. The sectors’ contri-
bution to the GDP gives the inverse picture to the labor force distribution: in 2006, the indus-
trial sector contributed 46 percent to the national GDP of US$ 935 billion (PPP). Services 
accounted for 41 percent and agriculture for a mere 13 percent of the national GDP (CIA 
World Factbook 2007). By and large, business activities and consequently employment are 
therefore most lucrative in the industrial sector, while agriculture trails far behind. Indonesia’s 
transformation is therefore characterized by a fast-moving industrialization process. At the 
same time, the population’s average educational level is rising. This is epitomized by an in-
creasing literacy rate which reached 91 percent in 2005. At the same time, nuclear family siz-
es are experiencing a downward turn as total fertility rates are rapidly dropping. In 1990, on 
average a woman could still be expected to bear 3.1 children during her reproductive years, 
while only 15 years later, this figure had dropped to 2.2 children. In summary, compared to 
only a few decades ago Indonesian society today is more industrialized and more urbanized, it 
has a high proportion of in-country migrants, a considerably higher levels of education and 
wealth, and smaller nuclear families. The economic importance of agriculture, formerly the 
backbone of the Indonesian economy (and society), is rapidly diminishing. 
What are the socio-cultural consequences of Indonesia’s rapid transformation? Let us look at 
the consequences of the spread of the market economy and the accompanying monetarization 
first. Today, the market economy not only prevails in the industrial and services sectors, but 
increasingly permeates the agricultural sector as well. Evers and Schiel (1988: 51) discern a 
clear turn from a subsistence mode of production towards a market-based system. When I 
asked several Indonesian academic experts on the most important trends that Indonesian so-
ciety faces today, the issue of the spread of the market economy, also to rural areas, usually 
emerged foremost. In fact, this process is not particularly recent but already started to gain 
traction in the mid-19th
Apart from its economic and nutritional importance, rice also has a cultural and social value, par-
ticularly in the tradition of food exchanges (sumbangan) during celebrations of life-cycle events. 
Should a family not have its own rice stock this means that before it attends a selamatan it has to 
buy rice at the market, sometimes at high prices. Hence, sawah not only means economic capital, 
but also provides social and symbolic capital. . . . The growing tendency in 1994 to sell the stand-
ing crop (tebasan) to middlemen, who harvest the land with their own work group (usually from 
 century. The accompanying monetarization of exchanges makes the 
workings of the economy more transparent (Bourdieu 1977: 172; Schiel n.d.,b: 5). This in 
turn uncovers the correlation between input and output in labor more clearly, a correlation 
which, as mentioned, the moral economy strives to suppress (cf. section 2.2.2). In conse-
quence, the economic value of many goods and actions takes increasing precedence over their 
ritual or symbolic value. This resounds the claim of Mahajan (2007a) about the increasing 
financialization of other assets classes (cf. section 2.4) or Rahnema’s postulate of the “eco-
nomization of society” (Rahnema 1992; cf. section 2.2.1). Koning gives a palpable example 
of this phenomenon regarding the value of rice paddies (sawah) in Java: 
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outside the village), had become a rather normal practice in 1998. . . . The economic value of sa-
wah therefore jeopardises the other forms of capital. (Koning 2006: 33-34) 
The spread of the market-economy and the accompanying monetarization process also affects 
the way labor is appropriated. Traditional reciprocal labor forms are gradually being replaced 
by wage labor contracts (Abdullah and White 2006: 55). This does not mean that the informal 
sector of the economy is rapidly giving way to the formal sector. Ford and Parker (2008: 8) 
note that “even after an extended period of rapid industrialization . . . over half of all working 
women and over 40 per cent of working men are in the informal sector.” For 2007, the ILO 
estimated that 63 percent of the employed population or 61.5 million people were working in 
the informal sector, while only 37 percent or 36 million were formally employed by compa-
nies or in the civil service. Moreover, the ILO notes that the proportion of the informal sector 
has been on the rise since the Asian financial crisis (ILO 2008a: 2, 4). Here, we see one of the 
differences in the transformation of Indonesia (and many other developing countries) to 
Western societies where industrialization went hand in hand with a near complete formaliza-
tion and legalization of work. 
The increasing integration of Indonesia’s economy into the global economic network runs 
parallel to the spread of the market economy within the country itself. This leads to an aug-
menting exposure to trends, shifts and downturns in the global economy, which also feeds 
back into Indonesian society. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 gave a vivid example of 
the possible negative consequences of this increasing international dependency. Koning and 
Hüsken vividly summarize the effect of the Asian financial crisis on Indonesian society:  
Modern Indonesian society is deeply enmeshed in global and regional economic networks and 
hardly resembles the image of self-sufficient local communities and self-evident solidarity. The 
economic crisis that hit Indonesia hard in 1997 and that left its marks in subsequent years, laid 
bare one of the major weaknesses of the development model of the New Order state. The lack of 
adequate social security provisions for a population that had to cope with sudden unemployment 
and price hikes proved to be a major barrier to rapid recovery from the crisis. (Koning and Hüsken 
2006: vii) 
Here, Koning and Hüsken also make a point that the crisis not only hit Indonesia hard, but 
that the consequences were further aggravated by “homemade” problems such as the lack of 
adaptation of the social protection system to the ongoing economic and societal transforma-
tions. Holloh (2001: 8) adds incomplete and inconsistent market reforms to the list of such 
aggravating “homemade” problems. However, the integration of Indonesia into the world 
economic system is far from complete and homogenous. In Indonesia, several MFI managers 
told me that the crisis had not severely affected the businesses of their micro-borrowing cus-
tomers precisely because these petty trades were conducted only slightly above subsistence 
levels and on a very much localized scale. The connection of these micro-businesses to world 
economic markets was at best weak, which made them less vulnerable to the market upheav-
als of the time. The fact that BRI, the LPD community banks in Bali, and the cooperative sec-
tor, and -with certain restrictions - the system of rural banks (BPR) weathered the Asian fi-
nancial crisis better than many commercial banks that focused on the higher end, more globa-
lized market, seems to support this point further (cf. Robinson 2000; cf. Holloh 2001). This 
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phenomenon of a considerable financial resilience of the low-asset informal economy at large 
and MFIs in particular to international economic and financial downturns seems to be repeat-
ing itself during the current world financial crisis (Welt 2009). Dieckmann (2007: 18) even 
sees the apparant low correlation of microfinance with the movements of mainstream capital 
markets as a favorable argument for investment in microfinance as a means of risk diversifi-
cation. 
Naturally, the spread of the market economy and monetarization also affects social structure, 
especially as this goes hand in hand with migration and urbanization. The above quotation by 
Koning and Hüsken already indicates that the image of the rural self-sufficient village in In-
donesia is no longer valid, if it ever was. Through the migration of mostly young community 
members to the cities the social homogeneity of village society has eroded. The villages are 
now highly connected with the urban centers, socially and economically, for example through 
the remittances sent home by the urban migrants. The family planning initiatives of the gov-
ernment have lead to smaller families even in rural areas which in turn diminishes the size of 
the families’ social network (Miguel et al. 2002:1-2; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 7). In the ci-
ties, a new middle class is emerging with distinct consumptive habits and largely independent 
of the restrictions of the moral economy. Hefner notes: 
In Jakarta . . . ., the new middle class lives in neighborhoods in which local social controls-
especially those that may be exercised by people of less privileged class standing - are less impor-
tant than conformity to lifestyle ideals disseminated in the media. (Hefner 1998a: 28) 
With migrants arriving in the rapidly growing urban centers from each part of the vast archi-
pelago, an unprecedented degree of ethnic mixing is occurring. Along with an increasing di-
versification of labor this contributes to a fair degree of social urban heterogeneity. Under 
these conditions, modern education becomes a primary leverage for social mobility. More 
traditional notions of status, such as titles of nobility, are rapidly losing their social clout (Su-
trisnaatmaka 1987: 146; Schröter 2000: 16; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 7).  
These changes in social structure have not left informal collective risk management arrange-
ments unaffected. Hüsken and Koning (2006: 25-26) assert that arrangements of balanced 
reciprocity are becoming even more exclusivist than they were before. Dealings with other 
community members are increasingly economized and changed to a basis of market-
exchange. And eventually, market-based dealings with outsiders are often preferred to still 
socially “obstructed” transactions with community members, as the case of the increasing use 
of external middleman for the rice harvesting shows (Koning 2006: 33-34). In short, the scope 
of protection that informal collective risk management arrangements have offered in the past 
is diminishing. Authors have consequently criticized the New Order government for its con-
tinued insistence on communal self-help instead of implementing public social protection 
measures while the strength of these informal networks had apparently gone into decline 
(Koning and Hüsken 2006: vii; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 7, 17). In fact, Miguel et al. (2002: 
31) regard this insistence and propagation of gotong royong and community self-help groups 
as a distinct feature that differentiates Indonesia’s transformation process from other develop-
ing countries. Here, it is useful to recall Zacher’s postulate that the more rapid a transforma-
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tion occurs the lower the resilience of traditional arrangements such as mutual community 
assistance (Zacher 1988: 29; cf. section 2.2.2). In summary, the size of mutual assistance net-
works based on balanced reciprocity has contracted and assumed a more pronounced exclu-
sivist character in the course of “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’”. It is interesting that 
Hüsken and Koning (2006) note that the contraction of balanced reciprocity is not only being 
met by an expansion of market-based arrangements but also paralleled by an expansion of 
general reciprocity in social life: 
Ritual exchanges on the other hand appear to be on the increase, becoming more elaborate as they 
tend to take on features of conspicuous consumption and ways to show off recently acquired 
wealth and modernity. (Hüsken and Koning 2006: 19) 
To me, this means nothing different than that for a large part of the population the primary 
preoccupation is no longer with “subsistence insurance” but with the accumulation of status. 
With increasing wealth and social heterogeneity, the necessity and even the possibility to 
maintain a socially more or less equal community has eroded while opportunities at social 
distinction through status have increased. Earlier, I have spoken of the two usage vectors in-
herent in assets, one which aims towards social equality and one which aims as social inequa-
lity (cf. section 2.4). I therefore hold that “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’” is continually 
shifting the pendulum from balanced reciprocity towards general reciprocity in social rela-
tions. In consequence, the inequality vector in asset usage is becoming more pronounced. Ad-
ditionally, with increasing wealth the inflationary tendencies in the gift-giving process, which 
Mauss (1954) and Schrader (1994: 38) have noted (cf. section 2.2.3), are now less constrained 
by the scarcity of valuables. Therefore, the more wealth increases the more the trend towards 
general reciprocity is accelerating. 
So far, all this seemingly adds up to an impression of utter dissolution of social equality and 
social cohesion. A process of disembedding along the lines earlier described by Polanyi for 
Western societies seems to be occurring, which would in turn strengthen the case for microin-
surance interventions to better protect low-asset people from the associated social upheavals. 
However, the picture is not as dismal as it has been depicted so far. The capacity of Indone-
sians to adapt foreign influences to their needs, to fuse, to merge, to syncretize, to harmonize, 
and to be entrepreneurial in their accommodation to changing conditions has been noted in 
various contexts (Geertz 1960: 5; Anderson 1972: 62; Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 146; Hüsken and 
Koning 2006: 24, 25). Especially in urban centers new social networks are created. Old social 
patterns are reenacted and adapted to meet the changing conditions. Already in 1962, Geertz 
recognized that traditional arisan arrangements have been refitted by farmers, low-asset urban 
dwellers and even the better off urban middle class to meet the requirements of a rapidly 
changing society (Geertz 1962: 260). Even earlier, in 1948, Haar (1948: 134) noticed that 
where traditional villages are becoming lax on communal endeavor and where migration is 
increasing, a tendency towards the formation of alternative associations can be observed. 
More recently, in a quantitative analysis of social capital processes in Indonesia, Miguel et al. 
(2002) find that in rapidly industrializing districts, social capital in form of non-governmental 
credit cooperatives, community recreational groups and spending on local festivals and cere-
monies are actually increasing as industrialization progresses. However, Miguel et al. (2002: 
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3) also note that “the migration of millions of young Indonesians from rural areas to nearby 
factory jobs appears to have reduced social capital in the districts they left.” Miguel et al. 
(2002) have a point when they correlate people’s degree of social involvement with matter of 
long-term residence. When urban migrants have the perspective of remaining within their new 
communities for longer, they get involved with community affairs. Wilhelm’s vivid descrip-
tion of the communal flood disaster management in low-asset kampung in Indonesia adds to 
the point that especially in urban areas, new communal arrangements make their appearance 
(Wilhelm 2009). It also seems that these are processes of readjustment, reformation, and recy-
cling rather than the creation of something entirely new. I will later argue, that also the slame-
tan pattern is undergoing such a reformation in an urban context (see section 7.8.1).  
In summary, the social consequences of “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’” have led to a 
more heterogeneous and urban society, where equality oriented balanced reciprocity is be-
coming increasingly exclusivist and status oriented general reciprocity is expanding. Especial-
ly in rural areas, social cohesion and informal collective risk management arrangements have 
weakened. However, in the highly dynamic urban centers, inhabitants are investing into the 
build-up of adapted social networks and social capital. Indonesian society is certainly not on a 
straight path to becoming individualistic in a sense of “atomistic individualism” in an ano-
nymous market-based society, as often postulated by mainstream economist thought (Kabeer 
2003: 108) and as feared by Polanyi (Dalton and Polanyi 1968: xxx). Life in Indonesia is still 
very much social, even if now socialization is more occupied with showing status than before. 
Nonetheless, the ongoing or reenacted resilience especially of urban low-asset dwellers to 
manage risks on a communal basis should not be underestimated when considering microin-
surance interventions. If anything, the case for microinsurance seems to be stronger for the 
“socially depleted” rural areas rather than in the dynamic urban areas. In addition, if microin-
surance remains as closely associated to the work of MFIs as it is today, and thereby contin-
ues to target the middle to upper echelons of the heterogeneous low-asset strata, then the 
probability is high that microinsurance only enhances exclusivist tendencies which in turn 
leaves very low-asset families with even less protection than before (cf. Hüsken and Koning 
2006: 25-26). 
If we have so far concluded that Indonesia used to be in an embedded state, and that Indonesia 
is currently undergoing a specifically Indonesian form of a “Great Transformation”, how em-
bedded can Indonesia still be considered today? Are the norms of the moral economy and the 
traders’ dilemma still relevant? Focusing on the context of the microinsured female petty 
traders of various ethnic and often migratory backgrounds in urban Java, I hold that these 
women still find themselves in a significantly embedded state. I have already referred to the 
moral economy being a still discernable constraint on the asset accumulation of these petty 
traders (cf. section 3.2.7). Based on his own work with Javanese petty traders, Evers (1994a: 
13) states that “the social situation of petty trade in the informal sector still poses the traders' 
dilemma to some extent.” Newberry (2007) gives a vivid example of how strong communal 
values and interactions still are in low-asset kampung in urban Yogyakarta: 
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This idea of sharing burdens and cooperating in the management of local problems was a powerful 
ethic in the kampung where I lived and worked, whatever its genesis. Indeed, the idea of coopera-
tion and sharing within the community was such a powerful sentiment that it was used to evaluate 
neighbours and how well they fit in the kampung. It was a powerful local critique to suggest that 
someone did not act ‘kampung’ (a critique susceptible to reversal by elites who use it to denigrate 
the lower class). (Newberry 2007: 1308) 
In passing, Newberry’s comment also affirms the point of Hefner (1998a: 28) as quoted 
above, namely that people of higher assets are relatively free from the constraints of commun-
al social control and its normative constraints.  
For me, the greatest indication that the economical sphere in Indonesia has still not separated 
itself clearly from the other spheres of social life is the continuing importance of spiritual be-
liefs and religion. Secularization has certainly not made comparably deep inroads into social 
life as in Western societies. The deeply rooted belief of Indonesians in all kinds of ghosts, 
collectively summarized under the term of hantu, strikes every external observer who stays in 
the country for more than a few days (cf. Schröter 2000). A wide variety of locally produced 
mystical TV series and movies enjoy great popularity. However, even more palpable and def-
initely more asserted by Indonesians is the continuing clout of religion. Today, Indonesian’s 
still have a hard time to understand that a person may not be religious. Should foreigners dec-
lare to be atheist they are often met with consternation and outright disbelief by their Indone-
sian counterparts. As with the glorification of mutual assistance and the creation of ‘traditio-
nalized’ orthodox gender roles, government policies also play a decisive role here. The first of 
the five principles of the state ideology pancasila, which was developed by the country’s first 
president Sukarno and reinforced by its successor Suharto, is the believe in a single divine 
power (ketuhanan yang maha esa).32
                                                 
32 Darmaputra (1988: 153) presents numerous proposed English translations for ketuhanan yang maha esa, such 
as “The One Lordship”, “Divine Omnipotence”, “The Being of Supreme Deity” and several others. According to 
Darmaputera, the most frequently used and semi-official translation is “Belief in God”. 
 In consequence, Indonesians are legally required to ad-
here to one of originally five, and now - after the inclusion of Confucianism - six religions 
recognized by the state (Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism). Especially Islam has witnessed an unprecedented revival in recent years 
(Hefner 1998a: 26; Hefner 1998b: 233; Schröter 2007). When laborers and managers alike 
interrupt their work at the call for prayers the subordination of the economic under the reli-
gious sphere becomes very visible. I also wonder how much macroeconomic sense econo-
mists make of the month-long fasting during Ramadan which ostensibly lowers workers’ 
productivity. Evers and Schiel (1988: 23) certainly have a point when they identify rapid 
transformation, modernization and social dislocation as one of the reasons for the revival of 
religion and spiritual beliefs. In the sense of Weber, religion is more than ever required to 
lend meaning to quickly changing social realities and provide people with authoritative direc-
tion for behavior (Bayer and Mordt 2008: 24, 32). This intertwining of modernization and 
religious revival makes it difficult to clearly delineate between disembedding and re-
embedding in the sense of Polanyi. In the case of Indonesia, I argue that the process of disem-
bedding has so far not nearly been as complete as in Western societies, and that tendencies of 
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re-embedding or rather re-assertion of embeddedness have appeared almost in parallel with 
disembedding forces (cf. Geertz 1962: 261). It should also be remembered that a strong reli-
gious assertiveness represents one solution to the traders’ dilemma. The reemerging emphasis 
of religion can therefore not only be seen as a search for meaning in a changing environment 
but may at least partly be also been driven by the opportunity it gives for resolving the con-
flict between material asset accumulation and being submissive to socially agreed good moral 
standards. These considerations also explain why, as I hold it to be, re-islamization is most 
salient in the middle class. Here, emerging economic opportunities and social transformation 
are proceeding most rapidly. However, the reasons for the noted revival of religion are mani-
fold, complex and often intersecting with politics. A closer examination is therefore beyond 
the scope of this thesis.33
 
 The point I want to make here is that process of transformation and 
modernization in Indonesia certainly has a distinct local touch. It is clearly happening and it is 
happening fast. But nonetheless, it has so far not led to a thorough disembedding of the eco-
nomic sphere along Western lines. The economic sphere is still closely intertwined with cul-
ture and religion, and in many respects in a subordinated position. Indonesian society is be-
coming more heterogeneous and stratified, which means that it becomes even more complex 
than before. In the process, old traditions persist, are reasserted or adapted, and often com-
plemented rather than replaced by modern practices (Buss 1985: 40; Van Bruinessen 1996: 
164; Hefner 1998b: 226). It is consequently a highly diverse and dynamic context in which 
microinsurance in the simple form of Payung Keluarga has made its appearance. 
4.2 Social protection in Indonesia 
Measured by Western standards, the public social protection system in Indonesia can at best 
be called rudimentary (Arifianto 2004: 20; Jordan 2005; Schuck 2005: 34; Hüsken and Kon-
ing 2006: 21). This system consists of a tight-knit social security system for civil servants, a 
relatively wide social security coverage of private formal employees, and a rather fragmented 
and disjoint array of social assistance measures for the very low-asset families. Those virtual-
ly devoid of any form of social protection are the large number of medium-asset to better-off 
people in the informal sector (Heydel 2009: 75). For the Payung Keluarga customers and be-
neficiaries who I surveyed for this thesis public social protection only played a minor role in 
their overall risk management (see section 7.3.1). For this reason, this relatively complex is-
sue will only be dealt with briefly here. 
As noted above, the New Order regime was hostile to the introduction of Western-style social 
security systems. Such systems were seen as characteristic of a type of Westernized and indi-
vidualized society that was incompatible with Asian values of family and community solidari-
ty, and that would lead to a culture of welfare dependency. The New Order regime therefore 
emphasized the importance traditional mutual assistance arrangements and the extended fami-
                                                 
33 For a more detailed overview of the process of religious revival in South-East Asia and the process of reisla-
mization in Indonesia refer to the works of Hefner (1997; 1998b; 2000 and others), and Schröter (2007). 
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ly as more adequate resources of social protection (Hüsken and Koning 2006: 4-5). Due to 
their substantial political and economic clout, coverage for civil servants and formal em-
ployees was nonetheless tackled through successive legislation but a wider coverage of Indo-
nesians by social security was not envisaged. For the informal low-asset sector, the govern-
ment limited itself to disjoint and ad hoc measures of emergency aid. Of course, apart from 
ideological constraints, financial constraints can also be held responsible for the feeble stand-
ing of social protection in Indonesia. Lastly, Zacher (1988) notes that modern social security 
needs a minimum level of social equality, or “normality”, as he calls it, to work smoothly. As 
the social spectrum in developing countries ranges from subsistence farmers over low-asset 
traders up to the middle-class and extremely wealthy urban elites, there is not a single “nor-
mality” but many “normalities”. Zacher (1988: 32) therefore concludes that “this variety can 
be so extensive and significant that no system of modern social security can satisfactorily ac-
commodate it.” 
Since the fall of the New Order regime, the issue of social protection is back on the table. In 
2002, a special task force was established to provide suggestions for a general overhaul of the 
country’s social security system to provide more effective social security to all Indonesians. 
In October 2004, outgoing president Megawati Soekarnoputri signed the resulting new social 
security reform law no. 40/2004 into force. The law prescribes a gradual expansion of the 
national social security system to all Indonesian citizens until 2025. While for high asset fami-
lies in the formal and informal sector a contributory system is planned, contributions for very 
low-asset families will be covered by the government. The scope of the law covers five social 
security programs, namely: (1) health insurance, (2) employment injury, (3) old age (provi-
dent fund), (4) pensions, and (5) death benefits. While the general intention and thrust of the 
law has been lauded, its slow and lackluster implementation to date is being criticized. Ari-
fianto (2004: 20) even denounces the bill as unrealistic, overly generous, devoid of private 
incentives for protection, and therefore economically destructive. Until 2007, only in the area 
of health insurance for low-asset families some progress was discernable. The new 15-
member National Security Council which law no. 40/2004 prescribes has not been installed 
yet. Many necessary executive presidential decrees are still outstanding (Koning and Hüsken 
2006: vii; Hüsken and Koning 2006: 2; ILO 2008b; Heydel et al. 2009: 75). 
In consequence, today most of Indonesia’s social protection system, and the social security 
system in particular, remain in effect as conceived after the last major legal overhaul in 1992. 
The formal sector, consisting of civil servants and formal employees, is catered to by four 
social security carriers (ILO 2008a: 1):  
(1) JAMSOSTEK (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja): JAMSOSTEK is the social insurance fund 
for private sector employers and their employees. It provides four programs: employment 
injury, death, health insurance, and a provident fund type old age benefit.  
(2) TASPEN (Tabungan dan Asuransi Pegawai Negeri): TASPEN is the fund for public sec-
tor employees. It provides a retirement lump-sum, and a pension program.  
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(3) ASKES (Asuransi Kesehatan): ASKES provides health insurance cover for public sector 
employees and some others.  
(4) ASABRI (Asuransi Sosial Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia): ASABRI is the coun-
terpart fund for the armed forces and police. It provides lump-sum retirement benefits and 
pensions similar to TASPEN. 
In total, these four providers cover 17 percent of the entire labor force and still less than half 
of all formal employees (ILO 2008a: 2). In general, coverage also extends to the spouse and 
children of the covered employees, albeit often with reduced benefits. Despite voluntary pro-
grams of ASKES and JAMSOSTEK which target the informal sector, their outreach to the 
informal sector is very limited (ILO 2008a: 2-3). The informal sector is therefore de facto 
excluded from formal contributive social security. Nonetheless, a wide array of safety net type 
social protection measures organized and administered by a number of government ministries 
and institutions exists. Heydel et al. (2009: 75) note that “each of them is operating in isola-
tion and no coordination between those programs takes place.” Besides lack of consistency 
and coordination, other problems which beset safety net programs in Indonesia are: (1) identi-
fying the “needy”, (2) preventing drain of benefits towards higher asset families, (3) providing 
adequate socialization34
(1) PUSKESMAS (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat): PUSKESMAS is a nation-wide system of 
health posts that was established by the New Order regime and heralded as one of its most 
significant achievements. PUSKESMAS provide outpatient medical treatment only. They also 
give referrals for inpatient treatment at hospitals or clinics. Everyone can use the services of 
the PUSKESMAS, either free of charge or against a relatively low and often discounted usage 
fee. Free or discounted coverage is provided to holders of a variety of government documents 
which identify the holder as poor or entitled. The quality of service at PUSKESMAS varies 
widely (McCord et al. 2006: 22). The PUSKESMAS also serve as immunization centers dur-
ing the recurring gratuitous national immunization campaigns, for example against polio. 
These campaigns achieve a very wide outreach within the population. 
, (4) frequent limitation to ad hoc, ex-post and short-term measures, 
and (5) budgetary constraints (Koning 2006: 44; McCord et al. 2006: 21; ILO 2008a; Heydel 
et al. 2009: 75). Bearing these constraints in mind, the following are some of the more impor-
tant safety net type social protection institutions and measures: 
(2) GAKIN (Keluarga Miskin): GAKIN is essentially a letter from the head of the neighbor-
hood ward (RT) which confirms that the GAKIN holder and his family are “poor”. The letter 
eventually entitles to free or discounted outpatient and inpatient treatment. However, various 
administrative steps are needed before that. Next to the RT, also the local PUSKESMAS, the 
head of the hamlet (RW), the village head (kepala desa or kepala lurah) as the lowest public 
administration level, and lastly one of the offices of the Department of Social Affairs (DEP-
                                                 
34 Socialization (sosialisasi) as used here and in many other instances throughout the thesis refers to the activity 
of informing someone about something, usually in the context of a crowd being informed of an upcoming (ad-
ministrative) measure. The term is frequently used in this sense in Indonesia. It naturally also entails elements of 
promotion and marketing. 
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SOS) which are directly located at hospitals, need to confirm the entitlement for free or dis-
counted treatment. Not surprisingly, the issuance of the GAKIN letter can be an easy or a 
complicated matter, depending on the social network of the applicant, transportation times et 
cetera. GAKIN letters are reported to sometimes benefit better off families as well (Heydel et 
al. 2009: 45-46). The exact benefits which the fully authorized GAKIN letter entitles to are 
hard to discern. Medication at pharmacies, hospitals and clinics does not seem to be covered. 
From my respondents I obtained diverging information as to the scope of the available dis-
count, the maximum possible coverage and whether access to private health facilities was 
possible with GAKIN. What seems to be clear is that GAKIN does not cover all health related 
costs in all cases. 
(3) ASKESKIN (Asuransi Kesehatan Miskin): The ASKESKIN program was started in 2005 
as the only concrete follow-up measure so far to the new social security reform act no. 
40/2004. ASKESKIN provides families below and near the national poverty line with 
ASKESKIN cards that should replace the old GAKIN letters and other health care entitle-
ments. In mid-2007, ASKESKIN allegedly had achieved a coverage of 76.4 million people 
(ILO 2008a: 3). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the program is put into doubt by apparently 
insufficient budget allocation, targeting problems and the complexities which the newly intro-
duced political decentralization adds to the problem, as local governments and stakeholder 
groups now have their say in the program as well. Moreover, previous systems such as the 
GAKIN letter appear to be in continuous use (McCord et al. 2006: 19; ILO 2008a: 6).35
(4) RASKIN (Beras Miskin): Through the RASKIN program, the government provides subsi-
dized rice to entitled recipients. 
 There 
seems to be a wide regional variation as to the effectiveness and smoothness of implementa-
tion. Whatever the eventual benefit of ASKESKIN and other public health programs, Gertler 
and Gruber (2002: 53) note that many people nonetheless opt to pay out of pocket for private 
medical services which they perceive to be of higher quality. 
(5) Unconditional cash transfers: At various stages, for example in 2005, when fuel prices 
hiked over 100 percent due to cuts in fuel subsidies, the government has provided uncondi-
tional cash transfers to entitled recipients. These are ad hoc measures of short duration.  
As mentioned, these social security programs and wider social protection measures only 
played a minor role in the risk management of the surveyed customers and beneficiaries. 
Their strongest impact can be seen in the field of health. Overall, their importance is on a si-
milarly low level as the importance of market-based (micro-)insurance. This will be outlined 
in more detail in section 7.3.1. The overwhelmingly dominant form of risk management still 
consists of informal individual and collective measures. This will also be outlined further in 
section 7.3.1. The two previous microinsurance market studies conducted on Indonesia 
(McCord et al. 2006; Heydel et al. 2009) render a similar picture. 
                                                 
35 The problem of the underfunding of ASKESKIN was also mentioned by several of the academic and business 
experts who I interviewed. 
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4.3 Microinsurance in Indonesia 
Indonesia has a small but rapidly growing insurance market. In 2007, total insurance pre-
miums amounted to almost US$ 12 billion (SwissRe Sigma 2009). Indonesia’s insurance pe-
netration, which measures insurance premiums as a percentage of the GDP, is still trailing far 
behind more developed South-East Asian nations such as Malaysia and Singapore, and trail-
ing even further behind the levels reached in industrialized Western countries. In a 2007 rank-
ing of worldwide insurance penetration, SwissRe Sigma (2009) found Indonesia to rank 98th 
out of 126 countries, with an insurance penetration of 2.05 percent of GDP (table 5). 
Table 5: Insurance penetration of selected countries in 2007 
Rank Country Estimated Insurance 
Penetration (Pre-
miums/GDP) 
1 Luxembourg 7.21% 
12 United States 7.10% 
21 Germany 7.00% 
23 Singapore 6.89% 
59 Malaysia 3.06% 
80 Thailand 2.40% 
93 China 2.14% 
98 Indonesia 2.05% 
100 Philippines 2.01% 
108 India 1.90% 
113 Vietnam 1.87% 
119 Bangladesh 1.81% 
126 Malawi 1.77% 
Source: SwissRe Sigma (2009) 
The largest part of the insurance premiums in Indonesia stems from the middle to upper mar-
ket segments as well as from industrial insurance. The microinsurance sector is still in a nas-
cent state (Heydel et al. 2009: 20), especially as far as commercial microinsurance offered by 
private insurance companies is concerned. In line with what has been said above, the demand 
for insurance coverage from low-asset families has been present for some time, however la-
tently expressed. However, for the also mentioned reasons of high transaction costs, small 
premiums and problems of anti-selection, information asymmetries et cetera insurance com-
panies have only hesitantly explored this market in the past (cf. sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.1). 
However, McCord et al. (2006: 6) notice that interest by insurance companies in Indonesia is 
on the rise and the microinsurance segment growing.  
In terms of products sold by commercial insurers to the low-asset market in Indonesia, credit 
life is clearly dominating. Almost all insurers offer group-based compulsory credit life insur-
ance, and most commercial banks automatically attach it to their credits, many of which, as in 
the case of BRI or more recently Bank Danamon Simpan Pinjam, target the upper low-asset 
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market. Among grassroots MFIs the usage of credit life insurance is less prevalent. Some in-
surance companies and banks are also cooperating on so-called savings or savings completion 
insurance. This insurance coverageguarantees the payout of the targeted savings amount, for 
example in a scheduled savings plan, should the savor die before the target date. This way, 
savings insurance is an inversion of credit life insurance. Some cheap term life coverage is 
also on offer. Term life insurance covers the death risk for a stated sum assured and a prede-
fined term. It is not connected to credit or savings and can be bought separately. Sometimes 
term life insurance is attached to certain group memberships, for example membership in po-
litical parties. Because these insurances are mainly automatic add-ons onto other services and 
their existence and features are often unknown to the insured, the customer value of such 
products is doubtful. Noteworthy, however, are various individual education endowment 
plans offered to the low-asset market by local insurance companies such as Bumiputera. For 
premiums as low as US$ 5 per month, parents can save for their children’s education and re-
ceive scheduled payouts (the endowments) at certain intervals, such as entry into elementary 
school, high school, and university (cf. Heydel et al. 2009: 20-21). These education endow-
ments are the most popular form of individual insurance among low-asset customers in Indo-
nesia, not only because they are targeted towards the highly valued education of children, but 
also because they guarantee a return at the end of the contract. This satisfies the wide-spread 
expectation of a “counter-gift” for the premiums paid. On the non-life side, product variety is 
even scarcer than on the life side. Many of the popular financing schemes for motorcycles 
come with a “loss insurance” for the motorcycle. In a way, this is a non-life version of credit 
life. Heydel et al. (2009: 60) note that actually many of the available housing insurances for 
fire and earthquake have affordable premiums. But their complex features and their distribu-
tion system are not targeted towards the low-asset market. This confirms the earlier statement 
that microinsurance cannot be defined by low premiums and low payouts alone (Heydel et al. 
2009: ix; cf. section 3.3.1). Private health insurance plans for low-asset families are extremely 
rare. The local takaful insurer Asuransi Takaful has a simple health plan on offer which costs 
US$ 19.20 per year for adults and US$ 9.90 per child. In case of inpatient treatment it pro-
vides fixed daily payouts irrespective of the actual illness (Heydel et al. 2009: 21). Global 
insurer AIG is offering a similarly cheap health insurance plan through a bancassurance36
Regarding products which are explicitly labeled as “microinsurance”, during my four and a 
half years of work in Indonesia (2004 - 2008) I have only found four instances where insur-
ance companies attached the label “micro” to any of their insurance activities. (1) The first 
one is of course Allianz with its Payung Keluarga product. It entered the market in September 
 
cooperation with the local bank NISP. However, this product is sold through telemarketing to 
existing customers and is paid for by auto debit from the NISP customers’ bank account. Al-
though allegedly highly popular with NISP customers it is unlikely to achieve significant out-
reach because NISP is a relatively small bank, and what is more, most low asset people in 
Indonesia do not have a proper checking account in the first place. 
                                                 
36 Bancassurance is the term employed to describe a partnership between a bank and an insurance company whe-
reby the insurance company uses the bank as a sales channel in order to sell its insurance products. 
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2006. Here, the term “micro” was justified with the additional payouts on top of the standard 
credit life coverage, which eventually, by way of this study, have proven to have little to con-
cerning developmental effects. Moreover, Allianz underlined the social aspect of the business 
and expressly chose the very low-asset market as its target group. (2) Shortly afterwards, in 
December 2006, a local NGO called TAKMIN, which acts as a kind of microinsurance bro-
ker, started a takaful microinsurance pilot in corporation with local insurer Asuransi Takaful 
(Asuransi Takaful 2008). The coverage provided here is actually only credit life, but TAK-
MIN is clearly pursuing this initiative with a microinsurance agenda. Their aim is to sensitize 
and educate Islamic MFIs and their low asset customers on insurance based on Islamic takaful 
principles. In late 2008, TAKMIN had less than 10,000 active insured through 24 MFI part-
ners. Because of the high educational effort involved and the low size of the MFI partners the 
product is certainly not financially viable. In fact, the project is strongly hinged on support 
from international donors. In the future, TAKMIN wants to gradually expand the product 
range.37
                                                 
37 Most information on TAKMIN is based on a series of interviews in 2007 and 2008 with leading members of 
TAKMIN, especially with their chairman Agus Hariyadi, the former CEO of Asuransi Takaful Indonesia. 
 In the case of TAKMIN, the primary reason for this initiative calling itself “microin-
surance” is therefore not connected to the actual product on offer but to the motivation and 
mission behind the entire project. (3) Another insurer which expressly sees part of its business 
in microinsurance is the local insurance company Megalife. However, apart from credit life 
and savings insurance, no other microinsurance products seem to be offered by this company 
(Media BPR 2007a; 2007b). (4) Lastly, the already mentioned flood-index microinsurance 
pilot project of MunichRe and GTZ in corporation with local general insurance company Wa-
hana Tata should be listed here (cf. section 3.3.1 and 3.3.3). After intensive preparations this 
product was launched in May 2009 and is currently being tested in a number of flood prone 
low-asset kampung in Jakarta (GTZ 2009). I have already mentioned the extremely low 
payout-to-premium ratio, which makes the premium akin to normal savings, only with less 
fungibility of funds. I have also alluded to the worry of NGOs that such products may stifle 
government efforts to reduce the flood risk. Here, two more aspects may be added which lead 
to my very critical assessment of this product : (1) Because MFIs operating in the area have 
declined the offer to distribute the product due to the perceived low customer value, distribu-
tion is now being tried via the system of RT (heads of the neighborhood ward) and RW (ham-
let head) in the area. This bears the risk that, depending on the commission scheme involved, 
the considerable social influence of these community leaders is being instrumentalized to per-
suade low-asset residents into buying the product despite its low customer value. (2) My own 
research on the major daily risks voiced by low-asset customers as well as research by 
McCord et al. (2006: 26) and Wilhelm (2009) have repeatedly shown that flood insurance is 
not a top priority of low-asset customers in Jakarta. On the contrary, flood risk is being ranked 
at the bottom of the priority list (see table 11 in chapter 6.1). Only Heydel et al. (2009) find a 
high demand for flood insurance. As the respective study was financed by GTZ and Mu-
nichRe and strongly focused on disaster risk instead of taking a more holistic view, this out-
come is highly susceptible to selection bias and lack of neutrality. Despite serious doubts from 
observers which were already raised during the product development process, the product 
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launch went ahead nonetheless. Here, it seems that the political and market necessities in the 
home market of GTZ and MunichRe played a more crucial role in the project than the actual 
needs of the ‘beneficiaries’ on site. After all, GTZ and MunichRe have doubtlessly launched 
the first flood-index based microinsurance worldwide and the first ever index product in In-
donesia. This gives a prime PR message to the public in the home markets. In this case, the 
term “micro” therefore seems to be connected to the strong desire to push a product to the 
low-asset market at all costs and regardless the negative consequences on social cohesion, of 
which Wilhelm (2009) is rightly concerned. 
These four microinsurance examples highlight that the interest in microinsurance from the 
supply side is in fact growing in Indonesia. However, they also show that this increasing in-
terest is starting off from a very low baseline. In addition, these examples also make it clear 
again that microinsurance is at least as much about the (developmental) intentions and moti-
vations that stand behind a product as about the actual product design itself (cf. 3.3.1). This is 
what makes microinsurance a somewhat blurry and subjective concept.  
It should be noted that not only formal insurers are providing insurance coverage for the low-
asset market. For instance, one of the biggest associations of credit unions in Indonesia, Induk 
Koperasi Kredit Indonesia (INKOPDIT), has been offering unregulated life and health insur-
ance coverage to over 700,000 members of more than 1,200 primary cooperatives for decades 
(INKOPDIT 2005; Heydel et al. 2009: 18). The credit life coverage of INKOPDIT is expen-
sive and apparently helps to subsidize the loss-making health insurance component. Notewor-
thy are also initiatives by politicians and local governments to provide insurance in coopera-
tion with private insurers. Several politicians have provided simple term life insurance as in-
centives for party members or even for prospective voters (Republika 2008). Since 2007, the 
local government of Depok district south of Jakarta has been offering continuous life insur-
ance with a coverage of US$ 220 to all its 1.5 million citizens. Every year, this contract is 
tendered to interested insurance companies (Republika 2009). No case of kickbacks and cor-
ruption has been proven in this context, but it may be reasonable to be concerned about such 
“side-effects”. In any case, what seems to play a role in these efforts to provide cheap insur-
ance as a means to achieve political ends is the apparent positive connotation of insurance as 
something “modern” and “progressive”. The respective politicians and the meanwhile directly 
elected governments apparently aim for this image to rub off on themselves.  
 
4.4 The Payung Keluarga project 
This section gives an overview on the background and details of the Payung Keluarga project. 
I discuss my operational role in the project, the product specifications, the underlying causal 
model, and how the product was distributed and marketed through MFIs.  
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4.4.1 Project background  
In February 2006, the promising results of an initial microinsurance market study (McCord et 
al. 2006) led Allianz Indonesia to the decision to go ahead with a first microinsurance pilot 
test.  Allianz Indonesia saw microinsurance as an opportunity to build customer loyalty from 
early on (Allianz 2006a). It has been mentioned above that this motivation often plays a role 
in “bottom of the pyramid” business (cf. 3.2.2). The formula used by the Allianz Indonesia 
was that microinsurance represented a “good business” opportunity in the moral and econom-
ic sense of the word (Allianz 2006b). The emphasis on business, however, also entailed that 
microinsurance needed to be profitable, ideally as soon as possible.  
As Allianz Indonesia was in the middle of a major restructuring process from 2004 to 2006, 
principal management support did not translate into many resources dedicated to the project. 
On the contrary, the clear direction was that microinsurance was a good and worthy initiative 
but should not burden the normal resources of the company. Because I had voiced my interest 
in microinsurance as early as 2004, I was appointed as the project responsible. Initially, I 
could only dedicate approximately 30 percent of my working time to microinsurance. Due to 
the aforementioned resource constraints there were no other project team members. I was 
therefore virtually left to my own devices. 
Actual product development for Payung Keluarga started in May 2006. Although the interna-
tional consultants who had worked on the initial market study (McCord et al. 2006) had found 
education costs and hospital costs to be the major risks to prospective customers, Allianz In-
donesia - under my own influence as project leader - decided to tackle the much simpler death 
risk first, and develop a compulsory credit life coverage with additional benefits. After all, the 
consultants had found that death was the fourth most salient risk among prospective custom-
ers (McCord et al. 2006: 26). What I did not notice then, although the consultants had already 
provided some indication of it, was the wide gap between the priority given to education and 
health as the two major risks and all other risks, including death, flood and other natural disas-
ters. I only realized this during my own impact research (see table 11 in section 6.1). And 
after all, it still sounded good to insure a top-5 risk. The main reasons for choosing compul-
sory credit life over other possible types of products, even over the voluntary education en-
dowment rightly recommended by the consultants, run very much along the lines already out-
lined above (cf. section 3.3.3), namely easier administration, reduced anti-selection risk, re-
duced transaction and risk costs, reduced premium and better coverage of the MFIs’ loan port-
folios. In the light of the tenuous resource situation of the project at Allianz and my own con-
viction that profitability of microinsurance needed to be demonstrated quickly in order to en-
sure its own survival, compulsory credit life in fact appeared as the only feasible option. I 
reckoned that once microinsurance was firmly established through a small-scale low risk pilot 
project and no longer perceived as “the great and risky unknown”, the access to necessary 
resources for larger follow-up initiatives would be easier and less hinged on benevolent CSR 
strategies. 
Much of the actual product design was consequently developed by me. Most importantly, the 
idea of providing additional payouts of twice the original loan amount in case of death of the 
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debtor was based on my own initiative. I proposed and promoted this proactively in order to at 
least attach some developmental meaning to the project. These additional payouts were to 
become a lynchpin of my later impact research, which eventually brought me to realize that 
this idea may not have been as outright beneficial as I had originally assumed.  
In May 2005, I conducted a number of product acceptance interviews with customers. I pri-
marily did this to satisfy the omnipresent call for development projects to have an element of 
participation. However, in effect I had already taken the major product design decisions befo-
rehand based on the outlined constraints within Allianz itself. The customers therefore only 
influenced minor product details such as the automatic sequence of beneficiaries in case the 
originally appointed beneficiary was dead, disappeared, in jail or otherwise unavailable in 
case of a claim. Participation in the case of Payung Keluarga was therefore fulfilling the criti-
que of Cooke and Kothari (2001: 1) who denounce much of the participatory efforts in devel-
opment as a “process undertaken ritualistically”.  
In July 2006, I finally managed to convince one MFI, namely DIMAN located in Tangerang 
City to the West of Jakarta, to team up with Allianz as its first distribution partner. On 1 Sep-
tember 2006, the first DIMAN microcredit customer was automatically insured with Payung 
Keluarga (see section 4.4.6 for an overview of the eventually seven MFI partners, and section 
4.4.7 for Payung Keluarga sales figures). 
4.4.2 My operational role 
 In its beginning, microinsurance at Allianz Indonesia was essentially a one-man project. I 
was the main person responsible for the development of the product, I wrote most of the poli-
cy wording and adjacent documents (enrollment forms, claim forms et cetera), developed a 
simple IT administration system, set up the necessary partnerships with local MFIs, did the 
training for the MFIs’ loan officers, and eventually handled the regular data entry, the cross-
checking of claims (which were being paid by the MFIs) and the reporting to management. 
When the initial one year pilot phase ended successfully in August 2007, I also took the initia-
tive to make the product more flexible in order to incorporate some of the pilot’s lessons, and 
to make the product more attractive to a wider range of MFIs. In addition, I handled much of 
the PR work related to the project and the relationship building with interested or involved 
national and international organizations. Naturally, help by other staff was provided such as 
management supervision, assistance with product registration with the regulatory authorities, 
and with accounting. Nonetheless, I was responsible for roughly 75 percent of all work related 
to Payung Keluarga from its first tentative twitches until June 2008 when I left the company 
to pursue my PhD. At this point, over 60,000 microcredits had already been insured. Notably, 
from January 2007 onwards, I was fully assigned to microinsurance. Shortly before my con-
tract end in June 2008, two local Indonesian staff were assigned and trained to continue the 
microinsurance activities of Allianz Indonesia. 
My strong and decisive involvement with the project has led to a likewise strong emotional 
attachment. Colloquially put, Payung Keluarga was “my baby”. But at the same time I need 
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to clearly acknowledge that this also means that I hold extensive responsibility for the even-
tual impact of Payung Keluarga. As Payung Keluarga - precisely because of the additional 
payouts that were my idea - has substituted traditional community and family assistance with-
out resolving an acute risk management challenge (see section 7.8.1), this highly doubtful 
impact is my responsibility. I therefore regard my operational role in the project as critical in 
the double sense of decisive and not entirely positive. Naturally, this critical operational role 
also bears strong implications for my role as a researcher. This is further outlined in section 
5.1. 
4.4.3 Payung Keluarga product description 
Table 6 provides the details of the Payung Keluarga product. Much of the features and termi-
nology introduced in section 3.3.1 is used. 
Table 6: Payung Keluarga product description 
Category Specification 
Product type Credit life insurance which additional benefits  
Product name Payung Keluarga (English: Family Umbrella) 
Contract type Group-based contract 
Insurable microloans • Maximum accepted loan amount is US$ 1,054 (IDR 10,000,000) 
• Loan term must not exceed two years 
• Loans can be group-based and individual 
Compulsory or voluntary Compulsory 
Person covered • All debtors of the MFI are automatically covered 
• No health check is necessary 
• Spouse and children are not insured 
Event covered Death due to any circumstances including HIV/AIDS, suicide and cata-
strophic events 
Exclusions None 
Term covered Original length of the loan 
Benefits 1. To MFI: loan outstanding on the day of death according to the ini-
tial repayment schedule 
2. To beneficiary: two times the initial loan amount paid as a lump 
sum 
Premium  • Calculation: 0.1% of the loan principal multiplied by the number of 
months of the loan term => 1.2% p.a. of the loan 
• Same rate for all customers, regardless of age and gender 
• Payment: one-time payment at loan disbursement 
Age limit (entry age) 15 – 60 
Beneficiary • There can only be one beneficiary 
• One beneficiary can be chosen from the nuclear family (usually on 
the loan application form) 
• Should the chosen beneficiary be unable to receive the claim 
payout, the natural order of beneficiaries is: 1. Legal spouse, 2. 
children (eldest to youngest, but no younger than 15), 3. mother, 4. 
father, 5. siblings (eldest to youngest, but no younger than 15) 
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Claims • Claims cannot be paid earlier than 8 days after death 
• Claims are checked and paid by the MFI from the collected pre-
mium, without prior information to and approval by Allianz 
Profit sharing / Commis-
sion 
• The MFI receives no fixed commission 
• Profits are shared with the MFI on a yearly basis 
• Losses will not be shared with the MFI 
• The profit due to the MFI are calculated as this: 
 
(Total premium earned from finished credit terms x 0.78% - Total 
claims paid for finished credit terms) x 80% 
 
 
A few things about the product design are noteworthy. First of all, the product clearly strives 
for as much simplicity as possible, just as recommended by leading microinsurance consul-
tants (McCord et al. 2003: 78; Churchill 2006b: 18, 23; Churchill and Cohen 2006: 188). The 
product benefits are straight-forward. The covered event is clear-cut: death of the borrower 
due to all circumstances. There are no exclusions although an entry age limit exists. Different 
from conventional life insurance, with Payung Keluarga Allianz abstained from standard ex-
clusions such as HIV/AIDS and suicide because the cost of explaining such exclusions and 
for checking claims accordingly was deemed prohibitively expensive in view of the small 
sums assured. Instead, a corresponding safety margin was added to the premium. A maximum 
entry age of 60 was set because mortality increases with age and steeply rises from an age of 
approximately 55 years onwards. If elderly customers beyond the age of 60 were covered, the 
premium rate, which was the same for all insured, would increase significantly. Fortunately, 
the MFI partners served few customers beyond their sixties. Some even had a self-imposed 
age limit of 60 or 55. The premium rate was set the same for all customers and eventually 
fixed at an easy-to-remember rate of 0.1 percent per month (or 1.2 percent per year). For ex-
ample, for a typical US$ 100 6-months microcredit the necessary one-time premium is easily 
calculated: 0.1% x US$ 100 x 6 months = US$ 0.60.  
Regarding claims, Payung Keluarga prescribes that claims cannot be paid earlier than eight 
days after death. This makes Payung Keluarga probably the only insurance product in the 
world where claims are explicitly not allowed to be paid as fast as possible. The reason for 
this provision was my worry that customers might spend the money inconsiderately while still 
in mourning, for example on the large slametan feast traditionally held seven days after death. 
Thus, already from the start, Payung Keluarga aimed at being culturally sensitive - quite un-
successfully as I was to find out later because slametan are also held 40 days, 100 days and 
several other stages after death (see section 7.8.1). In any case, on average claim payments 
happened 28 calendar days after death (n=64). Only in seven cases did the claim payment take 
ten calendar days or less. When debtors died, the MFIs’ loan officers verified the claim by 
obtaining a death certificate and also undertook the claim payment by using the funds from 
the collected premiums. Contrary to conventional insurance, Allianz did not need to be asked 
for claim payment authorization beforehand. This put another key task usually performed by 
insurance companies into the hands of the MFIs, next to other tasks such as distribution, cus-
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tomer education and premium collection. Again, this was done in order to reduce transaction 
costs for Allianz and to speed up claim payment. 
The maximum insurable loan amount was set to US$ 1,054, and the maximum loan duration 
was fixed at two years in order to further reduce the risk for Allianz. With such small sums 
insured the potential for disastrous losses to the company was minimized. With the short loan 
durations the possibility was given to exit the project relatively quickly and end all insurance 
obligations in case the project would go wrong. For classic group-lending grassroots MFIs 
these limits proved no obstacle because their loan amounts and loan duration were all below 
these thresholds. However, for MFIs which serve a slightly higher market such as the nation-
wide network of BPR secondary banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat) or the Balinese LPD vil-
lage banks (Lembaga Perkreditan Desa), Payung Keluarga proved unattractive because it 
could not cover their many loans above the mentioned thresholds. Moreover, these banks 
rightly argued that their better off customers would not need the additional payouts and would 
not be willing to pay the respective premium. As Payung Keluarga was not flexible in these 
points, no BPRs and LPDs could be won as partners.  
Regarding administration, as mentioned, most typical insurance work was outsourced to the 
MFIs. In return, they were compensated with 80 percent of profits. Once a month, the MFI 
partners electronically reported all newly insured loans and all claim payments to me at Al-
lianz. The MFIs also transferred the collected premium to Allianz minus the claims paid and 
minus a residual safety margin which allowed the MFIs to have money on hand to pay those 
claims which happened shortly after the bulk of the collected premium had just been trans-
ferred to Allianz. My administrative task at Allianz therefore consisted mostly of transferring 
the sent loan and claim data into a simple database, and to check the receipt of the premium 
transfers and - somewhat randomly - the correct documentation of paid claims. 
4.4.4 Causal model 
The original causal model, or theory of change, for Payung Keluarga as conceived by Allianz, 
and therefore primarily by myself, was straight forward. The death of the micro-borrower as a 
main breadwinner was assumed to cause severe financial difficulties to the bereft families, 
who were supposed to command a very low asset-base. The waiving of the debt balance and 
the additional payout of Payung Keluarga were intended to help the family overcome this 
post-mortem crisis. I assumed that the payouts would prevent the recourse to high stress ex-
post coping strategies such as the sale of land or productive assets. I also hedged the hope that 
a good part of the additional payouts would be used for economic investment in order to se-
cure and promote the income generating capacity of the family. In this respect, the causal 
model of Payung Keluarga very much focused on the protection aspect ascribed to microin-
surance (cf. section 3.3.1). 
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4.4.5 Customer education 
Informing the customers about Payung Keluarga was of key importance to the MFIs and Al-
lianz. As the MFIs perceived Payung Keluarga not only as a convenient protection of their 
loan portfolio, but also as an added value for customers and a competitive advantage over 
competing MFIs, the MFIs’ management was naturally interested in letting customers know 
about the insurance, the more so as the customers were paying the premium, not the MFIs (as 
it is often the case for standard credit life). For Allianz, the long term strategy of building cus-
tomer loyalty naturally needed the customers to be aware that they were insured by the com-
pany. Therefore, Allianz provided the MFIs with simple, customized brochures to be distri-
buted through the MFIs’ loan officers. Illustration 4 shows a typical Payung Keluarga bro-
chure as used by the first MFI partner DIMAN, alongside an English translation.  
Illustration 4: Payung Keluarga brochure 
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In some versions of the product brochure, and during my trainings to MFI loan officers, I tried 
to bring the message across that Payung Keluarga was nothing different than a large system 
of tolong menolong (mutual help). I did so for three reasons: (1) to find a fitting connection of 
insurance to local traditions in explaining insurance principles as has been recommended by 
leading microinsurance consultants (Churchill and Cohen 2006), (2) to avoid the expectations 
of a premium return upon contract end, and (3) to change the potentially distressing focus on 
one’s own death into the positively connoted focus on helping others. However, despite my 
sincere efforts in applying cultural sensitivity to the marketing of Payung Keluarga, I did not 
realize until much later that the concept of tolong menolong is based on balanced reciprocity 
rather than on conditional general reciprocity as I had assumed. Unintentionally, my insis-
tence on insurance as a large mutual assistance scheme may therefore have heightened expec-
tations of a premium return instead of lowering it. This example underlines the intricacies and 
risks of trying to exploit local culture for educational and marketing purposes without proper-
ly understanding the frame of reference of the ‘beneficiaries’.  
As another measure to increase customer awareness for the Allianz brand, the company’s logo 
was sometimes integrated into the MFIs’ own documents, for example on the loan application 
next to the field for the beneficiary appointment. The fact that the beneficiary needed to be 
appointed by the women instead of being automatically fixed as the spouse, then children et 
cetera, did have as much to do with (1) promoting the name of Allianz as with (2) making the 
women aware of the insurance coverage and giving them at least a quantum of freedom and 
“empowerment” in an otherwise compulsory insurance contract. Naturally, when a claim was 
paid, this was done by the MFIs in a solemn and carefully photographed ceremony. This 
spread the word that insurance “really worked” throughout the respective kampung. Moreo-
ver, the MFIs sometimes showed the photos as “proof of concept” to other customers. How-
ever, despite the interest of the MFIs’ management and Allianz in a certain degree of custom-
er information, the loan officers proved to be a bottleneck for customer education. With the 
loan officers’ tight working schedules and the lack of specific incentives to promote insur-
ance, the time and quality of explications on insurance to customers somewhat suffered.  
In summary, with Payung Keluarga Allianz and its MFI partners took customer education 
more seriously than has been criticized in other microinsurance implementations (McCord et 
al. 2005: 17-18, 22; Churchill and Cohen 2006: 182; Young et al. 2006: 10). But despite best 
of intentions and tangible self-interest, customer education on Payung Keluarga cannot be 
said to be optimal, or - put in common development talk - “best practice”.  
4.4.6 MFI partners 
Table 7 gives an overview of the MFI partners of Allianz. These seven MFIs distributed 
Payung Keluarga in its original version as described above (section 4.4.3) and participated in 
my impact research. 
Features common to all seven MFI partners were (1) their social agenda, (2) their focus on 
microcredit for low-asset borrowers, (3) a clear priority towards women (except MBM), (4) 
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the overwhelming reliance on group-based loans for business purposes, and lastly (5) the pre-
dominantly Christian background of their founders, management and loan officers. In general, 
these MFI therefore provide classic examples for grassroots, credit-focused, group-lending, 
and female-oriented MFIs as described in section 3.2.3. Only the Christian background may 
be surprising, especially in a predominantly Muslim country. This is mostly because it proved 
much easier for me to establish rapport with Christian-leaning MFIs rather than with non-
religious or explicitly Muslim MFIs. With Christian-leaning MFIs, the cultural frame of refer-
ence was apparently most similar to mine. Moreover, the international orientation of these 
MFIs also helped. Unlike many Muslim MFIs, virtually all MFI partners of Allianz had at 
some stage been supported by Western donor organizations and were therefore accustomed to 
working with large multinational organizations such as Allianz. 
Table 7: Profile of the MFI partners of Allianz 
Abbreviation BINA BISWA DIMAN DINARI MBM MMS WKP 
Full name Bina Arta Pusat 
Perkembang
an 
Keuangan 
Mikro 
(PPKM) Bina 
Swadaya 
Dian  
Mandiri 
Dian 
Bhuana 
Lestari 
Maha 
Bhoga 
Marga 
Mitra 
Masyarak
at 
Sejahtera 
Wahana 
Kria Putri1 
Legal form Lembaga 
Keuangan 
Mikro  
(Microfinan
ce Instituti-
on) 
Yayasan 
(Foundation) 
Koperasi 
Serba 
Guna (Mul-
tipurpose 
Cooperati-
ve) 
Yayasan 
(Foundatio
n) 
Yayasan 
(Foundatio
n) 
Yayasan 
(Foundatio
n) 
Yayasan 
(Foundatio
n) 
Established 2007 2003 (parent 
organization 
Bina 
Swadaya 
1967) 
1998 1992 1982 2000 1996 
Area of operation Jakarta, 
West-Java 
Jakarta, 
West-Java 
Jakarta, 
West-Java, 
Banten, 
Aceh, 
South 
Sumatra 
Bali Bali Jakarta, 
Sumba, 
Surabaya 
Bali 
Target market female 
petty tra-
ders 
female petty 
traders 
female 
petty tra-
ders 
female 
petty tra-
ders, 
famers 
traders, 
famers 
female 
petty trad-
ers, pre-
viously 
also far-
mers 
female 
petty tra-
ders 
Lending 
methodology 
group only group only group and 
individual 
group and 
individual 
group and 
individual 
group only group and 
individual 
First debtor insured 7 Oct 2007 7 May 2007 1 Sep 2006 5 Apr 
2007 
 2 Aug 
2007 
4 Jul 2007 13 Jun 
2007 
Female ratio of 
insured 
100% 99% 90% 73% 37% 81% 85% 
Total insured loans 
until 30 Sep 2008 
3,413 2,971 56,053 2,091 1,606 2,923 2,832 
Active insured loans 
per 30 Sep 2008 
3,411 2,210 12,214 877 1,497 1,882 227 
Average loan durati-
on (months) 
12.2  12.1  4.7  6.4  17.2  5.6  4.2  
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Average loan size 
(US$) 
101 180 126 203 336 158 112 
Claims until 30 Sep 
2008 
2 3 52 1 3 2 1 
1
Notwithstanding their more or less pronounced Christian background, all MFIs declared to 
make no difference between customers based on religion. They also stated not to proselytize; 
and indeed, during my time working with these MFIs I never noticed them proselytizing.  
 Numbers for WKP are only until 30 Jun 2008. Afterwards, this MFI adopted a different product configuration 
which became possible when Allianz added more flexibility to the product in early 2008. 
Despite the mentioned general similarities, the stance that “every MFI is different” nonethe-
less holds true for these MFIs. There were differences in the exact lending methodology, the 
geographic focus, and the profile of the borrowers. DIMAN, by far the largest of the MFIs, 
was using direct joint-liability contracts and also lent to women which were living for rent 
instead of having permanent housing (which signifies higher credit risk). On the other hand, 
BISWA was using successive individual contracts only loosely connected to group structures 
and moreover preferred to lend to borrowers with permanent housing. In terms of loan sizes, 
MBM’s average loan size was almost three times as high as DIMAN’s. This indicates consi-
derably higher-asset (and more male) customers. Lastly, the “corporate culture” of the MFIs 
showed significant variations. MFIs like DIMAN and MMS had a heavy social focus and a 
definite “NGO touch” to them. MFIs like BINA on the other hand took a more business-like 
no-frills approach to microlending. 
Naturally, I could only engage in field research with the MFIs after they had agreed to adopt 
Payung Keluarga. As the varying dates of the first insured debtor in table 7 show, this hap-
pened at successive stages from mid-2006 to mid-2007. In short, I needed to win and train the 
MFI partners for Payung Keluarga first, which was a time consuming process, before I could 
eventually do research with their customers.  
4.4.7 Payung Keluarga performance 
Table 8 displays key figures on the performance of Payung Keluarga, from its launch date on 
1 September 2006 until 30 September 2008, which serves as the reference period for this the-
sis. The displayed figures are accumulated from the seven MFI partners listed above (table 7). 
Because Payung Keluarga was also distributed by MFIs that did not participate in the field 
research (mostly because they joined the program too late for that), and sometimes sold dif-
ferent versions of the product (which became possible in early 2008), the below figures do not 
represent the entire Payung Keluarga business until 30 September 2008, but approximately 75 
percent of it. Unless otherwise indicated, for this thesis the term “MFI partners” exclusively 
refers to the seven MFIs listed above (table 7). With Payung Keluarga I only refer to the 
product as it was sold by those MFI during the reference period. 
What is immediately striking with the performance figures of Payung Keluarga are the small 
sums involved. This highlights why seen from a financial perspective this form of insurance is 
rightly termed microinsurance, although as noted the developmental mission behind the prod-
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ucts also plays a significant role. The average insurance premium per loan of US$ 0.92 is 
“micro”, even for low-asset customers. The average claim amount of US$ 387 is minute com-
pared to conventional life insurance contracts. The total premium earned in the course of just 
over two years (US$ 65,939) represents about 0.12 per mille of the approximately US$ 540 
million in premiums collected by PT. Asuransi Allianz Life Indonesia during that period. 
Measured by these purely economic standards, the company’s CEO should not have spent 
more than a blink of an eye on microinsurance. On the other hand, the 22,318 active microin-
surance customers on 30 September 2008 represented a slightly more tangible 4 percent of the 
company’s total customer base at that point. This highlights that with microinsurance the 
number of insured customers weighs more heavily than the related premium volume. 
 
Table 8: Payung Keluarga facts and figures (1 September 2006 until 30 September 2008) 
Total insured loans  
1 Sep 2006 - 30 Sep 2008 
71,889 
Active insured loans 
per 30 Sep 2008 
22,318 
Female ratio of insured 89% 
Average age of insured (at loan disbursement) 39.3 
Average loan duration (months) 5.7 
Average loan size (US$) 135 
Average premium per loan (US$) 0.92 
Total premium collected 
1 Sep 2006 - 30 Sep 2008 (US$) 
65,939 
Claims until 30 Sep 2008 64 
Death to claim payout (average calendar days) 28 
Claim ratio (12 months rolling) per 30 Sep 2008 60% 
Total claim amount (US$) 24,528 
    thereof outstanding loan balance (US$) 5,290 
    thereof additional payouts (US$) 19,493 
Average claim amount (US$) 387 
    thereof outstanding loan balance (US$) 83 
    thereof additional payouts (US$) 304 
Female ratio of claims 78% 
Female ratio of beneficiaries 27% 
 
One figure which nonetheless stands out as surprisingly high among all these “micro”-figures 
is the claim ratio of 60 percent. This means that 60 percent of premiums are being returned to 
the insured, or rather their beneficiaries, by way of claim payments. Generally speaking, the 
higher the claim ratio the better the customer value (Wipf and Garand 2008: 23). Although, as 
mentioned, comparisons of microinsurance products are difficult (cf. section 3.3.4), it appears 
that a claim ratio of 60 percent is indeed comparatively high (cf. McCord et al. 2005: 35; cf. 
Wipf and Garand 2008: 24). It should also be noted that different from other microinsurance 
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implementations the MFIs did not top-up the premium but only charged the rate as set by Al-
lianz.  
One figure which bears special significance for the analysis of the impact of Payung Keluarga 
is the low ratio of female beneficiaries (27%). As most borrowers were married women, these 
overwhelmingly appointed their husbands as beneficiaries. This explains the low number of 
female beneficiaries. The husbands were generally the main income earner of the family 
while the women were earning supportive incomes (cf. section 3.2.7). By and large then, the 
main breadwinner of the family benefitted from the insurance payouts rather than being in-
sured. In section 7.9 I will further elaborate on the consequences of this observation. 
Of course, the question arises whether Payung Keluarga has become profitable in the time-
frame of the PPP as I had originally intended. The profitability of Payung Keluarga was never 
analyzed on the basis of international controlling and accounting standards. Such an analysis 
would have probably cost more than all potential losses or profits of the product combined. 
As Payung Keluarga was a one-person project I tried to keep an eye on profitability through a 
layman’s approach. This way, I managed to at least make it convincingly clear to the man-
agement that with big MFI partners like DIMAN Payung Keluarga was profitable while with 
smaller partners it was not. This was because the working time and therefore the administra-
tion costs were about the same for all partners, while the premium from the smaller partners 
was not enough to cover these costs effectively. In short, small MFI partners could not cover 
the fixed costs associated with them. As all MFI partners apart from DIMAN were small, the 
entire Payung Keluarga portfolio was therefore likely making slight losses. However, the 
potential profitability of microinsurance had been proven and the decisive condition for prof-
itability had been identified, namely sufficiently large MFI partners. In addition, as the mone-
tary sums relating to Payung Keluarga were small, any potential monetary loss or profit 
would be miniscule in relation to the overall company performance. The realization that mi-
croinsurance was not posing a business risk but rather a business opportunity induced the 
management of Allianz Indonesia to eventually promote microinsurance form a “trial project” 
status to the status of “regular business” in late 2007.  
 
5  THE METHODOLOGICAL EMBEDDING 
After the socio-theoretical embedding (chapter 2), the developmental embedding (chapter 3), 
and the preceding practical embedding (chapter 4), this chapter delivers the methodological 
embedding as the last necessary component to properly locate and contextualize the findings 
which I will present in chapter 6 and chapter 7. Here, I discuss my research motivation, my 
double role as “actor” and “researcher”, my research objectives, and the resulting methodo-
logical approach. Furthermore, I will discuss at some length the challenges that my research 
faced, as well as my mitigation strategies, and the advantages which played in my favor. Per-
sonally, I consider such critical and extensive reflection of the applied research methodology 
as crucial for two reasons: (1) it creates transparency of the research process and helps the 
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reader to better assess the validity of the respective findings, and (2) I hold that some of the 
challenges which I faced during my field work are common to other impact research projects 
on microinsurance as well. I am actually left to wonder why the majority of methodological 
accounts often report smooth research execution, sometimes mixed with a carefully dosed 
presentation of challenges that do not endanger the accuracy and validity of findings. With my 
comparatively detailed account I therefore hope to provide valuable insights for future impact 
research. After all, I acknowledge that representativeness, accuracy and consistency of data 
are flawed in my research. I therefore only claim “validity by tendency”, not validity by ro-
bustness of data and by methodological rigor and faultlessness.  
 
5.1 My double role as observing participant 
In section 4.4.2 I have outlined my decisive operational role in the planning and execution of 
Payung Keluarga. As I did scientific research on Payung Keluarga at the same time I as-
sumed the double role of an “actor” with a vested interest in the research subject and the pa-
rallel role of a “researcher” bearing the requirements of scientific neutrality and objectiveness. 
These two roles fuse into the role of an observing participant. Because one of the key ques-
tions in the analysis of any kind of phenomenon is the question of motivation, I want to first 
outline the motivation that stands behind my observing participation and therewith behind this 
entire thesis.  
My motivation to assume an operational role on Payung Keluarga is easily defined. After the 
completion of my diploma in South-East Asian studies in 2003, the job opportunity at Allianz 
in Indonesia allowed me to gain a stable income in a region which I had focused on during my 
studies. When microinsurance appeared on the scene at the end of 2004 I perceived this as a 
thrilling opportunity to try and shape something new. Moreover, I was attracted by the social 
touch of the assignment and sensed the opportunity to combine my daily work with the still 
loosely defined idea of undertaking PhD-studies. With the operational motivation thus de-
fined, what were my exact motivations to assume an additional research role on Payung Ke-
luarga? First of all, as already alluded to, I had planned for a PhD-research ever since finish-
ing university because of the intellectual challenge and not least because of the symbolic capi-
tal connected to it in form of academic capital, with the possibility of convertibility into eco-
nomic capital later on (cf. Bourdieu 1986: 248). Payung Keluarga presented the ideal condi-
tions to combine an interesting money earning job with the scientific empirical field work that 
is almost indispensable for a PhD in South-East Asian studies. I must add here that I had nev-
er done empirical field work before. This put another interesting challenge to the idea, but 
certainly also accounts for a good deal of the methodological friction which I will outline be-
low (see section 5.3.3). The second motivator was my intrinsic wish to prove the meaningful-
ness of my own doing and formulate a soundly reflected position on it. After all, already Max 
Weber recognized that the two intertwining processes of (1) attaching meaning to perceived 
phenomena (Sinngebung) and of (2) formulating one’s own (subjective) position towards 
them (Stellungnahme) are crucial for defining humans as cultural beings (Bayer and Mordt 
 
137 
 
2008: 18). For me, the central driving question here was: “How does my own work influence 
the insured, and does it really benefit them?” I knew from early on that Allianz was not plan-
ning to answer this question through independent or internal impact assessments. This led me 
to conceptualize my own customer-centered impact research. Alternative topics would have 
been demand research, the CSR strategy of Allianz, or the financial effect of microinsurance 
on the MFI and Allianz, but these topics did not have the same potential to answer my ques-
tion of meaning. 
By late 2004, I had already formulated a rough plan to do impact research on Payung Keluar-
ga. I then needed to intensively see to the operational side first to make sure that the product 
was actually developed and launched; simply put: without a product, no research opportunity. 
My intention to do impact research was supportively acknowledged by the local Allianz man-
agement. However, Allianz completely stayed out of my research work and provided no direct 
funding. To preserve the neutrality of my research, I did not ask for financial support either. 
But in practice my research work was very much overlapping with my operational work, so 
that some indirect funding took place. For example, when I visited an MFI to train their loan 
officers in the morning, I used the afternoon to meet customers or beneficiaries for data col-
lection. Sometimes, I even dedicated entire working days mainly to research and just added 
some minor operational work (such as a courtesy visit to the respective MFI branch office) to 
give such ventures a legitimizing business touch. Overall, however, business definitely took 
precedence over research during my entire research phase at Allianz. This research phase, 
which is longer than the operational reference period, started with the first ex-ante group 
questioning on 24 July 2006 and lasted until my contract end on 30 June 2008. It was com-
plemented by one return visit to Jakarta in October and November 2008. Illustration 5 shows 
how my research time related to my other tasks at Allianz during this period. 
Illustration 5: My activity distribution 1 Jul 2006 until 30 Jun 2008 (n=4185 working 
hours) 
 
Source: Activity log book of the author 
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In effect, I spent eight percent of my working time or 353 hours on research. For Allianz, this 
means work related expenses of approximately US$ 4,000. My point is that at least indirectly 
Allianz provided financial support for my research. This negatively affects research neutrality. 
Indeed, I am thankful to Allianz for providing me the opportunity to use some of its resources 
to pursue my research. Moreover, without Allianz undertaking microinsurance in the first 
place, I could never have conceived my research project. Nonetheless, I hold my research to 
be sufficiently independent to be scientifically credible. Why so? I have four reasons for this 
assertion: 
(1) No external pressure for legitimization: As mentioned in the beginning (cf. chapter 1), 
neither the media nor the public sincerely questioned the positive social impact of Payung 
Keluarga. Internally, Allianz did even less so. Under these conditions, a serious investigation 
into the impact process of Payung Keluarga posed more of a threat to the positive image of 
microinsurance than holding the potential of increasing it. I therefore hold my research not to 
be motivated by a need to prove my work worthwhile to external parties. 
(2) A personal critical stance: Seen from a business perspective, I was convinced of the posi-
tive business potential of Payung Keluarga from early on. I also consider the long-term strat-
egy to firmly establish microinsurance as a business through a relatively low-risk step-by-step 
approach as reasonable under the given conditions. But seen from a social perspective, I 
hedged gnawing doubts about the positive social impact of Payung Keluarga. This provided 
an intrinsic need for investigation and legitimization which I could only credibly satisfy by 
taking a critical approach to microinsurance.  
(3) Independent research approach: Despite a certain indirect financial dependence on Al-
lianz, during my research I was completely left to my own discretion. None of my Allianz 
supervisors ever inquired on the exact content of my research. The only research guidance I 
had was via the occasional exchange with my supervisor at university. In fact, I was free of 
the pressure to write research proposals and intermediate research reports to any kind of insti-
tution or research funding organization. This greatly increased my research independence, 
albeit at the expense of limited academic peer discussion on my actual methodology. Next to 
my inexperience this certainly took another bite at research quality. 
(4) Transparent display of double role: Last but not least I am (hopefully visibly) anxious to 
make the intricacies of my double role as observing participant as transparent as possible to 
the reader as a form of mitigation through transparency.  
I am aware that in my particular situation as a researcher on my own work, critical results are 
likely to be taken more seriously than an outright positive absolution. In this respect, my re-
search may well have been biased towards critical results from the start. However, it is still up 
for the reader to decide whether my case makes sense to him or her. Besides, I hold a critical 
research outcome as beneficial and balancing for the overall discourse on microinsurance, 
which is currently skewed towards the positive (cf. section 3.3.3 and section 3.3.4). 
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5.2 Hypothesis and objectives of research 
As mentioned, on a very personal level my initial research question was: “How does my own 
work influence the insured, and does it really benefit them?” Realizing that contemporary 
Indonesia is undergoing a particularly rapid transformation (cf. section 4.1.), and in order to 
take a more scientific neutral stance rather than an outright moral approach, I reformulated the 
problem statement of this thesis as follows: “Indonesia is in an ongoing process of transfor-
mation and social change. Now, modern microinsurance steps onto the scene; and what hap-
pens? And why does it happen the way it does?” During the preparation of my field work, I 
refrained from breaking this problem statement down further into precise research hypotheses. 
I only assumed that the context in which Payung Keluarga would operate was likely to heavi-
ly influence the product’s impact, and that there was the potential that Payung Keluarga 
would likewise exert an impact on its wider context. As I had studied a number of practition-
ers’ narratives and consultancy reports on microinsurance beforehand, I was naturally aware 
of the principal developmental hopes pinned to microinsurance. I was especially keen to scru-
tinize the degree of realization of the first hope (protection) and second hope (promotion) in 
the context of Payung Keluarga (cf. section 3.3.1). Here, the question as to what beneficiaries 
would do with the insurance money was of particular interest. Would the payouts help the 
beneficiaries to manage the supposed financial difficulties after death better than without in-
surance? I was also considering that the majority of Payung Keluarga customers would never 
raise a claim. I felt that the perspective of this “silent majority” was also worthwhile investi-
gating. I have to reprise here that I only hit the concepts of embeddedness, moral economy, 
reciprocity et cetera after the end of my field work (cf. chapter 2). I therefore did not deduce 
any research hypotheses and research objectives from these concepts. 
In short, at the onset of my actual field research in mid-2006 I was left with a basic problem 
statement, a concern for context, and a vague array of notions where Payung Keluarga may 
make its impact felt, but without precise research hypotheses. Part of the difficulty in formu-
lating a more precise research agenda was that (next to my own methodological inexperience) 
no well documented precedents for microinsurance impact research were available at the time. 
In the same year, Young et al. (2006) acknowledged the scarcity of proven methodologies for 
microinsurance impact research:  
Known collectively as microinsurance, these new financial products seek to help the poor by re-
ducing their vulnerability to unexpected shocks like illness or death. Whether and how they actual-
ly do help the poor, however, is up for debate. . . . Indeed, because the field of microinsurance is 
still new, it is not even clear where to look for the impact. Although numerous studies have sought 
to assess the impact of micro-credit and savings by measuring changes in indicators such as 
household income and expenditures, whether these same indicators apply to microinsurance is un-
known. (Young et al. 2006: 1) 
Based on these conditions, my research aimed at the following objectives: (1) it should focus 
on customers rather than the MFIs or Allianz; (2) it should be as holistic as possible in order 
to be sensitive to a broad range of impacts; (3) it should be responsive to the socio-cultural 
context; (4) it should focus on detecting and understanding impact processes rather than pre-
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cisely measuring them, which resounds Geertz’ call for thick description (Geertz 2000: 7, 16); 
and (5) it should nonetheless achieve a certain degree of representativeness in order not to be 
dismissed as outright anecdotal by mainstream microfinance discourse which is clearly domi-
nated by economists preoccupied with sample sizes. Just as Armendariz and Morduch (2005: 
199) note: “Anecdotes . . . are not a substitute, however, for careful statistical evidence on 
impacts from large samples.” As a rule of thumb, sample sizes of 100 or more respondents or 
participants seem to be generally regarded as accruing a certain degree of statistical represen-
tativeness (Morduch 2005:54; Pan 2008: 92-93). Next to these five major objectives, one ad-
ditional logistic objective was that my research needed to fit into my operational work sche-
dule. In effect, this rendered large scale or nonstop continuous research efforts unfeasible. 
5.3 Methodological approach 
5.3.1  Basic considerations 
The essence of the methodological approach that resulted from the research objectives out-
lined above is aptly summarized by late anthropologist Clifford Geertz:  
This backward order of things . . . may seem odd, or even perverse, but it is, I think, at least most 
of the time, standard procedure in cultural anthropology. Some pretenders to high science and 
higher technique aside, we do not start out with well-formed ideas we carry off to distant places to 
check out by means of carefully codified procedures systematically applied. We go off to those 
places . . . with some general notions of what we would like to look into and of how we might go 
about looking into them. We then in fact look into them (or, often enough, look instead into others 
that turn out to be more interesting), and after doing so we return to sort through our notes and 
memories, both of them defective, to see what we might have uncovered that clarifies anything or 
leads on to useful revisions of received ideas, our own or someone else's about something or other. 
The writing this produces is accordingly exploratory, self-questioning, and shaped more by the oc-
casions of its production than its post-hoc organization into chaptered books and thematic mono-
graphs might suggest. (Geertz 2000: v-vi) 
Just as Geertz describes it, I started out with very rough ideas only. My research was explora-
tory and iterative, with several thematic and methodological twists and turns applied on the 
go. It was only during the data analysis phase that I started to properly organize my thoughts, 
and seek out, modify, and expand (where necessary) existing concepts that may prove useful 
in making sense of what I had observed in the field (cf. chapter 2). However, my research 
methodology was certainly not as ethnological as practiced by Geertz. I was no participant 
observer but rather the opposite, a very much involved observing participant. I also had to be 
pragmatic in the sense that I needed to wait for research opportunities to occur, such as new 
MFI partners joining or some claim being reported, and exploit these opportunities on the fly, 
always with a tight operational work schedule sneaking up from behind and with the neces-
sary coordination and related work burden for the MFIs in mind.  
I organized this somewhat fuzzy approach into the six distinct research components described 
in the next section. With regards to the epic distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
research I would describe the mixture of group questionings and interviews that I applied in 
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these components, and which I eventually enriched with a fair deal of personal observations 
and light bulb moments, as an integrated approach, at least by intention. The delineation be-
tween qualitative and quantitative aspects is clearly blurred. Taking into account the several 
challenges which I faced in the field and which all dented into the robustness and accuracy of 
my data (see section 5.3.3), I came to regard even my more quantitative data as merely indica-
tive and therefore in effect qualitative. Overall, I would therefore resume my methodological 
approach as explorative-qualitative in the sense of Bamberger (2000: 9), or as somewhere in 
between narrative econometrics as proposed by Moser (2007a: 3, 10) and classic ethnological 
field work as described by Schweizer (1982), Geertz (2000) and Korff and Schröter (2006: 
65-66). What had started out as an attempt at integrated research therefore ended up becoming 
an explorative-qualitative approach. 
5.3.2  Research components and locations 
Table 9 lists the six components of my research. One of the components, the customer com-
ponent was split into an ex-ante and an ex-post phase. Illustration 6 gives a geographic over-
view of my field research. This illustration underlines that the clear geographic focus of my 
research was on Jakarta and surroundings. Research activities on Bali, Sumba and West-
Timor were much more limited in scope. 
Table 9: Research components 
Phase # Component 
name 
Component description Timeframe Repondents No. of group 
questionings 
or interviews 
Ex-ante 1 (ex-ante) 
customer 
group questionings with 
prospective insured 
Aug 2006 - Jul 2007 174 17 
Ex-post 1 (ex-post) 
customer 
• group questionings 
• ideally with insured ex-ante 
respondents 
• 1 year after ex-ante group 
questionings 
Aug 2007 - Oct 2008 139  
(thereof 62 
same as ex-
ante) 
19 
2 Beneficiary interviews with Payung Ke-
luarga beneficiaries 
Aug 2007 - Oct 2008 26 26 
3 loan officer group questionings with loan 
officers of the MFI partners 
Aug 2007 - Oct 2008 66 6 
4 Expert background interviews with 
academic, cultural, religious, 
or business experts and poli-
ticians 
Jan 2008 - Jun 2009 24 20 
5 credit group 
leaders 
group questionings with in-
sured credit group leaders 
Oct 2008 - Nov 2008 31 4 
6 MFI man-
agement 
interviews with managers of 
the MFI partners 
Oct 2008 6 3 
Total Jul 2006 - Jun 2009 404 
(62 of them 
participated 
twice) 
95 
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An in-depth description of the various research components is provided below. All compo-
nents were conducted by me in Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia). The customer component and 
beneficiary component took place at the homes of the respondents. The other components 
took place at the MFIs or other office locations. The last versions of the questionnaires of four 
components (customer, beneficiary, loan officer, and credit group leaders) are contained in 
annex 1. 
Illustration 6: Geographic distribution of research activities 
 
(1) Customer component: This component started with ex-ante group questionings of micro-
credit groups shortly before the introduction of Payung Keluarga at the respective MFIs. I 
prefer to speak of group questionings rather than focus group discussions because different 
from the classical focus group concept there was hardly any free or loosely moderated discus-
sion among the research participants on a given topic (cf. Fern 2001). Instead, the sessions 
consisted mostly of a systematic question and answering process between me and the partici-
pants. In 17 group questionings a total of 174 prospective Payung Keluarga customers parti-
cipated in the baseline survey. As a second step, ex-post group questionings took place ap-
proximately one year after the introduction of Payung Keluarga at the respective MFIs. In 19 
ex-post group questionings a total of 139 respondents participated. An estimated 80 percent 
(111) of these had received a new loan during the previous year and had therefore at some 
point been covered by Payung Keluarga. 45 percent (62) were repeat respondents from the 
baseline survey. Both surveys were held orally following a structured questionnaire. I mainly 
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inquired on (1) risk profile and risk management strategies of respondents, (2) experience, 
demand, knowledge, and attitudes of insurance, (3) satisfaction with Payung Keluarga, and 
(4) changes to any of these variables. For the customer component I therewith applied a single 
difference approach which compares baseline data with endline data of the treatment group, 
however, without the inclusion of control groups (which would make for a double difference 
approach). Notably, five of the ex-post group questioning sessions had no ex-ante participant. 
These groups served as “semi-control groups” because through them I could at least verify 
whether certain variable changes may have been promoted by my initial sensitization of res-
pondents during the ex-ante sessions. The main reason why I chose to use group questionings 
instead of individual questionnaire-based surveys was to achieve significant respondent num-
bers in a time-efficient way.  
(2) Beneficiary component: Here, I held personal interviews with 24 Muslim and 2 Christian 
beneficiaries out of a total of 64 claims which had occurred during the reference period. On 
average, interviews took place 83 days after death and 55 days after claim payment. The basis 
of the interviews was a structured questionnaire. The focus of the beneficiary interviews was 
on (1) claim experience, partly in narrative form, (2) usage of payouts, and (3) imagination of 
a counterfactual (“What if no insurance?”).  
(3) Loan officer component: Here, 66 MFI loan officers of five MFI partners were clustered 
by MFI into a total of six group sessions. The main purpose of these sessions was to cross-
validate findings from the customer and beneficiary components. After all, by way of their 
“localness” and daily work the loan officers had much broader and deeper experience with the 
MFI’s customers than me. I therefore wanted to benefit from their “helicopter perspective”. 
The sessions took place between one and two years after the introduction of Payung Keluarga 
at the respective MFIs. They consisted of written individual questionnaires and an ensuing 
oral group questioning. These sessions focused on the loan officers’ perspective of (1) how 
Payung Keluarga was received by their microcredit clients, (2) what obstacles and frequently 
asked questions emerged in the socialization of the program, and (3) the loan officers’ impres-
sion on the impact of claims.  
(4) Expert component: This component consisted of loosely structured interviews with 24 
experts from various fields: academics, religion, insurance, microfinance and politics. 22 ex-
perts were Indonesians while two were Germans or of German decent.38
(5) Credit group leader component: Here, I held four group questionings with 31 key infor-
mants from among the Payung Keluarga customer base. Respondents were predominantly 
 These expert inter-
views were meant to (1) gather background information on social, cultural and religious per-
ceptions and behaviors observed among customers and beneficiaries, and (2) to shed a light 
on the relation of microinsurance with the general transformation processes occurring in In-
donesian society.  
                                                 
38 Here I count Professor Frans Magnis-Suseno as being of German decent although he has meanwhile received 
Indonesian citizenship. 
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women (97%) and many held the position of elected credit group leaders. With a number of 
controversial and open questions, these sessions came closest to the ideal of a moderated fo-
cus group discussion. However, I still classify them as group questionings. The sessions were 
held in October 2008 as the final stage of my field work in order to follow-up on open issues 
and questions which had emerged during the earlier components with customers, beneficia-
ries, and loan officers. 
(6) MFI management component: For additional cross-validation of the other components I 
interviewed six managers of three MFI partners of Allianz, applying a semi-structured ques-
tionnaire. 
Of these six components, the customer component and the beneficiary component were cer-
tainly the most important. The customer component with its two phases proved to be the most 
challenging exercise. The remaining four “ancillary” components served two purposes: The 
first purpose was to facilitate data triangulation. Triangulation refers to consistency checks 
through applying the same question or method to two or more different data sources (or repe-
titively to the same data source) in order to increase the validity of one’s findings (Baker 
2000: 9; Bamberger 2000: 14; Kabeer 2003: 113; ILO 2008c: 8). The earlier example of ask-
ing credit group leaders and loan officers separately on the micro-borrowers motivation for 
taking out loans is an example of data triangulation (cf. section 3.2.7). The second purpose 
was to gather additional information on issues which had emerged in the customer and bene-
ficiary components. In fact, I added the last three components (experts, credit group leaders, 
MFI management) only after the original components had raised nearly as many new ques-
tions as they had been able to answer. I should also note that apart from these six components 
I used other data sources for my research, such as the Payung Keluarga customer database 
and a vast range of informal and in-between talks with customers, loan officers, experts and 
managers. Last but not least, I rely heavily on my own personal working experience on 
Payung Keluarga. 
Although over 400 respondents participated in the formal field research components I was 
only able to surpass the “magic” 100 mark in case of the customer component. As only 64 
claims occurred during the reference period, the attainment of 100 interviewed beneficiaries 
was rendered mathematically impossible. Eventually, I only managed to visit 26 beneficiaries. 
This is still considerably more than in the few comparable efforts (SyncConsult 2006; Young 
et al. 2006). For the remaining four components I did not particularly strive to reach 100 or 
more respondents because, as mentioned, these components served mainly for cross-
validation and additional qualitative data collection. For data validity, I therefore rely more on 
the triangulation of data than on the size of the discrete samples. 
Regarding the total three years time span of my research (August 2006 until June 2009), this 
does not mean three years of non-stop continuous research. It rather means that I undertook a 
range of sporadic research activities during these years. As stated above, during my time with 
Allianz I only spent 353 hours on field work (including time for methodological preparation 
and travelling) and in total probably not more than 400 hours which makes for approximately 
50 working days until the commencement of the data analysis phase. 
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 Photo 1 
 
 Customer component group questioning (ex-ante) 
 Bali, 9 March 2007 
 Photo 2 
 
 Brand awareness exercise with prospective customers 
 East Jakarta, 28 May 2007 
 Photo 3 
 
 Filling demographic questionnaires 
 Sumba, 10 July 2007 
 Photo 4 
 
 Explaining a short written multiple choice questionnaire 
 Tangerang, 7 August 2007 
5.3.3  Research challenges and their mitigation 
The major research challenges to microinsurance impact research have been outlined above 
(cf. section 3.3.4). In their entirety, these challenges probably apply more to quantitative re-
search than to qualitative research. I nonetheless maintain that these challenges are relevant 
for this thesis. After all, it was the incomplete mitigation of these challenges in the first place 
which led me to consider even my intended quantitative results to only have qualitative validi-
ty, and to consequently classify my research as generally explorative-qualitative. In the fol-
lowing discussion I revisit these challenges and describe the applied mitigation strategies as 
well as the successfulness of these strategies. 
(1) Neutrality and objectivity: In section 5.1 I have already dealt with the crucial issue of re-
search neutrality in my particular case as an observing participant. To reprise the conclusion, 
on the financial side I was not completely independent from Allianz. However, on the side of 
actual research execution, data analysis and findings, I contend not to have been pushed to-
wards positive results. On the contrary, if anything, my findings may be skewed towards the 
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negative side in order to compensate for my intricate involvement with Allianz and Payung 
Keluarga. Different research on the same matter may therefore render more positive results, 
which leads to the issue of objectivity. Regarding research objectivity, full research objectivi-
ty is of course an idealized goal. I hold that I was sincerely striving for research objectivity, 
not least because I would not have been able to respond to my intrinsic doubts regarding the 
social impact of Payung Keluarga without applying self-convincing objectivity. Moreover, I 
also strive for transparency of the research process to enable the readers to form their own 
subjective opinions, which in their accumulation also contribute to research objectivity. If the 
overall feedback is good, my research was likely reasonably objective. 
Two additional challenges regarding neutrality and objectivity were (1) the fact that I was 
often perceived by the respondents as a representative of Allianz, and (2) that MFI loan offic-
ers were present during all but a few customer groups and beneficiary interviews. Although I 
presented myself as an independent researcher, the loan officers had often announced me as 
“someone from the insurance company”. This has certainly influenced the response patterns 
of respondents, all the more in the face of the present MFI staff and keeping in mind that after 
all the MFIs’ microcredits were much more important to the women than the small microin-
surance attachment. The women therefore had a vested interest in preserving their “credit-
worthiness” in the presence of MFI staff. This strong microcredit focus was tangible when the 
women sometimes mistook my questions to relate to microcredit instead of microinsurance. 
At various times I needed to point out that we were talking about microinsurance, not credit. 
While a fair number of researchers are consequently very strict on excluding MFI staff or any 
other person of authority during research activities, I took a more flexible stance. The pres-
ence of the MFI staff probably created as much trust and confidence among the respondents in 
face of a highly unusual situation as it may have obstructed “honest” answers. Moreover, the 
beauty of the chosen single difference method is that it allows me to validly measure changes 
in spite of a potential positive answering bias. Bluntly put, if prospective customers stated ex-
ante that they were somewhat fond of the idea of insurance in the presence of MFI and insur-
ance staff and one year later stated that they were now very fond of the idea of insurance in 
the presence of the same MFI and insurance staff, then the finding that acceptance of insur-
ance has increased appears valid, although the respective absolute acceptance levels may not 
be objectively accurate. Unfortunately, for the beneficiary component such single difference 
change measurement was not possible because the beneficiary interviews only took place ex-
post. However, here questions with a high risk of inducing “expected” answers were few and 
far between. And lastly, during the few group questionings and beneficiary interviews which I 
held completely on my own, I noticed no diverging response patterns. 
(2) Selection bias: Next to ensuring research neutrality and objectivity, selection bias is prob-
ably the biggest challenge in all but the most qualitative research methodologies. How did the 
selection process work for my various components and how did I thereby try to avoid selec-
tion bias? For the ex-ante customer component neither a randomized selection of respondents 
nor the forming of control groups was possible. As research usually started immediately after 
a co-operation with an MFI was established, I had no prior access to the MFI’s customer da-
tabase in order to randomize the sample. Moreover, the time schedule for the ex-ante group 
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questionings was usually quite tight (half a day). It would have been difficult to find logisti-
cally convenient but nonetheless randomly selected credit groups. The formation of control 
groups was practically impossible because all MFI credit customers would automatically re-
ceive Payung Keluarga with their next loan. After a year, when the ex-post phase was bound 
to start, the entire MFI portfolio was already scheduled to be fully insured (except in the case 
of MBM which had longer loan terms). Theoretically, it would have been possible to do re-
search with non-cooperating MFIs targeting similar customers in the same area. However, I 
did not have access to such MFIs. Another possibility would have been to purposely exclude 
some customers from Payung Keluarga during the first year for an RCT. However, for ethical 
and administrative reasons, I did not consider this. Therefore, I had to rely on respondent se-
lection by the MFIs and on the validity of single difference measurement. For respondent se-
lection for the ex-ante group component, I provided the MFIs a catalogue of selection criteria 
such as the request for “representative” credit groups of six to eight members. In the ex-post 
phase, I intended to revisit the same groups as the year before. Therefore, no separate selec-
tion process was needed. However, as I soon noticed high rates of attrition, I allowed MFIs to 
include new insured respondents in the group questionings. In five ex-post customer groups, 
in fact no ex-ante respondent at all was present. These groups could consequently serve as 
internal “semi-control groups”. Unfortunately, the MFIs often did not closely follow my se-
lection criteria. Sometimes I was faced with groups as large as 15 or 20 people. In these cases, 
it was extremely difficult to run through the entire questionnaire. Here, I tended to skip some 
questions which partly explains the varying sample sizes for my questions. Even more dis-
cerning than large group sizes was the realization that also a significant number of uninsured 
MFI customers (who had either dropped out completely or were taking a pause at lending) 
joined the ex-post groups. This problem will be further dealt with below in the discussion on 
measurement error. Despite the bumpy selection process, my initial worry that the MFI part-
ners would only guide me to “show-case” groups turned out unfounded. I experienced as 
many good and average groups as I met “sub-prime” groups. Not surprisingly, I was unable to 
revisit three of the 17 ex-ante groups because these groups had meanwhile disbanded, mostly 
due to loan repayment issues. This in turn acerbated the problem of attrition in the customer 
component. 
For the beneficiary component, the selection process was much easier. Bluntly speaking, se-
lection was done by death itself. When claims were reported, I tried to arrange an interview 
with the beneficiaries two months after the claim payout date. Naturally, I had to leave out 
claims at more remote places unless some business was taking me there anyway. Moreover, 
sometimes the MFIs could not locate and contact the beneficiary for an interview, or the re-
spective loan officer was too busy to assist me with the arrangements. When claim numbers 
rose towards the end of the reference period and time and logistics did not allow following up 
all of them, I started to guard a fair balance of low, middle and high claim payouts.  
For the remaining four components, I attached less importance to selection. The loan officer 
groups were organized by the MFIs without any selection criteria. Only once, at BINA, I spe-
cifically requested to interview Muslim loan officers because all previous loan officer respon-
dents had been Protestant, Roman Catholic or Hindu. For the credit group leader component I 
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had naturally asked the MFIs to invite credit group leaders instead of normal members. How-
ever, it turned out that only 40 percent of participants (n=31) held a leading position in their 
respective groups, which was nonetheless still much higher than in the customer component. 
For the expert component, I was using snowball sampling; that is obtaining referrals through 
trust networks (Spalter-Roth 2000: 51; Rao and Woolcock 2003: 167). First, I started off in-
terviewing personal acquaintances of mine and then continued to interview relevant friends 
which they recommended. However, here I was also trying to find a good balance of respon-
dents and not let one “thread” gain dominance over the others. This was especially important 
with academic and religious experts in respect to their affiliation to either Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) or Muhammadiyah, the two largest Muslim socio-religious organization in Indonesia, 
where the former is generally perceived as traditionalist and pluralistic while the latter pursues 
an agenda of a purified orthodox, so-called “modern” Islam. 
Despite the outlined challenges and non-randomness in the selection of respondents, the so-
cio-demographic picture of the customer component and the beneficiary component are gen-
erally well aligned to the characteristics of all Payung Keluarga insured (see section 7.1). 
Nonetheless, the non-randomization of respondent selection, the absence of control groups 
and the relatively small sample sizes are certainly discerning. These shortcomings were at 
least partly mitigated by the single difference approach of the customer component and a wide 
triangulation of data. I therefore once again claim “validity by tendency” for my research re-
sults without claiming the respective numbers to represent unfailing objective and accurate 
truths. What is also clear is that the surveyed MFI customers, and by tendency also their bene-
ficiaries, are by no means representative for all low-asset families in Indonesia. In fact, due to 
the high concentration of research activity in and around Jakarta I can only assert a certain 
level of representativeness for female urban Muslim petty traders who borrow from Allianz’ 
MFI partners in that area. The research stints in Bali and especially in Sumba and West-Timor 
merely provide ancillary information and help to color the overall picture.  
(3) Poverty and welfare proxies: In order to conceptualize poverty and welfare proxies, I em-
ployed the expanded asset-capital framework as outlined in section 2.4. For the customer 
component, this meant an investigation into changes of peace of mind as a human asset, both 
by way of direct asking as well as by comparing changes in risk perception. With the custom-
ers, I also investigated for possible changes in financial literacy, again through directly asking 
for a self-assessment, inquiring into the understanding of insurance principles, and through 
analyzing changes to brand recognition of various insurance and banking brands. Moreover, 
as a means of triangulation, I inquired with loan officers on the most frequently asked cus-
tomer questions to gauge the customers’ level of knowledge. With customers, I also tried to 
gauge changes to their business risk affinity which may indirectly point to a potential increase 
and decrease of economic welfare. These exercises generally worked well. Through the com-
parison of ex-ante and ex-post values they rendered meaningful results.  
For the beneficiary component, the situation was more difficult because the beneficiaries had 
just faced a severe emotional and economic shock through the death of a close relative. Here, 
I mainly asked what the beneficiaries had done with the money and what would have hap-
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pened without the insurance payout. This way I tried to gauge a counterfactual of how social 
and physical assets would have looked in the absence of insurance, and how social and eco-
nomic capital had been impacted. In fact, much of my (subjective) assessment of a particular 
payout’s impact depended on the respective claim circumstances as recounted by the benefi-
ciaries. In short, especially in the case of the beneficiaries the poverty and welfare proxies 
were not econometric in the strict sense of the word, but rather fuzzy and qualitative, which 
once again points to the context-dependent and qualitative “validity” of my findings. 
What I consistently refrained from was an in-depth measurement of the income or expenditure 
level of customers and beneficiaries, as this would have added too much complexity and a 
whole host of additional methodological difficulties to my research scope (cf. Foster et al. 
1984; cf. Sinha 2006:12; cf. Pan 2008:79). Although Chen and Schreiner (2009) have recently 
presented a quick poverty measurement scorecard for Indonesian families which takes about 
ten minutes to fill in, such tools were not yet available when I planned my research. I there-
fore took the loan amount as an indicative proxy for the absorption capacity of the respon-
dents and their families and thereby for their economic status and general asset situation. In 
addition, I supplemented this first indicator through observations of the respondents’ living 
standard and with occasional inquiries into the financials of their businesses, all of which 
eventually confirmed my initial association of higher loans with higher asset bases, not the 
least in terms of education. 
(4) Causality and attribution: For the customer component, I relied on the single difference 
method to discern by how far insurance coverage was responsible for any detected changes. 
Again, control groups would have further increased validity. Exogenous factors could have 
influenced these changes as well. However, the intermediate time span of just one year was 
rather short. I also checked for any major insurance or financial education campaigns and in-
quired if the customers had taken out insurance in between. Nonetheless, the establishment of 
clear causalities was somewhat obstructed by the fact that also non-insured participated in the 
ex-post groups. Through the use of the internal ex-post “semi-control groups” I could at least 
check if any detected changes had been promoted by the fact that I had done ex-ante microin-
surance research with the respondents, which may have overly sensitized them (I found that 
this was not the case). With the beneficiaries, causality was not much of a challenge. The in-
surance payout had generally just happened and the beneficiaries could well recall what they 
had done with the money and to what effect.  
(5) Fungibility and additionality: Fungibility did not pose a challenge. For the customer com-
ponent no money was involved except for the small one-off premium payment at loan dis-
bursement, and this was deducted from the loan amount, which made the financing very clear. 
The 26 interviewed beneficiaries, on the other hand, had all received payouts ranging from 
US$ 105 to US$ 1,050. Due to the relatively short recall period of two months the beneficia-
ries’ information on what they used these payouts on was reasonably precise and credible. I 
also asked the beneficiaries to hypothesize on the counterfactual which clearly revealed the 
extent of additionality. 
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(6) Effects beyond the unit of analysis: The two main units of analysis were the insured and 
the beneficiaries. As I questioned the insured in groups, in many respects the credit groups 
themselves became unit of analysis instead of the individual group members. The beneficiary 
interviews were often attended by other family members as well who contributed and thereby 
added a somewhat broader “family” perspective. Naturally, due to my holistic approach I was 
concerned that the introduction of formal insurance would make an impact on the community 
at large and possibly on excluded community members. This adds a certain degree of sensitiv-
ity for effects beyond the unit of analysis. Realistically speaking, however, such effects, espe-
cially when related to normative changes, are difficult to detect and measure over such a short 
period of time. Moreover, I did not make an explicit survey on non-insured, for example in 
the form of control groups. Instead, I inquired with the customer component on how insurance 
was discussed with neighbors and friends, and whether social cooperation in the community 
was changing. With the beneficiaries I inquired how the news of the claim payment was being 
received by their social network and whether their social relations had changed since. Gener-
ally, I found that the more abstract my questions were in this respect the more imprecise and 
divergent the answers became. In short, although I was concerned with effects beyond the unit 
of analysis and undertook some efforts to gauge them, these efforts were not more than ex-
plorative and potentially left a number of wider effects unnoticed. 
(7) Attrition and drop-outs: While attrition was no issue with the other components, the cus-
tomer component was heavily affected by it. Of 174 ex-ante respondents I was only able to 
meet 62 again during the ex-post phase (and not all of these had taken out new loans). This 
amounts to an attrition rate of 64 percent! On a group basis, the picture looks somewhat bet-
ter. Of 17 ex-ante credit groups, I could revisit 14 groups, although over the course of the year 
these groups had greatly changed in composition. The main reason for this high attrition rate 
is the dynamics and fluctuations of the MFIs’ customer base (cf. section 3.2.3). As mentioned, 
three groups had completely dissolved before the ex-post phase. Other groups had split into 
smaller groups or even graduated to individual contracts. Some members had migrated or 
dropped-out of the MFI program, or had decided to take a break from borrowing (istirahat). I 
had anticipated some attrition and had therefore aimed at an ex-ante sample size well beyond 
100 in order to still reach 100 ex-post respondents. Yet, when the ex-post phase started I was 
still surprised by the extent of attrition. I therefore decided to include the three ex-ante test 
groups (for questionnaire testing) in my proper sample and to do an ex-post survey on these as 
well, and to moreover allow for new insured respondents to fill up the ranks in the ex-post 
survey as “drop-ins”. Eventually, 139 respondents participated in the ex-post customer com-
ponent of which 62 were ex-ante participants and 77 were “drop-ins”. While I had prepared 
my ex-post questionnaire to handle the influx of new participants, I was unprepared for partic-
ipants who had not actually been insured during the year and had consequently never made 
any personal product experience with Payung Keluarga. In the field, it was difficult for me to 
clearly establish who had been insured and who had not, especially as on site I did not have 
access to the Payung Keluarga customer database for instant verification. Sometimes the 
women could not remember when exactly they had taken their last loan, before or after the 
introduction of Payung Keluarga. Some contended to have been insured when it later turned 
out that this was not the case. Some even claimed to have participated in the ex-ante survey 
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when in fact they had not. Logistical problems such as one person using different names or 
proxy respondents not exactly knowing the insurance status of the actual respondent further 
acerbated the situation. During the ex-post sessions I therefore had to improvise a lot. Even-
tually, I had to rely on the data analysis phase, where I had access to the Payung Keluarga 
customer database, to as good as possible segregate ex-post respondents into the four possible 
categories: (1) ex-ante insured participant, (2) ex-ante uninsured participant, (3) new insured 
participant, (4) new uninsured participant. Rather indicatively I conclude that 80 percent of 
the ex-post respondents had been insured at some point. It is clear that such fuzzy conditions 
thwart any claim at absolute data accuracy and further support my acknowledgement of “va-
lidity by tendency”. While attrition was a major problem, drop-outs in the sense of disgruntled 
insured leaving the MFI and not being surveyed were not. Because Payung Keluarga was 
compulsory and only constituted a minor aspect in comparison to the major aspect, the micro-
credit itself, drop-outs because of insurance are highly unlikely. Despite the noisiness of the 
data at least a positive bias of my findings due to attrition and dropouts is therefore unlikely. 
(8) Differential impact by poverty level: This challenge was most acute for the beneficiary 
component. As mentioned, by and large higher loan sizes serve as a good indicator of higher 
asset bases, including higher average educational levels. Those beneficiaries whose relatives 
had taken out small loans and were therefore considerably low-asset received small payouts. 
Those with higher loans and higher asset bases received higher claim payouts. Somewhat 
ironically, in absolute monetary terms Payung Keluarga therefore helped those insured the 
least who had the lowest asset base. In my interviews and especially during data analysis I 
was therefore interested to assess how the combination of low asset bases and low payouts 
would fare in comparison to relatively high asset bases and high payouts. This was one of the 
reasons why I strove to get a balanced sample of beneficiary cases by size of payouts.  
With the customer component, differential impacts on financial literary, peace of mind, risk 
affinity et cetera based on differential asset bases (especially education), as well as based on 
religion and geographic situation are certainly imaginable. Although I made efforts at analyz-
ing this during the data analysis phase, sample sizes often proved too small to produce more 
than feeble indications. 
(9) Influence and dynamics of exogenous factors: One of the key premises of this thesis is the 
strong influence of context on the impact of microinsurance. Exogenous factors such as socio-
economic situation, cultural norms, religion and the dynamics of Indonesia’s socio-economic 
transformation therefore build a key concern of my research. In purely quantitative research, 
exogenous factors are usually incorporated into the research design as control variable (Bam-
berger 2000: 18; Meyer 2007: 228-229). Through specific written (!) demographic question-
naires (see annex 1) I included potential control variables such as gender, age, marital status, 
educational level, religion and principal occupation into my research design. I also investi-
gated patterns of migration and support networks. However, most often sample sizes were too 
small to discern clear correlations between such exogenous factors and the observed impact of 
Payung Keluarga. This proved most difficult in the customer component because there I only 
recorded answers on a group basis, which was much quicker than individual recording, but 
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prevented me from relating a person’s individual answer to that person’s demographic profile. 
In addition, some questions were answered through anonymous voting using voting cards. 
Naturally, this prevents the application of individualized control variables. However, one par-
ticularly clear case of the influence of exogenous variables is religion. For example, the two 
Protestant beneficiaries whom I interviewed displayed such remarkably different usage pat-
terns for their payouts as compared to the 24 Muslim beneficiaries that I excluded them from 
the data analysis. Unfortunately, these two Protestant cases taken separately make for anec-
dotal evidence only, which is why I do not present them in this thesis.  
That exogenous factors can be dynamic was most relevant for the customer component be-
cause the ex-ante and ex-post phase were one year apart, a time in which exogenous factors 
could change. Although factors like religious affiliation, education, marital status and age 
were not going to change significantly during such a short period of time, I was on the loo-
kout for other potential influencing factors such as major insurance advertising or educational 
campaigns by competitors or the government (which did not take place) and changes in the 
general economic, political and environmental situation. Fortunately, the economic and politi-
cal environment during my research was relatively stable. The Asian financial crisis and the 
accompanying political upheavals had long passed in 2006. The kindling “sub-prime” crisis 
and the approaching second world economic crisis had not yet left its mark on the surveyed 
low-asset customers when I undertook my last field research trips in November 2008. There 
were also no major environmental changes or natural disasters in my research area.  
After all, my most detailed efforts at discerning the influence of exogenous factors was not on 
the quantitative, but on the qualitative side. As I was focusing more on the understanding than 
on the measuring of impact, many of my more open questions to the insured and beneficiaries 
served to discern the interplay between insurance and context. Last but not least, the expert 
component explicitly aimed to further enlighten the relevant socio-cultural background and its 
dynamics. In summary, the challenge of exogenous factors was at the center of my research 
efforts rather than being a methodological threat that I needed to mitigate. 
(10) Questionnaire design: My questionnaires certainly did not comply with the orthodox 
quantitative research ideal of carefully planned and pre-tested questionnaires that stay con-
stant throughout the research. Regarding pre-testing, I undertook prior consultations with my 
research supervisor and with Indonesian colleagues on the appropriateness and cultural sensi-
tivity of my questionnaires, but these consultations only prompted superfluous changes. As 
mentioned, I pre-tested the customer component questionnaire in three ex-ante group ques-
tionings, which resulted in a decisive shortening of my questionnaire’s length. However, I 
later decided to include the data from these test groups into my proper sample in order to in-
crease my sample size. Regarding constancy, throughout my field research my questionnaires 
underwent several revisions, especially those for the customer and beneficiary component. I 
noticed that some questions where ambiguous or irrelevant and decided to drop them. At other 
times I noticed the importance of certain variables which I had not included before. One ex-
ample was the realization that the affiliation of the beneficiaries to either NU or Muhamma-
diyah could influence their respective funeral patterns. Therefore, I started to inquire on such 
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affiliations, but only after I had already conducted half of my beneficiary interviews. In case 
of such latter additions, sample sizes are even smaller than the size of the total sample. What I 
nonetheless made sure of was that questions were not rephrased because this would have de-
stroyed the consistency and credibility of the response pattern. I either dropped or added ques-
tions, but I did not rephrase them. 
Next to my questionnaires not being intensively pre-tested and held constant, another element 
which adds “noise” to the data is the fact that virtually all my surveys were conducted orally. 
The exact phrasing of the questions varied from session to session. Although I tried to hold 
the wording as constant as possible, some groups and beneficiaries understood the questions 
immediately while others needed additional explanations and examples. This deals another 
blow as orthodox scientific consistency, as much as I had striven for it. I only used written 
questionnaires on three occasions: (1) short demographic questionnaires at the end of each 
group questioning or interview (except for the expert component), (2) anonymous written 
questionnaires for the first half of the loan officer groups, and (3) a simple multiple choice 
questionnaire with four questions as a part of the ex-post customer component. The filling in 
of the demographic questionnaire provided few obstacles. Here, the illiterate were helped by 
other group members. The written questionnaire for the loan officers also worked very well. 
But the short ex-post multiple-choice questionnaire was a complete failure. Already in the 
field I noticed that many respondents had difficulties with it although I provided instructions 
and even accepted that the illiterate were helped by more literate participants. During the data 
analysis phase I then had to realize that the response patterns for these questionnaires made 
little apparent sense which is why I decided to not consider them further.  
A last realization regarding the intricacies of questionnaire design was the influence that the 
sequence of questions can take on outcomes. This has been noted by Baker (2000: 35) before. 
Of course, I had aimed for a coherent and harmonious ordering of questions. For example, I 
put those questions which I considered most sensitive towards the end. I also introduced some 
control-questions at various stages of the questionnaire to later check on consistency of re-
sponse patterns. For the beneficiary interviews for example, I started off with a very general 
request to the beneficiary to recount his story. This served the purpose of a sensitive, respon-
dent-led entry into a potentially emotional discussion relating to the recent death of a relative. 
However, only during data analysis did I fully realize how much interviews and group ques-
tionings represent a learning process for the respondents in their own right; and that this phe-
nomenon is especially pronounced if the familiarity and comfort level of the respondents with 
the discussed topic is low. The most tangible example here is probably the observation that 
three of 19 ex-post customer groups showed a higher acceptance of Payung Keluarga when 
the premium was to increase by 50 percent. Three more groups showed no difference to ac-
ceptance level despite the price increase. Investigating this counter-intuitive phenomenon I 
found that I had asked the initial acceptance question - assuming the standard Payung Keluar-
ga premium - at the beginning of the session through anonymous voting. Then, in the course 
of the session I had explained several aspects of insurance, and only then had I asked for ac-
ceptance levels if premiums were to increase by 50 percent, again through anonymous voting. 
It therefore appears that the appreciation of insurance among respondents had increased dur-
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ing the session based on my information, which in turn induced a heightened tolerance for 
price increases. 
In summary, my questionnaires and their application did certainly not comply with “best prac-
tice”. On the positive side they revealed very rich and explanatory information, ironically of-
ten evoked by lessons from methodological faults. On the negative side, absolute accuracy 
and consistency levels as well as sample sizes suffered.  
(11) Measurement error: The challenges outlined so far make it easy to conclude that mea-
surement error poses a severe problem to my research. This is especially true for the more 
quantitative elements of the customer component with its heterogeneous mix of ex-post res-
pondents, the mostly oral group questioning technique, and the inquiry into chronically sub-
jective issues such as peace of mind. I have already indicated that in consequence I do not 
claim data accuracy but only validity and representativeness of the discerned trends. Mea-
surement error is less of a problem in the other components which leads to better data accura-
cy and better validity. But for these components small sample sizes reduce representativeness. 
My key mitigation strategy for measurement error in the customer component was the appli-
cation of the single difference method. Bluntly speaking, if ex-ante and ex-post conditions 
were equally obstructive, observed changes still preserve their validity. As mentioned, my 
focus here is more on detecting such changes between samples rather than on ensuring data 
accuracy for the respective samples. As a tangible example I reprise the example given earlier 
(in the discussion of neutrality and objectivity) of the measurement of insurance perception 
where the respective ex-ante and ex-post results may not be objective and true, but any ob-
served change in this time series is nonetheless objective and true, and likely to come close to 
a reasonable data accuracy as well. 
There were two additional challenges to data accuracy, or rather data collection in general, 
during the customer component: (1) Intra-session fluctuation of participant numbers, and (2) a 
“one-voice” phenomenon. Intra-session fluctuation refers to the dynamics of the credit groups 
during the actual execution of the group sessions. These group sessions took place at the 
home of one of the group members, normally the credit group leader’s home. Usually, there 
were several bystanders and especially curious children swarming around the location. Sever-
al women brought their babies along. Sometimes some members arrived after the session had 
already started, or had to leave early to attend to some urgent business. Some also left in-
between and came back later. Naturally, such a lively and bustling atmosphere is not compa-
rable to an orderly and quiet office atmosphere. This made data collection more difficult. Be-
cause respondent numbers varied during the sessions themselves, the sample sizes for various 
questions were stirred even further, next to the fact that with large groups or especially “noi-
sy” groups I could not do some of the more intricate exercises (such as brand awareness mea-
surement) in the first place. These intra-session dynamics come on top of the inter-session 
dynamics and fluctuations between the ex-ante and ex-post sessions which I explained earlier. 
On the positive side, doing research right at people’s places of living heightened their trust 
and confidence and provided me with an in-depth insight into their living conditions.  
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The one-voice phenomenon refers to the tendency of the group questioning respondents to 
answer with a high degree of uniformity to my close-ended questions. Usually, these offered 
three to five answering choices, such as “yes”, “maybe”, and “no”. To verify the extent of the 
one-voice phenomenon, I checked on 1,796 individual answers provided by approximately 
150 participants in 35 group sessions (ex-ante and ex-post) answering 12 distinct oral ques-
tions. These twelve oral questions had no obvious “right” or “wrong” answer choices in order 
not to bias the analysis results. One example is the ex-ante question if the respondents consi-
dered insurance to be generally expensive, mid-price or cheap. It turned out that in 91 percent 
of all answers, respondents had chosen the majority answer of their group. The probability of 
respondents choosing a slightly diverging answer, such as a “maybe” when the majority ans-
wered “yes”, was only 6 percent. The probability for completely diverging answers, such as a 
“no” when the majority answer was “yes” was even lower at only 3 percent. In consequence, 
this indicates how strongly coordinated the given answers were. I cannot tell, however, by 
how much group leader opinions where decisive here. Generally, a lively debate among res-
pondents preceded the final answering by a show of hands. In light of the one-voice pheno-
menon it is therefore hard to speak of independent and personal answers in the case of the 
group component. This adds to my earlier observation that here the unit of analysis was basi-
cally the group and not the individual participants. I tried to mitigate the one-voice phenome-
na by encouraging participants to speak their mind. In addition, I provided small candies as 
“rewards” for diverging answers (to the delight of the present children). However, the level of 
diverging answers turned out as low as observed above. As an alternative, for particularly 
crucial questions such as on product satisfaction, I used anonymous voting questions instead 
of open oral questions. For example, the participants were given voting cards indicating “I 
agree/yes”, “maybe/don’t know”, and “I disagree/no”. The women had to put their chosen 
answer card up-side down on the ground first, upon which I mixed and revealed the cards. 
This greatly reduced the amount of collective discussion and provided security that the indi-
vidual answers could not be associated with a particular respondent. However, even the re-
sponse pattern to such “action questions” still show 79 percent majority answers, 11 percent 
slightly diverging answers, and 10 percent strongly diverging answers (n=410 answers). It is 
noteworthy, however, that the one-voice phenomenon did not necessarily lead to positive an-
swers in the sense of “pleasing” the researchers. Measurement error is therefore given, but it 
does not imply a positive bias. Interestingly, there was a strong positive correlation of r=0.51 
between the average education level of the groups and the prevalence of diverging answers; in 
short, the higher the education the higher the tendency for speaking one’s mind.39
Despite these manifold measurement challenges, next to applying a single difference ap-
proach for the customer component, there are also other factors which mitigated or even re-
duced the extent of measurement error, namely (1) usage of intra-component and inter-
component control questions (triangulation), (2) the uniformity of research timing, and (3) 
 
                                                 
39 Like all correlations throughout this thesis, this correlation refers to the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient. Nota bene, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient only shows the degree of correlation 
between two variables, but it does not indicate any causality (Akkerboom 2008: 108-109). To establish causality, 
further (qualitative) analysis is needed. 
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research execution by a single researcher. Regarding the first factor, the usage of intra-
component and inter-component control questions, I have already referred to the use of trian-
gulation between different data sources. Such triangulation does not make measurement at the 
individual data sources more accurate, but it reduces the negative influence of erroneous mea-
surement on the validity of findings. In addition, I used several intra-component control ques-
tions to check on the consistency and consequently the validity of response patterns. For ex-
ample, in the ex-post customer component, five differently phrased and chronologically dis-
persed questions dealt with the issue of customer satisfaction. Regarding the second factor, 
the timing of the customer component, on average ex-ante and ex-post sessions were 12.1 
months apart. The shortest time-span was 10.7 months and the longest 14.9 months. Also the 
“semi-control groups” which were only carried out ex-post took place about one year after the 
introduction of Payung Keluarga at the respective MFIs. The length of “exposure” of the var-
ious respondents to Payung Keluarga was therefore more or less equal. Regarding the benefi-
ciary component, also here I tried to keep the recall period as uniform as possible: on average 
beneficiary interviews took place 83 days after death and 55 days after claim payment. How-
ever, variance is somewhat wider here. Standard deviation is 26 days. The “fastest” interview 
took place 12 days after claim payment, the “slowest” interview took place 128 days after 
claim payment. Lastly, the strongest advantage I can bank on is the fact that all research and 
data analysis was carried out by one single person. Despite all challenges, this at least ensures 
consistency in the tackling of such challenges, and promotes a congruent research approach 
and analysis. It especially prevents the difficulty which larger surveys face that are executed 
by a team of researchers, analysts and data collectors, namely that despite methodological 
rigor and carefully pre-tested questionnaires slight differences in research execution, and dif-
ferent ad hoc mitigation strategies to unexpected obstacles in the field tend to accumulate to 
sizable measurement errors. It is often stressed that the data collection teams of large scale 
surveys should be well trained and led by experienced researchers, precisely to prevent such 
accumulation of minuscule divergences into a large scale problem, and I strongly agree to that 
demand. Ideally, re-checks should be done on a selected number of respondents to verify the 
degree of data collection quality and measurement error. However, I still hold that even the 
most careful training, questionnaire design, pre-testing, and re-checking cannot eliminate all 
measurement error produced by different researchers faced with different respondents and 
different field conditions.  
(12) Statistical analysis: Despite a significant number of descriptive statistics and simple cal-
culations, my data analysis does not involve any advanced statistical analysis. At best, I have 
occasionally tried to test for correlations between certain variables, notably with leaving signi-
ficance testing aside. Mostly, however, these efforts proved futile due to the small sample 
sizes involved. The often observed phenomenon that different statistical methods applied to 
the same dataset can lead to diverging or even opposing results is therefore less likely in the 
present case (cf. section 3.2.6 and section 3.3.4). The difficulty lay clearly with data cleaning 
rather than with data analysis. 
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(13) Benchmarking: Because this study only focuses on the complex impact processes of a 
single product, the usual “apple to peaches” challenge that affects comparative analyses of 
insurance products and their impacts in different contexts does not apply.  
(14) Low claim frequency: For the beneficiary component, low claim frequency was a definite 
concern. As a mitigation strategy, I opted for a relatively large reference period of slightly 
more than two years (1 September 2006 - 30 September 2008). However, during that time 
only 64 claims occurred. Due to logistical constraints I only managed to interview 26 of the 
respective beneficiaries. For a representative analysis of how Payung Keluarga affects the 
post-mortem pattern of bereft Indonesian low-asset families this sample is admittedly too 
small. On the other hand, the sample is at least large enough so as not to be dismissed as pure-
ly anecdotal, especially from a qualitative “thick description” point of view. Once again, the 
compromise which I am suggesting is to take the resulting findings as “valid by tendency”. 
The low claim frequency also had an unexpected advantage: None of the ex-ante customer 
groups I met had experienced a claim themselves. At most 18 percent of the ex-post customer 
respondents had heard of a claim payment in their area. As claim experience usually increases 
product satisfaction (Cohen and Young 2007: 222), the low prevalence of such experience 
ensured that by and large I could assume ex-post customer satisfaction not to be heteroge-
neously and positively biased through claims. 
5.3.4  Research advantages 
There were not only many challenges to my research, but also a number of facilitating advan-
tages. First of all, Payung Keluarga was absolutely uniformly implemented across all MFI 
partners. Therefore, I did not need to worry about different “instances” of the product endo-
genously affecting my research. In addition, Payung Keluarga, in the original form which I 
surveyed, was a particularly simple product. Since the research context was already complex 
enough, I found it very helpful that at least the development intervention into this context was 
kept simple. In addition, I perceive my role as observing participant not only as a challenge to 
research neutrality and research objectivity (cf. section 5.1) but at the same time as a clear 
chance for gaining more in-depth and enlightening results, or in the words of Geertz, for a 
thicker description. Schröter (2000) rightly remarks that researchers (of ethnology) and the 
researched actors and informants all try to influence and construct the outcome of the re-
search, and that instead of artificially trying to uphold the illusion of distance, objectivity and 
neutrality, a pro-active and involved approach of the researcher can render meaningful, and 
scientifically relevant results, critical self-reflection and transparency provided. Following 
Schröter, I therefore hold that my in-depth involvement into the planning and execution of 
Payung Keluarga provided me with insights and in-depth knowledge of the inner workings of 
the product, and to some extent its context, which third-party researchers, even through a lon-
gitudinal approach, may not have noticed; and while claiming this, I am trying to live up to 
the necessary level of self-reflection and transparency. 
Lastly, another advantage was that, as mentioned, by and large insurance was not a sensitive 
issue for the respondents (cf. section 3.3.3). It was therefore easy to gain access to a consider-
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ably number of respondents and to openly discuss the matter with them. In addition, German 
born scholar Magnis-Suseno, who has decades of research and living experience in Indonesia 
and moreover referred to similar experiences made by Geertz in the 1950s, assured me that 
my role as a foreigner may have further promoted the general openness of respondents.40
 
 Ac-
cording to Magnis-Suseno, and according to many Indonesians I spoke to, Indonesians and 
Javanese in particular are constantly preoccupied with behaving along accepted social norms 
in order to avoid making a fool of themselves or their counterparts. Hefner (1998a: 23), and 
Forshee (2006: 44) also remark this preoccupation with face and etiquette. This constant 
preoccupation was often associated with the feeling of malu (awkwardness, shame). Indone-
sians try to avoid malu situations. When talking to foreigners, many of the deeply internalized 
social norms do not apply and Indonesians often speak more freely. However, situations 
where I was truly alone with my respondents were few and far between. So even if being a 
foreigner really helps in uncovering personal thoughts and preferences of respondents, this 
advantage is likely to have rather seldom played to my advantage. But even so, the un-
sensitivity of insurance as a matter of research definitely proved advantageous.  
5.4 Critical assessment of research methodology 
In many respects, my research methodology may appear unorthodox. Different from the cur-
rent quantitative-economic mainstream in microfinance research, I take a decidedly holistic 
and social perspective; I seek to understand the dynamics of impact processes rather than to 
exactly measure them, and in doing so I take a strongly localized approach. However, my 
research methodology is also not ethnological in the classical sense of long term residence in 
remote villages. In fact, I have tried to integrate the demands for representativeness posed by 
mainstream microfinance research with the strive for a deeper understanding of the underly-
ing complex impact mechanisms of Payung Keluarga. In effect, my approach was therefore 
originally planned as an integration of quantitative and qualitative measures. I had only de-
veloped a very rough problem statement and had not clearly operationalized my research hy-
potheses at the onset of my field work. Time and logistics for preparation and execution of my 
field work were severely constrained by and also contingent on my parallel work schedule for 
Allianz. Primarily for reasons of small and heterogeneous samples, lack of control groups, 
non-randomized respondent selection, and measurement error, eventually I cannot claim accu-
racy of data. However, what I indeed do claim for my data is a certain degree of representa-
tiveness and “validity by tendency”. In hindsight, this bestows my methodology with a qualit-
ative-explorative character somewhat removed from the intended integrated approach and 
even further removed from the “gold-standard experimental design evaluations” favored by 
World Bank development advocates such as Holzmann and Sipos (2008: 4). Table 10 pro-
vides an overview of the challenges, mitigation strategies and advantages related to my field 
                                                 
40 Interview with Professor Frans Magnis-Suseno, principal of Driyarkara University, in Jakarta on 26 March 
2008. 
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work. It is not entirely self-explanatory and heavily relies on the previous two sections. Table 
10 quickly shows that critically assessed data accuracy and robustness of my research suffered 
most, while the picture for validity and in part also for representativeness looks better.  
Table 10: Research challenges, mitigation strategies and research advantages 
# Research 
challenge / 
research 
advantage 
Specifications Mitigation Net effect on re-
search 
Challenges 
1 Neutrality 
and objec-
tivity 
- double role as "actor" and "re-
searcher" 
- high emotional attachment to object 
of research 
- indirect financing (of working time) 
by Allianz 
- perceived by respondents as Al-
lianz employee 
- presence of MFI staff during re-
search 
- no external pressure for legitimization 
- personal critical stance 
- independent research approach 
- transparent display of double role in thesis 
- trying to position myself as independent researcher 
to respondents (customers and beneficiaries) 
- single difference-method applied to level any bias 
- negative bias 
from strong 
double role miti-
gation 
- positive bias from 
Allianz-
association and 
MFI staff in-
volvement 
2 Research 
bias 
- non-randomized selection of res-
pondents 
- lack of control groups (customers 
and beneficiaries) 
- small sample sizes 
- selection criteria not always fol-
lowed by MFIs (customers and cre-
dit group leaders) 
- difficulty in reaching all beneficia-
ries 
- respondent selection by defined selection criteria 
- balanced snow-ball sampling (experts) 
- single difference approach to level any bias (cus-
tomers) 
- ex-post only "semi-control groups" (customers) 
- "imagined" counterfactual (beneficiaries) 
- striving for a balanced distribution of claim amounts 
(beneficiaries) 
- triangulation of data 
- reduced data 
accuracy 
- reduced repre-
sentativeness 
3 Poverty 
and Wel-
fare prox-
ies 
- no rigorous econometric evaluation 
of income and expenditures 
- no other clearly econometric pover-
ty proxies measured 
- subjective welfare indicators used 
(e.g. peace of mind) 
- apply expanded asset-capital framework 
- use loan sizes as proxy for (economic) asset levels 
- observation of living standard 
- focus on measurement of change, not absolute 
start and end values 
- triangulation of data 
- reduced data 
accuracy 
4 Causality 
and attri-
bution 
- non-insured participate in ex-post 
customer component 
- single difference method (customers) 
- check for possible exogenous factors (customers) 
- ex-post only "semi-control groups" (customers) 
- reduced data 
accuracy 
- reduced robust-
ness 
5 Fungibility 
and addi-
tionality 
- beneficiaries have received high 
payouts 
- short recall period (beneficiary) 
- "imagined" counterfactual (beneficiary) 
- analysis of the narrative of the claim stories (bene-
ficiary) 
- no effect 
6 Effects 
beyond the 
unit of 
analysis 
- no specific community related 
research 
- wider effects difficult to gauge 
- inquiry on community reaction (customers and 
beneficiaries) 
- inquiry with loan officers on overall effects 
- community wide 
effects possibly 
underrepresented 
7 Attrition 
and drop-
outs 
- extremely high attrition rate of 64% 
(customer component) 
- aim for high ex-ante sample size (customers) 
- inclusion of new ex-post "drop-ins" (customers) 
- reduced data 
accuracy (but no 
positive bias) 
- reduced repre-
sentativeness 
8 Differential 
impact by 
poverty 
level 
- could be due to different claim 
sizes and different asset levels 
(beneficiaries) 
- sample sizes too small to establish 
correlations with asset indicators 
(customers) 
- striving for a balanced distribution of claim amounts 
(beneficiaries) 
- well controlled for 
beneficiaries 
- insufficiently 
controlled for 
customers 
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9 Influence 
and dy-
namics of 
exogenous 
factors 
- sample sizes too small to establish 
correlations (customer component) 
- make this key concern of thesis 
- include a number of control variables (customers 
and beneficiaries) 
- check for possible exogenous factors (customers) 
- slightly reduced 
validity 
10 Question-
naire 
design 
- ambiguous questions 
- unnoticed variables and issues 
- largely oral questioning due to 
illiteracy 
- some groups needing more expla-
nation than others (customers) 
- unrecognized effect of in-session 
learning experience 
- (limited) pre-testing and peer-screening 
- maintaining constant phrasing of questions in (writ-
ten) master questionnaire 
- use same oral wording and same examples as 
consistently as possible 
- intra-component control questions 
- triangulation of data 
- reduced data 
accuracy 
- slightly reduced 
consistency 
- reduced sample 
sizes (in some 
cases) 
11 Measure-
ment error 
- heterogeneous mix of old and new, 
insured and uninsured respondents 
(customers) 
- no immediate insurance status 
verification possible (customers) 
- proxy respondents (customers) 
- fluctuation of respondents during 
sessions (customers) 
- noisy environment (customers) 
- one-voice phenomenon (custom-
ers) 
- oral questioning 
- subjective welfare indicators used 
(e.g. peace of mind) 
- single difference method (customers) 
- separate insured from non-insured through data 
analysis (customers) 
- ex-post only "semi-control groups" (customers) 
- consistent time span between ex-ante and ex-post 
sessions (customers) 
- use voting/action questions against one-voice 
phenomenon (customers) 
- use candies to incentivize diverging answers (cus-
tomers) 
- consistent recall period (beneficiaries) 
- research execution by a single researcher 
- reduced data 
accuracy (but not 
necessarily with 
positive bias) 
- reduced robust-
ness 
12 Statistical 
analysis 
- small sample sizes 
- insufficient data accuracy 
- stick to descriptive statistics 
- refrain from elaborate statistical analyses 
- no effect 
13 Ben-
chmarking 
- not applicable  - no effect 
14 Low claim 
frequency 
- few death claims (beneficiaries) - longitudinal research - reduced repre-
sentativeness (for 
beneficiary com-
ponent) 
15 Research 
experience 
& external 
review
- lack of previous personal research 
experience 
1 
- scarcity of proven methodologies 
for microinsurance impact research 
- do (limited) methodological peer discussion and 
pre-testing 
- reduced robust-
ness 
16 Time 
pressure
- precedence of business over re-
search 1 
- limited time for research prepara-
tion and execution 
- adapt methodology to be able to be carried out "on 
the job" 
- reduced robust-
ness 
- reduced consis-
tency 
Advantages 
1 Uniformity 
of product 
- same product configuration across 
all MFI partners 
 - increased ro-
bustness 
- increased validity 
2 Simplicity 
of product 
  - increased ro-
bustness 
- increased validity 
3 Research 
topic not 
sensitive 
- insurance topic was not perceived 
as "dangerous" or as a "taboo" by 
respondents 
 - increased data 
accuracy 
4 Broad 
insider 
knowledge 
- researcher brings in-depth know-
ledge of the researched subject to 
the research 
 - increased validity 
 1 This challenge was not listed separately in the relevant sections (3.2.6; 3.3.4; 5.3.3) but instead included in the explanation of 
other research challenges or the general discussion. 
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Of the six distinct research components which I employed, the customer component proved to 
be the most difficult, not the least because of the single difference approach and the group 
questioning technique that I employed here. Instead of using group questioning, individual 
customer interviews would have probably rendered less “noisy” results, and this benefit 
would have outweighed the corresponding smaller sample sizes. Yet, I have described the 
related challenges at some length as an example of “lessons learned the hard way”, even at the 
risk of somewhat discrediting my overall research methodology. However, the customer com-
ponent was only one of six research components. Execution of the other five components ran 
much smoother. In particular the data which I obtained from the beneficiary component are at 
least as important for my overall analysis as those from the customer component. Moreover, 
the triangulation of data obtained from the various sources combined with my insight know-
ledge of the Payung Keluarga project increases overall validity of findings. Representative-
ness and validity, however, only relates to the microinsured Payung Keluarga customers, in 
other words N = 71,899 insured microcredits during the reference period, and here especially 
to those petty trading Muslim ibu-ibu in urban and semi-urban areas around Jakarta. My find-
ings are not representative for low-asset customers in Indonesia in general. They are also not 
representative for other microinsurance products, although I hold that many of my observa-
tions are not confined to Payung Keluarga alone. I also hold that the difficulties and upheav-
als I faced in my field research are not unique to my own personal experience. I again wonder 
whether even so-called “gold standard” surveys are not beset by similar problems to some 
extent.  
By disclaiming my data as “valid by tendency”, the question arises whether to use any precise 
percentage figures at all in the presentation of my findings, knowing that these figures do not 
represent full objective accuracy, if this is possible in the first place. However, I have decided 
to do so nonetheless because I still hold the figures to be more informative and tangible than 
fuzzy classifiers such as “few”, “some” or “many”. Moreover, I hope to have sufficiently pro-
vided for transparency in the research process to enable the reader to make an informed per-
sonal assessment of my findings’ validity. I have also striven to present my research as suffi-
ciently neutral as not to be positively biased. It may even be somewhat negatively biased. 
Despite all methodological intricacies, I have to return to Geertz’ observation that he only 
started to make sense of the collected data during the data analysis phase, often by applying 
(and modifying) concepts developed by other scholars which fit the picture emerging from 
data and which enabled him to understand what was actually going on. The one major point 
which finally convinced me of the “utility” of my own data was the realization how well the 
concepts of embeddedness, moral economy, reciprocity, the traders’ dilemma and the ex-
panded asset-capital approach fit my own data. This good match, achieved after I had “dis-
covered” these concepts during the data analysis phase, verifies the value and depth of both 
these concepts and my data; much more so than if I had approached my field research “with 
well-formed ideas we carry off to distant places to check out by means of carefully codified 
procedures systematically applied”, to reprise the words of Geertz (2000: v).  
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6  KEY DATA FROM THE FIELD 
The previous chapter has concluded the preparatory discussion of theory, context and metho-
dology. This chapter in turn serves as a build-up for the presentation of my research findings 
in the following chapter. It presents key data from the field. First of all, table 11 presents ex-
ante customer component data on the risk perceptions of the prospective customers and their 
respective risk management methods (“What are your major daily worries and how do you 
deal with them?”). Second, table 12 displays the accumulated usage of the additional Payung 
Keluarga payouts by the 24 interviewed Muslim beneficiaries (“What did you do with the 
insurance money?”). After the two tables, the narrative of four exemplary claim stories is pro-
vided as recorded during the beneficiary interviews. 
This presentation of evidence from the field is decidedly descriptive. One purpose of this ex-
ercise is to lay open the most important raw data as unbiased as possible. Of course, even raw 
descriptive accounts already contain interpretation. They do not represent natural facts. And 
their selection is clearly non-randomized and in fact heavily biased. I have selected them (and 
ignored others) to serve as examples for certain points I want to highlight in the following 
discussion. Nonetheless, it should become apparent how little can be gained from the data 
without an explicit contextualized interpretation. This serves as a case in point for the second 
purpose of this exercise, namely to tangibly underline how important a detailed qualitative 
analysis is for a comprehensive understanding of the impact processes of microinsurance. 
 
6.1 Key tables: Risk perception, risk management and payout usage 
Column (C) of table 11 shows a weighted ranking of perceived risks in the respondents’ lives. 
This ranking was derived by first asking the participants of the ex-ante group questionings to 
give examples of major daily worries. These worries were therefore not pre-set, and the col-
lected ideas consequently differed by group. The collected ideas were written on cards which 
were put on the ground. Participants were then asked to simultaneously rank their top three 
risks by attaching post-it notes numbered “1”, “2”, and “3” to the respective cards. In the fol-
lowing weighing process each top-1 ranking was assigned three points, each top-2 ranking 
two points, and each top-3 ranking three points. Column (C) therefore displays the accumu-
lated points for each risk that was named by participants at least once. Column (D) displays 
how often these risks had actually happened to the respondents. Sample size is only n=63 be-
cause this was an open-ended qualitative question. The majority of respondents did not share 
their experiences, mostly because I could not take the time to ask every participant individual-
ly. Columns (E) and (F) show coping measures which the respondents had applied, roughly 
separated into high stress and low stress measures. Again, not all those who had recounted 
their experiences shared information on how they dealt with them, which further reduces 
sample size here. Notably, the recall period for columns (D), (E), and (F) was open-ended. 
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Table 11: Risk perception and risk management among ex-ante customer component 
participants 
A B C D E F 
# Risk 
Risk ranking 
by points 
(n=174 res-
pondents) 
Observed 
frequency 
(n=63 res-
pondents) 
Applied coping - High 
Stress 
(observed frequency) 
Applied coping - Low 
Stress 
(observed frequency) 
1 Educational ex-
penses 
248 6 Asset sale (5) Family assistance (1) 
Pawnshop (1) 
2 Severe illness 230 28 Asset sale (3) Family assistance (10) 
Savings (7) 
Free treatment (4) 
Family ROSCA (arisan) (1) 
Community assistance (1) 
3 Expensive social 
obligations 
62 2 Asset sale (2)   
4 Death  
(of family mem-
ber) 
56 17 1   Family assistance (6) 
Office loan (1) 
Family ROSCA (arisan) (1) 
Community assistance (1) Death  
(of spouse) 
6 Asset sale (1) 
Moneylender (1) 
5 Transportation 
accident 
42 5     
6 Bankruptcy 32 0     
7 Draught 22 5 Asset sale (5) Overdue credit (5) 
8 Old age 21 0     
9 Natural disaster 
(flood, earth-
quake) 
16 11 Asset sale (10) 
Moneylender (1) 
  
10 Fire 6 11 Asset sale (10) 
Moneylender (1) 
  
11 Theft 4 2   Family assistance (1) 
12 Lay-off  0 0     
1 
Table 12: Accumulated payout usage of 24 Muslim Payung Keluarga beneficiaries  
During risk perception measurement, no difference was made between death of spouse and death of other fami-
ly members. This difference only became salient during the risk management assessment. 
 US$ Frequency 
Rank by 
US$ Usage US$ % # % 
1 Funeral ceremonies (slametan etc.) 2,950 37% 18 37% 
2 Paying off other debt 1,630 21% 6 12% 
3 Business investment 1,110 14% 6 12% 
4 Savings / remaining money 900 11% 8 16% 
5 Medical costs 420 5% 1 2% 
6 Education 360 5% 5 10% 
7 Charity (amal) 300 4% 1 2% 
8 Others 150 2% 2 4% 
9 Living expenses 80 1% 1 2% 
10 Distributing to other family members 40 1% 1 2% 
Total 7,940 100% 49 100% 
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The information compiled in table 12 was derived by first asking the beneficiaries to recount 
their claim story. Later, I asked what the payout money had been used for, but without insist-
ing on definite amounts. Only in a third question did I ask the beneficiaries to name the spe-
cific amounts dedicated to the respective usages. These three distinct questions served (among 
other purposes) to check the consistency of the beneficiaries’ accounts, which was generally 
very good. Here, it was clearly advantageous that the recall period was relatively short. Be-
cause the two additional Christian claims which I surveyed show a decidedly different usage 
pattern from these 24 Muslim claims, and because by themselves they only make for anecdot-
al evidence, I exclude them from table 12 and the further discussion. However, I am sure that 
because of the generally strong influence of religion on the behavior of Indonesians, usage 
patterns would differ greatly if larger samples of Muslim and Non-Muslim beneficiaries could 
be compared.  
 
6.2 Four exemplary claims 
6.2.1  Claim 1: Ibu Zakiyah 
In October 2007, in East Jakarta 29-year old Zakiyah (see photo 50 on page 285) receives a 
Payung Keluarga payout of US$ 210, because her mother had died 29 days before. Zakiyah’s 
mother had taken out an automatically insured microcredit of US$ 105 from a local MFI part-
ner of Allianz in order to invest the funds into her small doughnut selling business. Zakiyah’s 
mother had suffered from diabetes. Eventually, the family couldn’t afford the necessary insu-
lin rations any longer. Zakiyah’s mother died from the ensuing health complications. The ap-
pointed beneficiary is actually Zakiyah’s father but because Zakiyah is generally handling 
family finances, he leaves her in charge of the insurance funds. First of all, Zakiyah uses US$ 
52 of the insurance funds for the funeral ceremonies of her mother, especially for the various 
slametan feasts held after death. Her neighbors, relatives and friends contribute an additional 
US$ 126 to these funeral ceremonies. From the remaining insurance funds, Zakiyah invests 
US$ 142 into her own small textile selling business. At the time of my visit, Zakiyah still 
keeps US$ 16 as emergency savings for a rainy day. Zakiyah says that it is perfectly legiti-
mate to invest the larger part of the payouts into her business. After all, she has to support a 
family of seven who share her small home. Moreover, she still has to pay for the education of 
her youngest brother. Zakiyah reports that now, after she has acquired a better stock of textiles 
from the insurance funds, she makes US$ 6.30 on an average day. Before, it was only US$ 
2.10. In effect, she has tripled her income. Zakiyah says that in combination with the income 
provided by her father, who works as a parking lot guard, and the occasional jobs of her sibl-
ings, the family is getting by well. Zakiyah asserts that the family has even more money at 
hand now than when her mother was still contributing to the family income. Zakiyah also 
notes that her home was flooded up to the roof during the severe flooding of February 2007. 
However, after a quick clean-up life continued as usual. Apart from income lost due to busi-
ness interruption, no major assets were lost. 
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6.2.2  Claim 2: Haji Mustani 
Haji Mustani (58) and his wife, Ibu Rohani (52) and some of their five children live in a two-
storied, relatively spacious and well-furnished home in the city of Tangerang. The house is 
conveniently located on a busy road. Its front yard hosts the garage business which is mostly 
run by Haji Mustani. His children occasionally help out as well. In addition, Haji Mustani has 
a side job as a driver. Sometimes, Ibu Rohani helps with the administration of the garage 
business, but she mainly works as a freelance aerobics trainer.  
In February 2008, Ibu Rohani falls sick and is diagnosed of cancer. Through his good connec-
tions Haji Mustani manages to obtain a GAKIN letter within a day, but the designated public 
cancer hospital has no appropriate third class rooms available for which the GAKIN letter 
would provide free coverage of room and board. Ibu Rohani therefore has to return home 
where she dies a few days later. Until then, medical costs have run up to US$ 631. To cover 
these expenses, Haji Mustani draws down some of his savings, receives considerable contri-
butions from his children and also uses the funds that visiting friends and relatives had do-
nated before death. On her death bed, Ibu Rohani asks her husband to take care of the out-
standing debt from a US$ 420 loan she had taken from a local MFI partner of Allianz. She 
does not know or has forgotten that her loan was credit life insured. Haji Mustani is therefore 
surprised when 15 days after his wife’s death he receives an insurance payout of US$ 840 and 
learns that the outstanding debt of his wife of a remaining US$ 158 has been paid by the in-
surance. At the time of claim payment, Haji Mustani has already collected US$ 368 in post-
mortem contributions (sumbangan) and has spent US$ 494 on the funeral ceremonies and 
slametan of the first seven days. Haji Mustani covers the shortfall between sumbangan and 
funeral spending by again drawing down more of his savings and asking his friends for addi-
tional support. Now, with the claim payment, his friends urge him to spend more on the fur-
ther slametan than Haji Mustani has originally intended. He describes the situation as follows:  
Of course I wanted to do a proper funeral for my wife, including the 40-day slametan as it is pre-
scribed by local tradition. I received lots of donations which were enough for the [festivities of the, 
M.H.] first seven days. For the 40-day slametan I didn’t want to spend as much as I actually did. 
My friends came and pressed me to spend even more, and so I spent more, but not as much as they 
recommended. . . . Yes, the pressure to spend a lot on the slametan is increasing. When I first 
moved to this area the situation was different. (Interview with Haji Mustani on 12 May 2008) 
Eventually, Haji Mustani spends US$ 262 of the insurance funds on the 40th day slametan for 
his wife, which increases his total funeral costs until this date to US$ 756. He uses US$ 420 
of the remaining insurance funds to open a food stall (warung) in front of his home (see photo 
52 on page 286). The warung is run by one of his previously unemployed sons and earns a 
discretionary profit of around US$ 1 to US$ 2 on an average day. Haji Mustani saves this ex-
tra money with a trustworthy neighbor. At the time of our interview, Haji Mustani still holds 
US$ 158 from the insurance payout. He plans to spend this money on the 100th day slametan 
of his wife. He says that by the time of the slametan for the first and second anniversary, he 
will probably have to rely on his own resources again, and those of his friends. The same 
holds true for the very last slametan, which is held 1000 days after death.  
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When I ask him where the huge insurance payout of US$ 840 was originating from as his wife 
has only paid US$ 2.52 in premium, Haji Mustani has no idea at first. Then he laughingly 
says: “Maybe from Allah the Almighty.” 
6.2.3  Claim 3: Pak Wahyu41
After the birth of her second child in 2006, Ibu Djunah (29) is diagnosed with diabetes. She 
lives with her husband, her two children, her grandmother, her brother-in-law and other rela-
tives in a small home in a kampung in Central Jakarta. Every time her husband, Pak Wahyu 
(35), receives his monthly salary as an office boy, he passes around US$ 63 to his wife to 
finance all domestic affairs. Ibu Djunah uses part of this money to buy insulin. She also uses 
part of her own income from a small textile selling business to finance medication. Unfortu-
nately, every month the insulin rations only last for about two to three weeks. In July 2008, 
Ibu Rahyu falls seriously ill and dies one day after being admitted to hospital, supposedly due 
to diabetic complications. In my interview, Pak Wahyu states that he does not know how 
much his wife used to spend on medication. He also does not know how much money his wife 
made from her textile business. He said that this was entirely her concern. Pak Wahyu also 
states that through his formal employment, his wife was co-insured with the public social in-
surance company JAMSOSTEK. Therefore, the insulin rations may have been subsidized or 
even provided for free. But the couple never investigated this option. However, due to his 
JAMSOSTEK coverage, Pak Wahyu did not need to pay for his wife’s second birth, and also 
not for her last hospital treatment, except for US$ 52 in administration fees and for medica-
tion. Pak Wahyu does not know whether JAMSOSTEK may eventually provide a death bene-
fit as well. 
 
After the death of his wife, Pak Wahyu receives US$ 84 as sumbangan from the kampung 
community. Because of his wife’s US$ 105 microcredit from a local MFI partner of Allianz, 
Pak Wahyu also receives a US$ 210 claim payout for Payung Keluarga. In total, he spends 
US$ 294 on all funeral activities up to the 40th day slametan. Next to the sumbangan and a 
further US$ 105 taken from the insurance funds, he covers the remaining balance through 
financial support from his closest relatives. He says that without the insurance payout, his 
family would have been happy to provide more support in order to guarantee the decent and 
proper execution of the necessary slametan. He also states that the provided family contribu-
tions are clearly marked as gifts. He will not have to repay them later on. At the time of our 
interview, Pak Wahyu therefore still holds US$ 105 from the insurance funds. He has already 
earmarked half of these remaining funds for the 100th day slametan. He plans to keep the oth-
er half as emergency savings.  
                                                 
41 As this beneficiary did not give permission for publishing his claim story, I have changed his name and that of 
his wife. 
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6.2.4  Claim 4: Lulu Setiawan 
In April 2008, 23-year old Lulu Setiawan (see photo 21 on page 278), a recently married but 
still childless factory worker who still lives with his parents in a suburb of Jakarta, receives a 
payout of US$ 631 from the Payung Keluarga insurance of his mother. The mother has died 
of breast cancer 15 days earlier. She was insured because she had taken out a loan from a lo-
cal MFI partner of Allianz in order to invest it in her own catering service. According to Lulu, 
this catering service mainly served as a past time because the income of his father was much 
higher and sufficient to maintain the entire family. First of all, Lulu uses US$ 50 of the payout 
to repay debts which his mother had with a number of acquaintances. Then he uses US$ 284 
for the funeral ceremonies of his mother to which his neighbors also contribute an additional 
US$ 105. Lulu states very clearly that without the insurance, he would have had to ask his 
friends and relatives for help. But in any case he would not have spent as much as now, with 
the insurance. Moreover, he would have repaid the outstanding debts of his mother in small 
installments. Lulu plans to donate the remaining insurance funds of US$ 287 as charity (am-
al). Lulu considers it inappropriate to keep this money a savings, or to invest it in some busi-
ness, or to use it for the needs of his own recently established family. He declares that the 
insurance funds belong to his mother and should be used for her good, not for the good of the 
living. He also states that he is not sure where the insurance money is stemming from, wheth-
er it is “good money” (uang jelas) or “bad money” (uang kurang jelas). Lulu therefore con-
siders a donation as the safest option that would benefit his mother in the afterlife.  
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7 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
If we consider the theoretical, developmental and broad practical embedding provided by the 
first chapters and the uncommented field evidence presented in the previous chapter, then a 
tension should have been created, an unresolved confrontation between “tools” and “subject” 
and this final discussion will aim to resolve this tension. It is the center piece of the thesis. 
First, I will discuss the profile of the customers in more detail, as well as their risk perception 
and risk management strategies. This will allow for a contextualized interpretation of the risk 
perceptions and risk management strategies depicted in table 11. Furthermore, I will analyze 
the impact of Payung Keluarga on customers. From there, the focus shifts to the beneficiaries 
and the interpretation of why a payout usage pattern as observed in table 12 has emerged. In 
this context, the slametan feast and its changing pattern in contemporary Indonesia play a 
crucial analytical and exemplifying role. During the discussion, a substantial amount of em-
pirical data from my field research is presented. In order to further underline and validate my 
findings, I also make frequent reference to related works, as well as to the thoughts and facts 
presented in the preceding chapters, especially to the theoretical concepts outlined in chapter 
2.  
 
7.1 Customer profile 
Some profiling information on Payung Keluarga customers has already been provided above, 
particularly in the discussion why the insured women seldom “make it big” (cf. section 3.2.7). 
This section reprises and further completes this picture. Table 13 presents key socio-
demographic and insurance information of the entire Payung Keluarga “population” (N) 
represented by the 71,889 insured loans during the reference period. This is matched with data 
from the surveyed customers and beneficiaries. This comparison allows for an assessment of 
how well the surveyed customers, and to a certain extent the surveyed beneficiaries, are repre-
sentative for the “normal” Payung Keluarga customer. Here, data accuracy is reasonably 
good because it is largely based on the quality controlled Payung Keluarga customer database 
(for N), and on the written demographic questionnaires used in the customer and beneficiary 
components. 
 
Looking at table 13, in terms of living surroundings the customer component matches the dis-
tribution of all customers (N) fairly closely. In fact, the high proportion of urban and semi-
urban customers reflects the rapid urbanization trend of the general Indonesian population (cf. 
table 4 in section 4.1). The surveyed beneficiaries, on the other hand, are overly concentrated 
in urban areas because most of them stem from DIMAN, the largest of the seven MFI partners 
which operates in urban and semi-urban areas around Jakarta, and which moreover has the 
longest time of program participation, and consequently more claims than other institutions. 
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Table 13: Socio-demographic and insurance information of customers and research par-
ticipants 
 All insured (N) Customer component1 Muslim beneficiaries 
Cases 71,889 313 24 
Living surroundings urban 43% 
semi-urban 42% 
rural 15% 
urban 49% 
semi-urban 37% 
rural 14% 
urban 62% 
semi-urban 38%  
rural 0% 
Female ratio 89%  83%  25% 
Average age 39.30²  38.73  40.67 
Marital status - single 5% 
married 86% 
widowed/divorced 9% 
single 13% 
married³ 83% 
widowed/divorced 4% 
Religion Muslim 83% 
Protestant 10% 
Catholic 5% 
Hindu 2% 
Muslim 55% 
Protestant 25% 
Catholic 8% 
Hindu 12% 
 Muslim 100% 
Avg. years of schooling -  8.94  9.05 
Estimated illiteracy rate - 10% 0% 
Employment status - informal 98% 
semi-formal 0% 
formal 2% 
informal 38% 
semi-formal 38% 
formal 24% 
Principal occupations - trading 50% 
farming 17% 
housewife 15% 
trading 29% 
office boy 8%  
construction worker 8% 
taxi driver 8% 
Estimated avg. income 
(US$/month) 
100 125 150 
Payung Keluarga cover-
age ratio (ex-post only) 
100% 80% - 
Average loan (US$) 134.75 177.604   - 
Average loan length 
(months) 
5.68 8.304  - 
Average premium (US$) 0.92 1.334  -  
1 Ex-ante (n=174) and ex-post participants (n=139) are summed up together. 62 repeat participants are therefore 
counted twice. This procedure recognizes a sizeable number of intermediate changes e.g. on age or occupation. 
² Age at loan disbursement. Note that the date of birth of MFI customers is often inaccurate. 
³ Includes spouse beneficiaries who became widowed because of a claim. 
4 Last loans of those ex-post participants who had taken a loan since the ex-ante survey. 
For the female ratio, matching between N and the surveyed customers is good. Regarding the 
beneficiaries it has already been mentioned that due to the high ratio of female insured, bene-
ficiaries were predominately male (husbands). Average age is very similar in all three catego-
ries. Although precise marital status data on N is missing, also here all three categories can be 
assumed to match well. After all, 80 percent of Payung Keluarga customers (n=17,019) chose 
their spouse as beneficiary, which means that minimum 80 percent of them were married (see 
table 25 in section 7.6). Regarding religion, the discrepancy between customer component and 
N is rather wide. I surveyed a larger portion of Protestant and Hindu customers than would be 
justified based on N, while the portion of surveyed Muslim respondents (55%) is much lower 
than in N (83%). The reason for this discrepancy are my research stints in Bali, Sumba and 
West-Timor where Hinduism and Christianity are more widespread than on Java, but where 
only a relatively small portion of the insured was actually located. The clear majority of in-
sured reside in the area around Jakarta. However, I do not hold this religious “mis-
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representation” to significantly influence my overall analysis because most of my other com-
ponents, especially the beneficiary component, put a counterbalancing emphasis on over-
whelmingly Muslim Java. For example, 100 percent of my relevant beneficiary sample was 
Muslim. Here, it is important to note that the dominant affiliation of Muslim insured and be-
neficiaries was with NU rather than with the modernist Muhammadiyah. Discerning such af-
filiation, however, is not always easy. Some decades ago, the confrontation between NU lean-
ing “traditionalists” and Muhammadiyah leaning “modernists” was creating severe social 
upheaval, as Geertz vividly reports from the 1950s (Geertz 2000: 153-169). Nowadays, Indo-
nesian Muslims are often reluctant to reveal their respective affiliation in order to preserve 
social harmony and avert the drawing of dividing lines. However, when I asked the Muslim 
customers, credit group leaders and beneficiaries what the dominant affiliation in their area 
was, the unanimous answer was always NU. Directly asked, eight beneficiaries admitted their 
NU affiliation. None declared to be close to Muhammadiyah. Three stated to be neutral. One 
neutral beneficiary was saying: “Yang penting Muslim” (“What is important is being Mus-
lim”). Except among the expert component I was not able to find one single declared Mu-
hammadiyah follower among all my respondents. The fact that all Muslim beneficiaries were 
performing the traditional slametan, which is of pre-Islamic origin and therefore denounced as 
un-Islamic by Muhammadiyah followers (cf. Geertz 1960: 139; cf. Van Bruinessen 1996: 
170-171; Forschee 2006: 37, 38), further indicates the strong dominance of an NU coded 
“frame of reference” among the Muslim insured. 
Regarding education, average years of schooling are about the same for surveyed customers 
(8.94) and beneficiaries (9.05), but the variance among customers was larger with at least 10 
percent illiteracy levels. I gauged illiteracy from the number of respondents who needed help 
with filling the demographic questionnaire. Yet, not all other respondents were automatically 
perfectly literate. A wide spectrum from almost illiterate to perfectly literate could be ob-
served. Understandably, comprehension of demanding texts like loan contracts or insurance 
policy wordings was beyond the capacity of the majority of customers. Their daily lives did 
not require and train such skills. Very telling are the differences in employment status be-
tween surveyed insured and beneficiaries. While the overwhelming majority of insured is ac-
tive in the informal sector (98%), only 38 percent of beneficiaries can be associated to this 
sector. Semi-formal and formal employment was much more dominant among beneficiaries. 
While informal work means work without any kind of working contract and institutional at-
tachment, semi-formal work refers to work without a fixed employment status but with at-
tachment to a larger company or organization, such as taxi-drivers leasing their taxis from a 
large taxi cooperative. Formal employment refers to employment under a formal employment 
contract. Visibly, the majority of insured women (and men) worked as petty traders, which is 
not surprising regarding the focus of the MFI partners. The portion of farmers (17%) is likely 
overrepresented compared to N due to relatively large group questionings with male farmers 
which I held in Bali and Sumba. Interesting is the high portion of housewives (15%) among 
the surveyed customers. Among female respondents alone, the portion increases to 16 percent. 
As mentioned above (cf. section 3.2.7), this may have to do with (1) the women simply re-
garding their domestic responsibility as their main occupation while regarding their petty 
business as a side activity, or with (2) the women passing on the loans to their husbands.  
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With respect to income, I can only make a rough guess. For the average insured I assume a 
monthly income of around US$ 100. This is congruent with estimates or empirical data from 
other sources on the same clientele (Heydel et al. 2009: x; MBK Ventura 2009: 19). Because 
the average loan sizes of the surveyed customers were significantly higher than average 
(which is mostly due to the higher loan levels in Bali and Eastern Indonesia), I also hold their 
average monthly incomes to be slightly higher at US$ 125. Beneficiaries were clearly earning 
more than the insured at around US$ 150. This can be at least partly explained by the higher 
formalization of their employment status. It should still be noted that although these income 
figures suggest a certain degree of income stability, incomes among the insured customers are 
exposed to a high degree of volatility. Volatility is highest among farmers, but also occurs 
with petty traders. 
Turning to the issues of migration and family structure, as noted the rapid urbanization of the 
Indonesian population in general is reflected by the insured MFI customers, many of whom 
are migrants or children of migrants When I asked MFI customers during the ex-ante custom-
er component whether they would define themselves as being from “this area” or as originat-
ing from a different area, overall 53 percent asserted a migratory background (n=172) (table 
14). 
Table 14: Migration among ex-ante customer component participants 
Question: Are you from this area? (n=172) 
Living surroundings  Migrants Non-Migrants 
# % # % 
Urban 73 87% 11 13% 
Semi-urban 18 29% 44 71% 
Rural 0 0% 26 100% 
Total 91 53% 81 47% 
 
Among urban respondents, the migratory rate was as high as 87 percent, while it was consi-
derably lower in semi-urban areas (29 percent). Rural areas saw no influx of migrants. Most 
migrants still had relatives living at their place of origin, or had family members who had mi-
grated to other areas. Especially among the urban migrants, inter-ethnic marriages were com-
mon, which through the addition of the often equally dispersed in-laws further expands the 
family network. Some respondents described their ethnic background as campur-campur (all 
mixed). For the surveyed customers and beneficiaries in Jakarta, which form the clear majori-
ty of all surveyed respondents, I therefore cannot depict them as clearly belonging to a Beta-
wi, Javanese or Sundanese cultural sphere. I rather prefer to neutrally speak of low-asset ur-
ban Indonesians. 
If ethnic and spatial family delineation is difficult for the surveyed customers, a related chal-
lenge is the investigation of familial power distributions and family structure. The emic un-
derstanding of family is flexibly scoped to include spouse, children, grand-parents, in-laws, 
closer and more distant relatives, and even neighbors and friends. Quite a number of informal 
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family rearrangements seem to be common, such as informal adoptions or the “passing on” of 
children to childless siblings. The phenomenon of proxy respondents in my field research 
shows that even the social boundary between the individual and the family are fluent. It is 
perfectly acceptable for a sibling or a spouse to take on the role of the respective individual in 
certain circumstances. Quite a number of authors writing on Indonesia have noted this fluidity 
of family structure (Alexander 1998: 215; Lont 2000: 162, 165; Witoelar 2005: 21; Newberry 
2007: 1314; Ford and Parker 2008: 4). It is this fluidity which lets me speak of (extended) 
families instead of the more econometric term of household (cf. chapter 1). Nonetheless, there 
seems to be a clear trend of an increased focus on the nuclear family whose size is moreover 
shrinking. This effect is especially pronounced among the middle class, where “Indonesia’s 
‘Great Transformation’” generally seems to be advancing fastest, but it is certainly also dis-
cernable among low-asset families (Alexander 1998: 214; Koning 2006: 30; Setiadi 2006: 
374). While some of the elder surveyed women still reported to have as many as 13 children, 
among the younger women below their forties, four children were already considered plenty. 
Within the nuclear family, formally speaking the father is the undisputed head of the family 
(kepala keluarga). He represents the family in public and in formal affairs, and he is expected 
to be the main breadwinner (cf. Setiadi 2006: 374). As noted above (cf. section 3.2.7), 81 per-
cent of married women in the ex-ante customer component declared that their husband was 
earning more than them (n=111), although this high figure may have to be discounted for an 
“expected answer” bias (cf. Lont 2000: 162). Among the generally more outspoken married 
female group leaders, the ratio of male main breadwinners was still 67 percent (n=24). How-
ever, group leaders can be considered especially successful with their businesses, which may 
close the income gap to their husbands. In any case, on average men are doubtlessly earning 
considerably more than their wives. The key role of women is rather related to the domestic 
sphere, the maintenance of the social network within the kampung and also the financial man-
agement of the family, where some petty trading commercial activity to gain supportive in-
come is perfectly acceptable or even necessary, at least among very low-asset families (Papa-
nek and Schwede 1988; Setiadi 2006: 374; Newberry 2007: 1315). Despite the strong finan-
cial and public role of the husband, power differentials among Indonesian families are not 
clear cut. Alexander (1998: 212) notes the absence of clearly demarcated lines of power and 
the emphasis on individual autonomy. She adds that moreover gender differences are not 
strongly marked, and that power is not identified with economic control. It has already been 
noted that generally in low-asset families it is the women who manage family finances (cf. 
section 3.2.7), although Lont (2000: 163) remarks that the family budget in fact consist of 
several budgets such as a budget for shopping money as well as separate accounts for wife, 
husband and children. He adds that especially in decisions on major expenditures the husband 
has an important say as well. Magnis-Suseno on the other hand contends that it is clearly the 
women who hold executive power, at least in Javanese families, while husbands are confined 
or confine themselves to public representative duties.42
                                                 
42 Interview with Professor Frans Magnis-Suseno, principal of Driyarkara University, in Jakarta on 26 March 
2008. 
 When I asked the credit group leaders 
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who was responsible for taking financial decisions in their families the unanimous answer was 
that it was them. Some, but certainly not all, noted that in certain cases they would consult 
their husband. The narratives of sample claim 1 and sample claim 3 provide additional evi-
dence that women are responsible for at least a good deal of money management and moreo-
ver often keep their own income to themselves. In short, my empirical evidence supports most 
authors’ claims of a very high level of financial decision making power of women among the 
insured customers. In addition, in line with findings from Papanek and Schwede (1988: 88), 
the credit group leaders and loan officers generally considered the husbands as supportive of 
their wives income seeking activities, provided that their domestic duties were not neglected. 
It should be restated, however, that both husband and wife need to agree to the loan applica-
tion. This presupposes a supportive attitude by the husband and eliminates those cases where 
husbands might be less supportive. Both, credit group leaders and loan officers, stated that in 
the majority of cases it would not lead to tensions if the wife was earning more than the hus-
band. Yet, some credit group leaders were quick to add that the formal position of the hus-
band as the head of the family needed to be respected at all times. Thus, as often in Indone-
sian society, with regards to familial power distribution, outward appearance and inner work-
ings are markedly different. 
It has already been noted that despite the wide and fluid family conception, the lack of clear 
lines of authority and an emphasis on individual autonomy hinders the women to appropriate 
familial labor “for free” for their micro-businesses (cf. section 3.2.7). Yet, in times of crisis 
the ability of families to mobilize astonishing resources from their social network has struck 
me time and time again. As Setiadi (2006: 375) notes, in times of crisis the extended family 
and especially the closer kin are expected to assist in kind and money. This obligation is 
stronger the closer the degree of relation and spatial proximity. These kinship liabilities ex-
tend well beyond the usual life cycle events such as birth, marriage, and death, although here 
they are most institutionalized. They also include shocks like illness, natural disaster and even 
social threats like the non-payment of debt of other family members which are ultimately con-
sidered as a collective family responsibility (Haar 1948: 136; Setiadi 2006: 375). A good em-
pirical example for the resourcefulness of low-asset families in times of need are the severe 
medical costs that frequently preceded Payung Keluarga claims. 15 of the 24 Muslim death 
claims (63%) occurred after preceding costly medical treatment of minimum US$ 105. In 
only five of these 15 expensive cases did social protection provide some cost coverage (1x 
ASKESKIN, 3x GAKIN, 1x JAMSOSTEK), for example in the case of claim 3 where JAM-
SOSTEK covered most hospital costs for Pak Wahyu’s wife. In only one of these latter five 
cases all costs were covered by social protection. On average, the families of the 15 expensive 
medical cases still had to cover US$ 649 by themselves. The medical costs preceding death 
were therefore significantly higher than the average funeral costs of US$ 375. For example, 
Haji Mustani of sample claim 2 had to mobilize US$ 631 for his wife’s medical treatment 
from his savings, family and friends. Unfortunately, as in Haji Mustani’s case, even the mobi-
lization of significant funds was sometimes not enough to cover all required medical treat-
ment. Eventually, Haji Mustani could not afford to put his wife in a first class hospital room 
which would have been the only class available, and had to take her home to die. In three 
more of the surveyed claim cases, fund mobilization either took too long or was not attempted 
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at all (out of fear of prohibitively high treatment costs) which greatly diminished survival 
chances for the insured. Again, my point here is that the resource mobilization capacity of 
low-asset families through their social network should not be underestimated. On the other 
hand, it is not always sufficient to meet the financial needs at hand. In a quantitative panel 
study of private health financing in Indonesia, Gertler and Gruber (2002: 67) reach similar 
conclusions. 
In many ways, the spatial extension of family networks through migration and inter-ethnic 
marriages has positive influences on the resource raising capacity of families in times of need. 
Witoelar (2005: 2), and Hüsken and Koning (2006: 19) both voice the hypothesis that remit-
tances and emergency transfer from remote family members may assist Indonesian families in 
managing shocks. And indeed, of those ex-ante customer respondents who reported to have 
family members living far away (n=78), 72 percent stated that they could expect emergency 
assistance from these kin (see table 15). Regular remittances, on the other hand, were much 
fewer in number. Only eight percent of those with remote family members stated to receive 
regular remittances, while on the other hand eleven percent stated to be sending regular remit-
tances to their distant relatives. The latter was especially prevalent among Muslim respon-
dents in Bali who had migrated from Central and East Java and whose asset situation was 
apparently better than that of their remote kin. Surprisingly, despite the large number of Indo-
nesian overseas workers, I found no examples of family members having gone abroad among 
the customer component and Muslim beneficiaries. 
Table 15: Remittances among ex-ante customer component participants 
  
# 
% of respondents with far 
away relatives 
(more than half day travel) 
(n=78) 
% of total respondents  
(n=158) 
Receiving regular remittances 6 8% 4% 
Sending regular remittances 18 23% 11% 
Expecting emergency remittances 56 72% 35% 
 
Access to emergency remittances certainly helps to balance the observed loosening and more 
exclusivist character of communal mutual assistance networks, especially in those rural areas 
which the migrants have left (cf. Miguel et al. 2002; cf. Hüsken and Koning 2006; cf. Koning 
2006). As migration geographically spreads accessible resources, it improves the protection 
against covariant shocks, something where communal mutual assistance networks have been 
noted to have their weak spot (cf. section 3.3.3). In addition, migration and the resulting ur-
ban-rural dependencies further undermine the image of the autonomous rural village commu-
nity which a number of authors have rightly identified as outdated, if such autonomy ever 
existed in the first place (Geertz 1962: 245; Koning 2006: 39; Newberry 2007: 1303).  
One question closely related to the resourcefulness of their social network is the question 
whether the microinsured customers can be considered low-asset or ‘poor’. I have already 
outlined that the conception of poverty is socially constructed and context related (cf. section 
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2.1). I have also outlined that poverty is multidimensional, multi-asset, and that I did not do 
an absolute and holistic poverty assessment. My approach is rather to measure relative 
changes in certain types of assets and thereby induce the social impact of microinsurance. 
Despite this somewhat blurry and relative approach to poverty analysis of the insured, there 
are manifold indications that the insured cannot be considered very low-asset. Indeed, they 
were a far cry from any possible notion of destitution, hunger, and undernourishment. First of 
all, the women’s estimated personal average income of US$ 100 per month was well above 
the national urban poverty line which stood at IDR 204,896 or US$ 21.55 per capita per 
month in 2008 (cf. BPS 2009). I take the urban poverty line here, because firstly it is higher 
than the overall or rural poverty lines, that is, it is the most conservative value, and secondly 
because most insured lived in urban and semi-urban surroundings. Including the husband’s 
(higher) income and assuming minor contributions from grand-parents, grown up children and 
other transfers, it is fair to assume an average monthly family income of around US$ 250. 
Conservatively assuming six nuclear family members, this still makes US$ 41.67 per month 
per capita, or about twice the national urban poverty line. It is also well above the new inter-
national US$ 1.25 PPP per capita per day poverty line (cf. section 2.1). Naturally, incomes 
and expenditures among the low-asset insured are volatile. Moreover, many customers earn 
less than the average so it is safe to assume some vulnerability to or realization of transient 
income or expenditure poverty among the insured customers. However, Morduch and Armen-
dariz (2005: 160) rightly remark that even most families “below the poverty line are in truth 
fairly far from the brink of subsistence.” Also visibly speaking, the physical asset situation of 
the families was not destitute. TV sets, refrigerators, motor cycles, quality furniture and de-
cent clothes were standard items in the homes where I conducted my field work. Regarding 
social assets I have just mentioned the astounding resource raising capacity through extended 
social networks. Another, slightly more formal indicator for social assets is the high preva-
lence of membership in groups like arisan, which literally means “cooperative endeavor” or 
“mutual help” and by and large represents an informal rotating savings and credit association 
(ROSCA) (Geertz 1962: 243). The majority of customer component respondents were moreo-
ver members of other non-familial groups such as Muslim prayer groups (pengajian) or 
Church-based groups. 58 percent (n=165) stated to be members of at least one arisan, espe-
cially female urban respondents. Among the respondents of the credit group leader compo-
nent, even 94 percent (n=29) were currently active in at least one arisan. Some were active in 
as many as four arisan at the same time, and the average was 1.69 arisan memberships. Time 
and time again, the high prevalence of arisan among low-asset kampung dwellers, especially 
among women, and in Indonesian society in general has been affirmed by other authors as 
well (Geertz 1962; Papanek and Schwede 1988: 191-192; Lont 2000: 161; Koning 2006: 45; 
Heydel et al. 2009). These authors also note the double function of arisan as social integrators 
and as economic savings (and credit) vehicles. Lont (2000: 161) notes that many RT (in Yo-
gaykarta) have installed compulsory arisan, an arrangement which I also encountered in sev-
eral kampung around Jakarta. Lastly, the high level of autonomy and power of low-asset ibu-
ibu within their family networks serves as a clear asset to them. Regarding peace of mind and 
“happiness”, I was impressed by the positive and merry atmosphere during my group ses-
sions. Even more so then the participating men, the women were often joking and laughing. 
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The women certainly complained that making ends meet was difficult, but they went about it 
rather pragmatically. I did not gain the impression that they were facing life with a gloomy 
and dismal outlook. A last and particularly strong indicator that the insured were not of a very 
low asset base was their emic social positioning. In the group leader component, respondents 
mostly classified themselves and their fellow group members as middle class (ekonomi me-
nengah). Only some women spoke of being lower middle class (ekonomi menengah ke ba-
wah), and very few women saw themselves at a low socio-economic level (ekonomi lemah; 
rakyat kecil). However, all women were very clear about not being “poor” (miskin). They 
unanimously defined being poor as not having enough to eat, something that they declared not 
to worry about. A local Muslim religious teacher (ustaj), whom I interviewed, confirmed the 
colloquial definition of poor (miskin) as people who earn less per day than their necessary 
food expenditure.43
To summarize the profiling of the surveyed Payung Keluarga customers, my survey and the 
resulting findings are most representative for urban and semi-urban married female petty trad-
ers of Muslim religion with a clear NU affiliation and of often migratory and mixed ethnic 
 He further specified that colloquially speaking being destitute (faqir) 
means earning less than half of what is needed for food per day. Hence, in terms of asset as-
sessment the emic perspective of the respondents is much in line with my own assessment. 
The insured definitely did not belong to the ‘poorest of the poor’. On the contrary, I hold the 
average Payung Keluarga customer to be at the upper end of what can be considered the low-
asset strata of society. This finding matches well with the earlier discussion on the motivation 
of the microinsured women to take out microcredits from their MFIs (cf. section 3.2.7). For 
reasons of their relatively stable socio-economic standing, the preservation and maintenance 
of family subsistence is certainly not the undisputed primary motivation for women to bor-
row. Motivations such as (financial) independence, pursuit of a meaningful and enjoyable 
pastime, as well as borrowing on behalf of the husband do play a role as well. And as noted 
before, the aspiration to become particularly rich is also not particularly present among the 
women, presumably because of a lack of structural and social perspective, as well as due to 
contentment with the initial economic gains derived from microcredit. I recall here that the 
bounds of the moral economy and the resulting traders’ dilemma are still very much discerna-
ble among the surveyed petty traders. The noted informal character of the women’s petty 
businesses is therefore not only attributable to a lack of entrepreneurial skills and lack of al-
ternatives, but also to a more or less actively pursued socio-economic strategy. Informal sin-
gle-employee micro-businesses are extremely flexible. They can be established and stopped 
as needed. They can be pursued part-time and close to home. In fact, most women I met only 
worked part-time, preferably in the morning (I adapted to this by trying to arrange my group 
sessions for the afternoon). Their businesses allow the women to keep their accounts separate 
from their husbands and use their proceeds as needed for personal and family purposes (cf. 
Papanek and Schweder 1988; cf. Lont 2000). Sample claim 3 palpably illustrates how Pak 
Wahyu had no idea of how much his wife had been earning. This reflects feedback from other 
male beneficiaries.  
                                                 
43 Interview with Ustaj Nurjamil of Yayasan Miftahul Ulan, in Jakarta on 18 October 2008. 
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background. Considered from various asset perspectives the women belong to the upper eche-
lons of the low-asset population and are generally reasonably educated, although cases of illi-
teracy are still noticeable. Within their families, the women enjoy considerable autonomy and 
wield significant socio-economic power, although the husband remains the formal head of the 
family and main breadwinner. The women pursue their petty trades for a variety of reasons, 
and by and large provide supportive income for the family’s shopping budget and for the 
women’s own separate accounts. The women are closely integrated into their respective 
communities and into an extended social network of kin which is often geographically spread. 
In times of need, the women can raise a considerable amount of resources through their com-
munity and extended social network.  
 
7.2 Risk perception 
In general, risk perception of low-asset people in Indonesia seems to be very much related to 
the notion of limited material and immaterial resources discussed in section 2.1 and section 
2.2.2. Just as personal fortunes, such as rezeki, are regarded as bringing misfortune to other 
community members and are exogenously explained, so the occurrence of shocks is generally 
exogenously explained and to a large extent managed through networks of balanced reciproci-
ty. Also the disconnection between input and output seems to play a role here. Bad luck and 
disaster are not necessarily directly connected to preceding misbehavior of the affected indi-
vidual, but exogenously explained and linked to the interference of spiritual powers. Although 
Platteau (1997) is not focusing on Indonesia in particular, his respective comments summarize 
the perceived exogenous nature of risk well:  
It must be borne in mind that in traditional egalitarian rural societies, as we know from the pio-
neering work of Evans-Pritchard, prolonged luckiness or repeated ill-luck inevitably arouses sus-
picions of supernatural manipulation through witchcraft practices. As a matter of fact, villagers 
just do not believe in accidents and they do not easily admit the idea of coincidence. This is why, 
when (repeated) accidents occur, witchcraft (the sending of evil spirits) is summoned to explain 
the inexplicable. In the same way as failure is thus traced back to the works of evil spirits, (conti-
nuous) success is never ascribed to the personal efforts or just the luck of the successful person. 
(Platteau 1997: 768) 
Along similar lines, Forshee (2006) argues with particular respect to Indonesia: 
People more often than not explain misfortune as supernaturally caused, in response to human 
misdeeds, bad faith, or community failures to carry out proper ceremonies - all provoking an up-
setting of social and cosmological balance. (Forshee 2006: 39) 
Of course, the microinsured low-asset customers in Indonesia are no longer living in tradi-
tional egalitarian rural societies, but often live in heavily urbanized and socially heterogene-
ous surroundings. But as much as I hold that the moral economy nevertheless still holds con-
siderably clout among the insured, so I also hold that the connected notion of exogenous risks 
is sill exerting its influence on risk perception and risk management. Why so? On a theoretical 
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level, it appears logic that the most fundamental cultural notions such as the perception on the 
origin of risk (and the principal reaction to it in form of balanced reciprocity risk sharing) are 
slowest to change in a transformational setting. However, also on an empirical level there are 
strong indicators for such trans-continuity. A prime empirical example is death risk. Unanim-
ously, my respondents expressed their strong conviction that the moment of birth and death, 
that is one’s lifespan (ajal), are decided by God.44 Sometimes even the preceding illness and 
the eventual death were not seen as a logical chain of events. This is much in line with similar 
observations by Geertz’ from the 1950s (Geertz 1960: 74-75; cf. Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 50). 
Moreover, death is perceived as a collective risk concerning the entire community. The death 
of a community member threatens the balance and harmony (rukun) of the entire community. 
If death is not dealt with as properly and ritually cleanly as possible, the bereft family as well 
as the surrounding community may risk future misfortune. The still strong-going death slame-
tan feasts which involve the entire community, even in urban areas, are a clear indication of 
this continuing collectiveness and exogeneity of death risk. Schröter (2000) provides a similar 
recent example from the Christianized Sara Langa in Flores. Also with other collective, or so 
to say socially constructed covariant risks such as natural disasters, the exogeneity and out-
right transcendence of their origin seems to be deeply imbued in the conscience of low-asset 
Indonesians. Heydel et al. (2009: 49), for example, report that among low-asset residents of 
Padang, West Sumatra, earthquakes were perceived as being sent from Heaven and that con-
sequently praying was an appropriate risk management strategy.45
                                                 
44 Although none of the respondents referred to the Qu’ran or a Hadith to underline this stance, Sura 3, 139 clear-
ly supports it: “It is not given to any soul to die, save by the leave of God, at an appointed time” (translation by 
Arberry 2008). 
 In fact, this resounds simi-
lar observations made by Young et al. (2006: 9) in Uganda, and thereby once again indicate 
that such patterns of risk perception are not unique to Indonesia (cf. section 3.3.4). Under 
these conditions, it is comprehensible that the idea of individualized insurance against divine-
ly influenced and collective risks causes a fair amount of initial consternation. Similar to the 
findings of SyncConsult (2006: 21) in Ghana, I met quite a number of respondents who were 
suspicious of life insurance as interfering with divine will. It was feared that it may attract bad 
luck and premature death. I often experienced that dwelling too much on the issue of death in 
the socialization of life insurance caused listeners to grow restless and exclaiming safety-
phrases such as “God behold that this does not happen.” I therefore did not find the same non-
chalance in face of death which Geertz (1960: 74) has reported on. Indeed, I came to call this 
wide-spread phenomenon takut cepat mati (fear of dying prematurely). I will deal more close-
ly with it in section 7.4.2. However, depicting risk perception as something outright exogenei-
ty-oriented and fatalistic is too restricted. The picture is more complex. First of all, collective 
arrangements like the rotating communal pattern of the slametan are very practical collective 
risk management arrangements. As mentioned, the entire traditional social structure of tradi-
tional agrarian societies can be perceived as being geared towards collective risk management 
(cf. section 2.2.2). So it is not that low-asset Indonesians had not done anything about the 
45 I have enriched the published quote with information derived from personal communication with the study’s 
authors. 
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risks they are facing. Quite the opposite is the case! Nonetheless, the general focus is that col-
lective risks need to be collectively managed. The idea of individual risk management for 
collective risks, or for any kind of risk, by way of insurance is (still) not as well perceived 
among low-asset Indonesians as it is in today’s industrialized societies. Low-asset Indone-
sians do not approach the matter of risk with a similar secularized means-end rationality as 
Westerners. Of course, the accumulation of livestock and gold as safety cushions are well 
known traditional individualized risk management strategies. But as noted, the moral econo-
my puts certain limits to the socially accepted accumulation of material assets. It should also 
be noted, that the perception of risk varies by the nature of the risk. Illness, for example, is 
regarded as a more private affair than death (cf. Van der Linden 1996: 16). Here, taking medi-
cation as a counter-measure to illness is of course allowed; and not surprisingly, the collection 
of community donations for medical treatment is less institutionalized than in case of death. 
With illness, the financing responsibility rests much more with the closer family. In conse-
quence, personal health insurance does not meet the same superstitions of bringing bad luck 
as life insurance. The matter of education costs is a similar example. When I asked the credit 
group leaders in which case they received most donations, the unanimous ranking was death 
as number one, illness as second, and education costs as a distant third. To a Western observer 
it may appear somewhat strange that donations are highest when it is already too late to save a 
life. However, seen from the perspective that death is perceived as posing a greater risk to the 
community and its future welfare than an individual illness, then this pattern becomes reason-
able in the local context. It should also be added that high costs for medical treatment and 
education are relatively modern phenomena to which traditional risk management strategies 
have had no time to adapt yet. While death and flooding, for example, have been ever-
recurring events to which communities have adapted well and even created their own spiritua-
lized “frame of reference”, this is not the case with medical costs and education. This at least 
partly explains why these two modern risks clearly come out on top as the two major daily 
worries of Indonesian low-asset families, far ahead of any other type of risk (see table 6.1). 
After all, I found the insured women to be quite pragmatic in their approach to risk manage-
ment. On a practical level, those risks which occur most frequently and which people are least 
prepared to cope with become those which are perceived as the most salient daily worries. 
This realization is not new. It has been generally noted by Brown and Churchill (1999) and 
with particular regards to Indonesia by McCord et al. (2006: iv).  
In summary, risk perception among low-asset Indonesian’s is influenced by traditional con-
cepts of risks as an exogenous force. This is especially valid for risks which are perceived as 
being collective, including death, and which have been an element of societies for ages. Here, 
the idea of individual protection through insurance is met with a fair degree of consternation. 
For more individual and modern risks such as health and education costs the situation looks 
different. Here, pragmatic new solutions such as insurance are welcomed by low-asset fami-
lies. But even then, it should not be forgotten that the frame of reference for risk management 
is still heavily influenced by the notion of balanced reciprocity, quid pro quo mechanisms.  
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7.3 Risk management 
7.3.1 Evidence from the ex-ante customer component 
Here, I mainly refer to table 11 which displays the risk perception and risk management strat-
egies of ex-ante customer component respondents. As mentioned, the applied risk manage-
ment strategies in table 11 are hardly representative and only valid by tendency. Interestingly, 
previous research has rendered very similar results in terms of risk prioritization (Lont 2000: 
166; McCord et al. 2006: 26), and in terms of applied risk management strategies (McCord et 
al. 2006; Heydel et al. 2009). However, these previous efforts have not tried as much as I do 
here to quantify and match risk perception with respective risk management strategies. What 
is more, with the exception of Lont’s ethnographic material, the underlying social structures 
and norms have previously garnered little attention.  
According to table 11, education costs came out as the top challenge, closely followed by 
costs for severe illness. Education costs were quite often met with the high stress coping strat-
egy of selling assets. Surprisingly, no savings depletion was reported. According to the tenta-
tive figures, family assistance and pawning assets with the nationwide government-owned 
pawnshop monopoly Pegadaian only played a minor role in covering education costs. Howev-
er, from informal comments during my time in Indonesia I learned that pawning is quite fre-
quently used to cover education expenses (cf. Yuliandini 2006), and that also the close family 
is often called upon to help out with education expenses. Older siblings in particular who are 
already working as well as wealthier relatives are expected to assist. One clear difficulty here 
is that education costs affect families (and the community) at the same time, namely twice a 
year at the commencement of the semester and particularly when enrollment into the next 
level of schooling is due (cf. Heydel et al. 2009: 46). When everyone faces the same difficulty 
at the same time, the scope for mutual assistance is severely limited. In recent years the gov-
ernment has intensified its efforts to provide free primary education and sometimes even free 
secondary education up to junior high school. I found that in Eastern Indonesia, respondents 
reported that primary education was indeed often free of charge, including for private schools, 
while around Jakarta, free education still seemed to be largely elusive; and even where prima-
ry education was free of charge, costs for books, uniforms, daily transportation and informal 
fees still accrued to significant amounts. Moreover, starting from senior high school onwards 
no more free education is provided, while many of the married women I spoke to had children 
of junior and senior high school age.  
In any case, what is definitely not forthcoming is collective community assistance in order to 
cover education costs. One reason for this has already mentioned above: education costs are a 
modern phenomenon. However, a more fundamental reason seems to be that education costs 
are perceived as an individual risk and successful education as a major vehicle of individual 
upward social mobility. Bourdieu (1986) has identified education as a prime example of dis-
crete symbolic capital accumulation (in its sub-form of cultural capital), and thereby as an 
attractive alternative to the often socially denounced accumulation of economic capital (cf. 
Schröter 2000: 36). In short, in embedded moral societies, education threatens social equality 
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and arrangements of balanced reciprocity. In consequence, the community as a whole sees 
little reason to support the education of certain individual members, while the nuclear family 
does in fact gain definite advantages from it. Thus, next to the lack of communal support for 
education costs, a closely related motivation for education coming out on top of the priority 
lists of low-asset Indonesians is that education still represents the most accepted form of capi-
tal accumulation within the present social structure. This may also explain why severe illness, 
which internationally usually ranks at top position (Roth et. al 2007: 8-9), only came out 
second in my survey of risk priorities despite the fact that its occurrence was reported more 
often by respondents (28x) than difficulties in covering education costs (6x). The effective 
dealing with health risks may maintain the status quo, but unlike education it offers little op-
portunity for social advancement. Here, it has to be noted that the risk of severe illness is two-
fold. It consists of the medical treatment costs, but also of foregone income of the sick person 
and those family members attending to the sick person’s care, most often women.  
According to table 11, the risk management strategies for health risks are most diverse. Asset 
sales seem to be sometimes applied, but the brunt of financing comes from family assistance 
and the depletion of savings. Besides, it is here that social protection shows its biggest impact. 
Four respondents reported to have been assisted during previous health crisis by social securi-
ty programs like GAKIN or ASKESKIN. It is also interesting that arisan were used at least 
once to cover health costs. Although I did not investigate this particular case further, the ari-
san assistance may have occurred in three ways: (1) The respective arisan participant may 
have had the luck that by coincidence it was her turn to draw the arisan kitty at the time of 
need. (2) She may also have asked her fellow members to assign the pending kitty to her due 
to the emergency situation at hand. Geertz (1962: 247) and Heydel et al. (2009: 46) mention 
that this is possible in certain arisan arrangements. (3) The arisan may contain a social fund 
from the start, which the participants may have granted to the family in need. Lont (2000: 
160) observes that arisan often reserve some of the regular contributions for social purposes 
instead of allotting all funds to the kitty. I found this to hold especially true in case of one 
arisan ibu-ibu I learned about during one credit group leader session: Here, approximately 
hundred women pay monthly contributions of IDR 25,000 (US$ 2.62). For the accumulated 
monthly kitty of roughly US$ 262, three winners were drawn who receive US$ 58 each (and 
who become ineligible for the draws of the following months). The remaining balance of US$ 
88 is assigned to consumption during the group meetings (konsumsi), to operational costs (kas 
operasional), and lastly to the alluded social fund. This sums up to an overhead of roughly 34 
percent of the paid in amounts, which illustrates how important the social function of arisan 
still is vis-à-vis its economic savings function for the low-asset women. In fact, economically 
the women are incurring heavy losses on this arrangement in form of negative interest. A 
completely different arisan arrangement is described by McCord et al. (2006: 10-11, 83). For 
this particular family arisan, all contributions go to a social fund which provides a precisely 
defined risk coverage. No kitty is built up and distributed. In addition, richer family members 
pay higher contribution than others. These various examples serve to illustrate the wide varie-
ty of arisan arrangements. The impression gained from the literature indicates that the higher 
the regular arisan contributions, that is the wealthier the arisan members, the more the eco-
nomic motive of arisan as a convenient savings vehicle comes to the fore (Geertz 1962: 246; 
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Papanek and Schwede 1988: 93; Koning 2006: 46). An additional point on arisan is that the 
rotating lump sum payouts which the arisan generally provide to their members are mainly 
used for consumptive purposes (Geertz 1962: 247; Papanek and Schwede 1988: 93; Lont and 
Hill 2008: 931). The exception seem to be special traders’ arisan where the payouts are main-
ly used as working capital, but not to establish new businesses (Geertz 1962: 248-249). This 
proves Dichter (2007c) right when he claims that low-asset people in developing countries 
only rarely use their funds at hand, even when provided through microcredit, to establish or 
grow their businesses (cf. section 3.3.3).  
Returning to the issue of risk management in case of health shocks, as just discussed, access 
to arisan seems to be one of several options, even if it was only mentioned once. Although 
also only mentioned once, community assistance in case of sickness is in any case not as pre-
valent as in the case of death. The vote of the credit group leaders was very clear here (cf. 
section 7.2).  
Social obligations came out as the third most important daily worry, although with a signifi-
cant distance to education costs and health costs. With social obligations respondents mostly 
referred to sumbangan, which is the social requirement to render in-kind or cash contributions 
to other community members on special occasions such as house-building or life-cycle cere-
monies, not the least death slametan(cf. Koning 2006: 47). Sumbangan are formally given as 
gifts. However, Koning (2006), referring to Sahlins, clearly identifies sumbangan as being 
based on notions of balanced reciprocity. In line with Mauss (1954), they are not free of self-
interest. Therefore it is not surprising that Koning also notes that people who can no longer 
expect to eventually benefit from sumbangan stop contributing themselves (2006: 48). Fur-
thermore, she finds that while other arrangements of mutual assistance such as bawon and 
even arisan are getting more exclusive and that this trend has been promoted by the Asian 
financial crisis, the social institution of sumbangan seems to be going as strong as ever (2006: 
47). In fact, I find that sumbangan represents the most collective and most inclusive of all 
such arrangements. No life cycle event can occur without sumbangan. Why then are sumban-
gan perceived as a threat by the surveyed respondents? This is because their timing is often 
hard to calculate, and the required contributions can reach significant sizes and strain the fin-
ances of the donor families. While sumbangan is a blessing for the recipient, it can be a bur-
den for the donor. Not surprisingly, in managing the obligation to give, the sale of assets has 
been reported twice in table 11. This speaks for the moral strength of the obligation to give 
and against Western tendencies to romanticize and popularize the notion of altruistic mutual 
help in such arrangements. As alluded to above (cf. section 2.4), over the long run these ar-
rangements were ultimately to the best self-interest of the community members, especially 
due to the lack of alternatives. They are moreover connected to heavy premiums, not only in 
form of the obligatory social pressure to give and receive (cf. Mauss 1954), but also by the 
resulting limitations on individual asset accumulation. In short, while sumbangan are still 
considered an absolutely necessary institution among low-asset respondents, it is by no means 
so that these arrangements are particularly cherished by them. This situation is approximately 
similar to the ambivalent relationship of customers to the joint liability obligation within their 
credit groups (cf. 3.2.5). 
 
183 
 
Looking at death of a family member as the fourth ranked worry in table 11, a distinction has 
to be made between death of non-spouse family members and death of the spouse, who in this 
case is mostly the bread-winning husband. While during risk ranking the respondents made no 
difference between the two, looking at the applied risk management such a distinction appears 
sensible. Death of a non-spouse family member did not lead to high stress coping measures, 
while over the long term the death of the bread winning spouse can apparently lead to high 
stress coping measures as indicated by the stated asset sales and use of moneylenders. This is 
explained by the fact that the death of a main breadwinner has the most serious long term ef-
fects on the family’s asset base. The death of any other family member does not seem to draw 
such significant long term effects. Again, it is important to note that such negative effects and 
corresponding high-stress coping measures seem to make themselves felt over the long term, 
not immediately after death. In case of death of any family member, including the spouse, the 
immediate shock was largely compensated by family assistance and a number of other meas-
ures such as (informal) office loans, help from arisan and last but not least help from the 
community. It is somewhat surprising that the drawing down of savings is not mentioned at 
all and that community assistance seems to play such an insignificant role. Here, I see a clear 
misrepresentation which I attribute to the methodological difficulties in my exercise to disen-
tangle the complex risk management processes of low-asset people. In this case, the group 
questioning format was clearly not conducive to good data collection. The long recall period 
further blurred the data. Nonetheless, this is still better than previous efforts; and complemen-
tary and better data is available from the beneficiaries, at least for handling death risk (see 
table 16 in section 7.3.2). This beneficiary data shows that savings depletion and especially 
community assistance in fact do play a considerable role in financial post-mortem coping. 
Proceeding towards the less important risks in table 11, a few additional observations are 
noteworthy. Draught risk as the top 7 risk in table 11 was already eleven times less important 
than education costs when measured by points. It was most salient among rural respondents in 
Bali and Sumba. Not only the farmers themselves but also petty traders in the area referred to 
draught as an important risk, albeit still far behind the importance of education costs and se-
vere illness. Petty traders in Sumba said that in case of draught, prices would usually surge 
while their farming customers would have less money to spend at their shops. They were 
therefore also negatively affected by draughts. Selling assets and postponing credit repay-
ments were frequent risk management strategies in case of draught. This confirms the earlier 
observation that agricultural microcredits are beset with an especially high credit risk (cf. sec-
tion 3.2.3). If the portion of rural respondents had been higher in my sample, draught would 
have certainly featured higher as well. Not surprisingly, McCord et al. (2006: 26), who had a 
significantly higher proportion of rural respondents in Indonesia (but a much smaller overall 
sample), rank “bad harvest” as the third most important risk, behind severe illness and educa-
tion costs.  
Old age fares particularly low in the risk perception, likely because the family is still being 
regarded as a reliable care provider at old age (cf. Setiadi 2006: 375, 377). In addition, many 
low-asset Indonesians in the informal sector continue to work and contribute to the family 
budget for as long as possible. There is no retirement in the formal sense of the word.  
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Even lower on the risk priority scale are fire and natural disasters like floods and earthquakes. 
Just like draughts, these risks are frequent occurrences in Indonesia. People have generally 
adapted to them to a certain extent. Wilhelm (2009) comprehensively outlines the intricate 
collective risk management strategies that low-asset kampung dwellers in Jakarta have de-
vised. And yet, table 11 shows ten cases of asset sales and one case of moneylending both for 
natural disasters and fire. At first sight such risk management appears more stressful than for 
any of the listed risk categories. How can this be? All these cases derive from one particular 
ex-ante group questioning which I held with ten women in East Jakarta. The womens’ houses 
had been severely affected by a kampung fire in 2002 and by unprecedented flooding in Feb-
ruary 2007. In consequence, they reported to have sold off several of their assets, but no large 
assets, and that through collective efforts of cleaning and mutual assistance business quickly 
returned to normal. I was nonetheless stunned to observe that the ten women still ranked edu-
cation and severe illness as their top challenges while fire and flooding very low on their 
priority list. As already alluded to various times before, this again raises doubts if the flood 
micro-insurance product recently launched by MunichRe and GTZ tackles a major concern of 
low-asset people. In any case, this example of one group session heavily influencing the re-
sults of my inquiry clearly shows the disadvantages of small sample sizes, where such unique 
occurrences can make themselves felt particularly strongly. It also shows how incoherent 
quantitative results can appear if the respective “history” as to how these data were collected 
and their respective contextual background are unknown to the analyst.  
7.3.2 Evidence from beneficiaries 
Table 16 casts a light on what funding sources beneficiaries drew on for the financing of fu-
nerals. Only those beneficiary interviews where I could obtain sufficient monetary informa-
tion are used (n=18). The figures are in fact distilled from qualitative questions. This is why 
the data is not as systematically complete as if an outright quantitative approach would have 
been taken. Funding from multiple sources was possible and in fact the rule. It needs to be 
borne in mind that table 16 shows the situation after the introduction of Payung Keluarga and 
that not all Payung Keluarga payouts were used for funeral financing (cf. table 12). Besides, 
financing of other post-mortem costs such as repayment of outstanding debts is not included.  
Table 16 shows that Payung Keluarga has financed 34 percent of all funeral costs. The re-
mainder is split over various sources whereby community assistance (sumbangan) (22%) and 
family assistance clearly make up the lion’s share (16%). The depletion of savings has played 
a role, but only a minor one. This is also the case for institutionalized assistance from the RT 
(financed by compulsory regular collections called uang mati (death money)) and token assis-
tance provided by the credit groups. What stands out very clearly here is that depletion of 
physical assets is hardly used, expect maybe in form of depleting working capital. In sum-
mary, this confirms the findings derived from table 11 that severe asset depletion does not 
play a role in funeral financing. This does not exclude the possibility that over the long term, 
the diminished income capacity of the family may eventually lead to asset sales. In addition, 
here the complementary evidence is rendered that next to family financing, community assis-
tance is in fact playing a crucial role in financing funeral expenses.  
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Table 16: Funeral financing of Muslim beneficiaries (n=18) 
  US$ % #1 
Total funeral expenses 6,750 100% 18 
from Payung Keluarga payouts 2,304 34% 14 
from other sources 4,446 66% 25 
  Community assistance (sumbangan) 1,467 22% 8 
  Family assistance 1,068 16% 8 
  Savings 158 2% 2 
  RT 84 1% 2 
  Credit group 18 0% 2 
  Working capital n.a. n.a. 2 
  Informal loan n.a. n.a. 1 
  Source unclear 1,652 24% n.a. 
1 All mentionings are recorded here, even those where no monetary amount was discernable.  
Frequency of mentionings therefore has a different sample base from US$ and percentage values. 
The earlier claim narratives have already given a first impression of the importance of such 
community and family help (cf. section 6.2). Without such triangulation of data, this comple-
mentary picture would not have emerged. Stated once again, table 16 presents the situation 
after the introduction of Payung Keluarga. In section 7.8.1 I will further discuss how Payung 
Keluarga has substituted traditional financing, especially financing provided by the family.  
7.3.3 Utilization and understanding of insurance 
Looking at the empirical risk management evidence presented so far, the absence of insurance 
as one “ingredient” of the respondents’ risk management strategy is obvious. This is of course 
apart from the compulsory Payung Keluarga coverage. Is it really so that the surveyed low-
asset respondents made no use of insurance? Could it be that insurance was something entire-
ly new to them? Table 17 shows that this was not the case. 
Almost half of the respondents (46%) had been covered by some kind of insurance before. 19 
percent had been covered by social protection programs at one stage, thereof 10 percent by 
the governmental social insurance companies JAMSOSTEK and ASKES. In many cases, so-
cial insurance coverage was obtained through the formal employment of the spouse, as in 
sample claim 3; and in most cases, social insurance coverage was no longer active at the mo-
ment of my baseline survey because either the respondent or the spouse had meanwhile lost 
their jobs. As many as 18 percent of respondents had bought private insurance in the past, not 
surprisingly with education endowments (12%) being the most popular type. No respondent 
reported to have bought private health insurance or non-life insurance in the past. Similar to 
social insurance coverage, many of the private insurance contracts where no longer in force. 
Only two respondents reported that they had finished paying for their education endowment 
and that they had already received the corresponding endowment payouts. In the majority of 
cases, however, insurance coverage had stopped due to (1) difficulties in paying the premium, 
(2) agents allegedly having run off with the premium, (3) misunderstanding of and consequent 
dissatisfaction with the policy benefits, and (4) in one case the bankruptcy of the insurance 
company.  
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Table 17: Insurance coverage of ex-ante customer component (before Payung Keluarga) 
Question: Have you ever been insured? If yes, by whom? 
Insurance type1 # % 
Respondents 170 100% 
Any kind of insurance 79 46% 
Social Insurance2 32 19% 
    Jamsostek 7 4% 
    ASKES 11 6% 
    GAKIN and others 6 4% 
    ASKESKIN 9 5% 
Private Insurance2 30 18% 
    Education Endowment3 20 12% 
    Life Insurance 9 5% 
    Old age savings plan 2 1% 
Credit Life (through MFI) 36 21% 
      
Insurers 24 100% 
    Bumiputera (local) 12 50% 
    Jiwasraya (local) 6 25% 
    Prudential (foreign) 1 4% 
    Others (all local) 5 21% 
1 All insurance instances recorded, even if already expired or no longer in-force 
2 Multiple coverage possible. Subtotals therefore do not sum up to totals. 
3 Counted once, even if several children were insured with different policies 
The overwhelming majority of insurance providers were local companies such as Bumiputera 
or state-owned Jiwasraya. Unlike most foreign insurers, these companies have a nationwide 
network of branches extending down to smaller cities. Moreover, they traditionally serve low-
er market segments than foreign insurers.  
Because one MFI partner had a credit life contract with a local insurance company before 
switching to Payung Keluarga, all their surveyed customers, that is 21 percent of the total 
sample (n=170), had been credit life insured before. This credit life coverage did not provide 
additional benefits. The respective customers were nonetheless well aware of their previous 
insurance coverage because the corresponding premium (1%) had been visibly deducted from 
their loans.  
All in all, it is clear that insurance coverage of the surveyed customers was patchy before the 
advent of Payung Keluarga, but not completely inexistent. In fact, regarding the low overall 
insurance penetration in Indonesia and the noted nascent state of microinsurance in the coun-
try (cf. section 4.3) I consider 18 percent coverage with private insurance, even if largely no 
longer active, as astoundingly high. Naturally, the notion of formal insurance was even more 
widespread than this. Almost all respondents who I talked to had already heard about insur-
ance before and could even name a number of insurance types, mainly life, health and educa-
tion insurance. However, as alluded to above, this does not mean that the contractual intrica-
cies and basic principles of insurance were widely understood. In a self-assessment of their 
insurance know-how, ex-ante customer component participants (n=174) attested themselves a 
weighted average insurance know-how of 23 percent (with zero percent marking low know-
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how and 100 percent marking good know-how). This strongly indicates a low insurance 
know-how. Even those who had bought individual insurance did not know about the risk and 
resource pooling principle of insurance. Only after I gave a number of hints did some respon-
dents get an idea where the money for claim payments was actually coming from, namely 
from the contributions of others who where insured. In several cases, even giving hints was 
not successful, and I had to “unveil the mystery” of low premiums and large payouts myself. 
This corrobates Platteau’s finding that in terms of risk management, low-asset people in de-
veloping countries are approaching insurance with a frame of reference coded by balanced 
reciprocity (cf. section 2.2.3). The list of most frequently asked customer questions as col-
lected from the loan officers further underlines this (table 18).  
The question of a premium refund as an indication of balanced reciprocity expectations clear-
ly comes out on top of the frequently asked questions (FAQ) list. At the same time, issues of 
affordability only make a tenuous appearance. It is therefore clear that premium refunds are 
more a question of principle than of economic need. The question of what insurance actually 
is was only mentioned twice by the loan officers. Thisfurther confirms that the term insurance 
is already familiar to customers. Issues of trust, which are usually very frequent with regards 
to microinsurance (Churchill 2006b: 20; Cohen and Young 2007: 221), are almost absent in 
my sample. This indicates a high level of trust into the services of the MFI partners which 
moreover rubs off on Allianz. On the other hand, what is clearly visible from these FAQ is the 
demand for more coverage, including for other family members and for health insurance. 
Something else which these FAQ indicate is a general openness towards the topic of insur-
ance and an eagerness to learn more about its possibilities. Together with evidence from a 
brand awareness exercise presented further below (see table 21 in section 7.4.4), this serves to 
confirm my personal impression that despite some reports of bankrupt companies and run 
away agents, insurance was generally perceived as something neutral to positive, not as a 
threat or as being notorious for failed promises. Notably, this goes against the assertion of 
Heydel et al. (2009: 38) that “insurance providers have a poor image in Indonesia especially 
among low-income communities, being seen as quick to sell and slow to pay.”  
Although I noted that discussing the issue of death at greater length often made respondents 
feel awkward and anxious, by and large neither the loan officers nor I found insurance to be 
directly connected to particular religious concerns and taboos (cf. section 3.3.3). Not even the 
fact that Payung Keluarga was not takaful compliant gave rise to concerns. A case in point is 
that according to table 18, the question as to whether insurance was colliding with religious 
principles only played a minor role. Besides, in the ex-ante customer component 87 percent of 
respondents (n=159) regarded insurance as something they would discuss with their neighbors 
and friends. Only a group of Balinese farmers collectively said that they would not discuss 
insurance. Here, the issue of takut cepat mati may have played a role as it was particularly 
salient in this group. One year later, almost all insured customers knew that they were insured 
and 83 percent of them (n=105) reported to have discussed Payung Keluarga with their 
neighbors and friends. This is a relatively high “compliance rate” (even if figures are to be 
taken as indicative only). It underlines the openness, sincerity and consistency of the respon-
dents’ answers regarding insurance. 
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Table 18: Frequently asked customer questions on Payung Keluarga as reported by MFI 
loan officers (n=66) 
Question: What are most frequently asked customer questions (FAQ) regarding "Payung Ke-
luarga"? 
rank Question mentionings by 66 loan officers 
# % 
Total 39 different questions 191 100% 
1 Is the premium returned if the borrower does not die? 
Why not? 
31 16% 
2 Does the insurance cover my family too? 20 10% 
2 What is the benefit of this insurance? 20 10% 
3 How much is the premium? 14 7% 
3 How does the claim process work? How long does it take? 14 7% 
4 How much is the claim payment? 12 6% 
5 Is there health insurance? 8 4% 
6 (Why) is the insurance compulsory? 8 4% 
7 Can I buy any other kind of insurance (excl. health)? 7 4% 
8 How long is the coverage term? 7 4% 
9 Can coverage period be extended? 5 3% 
10 Can the premium be decreased? 4 2% 
… …     
- What is insurance? 2 1% 
- Why is the premium so cheap? 1 1% 
- Do insurance and religious principles collide? 1 1% 
- What if Allianz forsakes us one day? 1 1% 
 
Naturally, the farmer group in Bali had also stuck to their line and not discussed insurance 
with others. Somewhat qualifying, however, is the finding that only 14 of 24 beneficiaries 
stated to have known about the insurance beforehand (which includes the possibility that they 
had forgotten about it). However, even among the beneficiaries, only 4 of 24 stated to have 
tried to keep the payout a secret, and only two negated permission to use their claim story in 
the media. All in all, this empirical evidence underlines that in case of the surveyed low-asset 
respondents in Indonesia, insurance was by and large not perceived as a sensitive issue. Evi-
dence from other countries shows that this is not always the case. The example from South 
Africa reported by Roth (2001:16) has already been mentioned (cf. section 3.3.3). There, 
where formal life and funeral insurance is much more widespread than in Indonesia, women 
are sometimes afraid of being accused of witchcraft and “cashing in” on their husbands 
should it become known that the husband was life insured. This raises the unanswered ques-
tion whether eventually, as private insurance coverage becomes more widespread, microin-
surance in Indonesia may also turn into a private individual matter as well. 
If insurance was therefore generally familiar to customers, although not in detail, and even a 
number of them had taken out insurance before, it is still surprising that insurance does not 
seem to play a role in the observed risk management strategies of the respondents. Even en-
dowment insurance, the most widely spread form of private insurance, was not mentioned to 
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reduce the preoccupation with education costs. I therefore conclude that the match between 
microinsurance products on offer and the risk management needs of the surveyed low-asset 
customers is still not very good. It is clearly visible that the demand for insurance is concen-
trated on two major risks only, namely education costs and severe illness as modern and 
largely individualized risks. While some education products are available, they may still not 
be sufficiently adapted to customer needs; and as noted above, affordable health insurance is 
extremely scarce (cf. section 4.3). Furthermore, despite the general openness to insurance, the 
general frame of reference applied by low-asset families, which is still coded along the lines 
of collective risk management for collective risks and of arrangements of balanced reciproci-
ty, somewhat speaks against the usage of insurance as a long-term risk management solution.  
7.3.4  Risk management revisited 
Analyzing the empirical evidence presented in the previous sections, it appears as if most risk 
management currently applied by the surveyed low-asset families in Indonesia was ex-post 
risk coping (cf. Heydel et al. 2009: ix). Social insurance and private insurance as typical ex-
ante risk mitigation strategies only play a very small role compared to informal ex-post dona-
tions and contributions received from the family, the community and other informal sources 
such as arisan and credit groups. Other ex-post measures include the depletion of savings and 
in some cases the sale of assets. However, in reality, the system of family and community 
donations is based on a carefully constructed and maintained system of reciprocities, mostly 
of a balanced kind, which in fact started to operate long before the individual community or 
family member experienced a shock, and which in their ex-post “draw down” already lay the 
basis for counter-obligations to be fulfilled in the future. The boundary between ex-ante and 
ex-post management is therefore blurred. Especially community assistance in form of sum-
bangan appears to be a continuous system of risk management, just as the underlying social 
structure of the moral economy is geared towards permanent risk management, or in other 
words social risk mitigation. This speaks against the claim that low-asset customers in devel-
oping countries would not engage in long term planning (cf. Holzmann et al. 2003: i).46
                                                 
46 I often heard such claims from local Indonesian observers and experts, most strongly during an interview with 
I Nyoman Putra Sukasana, Microcredit Program Manager of WKP, in Bali on 24 May 2008. 
 In 
fact, their continuous social involvement in balanced reciprocity networks speaks for a very 
long term approach to risk management. As Miguel et al. (2002) and Koning (2006) have 
noted, only if there is no probability of a definite return over the long term, do people start to 
withdraw from balanced reciprocity arrangements. They also do so if they cannot afford the 
contributions or have become wealthy enough to voluntarily opt out. What should be distin-
guished then is the existence of long-term risk management, even if sometimes unconsidered 
and habitual, from the absence of long-term financial planning in the sense of planning for 
one’s own private asset accumulation. Heydel et al. (2009: 61) attribute the lack of financial 
planning to the inability to save due to low and volatile incomes. However, in line with the 
above discussion (cf. section 3.2.7) I strongly add the influence of the moral economy as a 
complementary explanation for this phenomenon. As the moral economy denounces the ac-
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cumulation of economic capital, the scope for financial planning is diminished. On the other 
hand, the strong preoccupation with education costs shows that low-asset families do have a 
long-term strategy for asset accumulation as well, albeit more on the symbolic capital rather 
than on the economic capital side. 
Informal collective risk management strategies are naturally most concerned with risks which 
are perceived as collective risks. In tightly knit and socially relatively undifferentiated tradi-
tional agrarian societies, the majority of risks are perceived as collective risks because the 
balance of the community was perceived to be threatened by the misfortune (or fortune) of 
some of its members. This leads to the exogenous explanation for such events and collective 
efforts to reestablish social balance. In this respect, death of a community member was clearly 
identified as a public event and a collective risk. Ill health and other misfortunes were per-
ceived to be somewhat more individual risks. However, as Ravallion and Dearden (1988: 43) 
have well shown in a quantitative (!) analysis of a household panel for central Java, at least in 
rural areas also such more individual risks are being at least partly mitigated through collec-
tive transfers, whereby moreover generosity increases over-proportionally with income, 
meaning that wealthier community members are showing exceptional generosity (cf. Mauss 
1954). Ravallion and Dearden (1988) fittingly attribute this phenomenon to the impact of the 
moral economy. However, “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’” has given rise to new risks 
such as the growing importance of education as a source for social mobility and status, as well 
as inflationary health costs going well beyond the customary charges of traditional healers. 
These risks then, and education costs in particular, are not effectively dealt with by informal 
collective risk management strategies. In case of education, this is even for good reason as 
education, especially if selectively provided, can endanger social equality and collective “sub-
sistence insurance”. Not surprisingly, such modern risks emerge as the top concerns of the 
surveyed low-asset customers. In fact, the main message derived from table 11 is that modern 
individual risks are least covered by other risk management strategies and therefore raise de-
mand for insurance. The more “traditional” and collective a risk is perceived, the better tradi-
tional mechanisms are able to mitigate them. However, through social differentiation and 
modernization these collective risk management strategies are coming under increasing pres-
sure (cf. Koning 2006). From such analysis, Payung Keluarga can be interpreted as tackling 
precisely the wrong risk, namely one where traditional informal risk management strategies 
are still particularly strong, especially over the short term. The long term consequences of the 
death of the main (male) breadwinner of the family may be less well covered. The further 
analysis of the beneficiaries experiences provided in section 7.9 will further reinforce this 
point, and enrich the picture as far as the socio-economic post-mortem pattern is concerned. 
The contextualized analysis of low-asset families risk management strategies reveals clearly 
how complex these strategies are. It proved methodologically difficult to disentangle and un-
derstand what was going on. Nonetheless, the explorative-quantitative mapping of weighted 
risk perception, risk frequency and risk management strategies as intended in table 11 and 
enriched with qualitative interpretation and beneficiary information has provided valuable 
insights. Still, the emerging picture is far from being perfectly representative and coherent, 
and it is questionable if it could ever be, even with the most rigorous quantitative econometric 
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or ethnological analysis (cf. Geertz 2000: 16). Reprising considerations of section 2.4 on the 
expanded asset-capital framework, Moser (1998: 1) is well neigh right to claim that low-asset 
families “themselves are managers of complex asset portfolios”. I would add that with low-
asset families under the influence of the moral economy a very large part of this complex 
management is directed towards risk management rather than towards asset accumulation.  
 
7.4 Impact on the insured 
This section analyses the impact of Payung Keluarga on the insured, that is on the “silent ma-
jority” where no claim has occurred. In particular, the following questions will be dealt with 
regards to the expanded asset-capital framework: Has the peace of mind of customers in-
creased? Has the financial literacy of the insured increased? Has the risk perception of the 
insured changed? Do the insured show a higher risk affinity in their business ventures? 
7.4.1  Awareness of Payung Keluarga 
The first important clarification needed here is certainly whether the insured knew that they 
were insured, because supposedly without knowledge no impact on the insured is possible. As 
mentioned above, it can fairly be assumed that most customers knew that they were insured, 
and that their insurance was life insurance covering only them, not their spouses and children. 
After all, 83 percent of the insured ex-post respondents claimed to have discussed Payung 
Keluarga with their neighbors and friends. However, during the group sessions I also noticed 
a small number of insured who were not aware of the insurance, or at least unsure whether 
they were covered or not. As a case in point, the wife of Haji Mustani in sample claim 2 did 
not seem to be aware of her insurance coverage when she asked her husband to take care of 
her debts. While I nonetheless assert a generally high awareness of Payung Keluarga, know-
ledge about its details was certainly less profound. Sometimes, the women were unsure if next 
to death also injuries and sickness were covered. Others were unsure if other family members 
were covered as well. Only about half of the respondents were able to correctly tell the exact 
height of the death benefits. Despite these apparent gaps in detailed product knowledge, I was 
astounded to see that the majority of customers stated to feel well informed about Payung 
Keluarga. When I asked ex-post customer groups on what they regarded as advantages and 
disadvantages of Payung Keluarga, only three groups raised the issue of lack of product so-
cialization (see table 24 in section 7.5). Among the credit group leaders, 28 of 31 participants 
(90%) stated to feel well informed about the product while three felt not well informed. Natu-
rally, such questions posed by a researcher who was often perceived as an insurance em-
ployee, moreover in attendance of MFI staff, are prone to severe positive answering bias; and 
in this case, no corresponding baseline question was possible to neutralize such bias. Howev-
er, there are two more indicators that the tendency of this overall positive outcome on product 
awareness is correct. Firstly, the loan officers did not raise the issue of insufficient training or 
product socialization, neither on behalf of their customers nor on behalf of themselves. Se-
condly, I routinely asked respondents if they had any open questions at the end of the group 
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sessions or interviews. Here, only on one occasion did a male ex-post customer component 
participant in Sumba ask me to explain all the terms and conditions (syarat-syarat) of Payung 
Keluarga. All other questions posed by respondents rather related to technical details (which 
in fact indicates a general product understanding), and even more often to the possibilities of 
additional insurance coverage such as education and health insurance. In short, even when 
given a relatively neutral opportunity to inquire on the product, customers showed no particu-
lar enthusiasm or need for doing so. This situation is certainly different from what McCord et 
al. (2005) have observed on a microinsurance implementation in Africa:  
Focus group discussions seemed to generate frustration regarding how little clients actually know 
about the policy. Their inability to answer questions made them more animated in their desire for 
more education and information. Clients noted that they had never been given written documenta-
tion about the policy. (McCord et al. 2005: 17-18) 
In summary, regarding customer education we have three phenomena: (1) Customers were 
generally aware that they were life insured, but there were definite gaps in detailed product 
knowledge and the understanding of insurance principles. (2) Customers tended to grow rest-
less and anxious when the matter of death and the related death benefits were discussed at 
greater length. (3) Customers discussed insurance with their neighbors and friends and did not 
identify insurance as a sensitive topic. This leads to three conclusions: (1) The high general 
awareness level among customers confirms what has been claimed above, namely that cus-
tomer education was taken seriously by Allianz and the MFIs, although it was certainly far 
from perfect (cf. section 4.4.5). (2) There does not seem to be a direct correlation between 
being objectively well informed about the product and taking the initiative to discuss it with 
others. The possible hypothesis that low product understanding leads to low product promo-
tion by customers is therefore disproved in case of Payung Keluarga. (3) Customers do not 
necessarily want to know everything about their insurance contract, especially if possibly dis-
cerning issues such as misfortune and death are touched upon. Instead, customers often seem 
to content themselves with a general superfluous product knowledge and the trust that what 
the MFI was doing for them was good. In fact, this phenomenon may not be entirely unknown 
among readers. After all, who is keen on learning all about the fine-print provisions of his or 
her insurance contracts? What often counts more is the trust in the selling agent, in the image 
of the insurance company, and - where applicable - in the laws of consumer protection and the 
general jurisprudence. I feel that the realization that for various cultural and psychological 
reasons customers may not always want to know everything about insurance is something 
rather new. I do not find it in the microinsurance literature, but it may hold important implica-
tions for microinsurance marketing.  
However, returning to the major issue of general customer awareness of Payung Keluarga, 
such awareness can be confirmed. The exact level, however, was methodologically hard to 
discern. These considerations have to be borne in mind for judgment of the following impact 
evidence. In addition, a further difficulty arises from the fact that some 20 percent of the ex-
post customer component participants were not insured. Strictly speaking, due to lack of ac-
tual product experience these were therefore not “entitled” to give information on Payung 
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Keluarga’s impact. I have therefore tried to filter these uninsured from below data. I will indi-
cate those cases where this has proven particularly difficult and unsatisfactory. 
7.4.2 Peace of mind 
Regarding peace of mind as a human asset (cf. section 2.4), 44 percent of the insured partici-
pants of the ex-post customer component (n=109) stated to feel “a lot safer” because of 
Payung Keluarga. 45 percent felt “somewhat safer”, six percent reported “no change” and 
five percent felt “less safe”. As mentioned above such figures are to be taken as “valid by 
tendency” only, and I admit that in an insurance survey, such questions are particularly prone 
to a positive answering bias. Nonetheless, an increase in the feeling of protection of the ma-
jority of respondents can surely be noted. More interesting, however, is the question as to why 
some customers actually felt less safe with Payung Keluarga. I found such concerns to be 
based on two beliefs: (1) one’s lifespan (ajal) is based on divine decision (cf. Geertz 1960: 75; 
cf. Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 50); (2) it is consequently impossible and blasphemous to try to in-
sure a life; doing so would entail divine retribution through cutting short one’s life (cf. Samik-
Ibrahim 1963: 122). While the first conviction was unanimously shared by all respondents 
regardless of religion, the second is based on a literal interpretation of the term life insurance 
in the sense of insuring that a person will not die, or at least of taking precaution against the 
effects of divine will. This second belief, which I came to call takut cepat mati, was held by a 
much smaller portion of respondents and was especially concentrated in rural areas in Bali 
and Eastern Indonesia. Above numbers suggest a rate of five percent. However, further qua-
litative feedback shows that takut cepat mati concerns were shared to a varying degree by 
many of the insured. There was an ambivalence of feelings between fears of life insurance as 
bringing bad luck, that is, insurance as a risk in itself, and more pragmatic notions that insur-
ance can provide protection against risks. Although by and large the latter pragmatism clearly 
outweighed the former superstitions, this ambivalent perception explains why customers were 
contended with knowing they were insured but without wanting to worry too much about the 
details (cf. section 7.4.1). A further case in point is the failure of a related control question 
where I wanted to inquire how often respondents had already thought “how good that I am 
insured”. This amounted to a request to quantify how often the women had thought about bad 
luck happening to them. This “aggregation of negative thinking” made the women feel visibly 
uncomfortable, rendered very inclusive responses, and induced me to quickly drop this ques-
tion from my questionnaire. 
The fact that some customers openly admitted to feel less secure with Payung Keluarga com-
plicates the judgment of the product’s impact on the customer’s feeling of protection. Not 
only that the issue is very subjective to start with, having both positive and negative answers 
raises the additional question of the respective answers’ weight? Does the fear of the few off-
set the increased feeling of protection of the many? I hold that this is impossible to answer 
based on the collected empirical information. I therefore only dare to conclude that in terms 
feeling of protection, the overall result is ambivalent: a majority of respondents stated to feel 
safer, despite the fact that many of this majority had ambivalent feelings about life insurance 
themselves, and a minority clearly stated to feel less safe. One obvious technical solution to 
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this dilemma would be to make Payung Keluarga a voluntary product. However, as indicated 
above, this would increase administrative and pricing complexity and lead to considerably 
higher premiums (cf. section 3.3.3). 
7.4.3 Business risk affinity 
Although the reported feeling of protection among many insured may have increased, from 
the very outset of my research I did not expect Payung Keluarga to greatly affect the overall 
business risk affinity of customers. I reasoned that for such an effect to clearly materialize and 
to be clearly attributable to the provision of insurance, insurance coverage would have to be 
much wider, for example by including continuous long-term family life coverage, family 
health coverage, and the coverage of certain non-life business risks such as business interrup-
tion due to fire or flooding. Because the promotion of business risk affinity and consequent 
higher returns is a central hope pinned to microinsurance I nonetheless inquired with custom-
ers on their business risk affinity (cf. section 3.3.1). For this exercise, I gave three examples of 
(1) a daring and pioneering entrepreneur, (2) a more hesitant and observing entrepreneur, and 
lastly (3) an entrepreneur who is satisfied with the current state of affairs and does not seek 
out new business opportunities. Then, I asked the respondents to associate themselves with 
one of these three types, which represent three different levels of risk affinity. Table 19 shows 
the results of this exercise. 
Table 19 seems to indicate that the business risk affinity of Payung Keluarga customers has 
slightly increased, from a weighted ex-ante average of 47 percent to a weighted ex-post aver-
age of 52 percent. This increase seems to be particularly due to a drift of moderately cautious 
customers towards a more assertive business risk affinity. However, for this exercise the se-
gregation of insured and uninsured customers is particularly important, as is the close match 
between ex-ante and ex-post respondents.  
Table 19: Business risk affinity among customer component participants 
Question: Regarding business opportunities, would you say you are a risk taker, more cau-
tious or definitely cautious? 
  
risk taker  
(weight 100%) 
more cautious 
(weight 50%) 
definitely cautious  
(weight 0%) 
weighted  
average 
ex-ante n=170 
# 31 98 41   
% 18% 58% 24% 47% 
ex-post n=81 
# 23 39 19   
% 28% 48% 23% 52% 
 
Since business risk affinity is very much dependent on individual character, measurement 
error is bound to be wide if ex-post respondents are different from ex-ante respondents, espe-
cially in case of small sample sizes. I hold that the conditions of sufficient clarity on the res-
pondents “insurance” status and the close overlap of ex-ante and ex-post respondents has not 
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been sufficiently met in this case. I am consequently very cautious with regards to these re-
sults, and prefer to conclude that an increase of business risk affinity could not be ascertained. 
As mentioned, I still hold that only more comprehensive and ideally voluntary risk coverage 
could potentially increase business risk affinity and consequently lead to higher returns. After 
“discovering” the concepts of the moral economy and the related traders’ dilemma, I moreo-
ver hold that overall insurance coverage must be sufficient enough to render the reliance on 
informal collective risk arrangements largely unnecessary in order for the insured to opt out of 
the moral economy structure and the related restrictions on economic capital accumulation. 
This reverts back to the “double fortune / double blow dilemma” posed by microinsurance in 
combination with microcredit (cf. section 2.2.4). 
Despite the indefinite outcome regarding its original question, risk affinity testing was none-
theless worthwhile in that is shows, with some claim to validity and representativeness, that 
on average the insured low-asset micro-entrepreneurs in Indonesia are moderately risk affine. 
From a character point of view, they seem to be neither particularly risk averse, nor are they 
daring micro-entrepreneurs which unleash their economic potential upon the provision of mi-
crocredit. In fact, this conclusion of a balanced spread of business risk affinity among low-
asset people in Indonesia is conducive to the claim of Dichter (2007c: 181) that entrepreneuri-
al skills are as evenly distributed among low-asset people as among the general population 
(cf. section 3.2.5). 
7.4.4 Financial literacy 
The impact of Payung Keluarga on financial literacy is easier dealt with than the impact on 
peace of mind and on business risk affinity. Here, a clear increase in insurance literacy as a 
sub-category of financial literacy can be observed. It has already been mentioned that in an 
ex-ante self-assessment, customer component respondents attested themselves a weighted 
average insurance know-how of a low 23 percent (cf. section 7.3.3). In the repetition of this 
self-assessment during the ex-post survey one year later, self-assessed knowledge levels 
(n=117) had increased more than twofold to 57 percent (see table 20). In the absence of ex-
ogenous factors like large awareness and marketing campaigns by the government or other 
private insurers this is a remarkable result.  
Table 20: Changes in insurance know-how of customers 
Question: How would you consider your knowledge about insurance? 
  
good 
(weight 100%) 
middle 
(weight 50%) 
not much 
(weight 0%) 
weighted 
average 
ex-ante (n=159) 
# 12 49 98   
% 8% 31% 62% 23% 
ex-post (n=117) 
# 38 58 21   
% 32% 50% 18% 57% 
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On a methodological note, table 20 gives a good example for the appliance of the single-
difference method because ex-ante and ex-post responses to the same question are compared. 
The self-assessments and the resulting percentage figures are naturally subjective. However, it 
is certainly an objective finding that there is a significant increase of self-assessed insurance 
knowhow. Furthermore, looking at the five “semi-control groups” which I only interviewed 
ex-post, self-assessed ex-post insurance knowledge of these groups was even higher at 67 
percent. This speaks against the consideration that my preceding ex-ante sessions may have 
overly sensitized respondents. 
Further proof for an increase in financial literacy comes from a brand recognition exercise in 
the customer component. In this exercise, each participant received ten paper cards, each 
showing the logo of a different bank or insurance company. Then, I asked the respondents to 
put their ten logo cards onto four different fields drawn on the ground, depending on what 
image the respondents had of the company. The four fields were marked “?”, standing for “I 
do not know this logo/company”, “-” standing for “I have a bad impression of this company, 
“0” standing for “I know this company but don’t know if it is good or bad”, and lastly “+” 
standing for “I have a good impression of this company”. First, a volunteer was selected to 
allocate the first two or three of her cards as a demonstration effect. Then I asked all custom-
ers to simultaneously distribute their cards. Such simultaneity was meant to avert a one-voice 
effect. The depicted logos were naturally the same in the ex-ante and ex-post phase. Although 
this exercise was the most complicated of all my action questions, it proved to render reason-
ably good results (table 21). 
Table 21: Recognition of insurance and bank brands among customer component par-
ticipants 
Question: Do you know any of these 10 company logos?  
If yes, what image do you associate with these companies? 
  
ex-ante  
(n=1544 votes) 
ex-post 
(n=957 votes) 
Company not known ("?") 64% 39% 
Company known 36% 61% 
    bad image ("-") 2% 5% 
    neutral image ("0") 11% 17% 
    good image ("+") 22% 39% 
 
In the ex-ante customer component, participants recognized 36 percent of the shown logos. 
One year later, the portion had risen to 61 percent. Unsurprisingly, the biggest jump in brand 
recognition was registered by Allianz. From the least recognized of the ten logos with only 6 
percent ex-ante brand recognition Allianz jumped to second best known company with an ex-
post brand recognition of 82 percent. If we exclude Allianz, overall recognition levels of the 
remaining nine companies jumped from 39 to 58 percent. Besides a mere increase in brand 
recognition, this exercise also rendered information on the image of banks and insurance 
companies in Indonesia. Here, neutral and positive perceptions clearly outweigh instances of 
bad impressions. Although the card placement was virtually anonymous, when I found some 
 
197 
 
logos put on the negative image field I nonetheless routinely inquired who had put those par-
ticular cards and for what reason. I found the related critique to be most often concerning neg-
ative hearsay from friends and neighbors and impressions of low service quality. All in all, 
these results confirm my earlier claim that the image of insurance among low-asset customers 
is surprisingly good (cf. section 7.3.3). 
If we combine the findings from the knowledge self-assessment and the brand awareness ex-
ercise, this combination renders strong evidence of an increased sensitization to insurance 
related messages, and probably to financial messages as a whole (after all, bank logos were 
also included in the brand awareness exercise). This sensitization has led to a clear increase in 
insurance literacy, and therewith in financial literacy. It is highly questionable if a mere insur-
ance awareness campaign would have been able to achieve the same results at similar costs. It 
should be added, however, that despite such sensitization only one single respondent had vo-
luntarily bought a new insurance product in the intermezzo between baseline and endline sur-
veys, again unsurprisingly an education endowment. Because of a lack of appropriate follow-
up products, Allianz has therefore not yet managed to turn its increased brand awareness into 
up-sales and cross-sales. However, at least the company has achieved its goal to significantly 
increase its brand awareness, not only through media reports, but first and foremost among 
the sizeable number of microinsured customers. Mathematically speaking, the jump in brand 
awareness from 6 percent to 82 percent amounts to an increase of over 1,200 percent. 
7.4.5 Impact on the insured seen from an expanded asset-capital perspective 
In terms of changes to the asset base and ex-ante risk management strategies of customers, the 
overall impact of Payung Keluarga has been minor. Financial literacy as a human asset has 
certainly increased. The results on peace of mind as another form of human asset are at best 
slightly positive and at worst rather ambivalent. Moreover, whatever the change to peace of 
mind, it has not led to a discernable change in business risk affinity. Access to insurance as a 
financial asset has increased by default, but when considering the above, the merits of such an 
obligatory asset increase are far from certain, moreover as it is offset by a decrease in cash 
through the payment of premiums. I found no indication that these minor changes to the asset 
base had changed the way the insured were configuring their ex-ante risk management strate-
gies. In short, ex-ante risk management behavior among customers does not seem to have 
changed through the advent of insurance. By and large, the impact was more intangible and 
psychological, rather than resulting in behavioral change. Of course, ex-post risk management 
of beneficiaries was more significantly affected. This will be outlined in section 7.8. 
The fact that the insured where now “using” a modern and positively connoted new product 
may have increased their symbolic capital. This consideration is tenuously supported by the 
fact that the women proved almost eager to discuss the insurance with their neighbors and 
friends. Several group leaders were asserting that they used the insurance coverage as a sell-
ing argument to win new members for their credit groups. I also met several customers who 
stated that they felt proud of having insurance. But as I did not inquire deeply into this partic-
ular matter, I have to leave this consideration open as a largely unproven hypothesis.  
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7.5 Customer satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction with Payung Keluarga was good. On the Indonesian elementary school 
grade scale from 0 to 10, ex-post customer component participants (n=137) rated the program 
with 8.3 (see table 22). Discounting this value somewhat for a positive answering bias still 
renders a reasonably good result. Ranking was done anonymously. The customers had to 
write their ranking on a small paper and put it upside down on the ground in the middle of the 
circle in which the participants were usually sitting. Writing numbers was no problem for the 
illiterate and no discussion or assistance was allowed during the voting process. This helped 
to reduce the one-voice phenomenon, although response patterns within the groups were still 
remarkably aligned. Some groups were clearly more satisfied than others.  
Table 22: Satisfaction ranking among ex-post customer component participants (n=137) 
Question: How satisfied are you with Payung Keluarga on a scale from 0 to 10? 
  Worst               Best Summary 
Grade 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average grade: 8.3 
Votes 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 35 37 21 37 Total votes: 137 
 
There are a number of other quantitative indicators that customer satisfaction was high. For 
example, in a hypothetical question on customers’ readiness to repurchase Payung Keluarga, 
86 percent of respondents stated that they preferred Payung Keluarga to be attached to their 
next loan (see table 23). Even when premiums were supposed to increase by 50 percent, still 
more than half of the customers were in favor of having Payung Keluarga. This indicates a 
considerable price elasticity on the side of the customers, which in turn further supports a sig-
nificant satisfaction level. 
Table 23: Hypothetical repurchasing rate among ex-post customer component partici-
pants 
Question: Would you prefer Payung Keluarga to be attached to your next loan? 
 
No, I would prefer loans with-
out insurance 
Don’t know yet Yes, I would prefer loans with 
insurance 
if premium stayed the same (n=139) 
# 8 11 120 
% 6% 8% 86% 
if premium was to increase by 50 percent (n=137) 
# 41 26 70 
% 30% 19% 51% 
 
The repurchasing rate (or renewal rate) of short-term insurance contracts is considered a good 
indicator of customer satisfaction (Wipf and Garand 2008: 26). Because Payung Keluarga 
was obligatory and a realized repurchasing rate could therefore not be observed, above exer-
cise is admittedly hypothetical. Supposedly, there is gap between customer’s declared inten-
tion to part with their money and them actually parting with it. Churchill (2002: 386) notes 
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that customers of micro-health schemes are significantly less likely to renew their usually 
yearly contracts if they have not experienced a claim during the year (and do not receive a 
premium refund). Of course, this is strongly related to the unfulfilled expectation of balanced 
reciprocity. I suppose that the same would happen if Payung Keluarga were voluntary.  
On a methodological note, regarding table 23 it should be mentioned that in three of 19 ex-
post groups, acceptance levels of Payung Keluarga stayed the same and in three other groups 
acceptance even rose in sight of a 50 percent increase in premium. As noted above (cf. section 
5.3.3), this may be due to the fact that there were an number of other questions and additional 
information on Payung Keluarga in between the two questions of table 23, which may have 
further endeared the product to the respondents. It would have been better to ask these ques-
tions consecutively. On the other hand, this methodological flaw has the merit to highlight the 
importance of question sequencing and to reveal that the research process itself is a learning 
process for the respondents. In addition, this observation illustrates that customer satisfaction 
can be quite volatile. Nonetheless, the hypothetical high repurchasing rate and an equally hy-
pothetical considerable price elasticity as observed in table 23 supports the notion of a rela-
tively good customer satisfaction.  
Further support comes from the group leader component. Here, 97 percent of credit group 
leaders (n=31) stated that Payung Keluarga was one of the reasons which made the MFI’s 
credit program attractive. Only one credit group leader declared that to her it made no differ-
ence whether her loan came with insurance or not. The loan officers were more moderate but 
still positive in their feedback. 82 percent (n=66) reported that their customers perceived 
Payung Keluarga as an additional benefit. 18 percent saw no effect and no loan officer re-
ported a negative effect on overall MFI program attractiveness.  
It is based on this triangulation of data from customers, credit group leaders and loan officers 
that I base my claim of good customer satisfaction with Payung Keluarga. After this rather 
quantitative exercise, it is of course interesting to analyze the reasons behind the noted cus-
tomer satisfaction, and at the same time look for possible issues of critique. During my time 
working and researching on Payung Keluarga I could not help perceiving a certain “this must 
simply be good” attitude among MFI managers, loan officers and customers, very similar to 
the mentioned uncritical a priori endorsement by Allianz (cf. section 4.4.8). Unfortunately, 
this subjective general impression is hard to pin down. However, after some encouragement 
from my side, ex-post customer component respondents were quite precise in pointing out 
what they liked and disliked about Payung Keluarga. Table 24 presents the respective results. 
Here, I did not record how many participants supported each of the raised points. I therefore 
count every mentioned reason on the basis of the 19 ex-post groups, not on the basis of their 
individual participants. This makes the groups the relevant unit of analysis. If for example the 
number of recorded mentionings for “good price” is ten, this means that in ten of the 19 ex-
post groups this pro-reason was voiced at least once.  
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Table 24: Pro and contra reasons for Payung Keluarga as perceived by ex-post customer 
component groups (n=19 groups)  
Pro/Contra Reason1 # of mentionings % of mentionings 
Total 46 100% 
Pro sub-total 34 74% 
Pro Feeling of protection 10 22% 
Good price 10 22% 
Mutual assistance 7 15% 
Good socialization 2 4% 
All okay 1 2% 
Heard that claims are paid quickly 1 2% 
Promotes togetherness with MFI 1 2% 
Proud to be pioneers 1 2% 
Trusted (terpercaya) 1 2% 
Contra sub-total 12 26% 
Contra Protection too limited 7 15% 
Insufficient socialization 3 7% 
Takut cepat mati 1 2% 
Too expensive 1 2% 
1 Reasons are aggregated from more detailed customer feedback. 
Table 24 clearly shows that the groups found more positive (74%) than negative (26%) argu-
ments related to Payung Keluarga. The primary satisfaction drivers were (1) feeling of pro-
tection, (2) good price, and (3) mutual assistance. The fact that many groups reported an in-
creased feeling of protection is in line with the more detailed findings presented in section 
7.4.2. It may be nonetheless critically added once more that this is a very obvious and “ex-
pected” and therefore somewhat biased answer in relation to insurance. Regarding “good 
price”, the broad impression that Payung Keluarga was cheap certainly relates to the fact that 
it only made up a small portion of the insured loan, and that with an average premium of US$ 
0.92 per loan it was also perceived as cheap in absolute terms. Moreover, the premium rate 
seems to have been below the original premium expectations of the customers. In the ex-ante 
survey, when I had already explained the upcoming products benefits but still not mentioned 
the price, participants (n=123) estimated a “fair” premium for Payung Keluarga to be US$ 
2.35 for a one-year US$ 100 loan, while in fact the respective premium was only US$ 1.20. 
Compared to “feeling of protection”, I hold “good price” as a less obvious and less “ex-
pected” pro-reason, and therefore consider the corresponding results as a more accurate an-
swer than in the case of peace of mind. “Mutual assistance” as the third major driver of satis-
faction relates to my efforts to display insurance as a large mutual assistance arrangements, 
even while ignoring that traditionally such arrangements are based on balanced reciprocity 
rather than on conditional redistribution. Coming back to the issue of question sequencing, my 
pro/contra question came after I had earlier asked if customers knew where the money for the 
large claim payments was coming from. As virtually no customers related the payouts to the 
accumulation of their own small premium payments, I had consequently explained this rela-
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tionship. I am sure that it was my re-emphasis of this point shortly before posing the 
pro/contra question which made this point gain particular importance to the customers. How-
ever, this still indicates that in fact the idea of helping others through their own premium con-
tributions resounds well with low-asset customers. I therefore reprise my earlier point that the 
marketing of insurance to low-asset customers may gain from focusing more on the social, 
collective aspect of insurance rather than on the individual protection which forms the key 
message in most marketing to the middle class (cf. section 2.2.3).  
The observation that customers strongly approved of the social assistance aspect of insurance 
although it definitely represents an individualized risk management tool, leads me to suspect a 
fourth major driver of customer satisfaction: It was not explicitly stated by the customers but 
at least to a certain extent customers seem to prefer individual, autonomous protection over 
the socially and financially demanding informal collective arrangements such as sumbangan. 
This is even more so if they can formally uphold the socially very much approved notion of 
participating in a mutual assistance arrangement. This creates a further example of a diver-
gence of inner substance (individualized formal insurance) and outer form (mutual assistance) 
which I hold characteristic for many social institutions in Indonesia, much in line with the 
earlier example of the husband as undisputed family head in public vis-à-vis more balanced 
power differentials within the family (cf. section 7.1; cf. Schiel 1985: 15). This observation 
does not necessarily contradict the often repeated assertion that customers base much of their 
risk management conception on balanced reciprocity and therefore have a hard time to fathom 
the risk and resource pooling principle of insurance. This is because respondents were gener-
ally very much aware what insurance was for and that it did not entail the same social intrica-
cies as traditional mutual arrangements. 
We find further indications for the preference for individual protection if we combine feed-
back of beneficiaries as receivers of sumbangan with feedback of customers as givers of sum-
bangan. Ten out of the twelve Muslim beneficiaries who I asked on the matter admitted to a 
feeling of malu (shame, awkwardness) when having to rely on assistance from others, al-
though the level of malu varies depending on circumstances and the proximity to the lender. 
Magnis-Suseno underlines this further: 
Borrowing money, even from relatives, is always something connected with shame with Indone-
sians. Everybody does it, it is very common. . . . Money dealings within the family, this is always a 
delicate and precarious affair.47
In line with Mauss (1954), this awkwardness relates to the fact that receiving a gift first and 
foremost creates a social debt towards the donor. If the recipients of sumbangan do not feel 
comfortable with it, neither do the donors. Table 11 ranks the social obligation to give to oth-
ers on special occasions as the third highest daily worry. This is a clear indication that sum-
bangan in fact imposes a heavy (financial) burden on the donor as well. This observation 
points back to the earlier claim of informal mutual assistance systems not being based on al-
 
                                                 
47 Interview with Professor Frans Magnis-Suseno, principal of Driyarkara University in Jakarta, on 26 March 
2008. Translation from German by the author.  
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truism but on practical need and lack of alternatives (cf. section 2.2.2 and section 2.2.3), and 
is also reflected in the ambivalent position of customers towards joint-liability in group-based 
lending (cf. 3.2.5). In consequence, when viable long-term alternatives like microinsurance 
make their appearance, low-asset families are interested in accepting them, not only for those 
risks where informal arrangements have provided very limited coverage before (education, 
health), but also in those cases where such arrangements have provided reliable coverage.  
Although Payung Keluarga with its limited coverage has certainly not induced any significant 
exodus from the moral economy, other scholars support the notion that people tend to opt out 
of the moral economy when possible. Hefner (1998: 28) descirbes how the new middle-class 
in South-East Asian urban centers like Jakarta or Bangkok is hardly bound by the collective 
social controls prevalent among low-asset people. Newberry (2007: 1308-1309) recounts the 
self-legitimizing perspective of a low-asset kampung dweller who contrasts the positive, inti-
mate, and mutually supportive life in his kampung with the lifestyle of the rich, who do not 
need mutual support any longer, and therefore lead secluded and individualistic lives. Scott 
(1976: 61), writing on the moral economy among South-East Asian peasants under colonial 
rule, states that villagers who had economically benefitted from the colonial regime, were no 
longer heeding the claims and demands of the low-asset village population, and instead pur-
sued their economic self-interested claims in a more assertive way. 
I therefore reprise my claim that the provision of comprehensive market-based insurance cov-
erage can be socially and economically liberating to the individual, especially when combined 
with microcredit, while at the same time this liberation erodes existing traditional structures 
and may eventually leave other individuals worse off. This then adds further evidence to my 
postulate of the existence of a “double fortune / double blow” dilemma in microfinance. It is 
even possible that a “portion” of the increased feeling of protection does not relate to protec-
tion from the financial consequences of death itself, but instead to more protection from the 
intricate and precarious post-mortem social pattern. Interestingly, Mosley (2003) also asserts 
high customer satisfaction and a preference for formal protection in his impact assessment of 
micro-health insurance schemes in Uganda and Bangladesh (cf. 3.3.4). However, his conclu-
sions regarding the impact on social capital are the polar opposite of my own, as he writes:  
Within local communities there is compelling evidence that ‘bonding’ social capital in the sense of 
trust, has indeed been strengthened as a consequence of the advent of insurance. (Mosley 2003: 
151) 
For Mosley, insurance strengthens social cohesion instead of leading to more autonomy of the 
families. As his methodology and reasoning are not clearly spelled out, it is difficult to under-
stand why this may be so. One reason could be the different contextual conditions in Uganda 
and Bangladesh as compared to Indonesia. The point I want to make here is that in the current 
discourse on the social impact of microinsurance, as limited as it may be, there are opinions 
that very much diverge from my own.  
If we now look at the customer critique of Payung Keluarga as reflected in table 24, unsurpri-
singly most critique relates to the product’s limited coverage. This critique is understandable 
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if we consider that in effect Payung Keluarga did not address any of the major risks of cus-
tomers, and that not even the husband was covered by the policy - quite in contrast of what 
the product’s name as an “umbrella for the entire family” implies. This critique can also be 
interpreted positively as a clear demand for more microinsurance. “Lack of socialization” 
features as the second most frequent critique by customer groups. However, only three of 19 
groups have voiced this complaint, while another two groups were actually lauding the “good 
socialization” of the product. As mentioned before, I therefore hold the socialization process 
of Payung Keluarga not to be a critical issue.  
Looking at the raised critique, it is also enlightening which of the “usual candidates” did not 
appear as critical: First of all, the issue of affordability did not play a great role. This is of 
course in line with most groups endorsing the cheap premium of Payung Keluarga. In fact, 
when I asked credit group leaders how much they could spare for an education endowment 
product per month, IDR 50.000 (US$ 5.30) was the overall consensus. The women indicated 
that they could finance this from their business profits, and - except for one participant - stated 
that for this they would not cut back on other spending such as arisan contributions. To me, 
this is a further example of the resourcefulness of the insured customers. Another typical (mi-
cro-)insurance issue which does not appear as a concern in table 24 is the issue of trust. As 
alluded to before, the strong attachment and trust in the MFI has successfully averted such 
concerns. On the contrary, if anything, trust appeared as a positive point. Some groups stated 
“trusted”, “heard that claims are paid quickly”, and “promotes togetherness with MFI” as ad-
vantages of Payung Keluarga. The by and large satisfactory socialization has certainly also 
contributed to the confidence in the product. The customers seem to have had little problem 
with the compulsory character of the product. A last, a rather surprising absence from the list 
of critiques is the unfulfilled expectation of a refund. Although this is a matter of principle 
and the most frequently asked customer question (cf. section 7.3.3), the small monetary 
amounts involved seem to render this point too feeble to make it a serious point of critique. 
By and large, however, a comparison of the list of frequently asked questions as reported by 
the loan officers (table 18) with the pro and contra reasons provided by the customer groups 
themselves (table 24), renders a mutually supportive picture: While demand for more cover-
age is salient in both inquiries, issues of affordability and trust do not play a critical role.  
In summary, customer satisfaction with Payung Keluarga was good, mainly due to an in-
creased feeling of protection, good affordability, high levels of trust, and lastly the preserva-
tion of the image of engaging in mutual assistance while in reality switching to the preferred 
form of more autonomous individual protection. The inquiry into the background of customer 
satisfaction clearly reveals that if given a better alternative, low-asset people are inclined to 
opt out of traditional mutual assistance networks which impose severe moral restraints on 
people’s asset accumulation strategies and can cause “social stress”. However, taking the cri-
tique of the limited protection of Payung Keluarga as an indicator, the “liberating” impact of 
this simple product alone will not be sufficient to unravel the clout of the moral economy. 
Yet, the provision of more comprehensive microinsurance is likely to signficantly promote 
such a process. This probability is not critically reflected upon by the microinsurance custom-
ers. The emic perception of microinsurance is considerably more positive than my own criti-
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cal stance. I do not want to romanticize mutual assistance as practiced in Indonesia as a “tradi-
tional ideal”. More pragmatically, I argue again that microinsurance is an agent of social 
change. I add that by tackling the relatively well covered death risk, Payung Keluarga has 
acerbated this role. It has virtually attacked traditional risk management strategies head-on 
(cf. 7.3.4). The following discussion on the beneficiaries’ payout usage pattern provides fur-
ther evidence for this. Presumably, dealing with health and education first would have led to a 
smoother integration of new with existing risk management strategies. However, as outlined 
above, the project constraints did not allow for such daring ventures (cf. section 4.4).  
 
7.6 Beneficiary profile 
The insured had to appoint a beneficiary from their closest relatives at the moment of loan 
application. This was done as a measure to further raise awareness of the insurance coverage, 
and in addition to provide some minimal choice on an otherwise completely obligatory prod-
uct (cf. section 4.4). Initially, I asked the MFIs to electronically record and submit the benefi-
ciaries’ names and kinship status to Allianz. This was due to my intention to later analyze the 
beneficiary choice patterns. During the product acceptance group questionings which pre-
ceded my formal field research some women joked that their husbands may use the payouts to 
finance a remarriage or conspicuous consumption. I therefore wanted to analyze the benefi-
ciary choices to gauge if there was indeed a level of mistrust of women towards their hus-
bands which may induce them to instate their children, siblings or parents as beneficiaries 
instead of their husbands. After I had collected a reasonably large sample of n=17,019 benefi-
ciary choices, the electronic recording of beneficiary choices was abandoned because the co-
responding data entry process was time consuming for Allianz and operationally unnecessary. 
In case of a claim, the MFIs and Allianz could always seek out the original loan application 
document to check on the beneficiary choice. Table 25 presents the pattern of beneficiary 
choices from my sample. 
Table 25: Beneficiary choices of Payung Keluarga customers 2006 - 2007 (n=17,019) 
Sex of insured Beneficiary kinship status # % of female/male 
Female Husband 11,837 80% 
Child 2,402 16% 
Sibling 335 2% 
Mother 177 1% 
Father 67 0% 
Other relative 46 0% 
Male Wife 1,725 80% 
Child 192 9% 
Sibling 106 5% 
Mother 67 3% 
Father 56 3% 
Other relative 9 0% 
Total   17,019 
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Table 25 shows that proportionally just as many women as men chose their spouses as benefi-
ciaries, namely 80 percent. If we recall that 14 percent of the customer component partici-
pants were either single, widowed or divorced (cf. table 11 in section 7.1) it appears that in 
fact the overwhelming majority of married women had chosen their husband as beneficiary 
and vice versa; and those who did not may have done so for practical reasons such as the 
spouse living and working far away. There is therefore no indication of a particular level of 
distrust of women about the “appropriate” fund usage of insurance payouts by their husbands. 
It has to be noted, however, that the loan applications had to be co-signed by the spouses. The 
freedom of non-selection of spouses may thus have been severely limited. Moreover, co-
signature (which is legally required and practically necessary to engage the spouse in case of 
non-repayment) presupposes a certain level of agreement and trust among the spouses. Re-
garding the choice of other beneficiaries, particular social patterns are hard to make out. Be-
cause by terminology Indonesians mostly do not distinguish between male and female rela-
tives, but neutrally refer to anak (child), adik (younger sibling), and kakak (older sibling), the 
data does not allow to distinguish if more boys than girls were chosen as beneficiaries. How-
ever, due to the prevalent cognatic decent system in Indonesia I consider a particular male 
preference as unlikely. I rather suppose that by default the eldest child was chosen. From the 
sample it nonetheless appears that women tend to prefer their children over other non-spouse 
beneficiary choices, and moreover their mothers over their fathers, while with male insured, 
the preference for children is not as strong and the ratio between father and mother is more 
balanced. It would be interesting to verify this further through larger samples and to learn why 
this is so. However, apart from above data the person of the beneficiary remained obscure in 
the daily operational work of Payung Keluarga. Of course, my beneficiary interviews render a 
more detailed picture, but on an admittedly small sample base of only 24 Muslim beneficia-
ries. Most of their socio-demographic data has already been depicted in table 11. In reprise, 
these beneficiaries were mostly male (75%), had a better education then the insured (0% illite-
racy), more formalized employment, and higher average incomes. Moreover, my beneficiary 
interviews were limited to urban and semi-urban areas. I did not interview any “rural” benefi-
ciaries. In addition to this factual information, the sample claim stories in section 6.2 have 
provided narratives on four beneficiaries. Not surprisingly, three of them were male, while 
Ibu Zakiyah of sample claim 1 became de facto beneficiary just because her father had dele-
gated this responsibility to her. Below, in table 26, I present some additional information re-
garding the beneficiaries’ profile (and also the claimants’ profile). Here, the kinship status and 
the principal occupation is stated, as well as qualitative and quantitative information on the 
mutual financial dependency of insured and beneficiary.  
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Table 26: Relationship and financial dependencies of insured and beneficiaries (n=24) 
Insured Beneficiary Financial dependencies  
F/
M 
Principal 
occupation 
at moment 
of death 
F/
M 
 
Kinship 
relation 
Principal 
occupation 
at moment 
of death 
Narrative Ben. on 
insured 
(min 0 - 
max 5) 
Ins. on 
benef. 
(min 0 - 
max 5) 
 
F Housewife M Son University 
student 
- main income earner is father who runs a garage 
- insured (mother) sometimes helped in the fathers ga-
rage, but was mainly housewife 
- beneficiary (son) had his own income as a freelance 
math teacher 
- his parents supported him by providing food and housing 
1 0  
F Housewife F Sister-
in-law 
Clinic 
employee 
- insured was housewife and had borrowed for education 
purposes 
- the husband (original beneficiary), who had a small 
business, had run off with another woman 
- sister-in-law became beneficiary and has her own in-
come from her job in a clinic 
0 0  
F Trader 
(cosmetics 
& clothes) 
M Hus-
band 
Taxi driver - insured (wife) had her own income 
- beneficiary (husband) had his own income 
2 4  
F Trader 
(textiles) 
M Hus-
band 
Trader 
(decorative 
stones) 
- beneficiary (husband) was unemployed before, but was 
just about to open a decorative store trade with funds 
saved from the income of his wife 
5 0  
F Food stall M Hus-
band 
Trader 
(fish) 
- insured (wife) and beneficiary (husband) shared their 
respective incomes 
3 3  
F Housewife M Hus-
band 
Trader 
(vegetable 
hawker) 
- insured was housewife 
- beneficiary (husband) earned money through trading 
0 5  
F Aerobic 
trainer 
M Hus-
band 
Driver and 
garage 
- husband and wife shared their respective incomes, but 
husband’s income was higher 
2 3 sample 
claim 2 
F Trader 
(shoes, 
sandals, 
bags) 
M Hus-
band 
Tailor - insured (wife) was trading for a pastime 
- beneficiary (husband) was main income earner 
2 4  
F Trader M Son Factory 
worker 
- insured (mother) earned her own income 
- beneficiary (son) nevertheless sometimes supported his 
mother financially 
0 2 sample 
claim 4 
F Trader 
(textiles 
and elec-
tronics) 
F Daugh-
ter 
Trader - insured (mother) had her own business 
- beneficiary (daughter) nonetheless had higher income as 
trader and often supported the mother financially 
0 3  
F Trader 
(textiles) 
M Son University 
student 
- insured (mother) had her own small income 
- beneficiary (son) had no income as he was a student but 
he was only supported by the income of father 
0 0  
M Employee 
of TV com-
pany 
M Father Farmer - insured (son) was single, had his own income, and 
sometimes supported his mother and father (beneficiary) 
1 2  
F Trader 
(textiles) 
M Hus-
band 
Office boy - insured (wife) had her own income 
- beneficiary (husband) had his own income as office boy 
- all income was pooled and managed by wife 
- not clear who earned more 
1 3 sample 
claim 3 
F Trader 
(vegeta-
bles) 
M Hus-
band 
Freelance 
construc-
tion worker 
- insured (wife) had her own regular income from trading 
- husband had irregular income from construction projects 
- overall, husband’s income was nonetheless higher 
- the wife was the clear money manager of the family 
2 3  
M Freelance 
electrician 
F Wife Trader - incomes of insured (husband) and beneficiary (wife) 
were separated 
- the husband's income was higher 
4 2  
M Trader 
(dried fish) 
F Wife Trader 
(dried fish) 
- the entire family was engaged in a joint family business 
(dried fish production and trading) 
- income was pooled and shared 
3 3  
F Trader 
(textiles) 
M Hus-
band 
Driver - business of wife (insured) and beneficiary (husband) 
were strictly separate 
- the husbands income was higher 
- the husband provided the initial capital for the business 
of his wife 
1 3  
F Trader 
(textiles, 
food) 
M Hus-
band 
Unem-
ployed 
- beneficiary (husband) was laid off as a bus driver for a 
public bus company 
- he now waited for his pension 
- meanwhile, the insured (wife) supported him from her 
income 
4 0  
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F Food Stall M Hus-
band 
Food Stall - insured (wife) and beneficiary (husband) ran a food stall 
(warung) together and shared the revenues 
3 3  
F Unclear M Son Office boy - insured (mother) had her own income 
- beneficiary (son) also had his own income 
- he sometimes supported his mother out of gratitude, not 
because of the mother's need 
0 1  
F Mobile 
beauty 
salon 
M Hus-
band 
Freelance 
construc-
tion worker 
- incomes of insured (wife) and beneficiary (husband) 
were kept strictly separate 
1 2  
F Trader 
(food) 
M Hus-
band 
Taxi driver - insured (wife) and beneficiary (husband) had two sepa-
rate sources of income 
- husband stopped working to care for wife 
- after wife's death, husband continues his wife's business 
2 3  
F Trader 
(donughts) 
F Daugh-
ter 
Trader 
(textiles) 
- insured (mother) and beneficiary (husband, then passed 
on to daughter) had separate incomes 
- incomes were pooled and administered by the women 
3 3 sample 
claim 1 
F Food stall F Mother-
in-law 
Production 
and sales 
of trad. 
medicine 
(jamu) 
- insured (daughter-in-law) had her own income which 
supported her own nuclear family 
- there was no financial relationship to the beneficiary 
(mother-in-law) 
- the original beneficiary (husband of insured) had died 
before 
0 0  
     Average (all) n=24 1.7 2.2 
      Average (wife insured - husband beneficiary constellations 
only) n=13 
2.1 2.8 
  
I concluded on the stated quantitative numerical values for financial dependency in table 26 
from the beneficiaries’ overall claim story, not from precise measurement of income and ex-
penditure flows. It is therefore a subjective assessment. The aim of table 26 is to highlight as 
palpably as possible what has been mentioned several times already, namely that on average 
the beneficiaries were more independent from the insured (2.2) than vice versa (1.7), especial-
ly in the case of the insured being the wife and the beneficiary being the husband (2.8 vs. 2.1). 
However, it also becomes clear that while being the main breadwinner, the husband is rarely 
the sole earner of the family. The fact that many beneficiaries had separate incomes from the 
insured does not automatically mean that the two incomes were kept separate for family mon-
ey management. The most frequent arrangement was that the husband passed (most of) his 
income on to the wife who was the primary family money manager, and who also put in her 
share to the family budget. In this arrangement, the husbands often did not know how much 
their wives were actually earning, just as in case of Pak Wahyu in sample claim 3 (cf. section 
7.1.1; cf. Lont 2000). 
 
7.7 Perceptions of death and the insurance payouts 
Much of the reasoning behind the payout usage as documented in table 12 is influenced by the 
perception of death as the trigger for the payouts, as well as the perception and timing of the 
claim payouts. These influencing factors are described first before a more detailed discussion 
of the various payout usages follows in section 7.8. 
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7.7.1  Perceptions of death 
As alluded to, death is traditionally regarded as a particularly critical life cycle event and 
moreover as a collective and exogenous risk (cf. section 7.2). Van Gennep (1960) has de-
scribed death and the accompanying funeral rituals in traditional societies as rites of pas-
sage.48 The spirit of the dead is believed to embark on a passage of certain length before arriv-
ing in the afterlife. During the time of passage the deceased is still a “living dead” (Chambert-
Loir and Reid 2002: xx). Only when funeral rites have been properly performed, and the flesh 
and the fluids have disappeared, and the bones are perfectly dry, then the pacified soul can 
reach its ultimate abode. In case that the prescribed funeral rites are not performed properly, 
the spirit’s passage to the afterlife fails and leaves the spirit caught up between the present 
world and the afterlife where it would continue to haunt the living and bring misfortune upon 
the family and the community as a perpetual disgruntled “living dead”. This is why death in 
traditional societies is perceived as a collective risk (cf. section 7.2). Funeral rites are not only 
necessary for the benefit of the deceased, but also for the protection and long-term benefit of 
the living (Van Gennep 1960: 160-161). According to this reasoning, funeral rituals therefore 
serve pragmatic and economic purposes. Among other things, they are an investment into the 
future prosperity of the family and community. All matters surrounding death have to be dealt 
with as properly as possible. Where pragmatism was allowed during life, in death this is not 
the case. Death has to be clean. Chambert-Loir and Reid (2002) argue that this basic percep-
tion of death also applies to traditional Indonesian societies and bears relevance until today. 
Building on the many respective comments I received from customers and beneficiaries I can 
only confirm this. One good example is the worry of Lulu Setiawan in sample claim 4 about 
the origin of the insurance payouts and his decision to play as safe as possible and donate the 
remaining insurance funds as charity. Similar concerns regarding life insurance payouts in 
Indonesia have been reported by Samik-Ibrahim (1963: 106). An ustaj who I interviewed also 
acknowledged that in his community the origin of funds needed to be particularly clear in case 
of death.49 Because death threatens the balance of the family and the community, overt ex-
pressions of grief and bereavement are disapproved in Indonesia as further accentuating the 
precarious situation. This is particularly so among the Javanese. Instead, the family is sup-
posed to maintain a state of willed unaffectedness (iklas) and the community has to strive for 
preserving its communal harmony (rukun) (Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 76; Geertz 2000: 153). The 
preservation of inner balance and harmony is therefore intertwined with the preservation of 
collective harmony, which naturally calls for strong community support for the bereft family. 
Already Van Gennep (1960: 165) notes that traditional funerals are collective affairs involv-
ing the serving of food. In Indonesia, this traditional feast is the death slametan which is of 
autochthonous, pre-Islamic origin (Forshee 2006: 37-38), despite some claims that the slame-
tan is an entirely Islamic affair (Muhaimin 1995: 11).50
                                                 
48 Rites de passage, the French original of Van Gennep’s treatise, was first published in 1909. 
  
49 Interview with Ustaj Fahmi of Pesantren Al-Futuwah in Jakarta on 7 May 2008. 
50 All academic and religious experts, who I interviewed - whether affiliated with NU or with Muhammadiyah - 
agreed that the slametan was not authentically Islamic. 
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The important underlying presumption in the perception of death as a rite of passage is the 
belief in the continuity of a relation between the dead and the living. The dead, at least for a 
considerable amount of time, can still influence the fortunes of the living. Especially powerful 
dignitaries in the present world, such as the founders of a village or leaders of a clan, can even 
become powerful spirits in the afterworld with a continuous influence in worldly affairs. Such 
ancestor cult is an important ingredient of many autochthonous belief systems, also in Indone-
sia (Chambert-Loir and Reid 2002: xix). Opinions vary, however, as to the extent of ancestor 
worship in contemporary Indonesia. Already in the 1950s, Geertz perceived no particularly 
elaborate ancestor worship in Central Java:  
Javanese ‘ancestor worship’ . . . amounts to little more than a pious expression of respect for the 
dead plus a lively awareness of the necessity of being on good terms with one's own deceased fa-
ther and mother and of being sure to feed them some rice or flowers when they appear in one's 
dreams. (Geertz 1960: 76) 
Chambert-Loir (2002), on the other hand, regards a more holistic ancestor cult to be vibrantly 
alive in modern Indonesia. He exemplifies this by the still strong-going worship of Muslim 
saints in Java, and he criticizes Geertz for not having sufficiently taken note of this phenome-
non (Chambert-Loir 2002: 133). I have not inquired deeply into the matter during my re-
search. However, as far as my own findings allow for it, I can at least confirm Geertz’ state-
ment that there is a strong reverence for one’s own deceased parents among NU leaning mi-
croinsured customers. In addition, just as before, death seems to be still perceived as a collec-
tive and exogenous risk and in consequence funeral rites are a collective affair. One particular 
telling episode took place during a group leader session in Tangerang in Oktober 2008. The 
participants and I were just discussing the issue of slametan and that Muhammadiyah was 
critical of this practice when the group reported how a recently deceased Indonesian horror 
movie actress, Suzana, had wished that no special funeral rites were to be held for her (cf. 
Antara News 2008) The group leaders then - somewhat jokingly - remarked that for this 
strange behavior Suzana would probably become a hantu herself to haunt the living. Despite 
the humorous overtones of this episode, it nonetheless reveals real undertones of an ongoing 
preoccupation with death as a collective risk. Orthodox Islam, on the other hand, takes a ra-
ther rigid attitude towards death which is perceived as a definite cut between the dead and the 
living without further interaction (Smith and Haddad 1981: 7; Van Bruinessen 1996: 170-
171). Muhammadiyah as the largest modernist Islamic organization in Indonesa therefore 
denounces all kinds of ancestor worship and the continuous preoccupation with the deceased 
after death as epitomized by the prolonged sequence of death slametan at various stages after 
death (Geertz 1960: 139; Van Bruinessen 1996: 170-171). Contrary to Muhammadiyah and 
other modernists, NU takes a more accommodative stance towards traditional perceptions of 
death and the accompanying funeral rites. Several of my interview partners confirmed that 
NU and preceding Muslim missionaries in Indonesia had opted for an Islamization of the tra-
ditional funeral rites instead of an outright ban in order to spread Islam more easily among the 
population. The NU leaning ustaj who I spoke to all endorsed the holding of slametan and 
accompanying rites such as the nightly tahlilan prayer sessions for the first seven days after 
death (cf. Van Bruinessen 1996: 170). However, the ustaj were quick to point out that a sla-
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metan should only be held according to the means of the family. It should not create a finan-
cial burden to the family. It was therefore not required of the ‘poor’ (orang miskin). Moreo-
ver, the ustaj basically acknowledged that death represented a general cut between the de-
ceased, who were now in the afterworld (akhirat), and the living, who were still in the present 
world (dunia) (cf. Smith and Haddad 1981: 6-7). Death also ends the possibility for Muslim 
to accumulate merits (pahala) for the final accounting of their personal good and bad deeds at 
the Day of Judgment. However, as typical for an NU perspective, the ustaj saw some flexibili-
ty here. According to them, three things of the present world could still benefit the dead in the 
afterworld and increase their pahala: (1) ilmu, that is knowledge which the deceased has 
created during his lifetime and which continues to do good among the living, (2) amal, that is 
charity which the deceased has given during his lifetime and which still continues to exert 
positive impact, and lastly (3) anak yang sholeh, that are well behaved children who continue 
to be good Muslim full of gratitude for their parents. Not surprisingly, I also found this three-
pronged idea of ilmu, amal and anak yang sholeh among the surveyed customers and benefi-
ciaries. Especially relevant to the matter of death and funeral rites is the interpretation of what 
anak yang sholeh entails. First and foremost, it seems to refer to children continuing to pray 
for the good of their parents. All respondents emphasized the importance of the prayer of the 
children after death. The prayer of more distant relatives and friends and especially of orphans 
was considered helpful and supportive, but ultimately of less importance. Smith and Haddad 
(1981: 60) point out that the belief in the benefits of praying for the dead are a widespread, 
but not unanimously accepted Islamic tradition. Next to praying, the microinsured customers 
and the beneficiaries also considered the holding of a proper slametan, including all the pre-
scribed foods, as an expression of anak yang sholeh.51
The interviewed ustaj further outlined the de facto continuance of a connection between the 
dead and the living by recounting various stories from the Hadith. The Hadith are a vast col-
lection of stories of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his early followers. In fact, various 
different collections of Hadith exist. Different from the Qu’ran they are not fully canonized 
and there is a fair amount of disagreement among Muslim scholars as to which of the stories 
are authentic and authoritative and which are not (Gibb and Kramers 2001: 116-120). One of 
the interviewed ustaj recounted the Hadith story of a man to whom his late father had ap-
peared naked in a dream. Hearing about it, the prophet Muhammad recommended that the 
man should give clothes to the poor. This done, the man again dreamed of his late father, who 
wore clothes this time around. The ustaj then interpreted this story as a clear indication of 
how the good deeds of the children done in memory of their parents were still benefitting the 
dead parents. However, the ustaj also acknowledged that such stories were not universally 
acknowledged as authentic. During my ustaj interviews, I was in fact told a number of similar 
stories from the Hadith. Smith and Haddad (1981: 51-52) also report on a number of analog-
ous stories, albeit not the same which I was told. Besides effectively blurring the boundary 
 
                                                 
51 The notion of those three continuing pahala generators was also shared by some Muhammadiyah leaning 
experts who I interviewed. However, they exposed a much more limited definition of them. Slametan, for exam-
ple, was definitely not included into their definition of anak yang sholeh. 
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between the present world and the afterlife, the ustaj also emphasized that according to their 
Islamic practice, the handling of the funeral was very much a collective affair. The ustaj 
called it a collective duty (fard kifayah) of all Muslim in the community to take care of the 
proper funeral of a deceased Muslim community member (cf. Jonker 1997: 161, 163; Gibb 
and Kramers 2001: 100). The principal purpose of this is to alleviate the burden of the bereft 
family. The family, already emotionally burdened by the loss of a loved one, is not to be 
doubly burdened by adding the logistic and financial worries of a funeral. This Islamic idea of 
collectivity corresponds well with the autochthonous perception of the funeral as a collective 
responsibility. Nonetheless, the ustaj pointed out that the proper Islamic funeral only consists 
of four specific tasks to be carried out as soon as possible after death: (1) the washing of the 
dead (dimandikan), (2) the wrapping of the dead in clean cloth (dikafani, dibungkus), (3) the 
prescribed prayers for the dead (disholat), and (4) the actual burying of the corpse (dikubur). 
These four tasks have been widely described as the basic Islamic funeral rites in the literature 
(Geertz 1960: 139; Granqvist 1965; Idlemann Smith and Haddad 1981: 31-62; Muhaimin 
1995: 150-151; Jonker 1997: 153-158). Some experts in Indonesia, who all showed awareness 
that the core Islamic burial only consisted of these four tasks, added that an additional fifth 
requirement is the praying of the children for their late parents. This praying, however, is not 
defined in terms of content, timing and frequency. Also customers, group leaders and benefi-
ciaries were generally aware that only those four to five steps made up the core Islamic burial 
and that the slametan was not prescribed by religion but by tradition (tradisi). When I asked 
respondents on their motivation to hold a slametan, the unanimous first answer was that this 
was done because tradition prescribed it this way, not because religion did. However, in some 
cases there was some initial discussion and confusion as to whether the slametan was or 
wasn’t a religious duty before the groups came to the concise answer that it wasn’t. When I 
inquired further what the benefit of the slametan tradition was, typical comments from the 
respondents were: (1) “slametan untuk masa depan lancar” (The slametan is for a smooth 
future); (2) “slametan untuk menambah rezeki, baik di dunia maupun di akhirat” (The slame-
tan serves to increase our fortune, in the present world as well in the afterworld); and (3) “bila 
tidak ada slametan, masih rasa berhutang” (Without a slametan, there is still a feeling of open 
accounts). These comments show how deeply ingrained the notion of the importance of a 
proper funeral - the bulk of which is made up by the death slametan - still is among low-asset 
NU leaning people in Indonesia. Moreover, the comments point out that a slametan is per-
ceived as being mutually beneficial for the living and the dead, and in fact necessary for the 
future prosperity of the living (cf. Geertz 1960: 14-15). This all resounds the ideas of death as 
a collective risk and of a proper funeral as a risk mitigation tool which I have previously out-
lined.  
Eventually, a rather complex mixture of autochthonous and Islamic perceptions of death and 
related practices emerges from among the low-asset respondents I could talk to: (1) In both 
perceptions, death is perceived as a collective event and the funeral as a collective duty. (2) In 
both perceptions, there is a more or less continuing relationship between the living and the 
dead, even if orthodox Islamic doctrine - much softened by an NU perspective - speaks 
against it. (3) In the autochthonous perspective, the dead influence the fortune of the living, 
while the Islamic perspective adds the idea that the living can influence the pahala of the 
 
212 
 
dead. These two perceptions are not mutually exclusive, but seem to have merged into a har-
monious symbiosis. Conducting proper funerals, from the core Islamic burial ritual on to the 
autochthonous (although heavily Islamized) funeral rites, is therefore mutually beneficial and 
in effect a balanced reciprocal relationship. Also Sutrisnaatmaka (1987) clearly observes this 
vertical, transcendental reciprocity:  
First, ancestor worship was originally intended especially to ask help and protection from them. 
But after receiving the doctrine of life after death; their devotion changed: now they pray for the 
salvation of their ancestors' souls by holding slametans from the day of the death until the thou-
sandth day. (Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 134) 
However, while Sutrisnaatmaka primarily sees a reversal of direction (first prayer for one’s 
own protection, then prayer for the salvation of someone else), I see both aspects to be simul-
taneously at work: The death slametan still has a worldly utility of protection (its simultane-
ous status utility will be discussed in section 7.8.1), but through the advent of Islam it has 
been further enriched by a transcendental component. This way, the ritual has become even 
more beneficial for all involved - the dead and the living - than before. This may help to ex-
plain why despite the rapid transformation of Indonesia and the strong call of the Islamic 
modernists to abandon the practice, the slametan is still going strong. In fact, I hold the slame-
tan as a prime example for the much discussed ability of Indonesians to adapt and enrich ex-
ternal influences to their needs, not only in outward practice as epitomized by the Islamization 
of the slametan itself, but also in the underlying belief system.  
One may note here that the perception of death as a collective risk was originally conceived in 
more or less egalitarian and socially relatively undifferentiated agrarian village communities. 
There, labor intensive agrarian (wet-rice) production and the accompanying risks to subsis-
tence created mutual dependencies, which in turn created a self-interested concern of one 
community member for the welfare of the other. It is fair to ask if the concept of the commu-
nity as sharing a “common destiny” and sharing collective risks such as an individual’s death 
is still relevant in the urban or semi-urban context where I conducted most of my research. I 
hold that this concept is indeed still very much relevant. Despite their social heterogeneity I 
found the insured customers very much active in widespread social networks in their kam-
pung, not the least through their MFI credit groups and various arisan memberships. I per-
ceived this as an effort to reenact a sense of community and homeliness which had been lost 
through the migration from their villages of origin. The obligation of the surrounding families 
to attend a slametan was still very much emphasized and treasured among my respondents. In 
fact, the slametan may thereby serve as a starting mechanism for communal relationships in 
new surroundings. Moreover, if the villages were rich in various kinds of ghosts (cf. Schröter 
2000), urban centers are by no means free from them. In fact, urban ghosts can be taken as 
less well known than the age-old rural ones. To the migrants, the kampung is therefore not 
only spatially and socially new terrain, but also spiritually. All the more is it imperative under 
such circumstances to be particularly careful in well-known precarious situations such as the 
death of a neighbor.  
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It is possible that particularly high levels of migration, high fluctuation of people, and ethnic 
diversity may thwart such efforts to reenact a sense of community along with reenacted 
rites.52
7.7.2 Perceptions of the insurance payout 
 In such fluid social conditions, the case for microinsurance as a complementary rather 
than supplementary form of protection may be strengthened, but this has to remain a hypothe-
sis as I have not done research in such areas. In the kampung where I did my research such 
reenacted communities were visible and thriving, although they may have been somewhat 
more exclusivist than in rural areas (cf. Koning 2006). 
The claim payouts occurred on average 28 calendar days after death, although the individual 
variance was high. In all but a few cases, payout occurred before the 40th day death slametan. 
On average, the 24 interviewed Muslim beneficiaries received payouts of US$ 331. The aver-
age waived loan balance amounted to US$ 68. My beneficiary interviews where held about 
two months after payout and three months after death. At the time of my interviews, the bene-
ficiaries gave an almost ideal impression of the state of iklas, of willful affectlessness. Only at 
very few occasions did I notice the beneficiaries, women and men alike, to become emotional 
when they recounted the circumstances of death and the following claim process and claim 
payout. By and large, the beneficiaries were indeed very much composed and factual in their 
accounts.  
14 of 24 Muslim beneficiaries stated that the insured had told them about the insurance. Of 
these 14 “informed” beneficiaries, only four claimed to have known the exact benefit amount 
while the insured was still alive. Three more stated to have had a vague idea of the insurance 
benefits. In other words, most beneficiaries had no or only vague ideas of the insurance cov-
erage of the insured. When I asked the beneficiaries about how it was possible that they had 
received such high payouts while the insured had only paid a minimal contribution, no benefi-
ciary knew the answer. Here, the finding of a lack of understanding of the risk and resource 
pooling principle is the same as earlier with the insured (cf. section 7.3.3). When I asked the 
beneficiaries what they thought was the source of payout funds, 14 stated to have no idea, 
including Haji Mustani of sample claim 4 who eventually referred to Allah as the source of all 
things, including the insurance payouts. Only two beneficiaries identified the payout as com-
ing from the insurance as a due service. Very telling is the explanation of the remaining eight 
beneficiaries: They perceived the payouts as some form of donation, mostly originating from 
the MFIs but also from the insurance company or even from some foreign government. The 
association of insurance payouts with donations has been noticed by Heydel et al. (2009: 53) 
before, but they do not provide an explanation as to why this occurs. According to my find-
ings such association can be attributed to several reasons: (1) Most beneficiaries had only a 
vague idea of the insurance contract of the insured, (2) no beneficiary knew about the rela-
tionship between premiums and payouts, (3) and most importantly, all traditional assistance in 
                                                 
52 This observation is based on personal communication with Mario Wilhelm, who had noticed a considerable 
degree of social atomization in several highly diverse and migratory kampung in Jakarta where he conducted 
research. 
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case of a death comes in form of donations by the community and the family, unless money is 
borrowed on more or less informal terms. As the insurance payout was clearly not a loan ar-
rangement, what else could it be than a donation, the only other well-known option?  
Because the post-mortem sumbangan donations are clearly marked for the benefit of the dead, 
this usage limitation is also transferred onto the insurance payouts. Two beneficiaries consi-
dered it haram (religiously prohibited) to use the insurance payouts for anything else than the 
benefit of the insured, for example in form of funeral ceremonies, amal, or repayment of out-
standing debts. While one beneficiary, Lulu Setiawan of sample claim 4, had doubts as to the 
freedom of usage and preferred to play safe in donating the remaining money, the remaining 
Muslim beneficiaries saw no explicit religious restrictions on how payouts could be used. 
However, many noted the moral constraint that religious obligations and traditional obliga-
tions needed to be fulfilled first, and that the remaining money (if any) was not to be used 
erroneously (tidak salah guna), for example for buying cigarettes, mobile phones et cetera. By 
tendency then, payouts were perceived as donations and as belonging more to the dead than to 
the living. Apart from a few exceptions, the idea that the insurance payouts may be used as 
compensation for lost income or for searching new income opportunities was alien to the be-
neficiaries. Religion again plays a role here. The idea of compensation seems strange for 
something which has been preordained by divine will. It has also been noted before that un-
like all other “donations”, the source of funds from the insurance payout was unclear to many 
beneficiaries, which caused some of them to feel anxious, for example in case of Lulu Setia-
wan of sample claim 4. By and large, however, the payout was perceived positively by the 
beneficiaries as a form of rezeki, as an unexpected financial windfall in consequence of the 
death of the insured. This in turn entailed not only the obligation to use the money wisely in 
remembrance of the deceased, but also the obligation to share at least some of the spoils. This 
perception was not only held by the beneficiaries themselves, but also by their social network. 
The pressure which the friends of Haji Mustani of sample claim 2 exerted upon him to hold a 
particularly large slametan with good food and small income opportunities for many commu-
nity members is a case in point. Here again we find a key precept of embedded moral socie-
ties, namely the sharing of misfortune and fortune alike in order to maintain the social com-
munal balance. In line with this is the observation that 19 out of 24 claim payment ceremonies 
were non-private. They were attended to by a variety of persons other than the close family, 
the credit group leader, and the MFI staff. Although these non-private ceremonies were not 
large in the sense of large scale public events with a stage, tent, and food, they were nonethe-
less collective. Very often the RT and various members of the credit group attended. In fact, 
most beneficiaries asserted that they preferred the claim payment ceremony to be public in-
stead of private. They said that they felt more comfortable if there were witnesses to the pro-
cedure and if it was generally more lively (lebih ramai). By and large then, beneficiaries did 
not try to keep the payouts their own private secret. One beneficiary remarked that this was 
not possible in the tightly crowded kampung anyway. It has also been noted already that the 
great majority of beneficiaries talked openly about the claim payment with their friends, 
neighbors and colleagues (cf. section 7.3.3). Although there were exceptions to any of the 
above observations, by tendency insurance payouts are nearly as much collective affairs as the 
death of a community member.  
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7.8  The payout usage pattern explained 
7.8.1  Slametan and other funeral ceremonies 
37 percent of all additional payouts of Payung Keluarga which the 24 interviewed Muslim 
beneficiaries had received were spent on funeral ceremonies (see table 12). 18 of the 24 bene-
ficiaries had spent at least some part of their payouts on these ceremonies. The question as to 
why this has occurred can easily be answered when taking recourse to the preceding discus-
sion. The beneficiaries unanimously considered a proper funeral as obligatory. To all benefi-
ciaries, a proper funeral consisted of both the prescribed Islamic funeral, which is relatively 
simple, and a number of slametan. Such proper holding of the funeral would ensure a safe 
passage of the deceased to the afterlife and increase the deceased’s pahala for Judgement day, 
while in turn the living would benefit from the protection from evil, misguided spirits and 
even from blessings provided by the deceased ancestors. This makes for a symbiotic mix of 
Islamic and authochtonous beliefs. As the insurance payouts were perceived as donations 
primarily targeted to the benefit of the deceased, one of the most obvious usage options was 
therefore an investment into a proper funeral. I consciously call this usage an investment be-
cause customers and beneficiaries alike perceived funeral spending as a precondition for their 
own prosperous future. In Western terms, this may be dubbed a social investment, but in the 
embedded context of the low-asset Payung Keluarga customers I hold funeral spending to be 
a socio-economic investment. As is typical for embedded contexts, the social sphere cannot be 
segregated from the economic sphere.  
Even if the question of the “why” of such usage has thus been answered, there is still the 
question of the corresponding impact of Payung Keluarga on the funeral pattern. This remain-
ing open question prompts me to first consider the question of the slametan and how its pat-
tern is changing in contemporary Indonesia at some length. The way the slametan pattern is 
changing offers a micro-reflection of the way Indonesian society is changing in the course of 
its “Great Transformation” and how it is demonstrating time and time again its fundamental 
ability to adapt, absorb and mix different external influences with existing local patterns. In 
the sense of Schröter (2000: 22), in a condensed and rather standardized form the slametan 
ritual mirrors the general state of society and its transformational processes. This makes it a 
prime opportunity for researchers to study larger societal processes as if seen through a fixed-
focus lens. What is more, the way microinsurance has impacted the slametan pattern is throw-
ing a light onto the consequences which a larger scale spread of microinsurance may have. As 
these realizations occurred to me quite late in the research process and only hit me in their full 
force during the data analysis, the slametan much unexpectedly became a lynchpin for my 
line of argument. I have to admit that I have never participated in a death slametan myself as 
this was not part of my research agenda until very late. I have of course witnessed slametan in 
passing as they were quite frequent in the kampung where I was living. But my information 
on slametan is largely based on my interviews with the beneficiaries and on ancillary expert 
interviews, and also complemented by excellent descriptions of this ritual by scholars such as 
Geertz (1960; 1962; 2000), Sutrisnaatmaka (1987), or Newberry (2007).  
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Although the slametan and other funeral ceremonies have already been mentioned several 
times during the discussion, at this stage it is nonetheless useful to present a comprehensive 
description: Death is announced in the kampung using the loud speakers of the local mosque. 
This is also true for non-Muslim deaths. Word of the recent death spreads quickly, especially 
now when most Indonesians have access to mobile phones. As soon as the news spreads, 
community members start to gather in the home of the bereft family. An open basket called 
baskom is put up in the home to receive the sumbangan donations of the visitors. Previously, 
sumbangan were given in kind, but with the monetarization of the economy, they are now 
mostly given in cash by putting small envelopes filled with Rupiah bills into the baskom (cf. 
Geertz 1962: 245). The size is of the donation is therefore not immediately visible, but ac-
cording to my respondents, everybody knows well enough how much to give: namely accord-
ing to one’s financial capacity. Amounts generally seem to vary between IDR 10,000 (US$ 
1.05) and IDR 100,000 (US$ 10.50). If death occurs in hospital, the process of giving sum-
bangan and preparing for the funeral starts immediately after a phone call has confirmed that 
the medical death certificate has been issued. In any case, the corpse (jeenazah) has to be 
brought home and put up in the home. This relates to the belief that the soul (nafs) or the spirit 
(roh) of the deceased leaves the body soon after death and then likes to linger around the fa-
miliar atmosphere of the home before embarking on the passage to the afterlife a few days 
later.53
                                                 
53 There is some discussion among scholars regarding the differences of soul (nafs) and spirit (roh). However, 
Idlemann Smith and Haddad (1981: 17-18) point out that most past and present scholars fail to precisely distin-
guish between the two. I follow this general interchangeability of terms, although all experts who I interviewed 
spoke of roh, not of nafs. 
 Preparations are coordinated by the RT or the local ustaj and carried out by various 
community members who are often specialists in the various aspects, such as erecting a tent 
with seating on the alley in front of the home to accommodate the increasing number of visi-
tors. As mentioned, the core Islamic burial ritual is initiated as early as possible and is kept 
relatively simple and brief. The body is washed, wrapped, prayed for and then buried in a 
nearby cemetery. Coffins are not used because it is an Islamic belief that the dead body has to 
touch the soil in the grave to ensure a smooth passage. All in all, this ritual is relatively inex-
pensive. The cloth for wrapping the jeenazah is often provided free of charge by the local 
mosque. The grave diggers and the leading ustaj receive token fees for their services. Among 
the beneficiaries, the burial ground was provided free of charge at the local community ceme-
tery. Other informants, however, mentioned that in urban centers a burial place often needs to 
be rented from the municipality at considerable costs. If death occurs before the afternoon, the 
burial takes place in the afternoon of the same day. If death occurs later in the day or during 
the night, the next day is awaited (cf. Muhaimin 1995: 150). After the burial, the first slame-
tan is held at the home of the deceased. The slametan is a communal feast. It is attended to by 
the members of the surrounding community. Food is served and prayers are held. Contrary to 
the elaborate funeral ceremonies on Sumba or those of the Toraja in Sulawesi, the slametan is 
a relatively small event. Geertz (1960: 11) describes it as a “simple, formal, undramatic, al-
most furtive, little ritual.” However, I will shortly outline how the contemporary urban slame-
tan is gradually becoming more conspicuous. As noted, slametan are of pre-Islamic origin and 
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widely practiced in Java. Sutrisnaatmaka (1987: 13) notes that also Catholic Javanese hold 
slametan. This further adds to the evidence of slametan being of pre-Islamic origin. I also 
found people in Aceh, Padang, and Manado to be practicing slametan much along the same 
lines as in Java. However, generally speaking, the slametan is strongly associated with Mus-
lim Javanese.  
Traditionally, slametan are held at any major life cycle event such as birth, circumcision, mar-
riage and death. Slametan can also be held when moving houses, when embarking or return-
ing from a journey, or at any other occasion which the holder of the slametan regards appro-
priate. Furthermore, slametan are held in connection with calendrical events, at the occasion 
of the traditional communal cleansing of the village, and in connection with the agrarian cycle 
of wet-rice production (Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 54-55). However, with the decreasing social 
and economic importance of agriculture, these agrarian slametan are rapidly losing ground 
(Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 107). Of all slametan, the death slametan seems to have retained most 
of its original importance and still forms a central part of everyday life in the low-asset kam-
pung which I visited (cf. Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 146; cf. Newberry 2007: 1309). Due to the 
fact that the death slametan is the only one relevant in connection with Payung Keluarga, the 
following discussion focuses on this type of slametan and moreover only in its application 
among NU leaning Muslim in urban and semi-urban Java. Yet, as the diverse ethnic back-
ground of the beneficiaries indicates, the holders of the slametan do not necessarily have to be 
of Javanese origin. One woman in the group leader component reported that back in her ho-
metown of Padang, her relatives sometimes held slametan, and sometimes did not. In Jakarta, 
on the other hand, her family invariably held slametan in order to adapt to local custom. Other 
credit group leaders confirmed the observation that many migrants choose to follow the local 
slametan custom as a measure of integration. In addition, two cultural experts reported that 
even Muhammadiyah followers were starting to hold slametan as a measure of social recon-
ciliation and integration.54
The death slametan as held in Javanese agrarian villages was originally intended to (1) affirm 
the togetherness, equality and harmony of the community, (2) to provide support to the bereft 
family in order to achieve a state of iklas, (3) to protect the community from evil spirits by 
establishing harmony (rukun) between the living and the spirits, a purpose already ingrained 
in the meaning and origin of the word slametan which Geertz (1960: 14) translates as “noth-
ing is going to happen (to anyone)”, and which according to Muhaimin (1995: 136) derives 
from the Arabic salamah, meaning “peace” or “safety”, (4) to provide for its own financing 
through the collection of sumbangan, and to (5) reinforce the obligation of the holder of the 
slametan to reciprocate with moral support and sumbangan in the case of another community 
member’s future death. Geertz (1962: 245) notes that “the expectation is that over a period of 
time the giving of slametans will balance out among all the families of the neighborhood.” In 
today’s urbanized low-asset environment, the slametan pattern has further evolved from this 
more traditional pattern. Next to reinforcing the sense of community, the slametan now also 
 
                                                 
54 Joint interview with Rahman Abbas and Mardalenna I.F. of Rahmania Foundation in Jakarta on 19 October 
2008. 
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serves as a social starting mechanism in the sense of Gouldner (1960) and Sahlins (1965: 
161), as a vehicle to get a sense of community going. Furthermore, as the need for absolute 
social equality to preserve subsistence insurance for all diminishes, the element of showing 
conspicuous consumption as a measure of demonstrating status is increasing in importance. 
The long-term balancing of accounts fades into the background while status enhancing gener-
al reciprocity becomes stronger. This trend is further promoted by the high social fluctuation 
in urban kampung, which forestalls a longer term accounting of reciprocal contributions. One 
expert fittingly called the modern slametan a networking opportunity, meaning that it offered 
opportunities to meet new influential people and establish connections which may prove 
beneficial for one’s upward social mobility.55
The receding emphasis on the autochthonous spiritual element and the corresponding increas-
ing status consciousness are a long term process. It has been noticed by Geertz (1960: 11), 
Sutrisnaatmaka (1987: 145) and Hüsken and Koning (2006) before. Hüsken and Koning 
write: 
 This function is similar to modern career net-
working events organized for aspiring managers in industrialized countries. In this respect, the 
slametan is turning from a safety net into a springboard, to reprise the formula propagated by 
the World Bank in connection with its SRM framework (cf. section 3.1.2). At the same time, 
the autochthonous spiritual character of the event is increasingly fading into the background. 
For more traditional slametan, Geertz (1960: 15) claims that the food is the most important 
ingredient. The smell of the food is thought to please the spirits. The spirits are even believed 
to take part in the feast. Newberry (2007: 1315) describes the joint preparation of the food by 
the women of the community as an important spiritual and social unifier. However, today, 
food preparation is often outsourced to a catering service and not necessarily served at the 
height of the slametan where the prayers take much more room than before. The food and its 
spiritual connection have therefore lost much of their former importance. In high-asset fami-
lies, so-called “goodie bags” have complemented or even replaced the obligatory box of food 
which the visitors used to take home. Among the surveyed beneficiaries, however, no “goodie 
bags” were used.  
Local allegiance is no longer carrying great moral weight, and reciprocal labour forms are gradual-
ly being replaced by wage labour contracts. . . . Ritual exchanges on the other hand appear to be on 
the increase, becoming more elaborate as they tend to take on features of conspicuous consump-
tion and ways to show off recently acquired wealth and modernity. (Hüsken and Koning 2006: 19) 
This process does not necessarily mean that the slametan is becoming a secularized event, 
although Sutrisnaatmaka (1987: 145) claims that this is at least partly the case. As mentioned, 
Islamic prayers now take up much room in the ceremony. The credit group leaders consistent-
ly emphasized the importance of the prayers. Despite the largely acknowledged non-Islamic 
origin of the slametan, they regarded it as an appropriate vehicle to mobilize as many prayers 
                                                 
55 Interview with Karna Sutisna Priatna, Seto Hardjana, and Umar Abdul Aziz of the University of Passau on 24 
June 2009. The respective comment was made by Seto Hardjana. 
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as possible. In addition, the accompanying ritual of tahlilan, nightly prayer sessions held for 
the first seven nights after death, is also gaining ground (cf. Van Bruinessen 1996: 170).  
Yet, something which is definitely happening to the modern slametan pattern is its economi-
zation, which is in line with the all-encompassing financialization of virtually all asset classes 
(Mahajan 2007a; cf. section 2.4). First of all, as already noted, cash has replaced the previous 
in-kind sumbangan donations. Then, instead of joint food preparations, often a catering ser-
vice has to be paid. Many beneficiaries and experts recounted that important ritual tasks like 
the washing and wrapping of the corpse or the leading of the prayers used to be performed for 
free by experienced community members. Today, such tasks are largely performed by special-
ists who charge fixed fees for their services. In addition, all respondents except for the inter-
viewed ustaj saw a strong inflationary tendency of slametan costs. One example is Haji Mus-
tani in sample claim 2 who noted that “the pressure to spend a lot on the slametan is increas-
ing.” So why did the NU leaning ustaj assert that slametan costs were not increasing? They 
stressed that the slametan should not be about showing status, that the food was not impor-
tant, and that the poor did not need to hold it. Although they generally endorsed the holding of 
the slametan, it should be done according to one’s means and ideally entirely financed by the 
community. Such reasoning appears to be a heavily biased and “expected” answer from pious 
Muslim teachers, especially as it runs counter to the more straight-forward and sober observa-
tions of the beneficiaries and other respondents. In fact, a diminishing of slametan costs 
would financially hurt many NU ustaj. The great majority of them do not receive fixed sala-
ries. Instead, they obtain a large part of their income from performing religious services such 
as the leading of slametan ceremonies.56
In line with the assertion of Geertz (2000: vi; cf. section 5.3.1) that the reality as perceived by 
the researcher is more complex than its post-hoc organization into chaptered books and the-
matic monographs might suggest, so also the described transformation of the slametan pattern 
 It is therefore unlikely that the ustaj are full-
heartedly promoting a scale down of slametan expenses; that is, of their own income oppor-
tunities. Not surprisingly, the group leader respondents reported that their local ustaj were 
generally propagating to hold slametan according to one’s means rather than a low-cost ver-
sion. In short, although I have not done a longitudinal inquiry on it I am quite sure that by and 
large slametan costs are increasing, and in fact increasing faster than the normal inflationary 
rate in Indonesia, which gives another indication that status considerations are of increasing 
importance in the slametan pattern. This does not necessarily have to be a conscious reflection 
by the slametan holders. Haji Mustani clearly speaks of the pressure exerted on him to spend 
more than planned on the slametan. The pressure to add more conspicuous consumption and 
ritual to the slametan is therefore also exerted by the social network. This is quite understand-
able as bigger and more monetarized funeral ceremonies offer a number of income opportuni-
ties to participants while the pressure to reciprocate on balanced terms is diminishing.  
                                                 
56 I am grateful to Dr. Zurkon Kamil of the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) at Universitas 
Islam Negara (UIN) in Jakarta for pointing this out to me during our interview on 6 February 2008. I am also 
grateful to Dr. Werner Kraus of the University of Passau for further confirming this observation during our in-
terview on 23 June 2009. 
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from safety net to springboard, from balanced to general reciprocity is not as linear, uniform 
and coherent as the above analysis might suggest. Quite recently, for example, Newberry 
(2007: 1313) notices that the food, which was still self-prepared in the kampung where he did 
his research, was not distributed to low-asset families in the community, but strictly kept 
within the rather exclusive network of families of equal socio-economic standing. This would 
indicate a strong continuance of the more traditional slametan pattern based on balanced reci-
procity. On the other hand, the respondents I talked to confirmed time and time again that it 
did not matter whether the neighbors who attended were rich or poor. According to their opi-
nions, everyone was welcome at a slametan, regardless of status and religion, and only needed 
to give as much sumbangan as he or she could afford. Some experts reported that the slame-
tan for particularly well-known persons are also attended by poor persons from distant loca-
tions who can only contribute US$ 0.52 in sumbangan but nonetheless want to express their 
solidarity. In such occasions, there is of course no expectation of a balancing of accounts. In 
addition, respondents generally contended that it was only the reputation of the deceased 
which decided whether a slametan was attended or not, irrespective of his or her material 
wealth. In the emic perspective, the slametan is therefore much more socially and spiritually 
explained than economically. In summary, I think I can nonetheless conclude that the slame-
tan pattern has definitely expanded its scope in an urban context, and that on average status 
considerations are playing an increasingly important role, quite in line with the increasing 
social heterogeneity and diversification in urban areas. Naturally, the status vector inherent in 
the slametan pattern increases with the asset base, while among low-asset families, the equali-
ty vector still exerts significant clout. In any case, the original driving factors of the slametan 
have not disappeared; they have rather been enriched, reinterpreted, and readjusted along the 
line. From a pre-Islamic ritual, the slametan has turned into a heavily Islamized ritual. Origi-
nating in an agrarian society, it has survived the transition into an urban context, and next to 
being a guarantor of community harmony and mutual assistance, it is increasingly assuming 
the function of a starting mechanism and status vehicle. In the process, the slametan has ad-
mittedly become more conspicuous, but in this respect it has also become stronger than ever. 
This makes the slametan, the core ritual of Javanese society (Geertz 1960), a perfect example 
of the continuity, adaptability and reinvention of long-running social institutions in a rapidly 
transforming Indonesian society, and in fact of the resilience, flexibility and synergetic power 
of this society itself.  
In order to return to the chronology and choreography of the funeral ceremonies, the slametan 
of the 1st day is repeated in a very similar fashion on the 3rd, 7th, 40th, 100th and 1000th day 
after death, always in the late afternoon at the home of the deceased.57
                                                 
57 For explanations for this particular sequence of dates, see Sutrisnaatmaka (1987: 76-84) and Muhaimin (1995: 
151-152). 
 The beneficiaries also 
noted the tradition to commemorate the 1st and 2nd anniversary of death (khaul) with a slame-
tan (cf. Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 82; cf. Van Bruinessen 1996: 170). Five beneficiaries reported 
to have also held a slametan on the 14th day after death. They called this slametan ngujuh and 
explained that the term was derived from two times the Indonesian word for seven (tujuh). 
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However, this seems to be a special tradition as such 14th day slametan were not known to 
other beneficiaries, customers or experts I talked to. Traditionally the 1000th day slametan is 
considered the most important, because on this day the soul is believed to leave the present 
world forever and the body is believed to have decayed entirely (Sutrisnaatmaka 1987: 82). 
However, among the beneficiaries and customers all death slametan beyond the 100th day 
seem to have diminished in relevance. The focus is clearly on the early slametan, especially 
on those of the 7th and 40th day. Geertz (1960: 72) reports that all adult children who maintain 
a separate home are supposed to hold the entire series of slametan at their place, but I only 
found slametan to be held at the home of the deceased and organized by the entire nuclear 
family and the surrounding community. The slametan used to be mainly attended to by men 
as the heads of the neighboring families, while the women were traditionally confined to the 
kitchen preparing the food (Geertz 1960: 12). Today, men, women, and children can attend. 
This is often due to the pragmatic reason that the men are away working, and their wives and 
children have to attend as their deputies. Because catering is increasingly replacing the joint 
preparation of food, formal attendance by women in the slametan proper is further facilitated. 
Geertz (1960: 96; 1962: 245; 2000: 156) is certainly still right that a death slametan still 
comes with the greatest obligation of the surrounding families to attend, and that it is there-
fore primarily geographically defined. However, while before absence was automatically ex-
cused and attributed to an important and urgent reason, nowadays attendance seems to be 
more closely scrutinized, not only in terms of which families attend, but also which members 
of those families. This is a further indication that the earlier communal egalitarian character of 
the slametan is dwindling in favor of a more heterogeneous crowd of visitors.  
The food, whether prepared on site or delivered by catering, always consists of rice and re-
freshments. While in pre-Islamic times, alcohol seems to have been served as well, this has 
long since been replaced by water.58
                                                 
58 This information and all following information on pre-Islamic slametan is based on an interview with Dr. 
Nurhayati Djamas, Dean of the faculty of Islamic studies at Al-Azhar University in Jakarta, on 8 January 2008. 
 For the 3rd day slametan, chicken is served. For the more 
important 7th and 40th day slametan, goat meat is considered more appropriate. Even some of 
the more low-asset beneficiaries served goat meat on those occasions. In practice, the core 
slametan ritual can be further elaborated at will, only constrained by the availability of re-
sources. The holding of a tahlilan ceremony on the first seven nights after death was standard 
among the beneficiaries. In this ceremony, the host and the mostly male visitors chant verses 
of the Qu’ran and other ritual texts, for example the Sura 112 (al-ikhlas or “Sincerety”), the 
so-called Throne Verse (ayat al-kursi) of Sura 2,225, and the repetitive recitation of the creed 
la ilaha illa’llah (“there is no god but Allah”) from which the tahlilan derives its name (cf. 
Van Bruinessen 1996: 170). The tahlilan proper only lasts from the fourth prayer of the day 
(magrib) until the fifth and last prayer of the day (isah); that is, roughly from 18:00 until 
19:30 in the evening. The praying men are compensated for their services with refreshments 
and token payments, which can nonetheless accumulate to considerable sums and represents 
one of the mentioned earning opportunities which funeral ceremonies provide (cf. Geertz 
1960: 72). Those who can afford it have the praying men take turns to chant all through the 
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night or even around the clock. One ustaj in Jakarta reported that it was considered especially 
meritorious (and especially expensive) to have the tahlil repeated 10,000 times per day for the 
first seven days.59
Regarding the costs and financing of the slametan and surrounding ceremonies, as indicated 
by table 16, the 18 Muslim beneficiaries of whom I could obtain sufficient financial informa-
tion spent US$ 375 on average on the entire funeral ceremonies up until the 40th day. The 
lowest amounts spent were US$ 210. Haji Mustani of sample claim 2 recorded the most ex-
pensive funeral ceremonies with US$ 756. Table 27 gives a patchy overview about common 
expenses at funeral ceremonies. This information is based on interviews with the only two 
beneficiaries with whom I happened to discuss the itemization of funeral costs in more detail. 
Thus again, this information is explorative rather than authoritative, and it neglects the slame-
tan beyond the 40th day.
 Such conspicuous extravaganzas were out of reach of the surveyed benefi-
ciaries. Nonetheless, some of them followed the custom to hold additional tahlilan sessions 
every Friday night until the 40th day after death. 
60
Table 27: Common funeral expenses among low-asset Muslim Payung Keluarga benefi-
ciaries (n=2) 
  
Item US$ 
Ustaj on 1st day 6 
Grave diggers 47 
7 tahlilan sessions for the first 7 days 26-37 
3rd day slametan 63 
7th day slametan 74-121 
14th day slametan (not always held) 79 
40th day slametan  
(especially for chicken and goat meat) 
158-210 
 
Apparently, not even the beneficiaries with the lowest asset base had made use of the theoret-
ical option, so frequently mentioned by the interviewed ustaj, to skip a slametan for lack of 
funds. The credit group leaders were not surprised by this finding. They stated that not hold-
ing a slametan would make the respective family feel extremely malu for not being able to 
fulfill socially accepted good standards. It would also induce a feeling of malu towards the 
deceased, a feeling of not being anak yang sholeh, of being disloyal and ingrate. In fact, the 
lower asset families in particular, where private disposable assets and the provided sumban-
gan were far from reaching the minimum of US$ 210, went to great length to nonetheless 
finance a proper slametan, even at the risk of being gengsi which in this context means to go 
beyond ones means in order to live up to a (perceived) social norm (see annex 4 for a more 
                                                 
59 Interview with Ustaj Nurjamil of Yayasan Miftahul Ulan, Jakarta, on 18 October 2008. 
60 One of the few other authors, if not the only one, who provides a cost overview of slametan expenses is Geertz 
(1960: 35-37). As his figures are based on a different historical, geographic, and social context they are hard to 
compare to my own figures. I have therefore refrained from doing so. 
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detailed description of malu and gengsi). Nonetheless, as has already been noted, the sale of 
assets and other high stress coping methods is hardly ever applied in coping with funeral 
costs, at least over the short term (cf. table 11 and section 7.3.1). This also holds true for the 
surveyed beneficiaries (cf. table 16), including those with the lowest asset base. Why then 
were no physical assets sold or no formal emergency loans taken? The beneficiaries and the 
credit group leaders considered these options as strange (aneh) because it was not customary. 
One beneficiary even contended that such measures were prohibited in case of death. In addi-
tion, the credit group leaders pointed out that it would be difficult to obtain emergency loans 
from banks due to their long processing time and requirements. The MFIs do not provide 
emergency loans either. The moneylender as the only timely option was considered too risky 
in this case. However, I believe that apart from such logistic reasons the absence of asset 
sales, formal lending and even the small role of savings depletion strongly relates to con-
straints of religion and tradition. Traditionally, the family was assisted by the community to 
overcome its crisis. In pre-Islamic times, contributions seem to have been raised by way of 
gambling; that is, by donating part of the gambling proceeds, while in modern times, this has 
been replaced by outright contributions. Moreover, the Islamic doctrine of fard kifayah under-
lines the necessity to alleviate the burden of the bereft family, although formally speaking 
fard kifayah only extends onto the Islamic burial as such. If the family were to sell its assets 
or to take out formal loans this would be an open confession that community assistance and 
fard kifayah have failed. This would undermine one of the key purposes of the exercise, 
namely to demonstrate communal harmony and equality. However, informal borrowing at 
lenient terms from family members, friends, or from work was considered as still acceptable. 
In fact, while sumbangan of the community were always marked as donations, family contri-
butions can oscillate from sumbangan to informal loans with more or less clear terms of re-
payment; that is, from direct balanced reciprocity to indirect balanced reciprocity in terms of 
timing of the counter-gift. According to the beneficiaries’ comments, the exact nature of fami-
ly contributions was case dependent. In the light of Sahlin’s concept of reciprocity, it seems to 
be necessary for the family to spend at least slightly more than what comes in through sum-
bangan in order to bestow a “shadow of indebtness” on the attending families which empha-
sizes the obligation to reciprocate in the future (cf. Sahlins 1965: 177; cf. section 2.2.3). Oth-
erwise it could be held that the exchange of prayers and sumbangan for food in a slametan is 
already balanced, which may push the arrangement towards self-liquidation. But again, ex-
penditures in such basically balanced arrangements should not be overtly self-destructive. In 
short, in case of funeral financing, religious and cultural norms keep funeral cost inflation 
through high stress methods in check, a task which is usually assigned to microinsurance but 
obviously unnecessary here, at least over the short term (cf. section 3.3.1).  
Before the advent of Payung Keluarga, funeral expenses were largely covered by two 
sources, sumbangan of the community and family contributions. While sumbangan are given 
shortly after death and cover the costs of the first seven days, albeit not completely, the assis-
tance of the family is called upon for the later slametan, especially the 40th and the 100th day 
slametan. With the insurance payout arriving 28 calendar days after death on average, and 
almost always before the 40th day after death, it is hardly surprising that much of the funds 
were used for the 40th day slametan, with some additional funds being saved for the 100th day 
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(cf. sample claims 2 and 3), and in a few cases even for paying back informal debts incurred 
for the financing of earlier slametan. It is therefore also hardly surprising that the insurance 
payouts have substituted a considerable part of the family assistance which would have oth-
erwise been forthcoming. Nine beneficiaries reported that without Payung Keluarga their 
family and friends would have had to contribute more funds, such as in case of Pak Wahyu of 
sample claim 3. The insurance has therefore crowded out informal familial assistance which 
was moreover highly institutionalized and seemingly effective, most likely even in the case of 
covariant shocks because of the migration-induced geographic spread of social networks. But 
not only that: six beneficiaries, including Haji Mustani of sample claim 2, declared that due to 
Payung Keluarga they had spent more on the funeral ceremonies than they would have done 
without it. Payung Keluarga has therefore not only substituted familial assistance but also 
promoted the long standing inflationary trend of funeral costs, and therewith the continuing 
shift of balances from balanced reciprocity towards status oriented general reciprocity. Be-
cause the insurance payouts were perceived as a form of rezeki that needs to be shared, such 
usage was clearly socialy endorsed and not associated with creating a financial burden to fam-
ily and with being self-destructive. Due to the explorative-quantitative nature of my research, 
the exact amount of substitution and additional cost inflation is impossible to measure, espe-
cially because no hard counterfactual in form of control cases is available. As table 16 indi-
cates, Payung Keluarga has financed approximately 34 percent of funeral costs. Subsitution 
can therefore not be higher than this, and - in the light of a certain degree of parallel additio-
nality in form of inflation – it is in fact likely to be lower. Sumbangan and familial assistance 
are obviously still very much necessary. It is nonetheless clear that the two phenomena of 
crowding out and cost inflation are happening; nota bene, not in all cases but in sufficient cas-
es to give this observation validity by tendency. This also entails that the benefits of Payung 
Keluarga are often literally atomized as they are virtually distributed onto the many family 
members who now have to give a little less than before. The sister of one beneficiary openly 
expressed her satisfaction because due to Payung Keluarga she had to give less of her scarce 
funds to her brother. Therewith, Payung Keluarga clearly demonstrates how it is an actor of 
social change, at least as far as funeral financing and the respective reciprocal arrangements 
are concerned. It furthers a transformation of the slametan pattern which has been ongoing 
since long before the advent of microinsurance. This small-scale example hints at the possible 
impact which the large scale application of microinsurance may, in the worst of cases, have 
on the overall transformation of Indonesian society, namely a further acceleration of this on-
going trend towards status generating general reciprocity, social differentiation and increasing 
social inequality. 
7.8.2 Debt repayment 
Paying off other outstanding debts consumes the second largest portion of funds (21%). Such 
debt repayments were religiously motivated, even more so than proper funeral rites. Accord-
ing to the unanimous belief of customers and beneficiaries, the repayment of debts is a pre-
condition for Muslims to enter Heaven. Although none of the customers and beneficiaries, 
and not even the interviewed ustaj were able to pinpoint any precise Sura or Hadith story to 
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support this claim, Sura 4 (“Women”),11-12 endorses such an understanding as it stresses 
several times that the distribution of the deceased’s inheritance can only start after all debts 
have been settled. Haar (1948: 211) points out that also according to adat law instant debt 
repayment upon death is obligatory, and that repayment must take place before funeral cere-
monies commence. Hooker (1978: 120-121) affirms that the obligation to repay the debt of 
the deceased is common for all adat systems in Indonesia. In addition, Haar (1948: 136) re-
ports that according to adat the debt of a person is perceived as debt of the entire clan, and 
that this joint liability is particularly strong among husband and wife. Although only some 
respondents, particularly in West-Timor, were knowledgeable enough about their own adat 
tradition to confirm this adat obligation, it is likely that such age-old practice still exerts its 
influence and thereby strengthens the parallel Islamic demand. One ustaj described debt as a 
negative inheritance (warisan negatif), which needs to be taken care of by the heirs as much 
as the positive inheritance (warisan positif).61
It was evident that these considerations, although not necessarily consciously reflected, were 
strongly present among customers and beneficiaries. This can be gauged from typical com-
ments such as: (1) “Hutang lunas, mati lancar” (With debts repaid, death will be smooth); (2) 
“Orang meninggal bawa hutang, bingung” (If someone dies and carries debt, that’s confus-
ing). We can also recall that Haji Mustani’s wife pleaded him on her death bed to take care of 
her debt (sample claim 2), and that the first thing Lulu Setiawan did after the insurance payout 
was to repay the outstanding informal debts of his mother (sample claim 4). As these com-
ments and actions strongly focus on a religious and psychological level, I argue that the re-
payment of debt is largely of social benefit rather than being an urgent economic necessity. A 
second observation supporting this argument relates to the nature of the repaid debt. It was 
informal and interest free. Creditors were family members, neighbors or employers. Such 
creditors are unlikely to urge the bereaved family for immediate repayment. Several benefi-
ciaries noted that in the absence of insurance they would have repaid the debts in small in-
stallments, and only if their fortune had allowed for it (kalau rezeki). I did not find one bene-
ficiary who reported that the insured had left outstanding formal debts. In addition, various 
customers, beneficiaries, and one ustaj
 The same ustaj also explained that before enter-
ing Heaven, all open affairs on a horizontal axis, namely among humans, needed to be sorted 
out before the passage on the vertical axis, namely to Heaven, could proceed smoothly. In 
fact, this comment indicates the principal reason for the urgency of debt repayment: Open 
financial accounts are a palpable threat to communal harmony, which is what funeral ceremo-
nies have traditionally tried to avert as much as possible. Therefore, the faster debts are repa-
id, the better for the deceased and the community, ideally even before the actual funeral 
commences.  
62
                                                 
61 Interview with Ustaj Nurjamil of Yayasan Miftahul Ulan in Jakarta on 18 October 2008. 
 reported that it was standard procedure during the 
Islamic burial rites, in between the wrapping of the corpse and the recitation of the funeral 
prayers, to call upon any attending creditors to voice their claims (cf. Muhaimin 1995: 150-
151) The creditor then has the option to insist on debt payment or to waive it. Haar (1948: 
62 Interview with Ustaj Nurjamil of Yayasan Miftahul Ulan in Jakarta on 18 October 2008. 
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211) finds that this procedure is also known in adat law, and among Protestant customer 
component respondents in West-Timor, the practice was also known. The waiving of debts is 
considered highly meritorious for the creditor and seems to occur quite frequently, especially 
in case of minor debts. This underlines the social component of informal financial debt. It is 
questionable if the cancellation of informal debt will remain just as frequent if life insurance 
becomes the norm. When payouts provide the beneficiaries with sufficient funds for debt re-
payment so as not to create a burden from them, why should debt be cancelled any longer? 
Indeed, one beneficiary reported that after the word of the claim payment had spread, a num-
ber of creditors of his late mother had made their appearance although there were no wit-
nesses or written records of their debt claims. In order to play safe and fulfill his religious 
obligations, the beneficiary nonetheless chose to satisfy and pay these claims. 
Naturally, the practice of debt claiming or debt cancellation during funerals does not apply to 
formal credits from banks or MFIs. For banks, respondents voiced the expectation that debts 
are automatically cancelled, probably due to the pervasive use of credit life insurance in the 
banking sector. The MFIs had various and apparently case dependent practices on how to 
handle outstanding debts of deceased customers before the advent of Payung Keluarga. DI-
MAN reported that sometimes they had only noticed that a customer had died when they 
wanted to issue the next loan since the family had continued to regularly pay the loan install-
ments. In other cases, the family had paid off the debt in a lump sum, in yet other cases the 
family had demanded that the debt be cancelled. Other MFIs had kept small provision funds 
to be used for writing of the debts of deceased customers. In any case, the MFIs were careful 
not to press the heirs too insistently on the repayment of debts because after all the relation-
ship between the MFIs and the credit group is heavily socialized, especially through the figure 
of the loan officer. Dunning the heirs too overtly may have caused a backlash on the MFIs. 
In summary, the instant cancellation of informal debts by using some of the insurance funds 
primarily fulfilled social and religious purposes. Psychologically speaking, it was a great re-
lief for the beneficiaries. For the community, it assured the balancing of accounts and preser-
vation of communal harmony. Purely economically speaking, however, such instant debt re-
payment was less urgent and necessary, as the repayment of debts could have been greatly 
extended until economic conditions had allowed for relatively stress-free repayment. Looking 
at the customer and beneficiary comments cited above, I am certain that similar to the execu-
tion of a proper funeral, also the repayment of debt contributes to a “smooth death” (mati lan-
car) which eventually promotes the prosperity of the living. After all, this finally adds an eco-
nomic long term perspective to instant debt repayment, which makes this fund usage - when 
seen from the perspective of the beneficiaries - an equally socio-economic and equally rea-
sonable investment as the spending on funeral ceremonies. Seen from a homo oeconomicus 
perspective, however, it would appear that almost 60 percent of the total additional payouts, 
namely for funeral expenditures (37%) and for debt repayments (21%), were largely “wasted” 
for unproductive social purposes 
It should not be forgotten here that Payung Keluarga also waived the outstanding loan bal-
ance. As noted before, the average outstanding loan balance of the 24 Muslim beneficiaries 
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was US$ 68, which is considerably less than the corresponding average additional payout of 
US$ 331 (cf. 7.7.2). Such waiving of the loan balance certainly contributed to the religious 
and psychological relief described above. Besides, this debt was more formal than the remain-
ing debts of the insured. From an economic perspective, this repayment was therefore more 
urgent and formally obligatory. The cancellation of the loan balance thus clearly provided a 
certain economic relief, but this relief should not be overrated due to the relatively small sums 
involved and the previous leniency by the MFIs in dealing with such debt. 
7.8.3 Business investment 
The third highest position in terms of payout usage, namely economic investment, was more 
in line with the original causal model and the expectations of Allianz (cf. section 4.4.4). How-
ever, with only six instances and 14 percent of funds used, such cases serve more as PR-
compatible show-cases than as representative average cases. Sample claim 1 (Ibu Zakiyah) 
and sample claim 2 (Haji Mustani) certainly make for good show cases, while sample claim 3 
(Pak Wahyu) and sample claim 4 (Lulu Setiawan) do not. In fact, I argue that especially sam-
ple claim 3 serves as a good example for an average claim: the beneficiary was a formally 
employed male, no economic investment was made, most funds were spent on the funeral, 
and only a small portion of the payout was saved for emergency purposes. By and large, 
Payung Keluarga has not “behaved” according to the original causal model of Allianz (cf. 
section 4.4.4). It can neither be said that it brought broad economic relief for the beneficiaries, 
nor that it generally stimulated economic recovery. Economic investments were few and far 
between. More critically, by tendency such investments were made by better-off beneficiaries 
(like Haji Mustani), who can be considered to have commanded the most stable asset bases in 
the first place.  
There appear to be several factors which are conducive to the undertaking of investment after 
the receipt of an insurance payout: (1) a relatively high asset base of the beneficiary, (2) 
payouts well above the customary funeral costs, (3) absence of semi-formal or formal em-
ployment of the beneficiary, (4) presence of an entrepreneurial spirit, and (5) a religious atti-
tude which sanctions the usage of payouts for forward-looking purposes. Regarding point (1), 
a high asset base strongly correlates with higher loan amounts, which in turn produces 
payouts with a higher likelihood of exceeding customary funeral costs (point 2). Point (3), the 
absence of semi-formal or formal employment, relates to the fact that those beneficiaries who 
receive a fixed and stable income are little inclined to give up this security and venture into 
self-employed businesses, all the more if no entrepreneurial spirit is present, as point (4) sug-
gests. Here, claim 3 of Pak Wahyu, the office boy, makes a particularly fitting example. As 
most beneficiaries were men who commanded considerable and independent incomes, often 
from semi-formal or formal employment, they could well afford the documented social in-
vestments. Even more influential than economic need and entrepreneurial spirit was the reli-
gious attitude of the beneficiaries with regards to the insurance payout (point 5). As outlined 
above, most beneficiaries agreed that the primary purpose of the insurance payout as a per-
ceived donation was to serve the “religious” needs of the deceased, not the material needs of 
living (cf. section 7.7.2). Only beneficiaries with a relatively flexible perception in this re-
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spect, like Ibu Zakyiah of sample claim 1, felt morally authorized to use parts of the insurance 
payouts for their own purposes such as economic investment. 
It should be noted that in the few cases where business investments were actually undertaken, 
the returns were considerable. Ibu Zakiyah reported a tripling of her income. The warung 
which Haji Mustani established with the payout generates discretionary savings of US$ 1 to 
US$ 2 per day. Although difficult to measure and standardize, such returns come close to or 
even exceed annual profit margins on invested capital of 100 percent or more. As outlined 
before, such dramatic returns are not uncommon in informal micro-businesses (cf. section 
3.2.3). If these returns would be properly accounted for, computed onto a time series of three 
years and more, and then added to the claim amounts, it is likely that the aggregated “eco-
nomic return” to the insured and their beneficiaries by Payung Keluarga would be much 
higher than the observed 60 percent claim ratio. It could well be that seen from the perspec-
tive of the customers Payung Keluarga even creates an economic surplus, which means that 
the overall return is higher than the original premium payments. Because of the small sample 
size of observed economic investments (and because of my lack of the necessary accounting 
skills) I have refrained from calculating such precise projections. I thus have to leave the 
question of the overall economic return to customers of Payung Keluarga (and other prod-
ucts) open for future research.  
7.8.4 Savings / remaining money 
At the time of my interviews, 11 percent of the total insurance payouts had still not been spent 
and had not been definitely allocated to a definite purpose, such as for the 100th day slametan. 
Some beneficiaries, such as Ibu Zakiyah (sample claim 1) and Pak Wahyu (sample claim 3) 
perceived these funds as emergency savings. Others, however, said that they just had not de-
cided yet what to spend the money on. In any case, this visible but comparatively small por-
tion of savings can be positively credited to the protection function of Payung Keluarga. At 
the same time it also needs to be considered that such emergency funds reduce the necessity 
to rely on one’s family in case of need, which again comes with the noted positive aspects on 
personal financial and social freedom, but with likely negative effects on the level of mutual 
familial and communal cooperation.  
7.8.5 Other usages 
The fact that insurance payouts are often perceived as donations for the deceased explains 
why few funds were spend on education (5%), distribution to other family members (1%) or 
to cover living expenses (1%). While it might be generally expected that family members de-
mand a more explicit share of the sudden rezeki of the beneficiary, just as it has been noted in 
case of funeral insurance in South Africa (Roth 2001: 16), in case of Payung Keluarga this 
was prevented by the piety of family members. Nonetheless, the finding still stands, that indi-
rectly, family members benefitted from Payung Keluarga payouts by having to contribute less 
to the funeral expenses. Moreover, family members can also be seen to share at least some of 
the beneficiary’s socio-economic interest in a decent funeral, and therefore benefit from its 
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proper execution partly financed by Payung Keluarga; and not least of all, the family mem-
bers can enjoy the good treat provided during the slametan feast as much as the other com-
munity members (cf. Geertz 1960: 13).  
Something I find especially noteworthy is the extremely low usage of payouts for living ex-
penses. Only a minuscule one percent of total funds were spent on daily consumption. This 
confirms the earlier observation that beneficiaries were far from facing severe poverty int the 
immediate aftermaths of the death of the insured. This falsifies the underlying hypothesis of 
the original Allianz theory of change (which I very much subscribed to), namely the assump-
tion of a severe post-mortem financial crisis. If anything, such crisis seems to develop only a 
considerable time after death, and potentially only if the deceased was the husband and the 
main breadwinner. 
 
7.9  Impact on beneficiaries 
This section serves as the concluding analysis of the above discussion on the beneficiaries, 
their profile, their perception of death and the insurance payouts, as well as their payout usage 
pattern. In line with the general thrust of this thesis, the central question here concerns the 
social impact of Payung Keluarga on the beneficiaries, especially in relation to the expanded 
asset-capital framework. 
One obvious observation is that much of the observed payout pattern is hinged on the fact that 
the beneficiaries were overwhelmingly male and had higher incomes than the insured. This 
raises the question if the usage pattern would have looked different if Allianz had insured the 
spouses instead of the debtors. To examine this question, I asked the largely female credit 
group leaders and two of my last ex-post customer component groups (n=44) on their recom-
mendations for payout usage. Table 28 compares the obtained recommendations with the ac-
tual payout usage by the beneficiaries.  
Table 28: Comparison of actual and recommended payout usage 
Usage Actual claims 
(n=24 beneficiaries,  
100% Muslim, 75% male) 
Recommendations 
(n=44 insured,  
84% Muslim, 98% female) 
% of payouts rank rank % of points 
Funeral ceremonies (slametan etc.) 37% 1 4 14% 
Paying off other debt 21% 2 1 28% 
Business investment 14% 3 3 18% 
Savings / remaining money 11% 4 5 7% 
Medical costs 5% 5 8 0% 
Education 5% 6 2 23% 
Charity (amal) 4% 7 7 3% 
Others 2% 8 8 0% 
Living expenses 1% 9 6 7% 
Distributing to other family members 0% 10 8 0% 
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The procedure applied in the gathering and weighing of the usage recommendations displayed 
in table 28 is the same as used for the compilation and weighing of risk perception in the cus-
tomer component (cf. section 6.1): First, the respondents gathered ideas of possible usages 
through a brain storming process and then ranked their ideas by signaling their top 1, top 2, 
and top 3 usage recommendations, which each received 3, 2, or 1 point respectively. The un-
derlying assumption of this exercise is that the achieved weighing by points is comparable to 
the actual fund usage of the beneficiaries. It has to be acknowledged, however, that expressed 
intention and actual behavior are almost never 100 percent correlated. The match is therefore 
taken to be approximate, not accurate. Naturally, this exercise was done before I outlined how 
the beneficiaries had actually used the funds. The respondents were therefore not influenced 
by a previous real-life example.  
Table 28 shows that the usage recommendations of the insured female respondents were 
somewhat more forward-looking and in line with the initial expectations of Allianz compared 
to the actual usage pattern of the beneficiaries. However, the recommendations were never-
theless still closely aligned with the actual usage pattern. The financing of education was 
ranked as second usage priority by the female customers (23%), while in the actual usage pat-
tern this clear investment into human capital only ranks a distant fifth drawing five percent of 
payouts. Female customers seem to prefer more business investment (18%) than the benefi-
ciaries (14%). This likely relates to the fact that the women are more informally employed 
than the beneficiaries. The women clearly recommended using fewer funds on funeral cere-
monies (14%) than done by the beneficiaries (37%). This also indicates a more forward look-
ing attitude. But this may also be due to the implicit expectation that sumbangan and family 
support would be as forthcoming as usual in case of death, without calculating the actual pres-
sure to use the insurance payouts instead of relying on family help. The fact that the women 
considered spending on living expenses (7%) more urgent than in reality (1%) could relate to 
the realization that with the husband’s death, the main income earner would be gone and pro-
vision for the family would become more of a problem than it was with the actual male bene-
ficiaries. Not surprisingly, the insured showed much interest in insuring their spouses. Despite 
these forward-looking and slightly more economic tendencies, it should not be overlooked 
that the repayment of debt was of greatest importance to the women (28%), even more so than 
education. This makes another vivid showing of the deeply felt obligation to settle accounts 
after death. It should also not be overlooked that with the women funeral expenditures still 
managed to capture fourth spot (14%). Hence, they also acknowledged the importance of a 
decent funeral, including the various slametan feasts. In summary, there is some tentative 
evidence that the usage pattern of female beneficiaries would show a more forward-looking 
and pragmatic orientation. But the evidence is weak and the concrete social pressure to spend 
considerable amounts on the funeral gives reason to suspect that in the concrete situation, the 
usage pattern may well move closer to the observed usage pattern of the beneficiaries. It 
would be interesting to examine the payout usage segregated by gender based on more empir-
ical evidence. Unfortunately, I could not obtain sufficient empirical evidence for that. A com-
parison of the usage pattern of the five female beneficiaries with that of the  male beneficia-
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ries does not render credible evidence. It only indicates that among those five female benefi-
ciaries spending on funeral ceremonies (31%) and debt repayment (29%) were considerable 
and in the same range as the overall sample.  
The exercise of table 28 further underlines one general finding of the beneficiary component, 
namely just how much religion and culture influence the way risks are perceived and payouts 
are used. In this respect, the beneficiaries are located in a highly embedded context where 
social factors greatly influence economic behavior. The socio-economic utility derived from 
debt repayments and funeral spending illustrates how closely the social and the economic 
sphere are still intertwined among the low-asset families. Virtually the entire usage pattern 
shows that for the beneficiaries the scope to freely decide on the payout usage is severely re-
stricted by socio-religious norms and social pressure. The case of Haji Mustani (sample claim 
2) gives a good example of this struggle between “structure” and “agency” inherent in the 
usage of insurance payouts.  
The financing pattern of the funeral ceremonies serves to demonstrate the benefits derived 
from the social dependence on mutual communal and familial assistance in a context which I 
once again hold to be largely a moral economy context. The provision of considerable funds 
for the funeral is highly institutionalized and thereby virtually guaranteed in case of death. 
The low usage of insurance payouts for living expenses indicates that the worry of a subsis-
tence threatening financial crisis after death is unfounded. By and large, the asset base and 
risk management options of the beneficiaries have not been visibly improved by Payung Ke-
luarga, apart from a few retained emergency savings and some successful economic invest-
ments, which moreover tended to benefit the better off beneficiaries. Ex-ante risk manage-
ment has changed even less than ex-post risk management because the beneficiaries were 
generally not aware, or only faintly aware, of the insurance coverage. Therefore, an important 
attribute in the optimization of risk management through insurance is missing: planning! This 
may of course change if life insurance becomes more widespread among low-asset families. 
However, the negative sides of such developments have also been shown again, just as in the 
discussion on the impact on the insured before (cf. section 7.3.4 and section 7.5): Payung Ke-
luarga has precisely intervened in an area of risk management where initial risk perception 
was relatively low and informal collective risk management particularly strong. Bluntly put, 
Payung Keluarga wanted to assist where it was least needed (cf. section 7.3.4). Even worse, 
the introduction of Payung Keluarga has substituted and thereby weakened familial assis-
tance. So far, communal assistance appears largely unaffected. Nonetheless, negative long-
term consequences for cooperative social capital, that is social capital which emphasizes the 
egalitarian vector, are foreseeable. The additional payouts of Payung Keluarga have not only 
reduced familial assistance but also inflated funeral costs. In this respect, Payung Keluarga 
has contributed to status generating symbolic capital. Payung Keluarga has pushed the bal-
ance clearly towards a more conspicuous and status-conscious slametan, a development 
which the slametan has been experiencing for long and which reflects a general societal trend. 
As mentioned several times before, this can be perceived as liberating by the beneficiaries, 
and in part also by the family. The need to give contributions has been reduced. Thereby, 
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Payung Keluarga may slightly reduce the risk perception of sumbangan, which is after all the 
third highest ranked risk (cf. table 11).  
In short, the impact of Payung Keluarga on the beneficiaries and their family has been low 
and sobering, even offering reasons for concern. Payung Keluarga promotes individual risk 
management where it is not necessarily needed. It weakens cooperative social cohesion where 
this appears to make least sense. Once again then, Payung Keluarga acts as an agent of social 
change, all the more in a way which was certainly not intended. From a developmental pers-
pective, I would therefore recommend to abolish the additional payouts all together or at least 
reduce them, and to insure the spouse instead. If the husbands as the main bread-winners were 
insured, the developmental impact may look better, but this is also not certain.  
The extent of social change induced by Payung Keluarga depends on the extent by which it 
manages to replace other forms of risk management. It is clear that the product’s influence is 
significant as far as the post-mortem slametan pattern is concerned. Yet, on the overall risk 
management pattern of low asset families and on a larger societal level, Payung Keluarga 
alone is certainly not going to have a signifianct impact. Here, the product is too limited to 
significantly push the ongoing shift of scales from balanced towards general reciprocity. The 
small-scale example that Payung Keluarga has nonetheless set allows the forecast that this is 
what is going to happen if microinsurance is provided with wider coverage and on a wider 
scale, for the better or for the worse. 
 
8 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Let us look at the most palpable findings of this thesis first. The empirical evidence presented 
in this thesis, even though it is only “valid by tendency” due to its qualitative-explorative ap-
proach, shows that the positive social impact of Payung Keluarga was literally “micro”. In 
many respects social impact was even discerning. The product has not fulfilled the develop-
mental hopes of Allianz. By and large, Payung Keluarga has not “behaved” according to the 
original causal model employed by Allianz and promoted by myself. Instead of protecting 
bereft family members in an actually non-existent post-mortem financial crisis, Payung Ke-
luarga has proven to be an actor of social change. Quite unintentially, the social change pro-
moted by Payung Keluarga leads towards an individualization of risk management in an area 
where it is not necessary and furthers the erosion of social cohesion. 
However, looking at the positive side first, for the predominantely Muslim low-asset insured a 
clear increase in financial literacy as a human asset can be ascertained. Nonetheless, the risk 
and resource pooling principle of insurance is not comprehended by the great majority of in-
sured. As far as an increase in “peace of mind” as a further human asset is concerned, the pic-
ture looks ambivalent. While many insured reported to feel safer with the insurance, a small 
portion stated to feel less secure, out of fears that life insurance collides with divine predeter-
mination, a phenomenon which I came to call takut cepat mati (fear of dying prematurely). To 
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a certain degree, takut cepat mati concerns were present among many insured in combination 
with a more pragmatic demand for financial protection. However ambivalent the effect on 
peace of mind may be, Payung Keluarga has apparently not changed the business risk affinity 
of the insured. Hence, seen form an expanded asset-capital perspective, neither the asset base 
not the resulting ex-ante risk management options of the insured have significantly changed. 
Despite of this, customer satisfaction was high, not least of all because microinsurance in 
general offers the appreciated opportunity to evade the intricate social mechanisms of mutual 
assistance that were - and in fact still are - the dominant risk management mechanism before 
the advent of microinsurance. By and large, the impact on the insured was primarily intangi-
ble and psychological, rather than resulting in behavioral change.  
The social impact on the beneficiaries is more discerning than in case of the insured them-
selves. The surveyed Muslim beneficiaries used the majority of the additional life insurance 
payouts for funeral ceremonies and repayment of informal debts. Here, Payung Keluarga has 
shown a clear tendency to substitute familial assistance which would otherwise be forthcom-
ing. What is more, the insurance payouts have contributed to a further inflation of funeral 
costs. The repayment of informal debt, which also consumed considerable funds, did not ful-
fill a pressing economic need. It was rather religiously motivated. Only one percent of all 
payouts were used to cover living expenses. I therefore found the original assumption un-
founded that the bereft family would face severe financial difficulties and increased vulnera-
bility to poverty. In addition, also different from Allianz’ expectations, and therwith different 
from my own personal expectations as the responsible project leader, few conventional eco-
nomic investments were undertaken, and if so, they largely benefited those beneficiaries of a 
relatively high asset-base.  
The beneficiaries regarded the payouts largely as a donation for the benefit of the deceased 
and in effect distributed much of the “spoils” onto their family and friends in form of consp-
cious funeral feasts (slametan), token payments, and immediate informal debt repayment. For 
the beneficiaries then, Payung Keluarga certainly did not form part of a consciously planned 
risk mitigation strategy. For the insured and even more so for the beneficiaries, Payung Ke-
luarga is still not so much a strategically applied risk management tool, but rather an obliga-
tory service of unfamiliar value, and in case of a claim payout, an unexpected “blessing from 
the sky” or rezeki. 
As noted, these are the most palpable of my field research on Payung Keluarga, but also they 
are also the most superfluous. What this thesis has particularly striven to investigate is to en-
lighten the process of interaction between context and product that has lead to these observed 
impacts. In short, while the “what” is relatively obvious the question of the “why” is more 
intricate and interesting. Why has this impact occurred in the way it did? And immediately 
following is the question of what will happen next? What are possible impacts of microinsur-
ance in the future? Regarding the “why” and the “what next”, this thesis has produced a num-
ber of in-depth findings. 
Most importantly, the cultural and demographic context in which Payung Keluarga operated 
has greatly influenced the way the product was perceived and utilized. The majority of in-
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sured were married female petty traders living in urban or semi-urban areas around Jakarta. 
Most of these women were Muslims with a clear leaning towards the pluralistic and syncretis-
tic perspectives on Islam favoured by NU, as compared to the orthodox and modernizing 
stance of Muhammadiyah. The women, many of which had a migratory background, com-
manded a considerable asset base. They were not “poor” but rather belonged to the upper le-
vels of the low-asset segment of society. Most importantly, the women did not consider them-
selves as “poor”, but rather as “middle class”. They pursued their micro-businesses for a 
number of reasons, of which becoming rich is just one among many. The idea of enjoying a 
meaningful pastime and a degree of financial independence from the husband, who is general-
ly the main breadwinner of the family, as well as the prospect of supporting the family budget 
figured as additional powerful motivations for borrowing. In any case, when borrowing the 
focus of the women was certainly on the microcredit and not on the insurance that came as a 
minor attachment with it.  
As most women chose their husbands as beneficiaries, the Payung Keluarga payouts went 
mostly to men, who moreover enjoyed considerable incomes from often semi-formal to for-
mal employment. This way, the main breadwinner of the family became the beneficiary, in-
stead of being insured. Insuring the bread-winner had been the original intention of Allianz. 
One may therefore conclude that the payout usage may have looked differently if the hus-
bands had been insured instead of their wives. This consideration has some merit to it, al-
though I found tenuous evidence that in this case the payout usage pattern would only slightly 
change towards a more forward-looking and economic one. In fact, having insured wives in-
stead of the economically more important husbands is only one, albeit the most obvious com-
ponent of a comprehensive explanation for the unexpectedly low social impact of Payung 
Keluarga. The second and far more decsive component is the realization of how much the 
worldview and actions of the insured are being influenced by the norms of an embedded mor-
al society as their predominant cultural context. Essentially, these norms aim at preserving a 
more or less egalitarian social structure which guarantees “substistence insurance” for its 
members. This means that social structure is greased by a carefully balanced system of ex-
changes, by so-called balanced reciprocity arrangements, of which the communal rotating 
slametan pattern is but one. The entire structure of the embedded moral society can therefore 
be said to be geared towards risk management. However, subsistence insurance for all comes 
at the premium of social sanctions on self-interested accumulation of material asset by indi-
vidual community members. While accumulation of symbolic capital and power is tolerated, 
especially to fulfill redistributive functions, embedded moral societies reject the idea of ag-
gressive economic asset accumulation. This is because the opting out of economically weal-
thier community members would quickly unravel the stability of the entire “subsistence insur-
ance” system. This phenomenon bears similarities to the anti-selection challenge in conven-
tional insurance.  
The ongoing clout of the moral economy has shown itself very visibly among the petty trad-
ing women. For example, they ranked the social obligation to give contributions (sumbangan) 
to other community members as their third highest daily worry, after education costs and 
medical costs. This points at the significant influence that the system of mutually equalizing 
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exchanges still has among the insured. It also shows that such arrangements are not particular-
ly liked but rather followed out of lack of alternatives. It is not surprising then that insurance 
was welcomed as a possible alterantive, leading to good customer satisfaction and to a vocal 
demand for more products. A second indicator for the ongoing influence of the moral econo-
my can be seen in the fact that despite taking on micro-credits, the petty trading women tend 
to only grow their businesses up to a socially accepted level. Very few of them really “make it 
big”. To the women, keeping a low profile is their personal solution to the traders’ dilemma 
which poses itself in embedded moral societies; that is, the conflict between profit maximiza-
tion through trade and the obligation to immediately share the spoils with the social network. 
In this situation, the equality vector inherent in all forms of assets by and large still dominates 
over the simultaneously present inequality vector. Of course, next to the morally induced self-
restriction to small business, other reasons for a lack of business growth have been identified 
as well, such as lack of entrepreneurial character, a family structure which prevents easy ap-
propriation of familial labor, and gender roles which gurantee considerably leeway in small-
scale business activities but also emphasize the domestic roles of women, especially on higher 
social levels. These reasons combine to an apparent lack of perspective and a consequent lack 
of motivation for long-term business expansion of female headed micro-enterprises in Indone-
sia, even when supported by microcredit.  
The continuing influence of the moral economy, also in urban areas, can be observed despite 
the fact that contemporary Indonesia is in a phase of rapid modernization. Indonesia’s so-
called “Great Transformation” is characterized by the spread of the market economy, stronger 
connection to globalized markets, monetarization, industrialization, migration and urbaniza-
tion, and lately also democratization and decentralization. Socially, this produces increasing 
levels of general economic wealth, but at the same time increasing social diversification and 
social inequality. This is especially notable in the rapidly growing urban centeres. Other re-
lated consequences are a migration-induced geographic spread of family networks, the in-
creasing importance of education for upward social mobility and status production, and ulti-
mately the general shift from balanced reciprocity towards status conscious general reciproci-
ty in social exchanges. Assets are increasingly used to accrue status instead of investing in 
equality strengthening exchanges. For many Indonesians, this becomes possible because in-
creasing wealth levels have greatly reduced the immediate need for “subsistence insurance”.  
The longue durée change from a society build on balanced exchange towards one that is build 
on market-exchange and general reciprocity is eptitomized by the changing slametan pattern. 
From a humble communal feast aimed at managing the collective risk posed by the death of a 
community member, the death slametan is increasingly becoming a social starting mechanism 
and status generator complete with increasingly conspicuous consumption. However, it would 
be too simple to assume that the previosus safety net purpose is being neatly replaced by the 
new springboard purpose. In fact, it seems that to a fair degree the old and the new functions 
have integrated and further enriched the death slametan which today goes as strong as ever, if 
not stronger; not despite “Indonesia’s ‘Great Transformation’”, but because of it. This way, 
the slametan makes a prime example for the adaptive and recreative capacity of Indonesian 
society. What has become clear in the discussion is that transformation in Indonesia is not 
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leading to a disembedded state in the straight-forward sense of Polanyi. Neither is it leading to 
a disenchanted and secularized society of atomized individuals in the sense of Weber. Here, 
especially the continuing and even increasing influence of religion can be named as a case in 
point. Even if it is more status conscious than before, Indonesian society is and will probably 
remain highly social and hinged on ideas of collectivity rather than on individualistic seclu-
sion. Instead of a linear embeddedness-disembeddedness-re-embeddeness process as observed 
by Polanyi for Western socities, in Indonesia disembedding and reembedding seem to run 
parallel, and even original elements of embeddedness are being retained, reformulated and 
combined with new influences. Although this complex process of social changes is proceed-
ing fastest among the middle class, it is also tangible among the (not so) low asset customers 
of Payung Keluarga. 
It is consequently a highly dynamic and rich socio-cultural setting where microinsurance in 
the form of Payung Keluarga has made its appearance as one of many new influences assail-
ing Indonesian society. The entire Payung Keluarga project was conceived as an intervention-
ist development project. In fact, as I have shown, microinsurance as such is not only defined 
by its focus on low-asset customers, but also by its developmental intention. Nonetheless, 
microinsurance has so far not wittnessed much critical scrutiny in the development discourse, 
likely because of its relatively young developmental history and the scarcity of available qual-
ity impact research. The field is still dominated by donors and practicioners keen on getting 
microinsurance set-up first before worrying about the impacts later. Nonetheless, microinsur-
ance as a part of microfinance lends itself well to the general critique on development, first 
and formost to the critique of propagating a neo-liberal market-based agenda that forestalls 
the emergence or strengthening of local solutions while at the same time creating new, more 
globalized and less controlable dependencies. Particularly the crowding out of public protec-
tion efforts as well as the crowding out of informal risk management arrangements is a critical 
issue with regards to microinsurance. In any case, microinsurance definitely adds another 
chapter to the ongoing totalization process of development in terms of issues, actors and spac-
es, for example by incorporating private companies like Allianz into the development agenda.  
Payung Keluarga was primarly conceived to assist low asset families in an assumed post-
mortem financial crisis. But there was no financial crisis. The underlying assumption was 
wrong. Instead of providing the intended assistance to maintain the status quo of a family, 
Payung Keluarga has quite unintentionally proven to be an actor of social change. This can be 
illustrated through three examples of varying levels of abstraction which this thesis has elabo-
rated on: (1) a push for more general reciprocity in the funeral pattern, (2) a paradigm shift in 
the “frame of reference” applied to risk management, and ultimately (3) the discovery of “the 
double fortune / double blow” dilemma of microfinance. 
The first example is certainly the most concrete and tangible. Payung Keluarga has contri-
buted to a further emphasis of general reciprocity in the funeral pattern. The beneficiaries 
have used large parts of the payouts on funerals. In total, Payung Keluarga financed approx-
imately 34 percent of the funeral ceremonies up until the 40th day after death. Such ceremo-
nies are perceived as a religious and traditional duty. In fact, a symbiotic mix of Islamic and 
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autochthonous beliefs makes the funerals with their several slametan celebrations a merito-
rious affair, both for the deceased and for the living. Proper and ritually clean funerals are still 
very much perceived as a pre-condition for future propersity. In this sense, funeral expendi-
tures are a reasonable socio-economic investment with a clear present-wordly utility. Before 
the advent of Payung Keluarga, funerals were almost solely financed by community and fa-
milial support. Such support is forthcoming and in fact highly institutionalized because death 
is perceived as a collective risk to communal harmony and safety and a proper funeral is 
therefore regarded as a collective duty. High stress coping measures are rare and only appear 
to occur over the longer term. This is because the sale of assets or moneylending is prevented 
by religious and customary perceptions. Such measures would be regarded as openly self-
destructive and as a highly disharmonious accusation against insufficient community assis-
tance. This phenomenon makes for another of many examples that I encountered during my 
research where religious and customary perceptions showed their impact on risk management. 
The post-mortem financial exchanges of course work mostly on the basis of balanced reci-
procity to be repaid at future funerals. With Payung Keluarga, however, the family is some-
what relieved of its obligation to give by the sudden rezeki of the payouts. Quite naturally, the 
insurance payouts are still perceived as a form of donation to be spent for the benefit of the 
deceased, and in effect to be distributed onto many recipients by way of (considerable) token 
payments for services, by providing food, by lowering of the gift obligation of the family 
members, and also in form of informal debt repayment. This way, the benefits are literally 
atomized and the principle of balanced reciprocity undermined. For the beneficiaries, this 
accrued status in form of symbolic capital. In short, Payung Keluarga has further promoted a 
long-going trend to move slametan away from equality-strengthening events towards status 
events, although as mentioned the former purpose is still making itself felt, especially in emic 
descriptions of the event. What is especially critical here is that in a post-mortem situation, 
informal collective risk management is especially strong, much stronger than in case of illness 
or when people have difficulties with paying for the education of their children. Instead of 
complementing informal risk management (as demanded by several microinsurance propo-
nents but deemed an ideal illusion by myself), Payung Keluarga has tried to help where it was 
least needed. It has insured the wrong risk. It has attacked the existing cooperative social capi-
tal where it is still strongest. Even the argument that microinsurance offers better protection in 
case of covariant shocks does not help much to remedy the situation, as today risks and re-
sources are also spread by way of the migration-induced spatial expansion of the social net-
work. 
The second aspect of social change related to Payung Keluarga is the required paradigm shift 
in risk management. Instead of jointly managing collective risks based on balanced reciproci-
ty, insurance is based on conditional general reciprocity accumulated to generalized redistri-
bution. This means that insurance knows clear winners and clear losers. Balanced arrange-
ments, on the other hand, are actually striving to prevent people from delineating obvious 
winners and obvious losers. Instead, every input is supposed to be eventually repaid with a 
tangible return. As the entire social structure of embedded moral societies is based on this 
balanced principle, the switch to insurance puts this entire social structure into question. 
However, the observed high expectations of a premium refund upon contract end demonstrate 
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that at present customers are still far from making this paragdim shift in their “frame of refer-
ence”. This point therefore serves as a caveat for the future, namely that microinsurance is not 
simply about buying insurance instead of asking the neighbor for help. Next to initiating 
processes of commoditization of risk, monetarization of risk management, first and foremost 
insurance switches risk management from a collective social affair towards a formalized, in-
dividual affair of winners and losers.  
The “the double fortune / double blow” dilemma of microfinance, as the third major aspect of 
social change related to Payung Keluarga, postulates that microinsurance would need to be 
provided to such a comprehensive extent as to make people feel better proctected by insur-
ance than by informal collective assistance. This would induce customers to opt out of the 
socially and financially demanding intricacies of the embedded moral society. Only then can 
people pursue a more assertive strategy of economic asset accumulation; and only then can 
microcredit unfold its full potential of promoting significant economic growth; conducive 
structural conditions and sufficient entrepreneurial skills provided. It is this combination of 
insurance and credit which can truly “liberate” people from the coercive and severly limiting 
clutches of the moral economy, and make the emergence of a “moral economy of self-
interest” likely. However, what this thesis has striven to point out is that this “individual for-
tune” is likely to erode cooperative social capital and leave very low-asset people even more 
excluded and unprotected than before. In short, microinsurance in combination with micro-
credit has a high potential of dealing a blow to social cohesion. It is up for debate whether the 
fortune ways heavier than the blow. It certainly depends on context and perspective. The high 
customer satisfaction with Payung Keluarga and the vocal demand for more products clearly 
indicates that people are indeed inclined to quickly opt for more individual protection is the 
opportunity arises, not only for those risks so far little covered by other arrangements, such as 
education and health, but also for those which have been collectively dealt with before.  
This multifaceted role of microinsurance as an actor of social change has so far been hardly 
discussed in the academic discourse. I do not claim that this thesis has completely “unravelled 
the mystery”, but I claim that the identification of microinsurance an ambivalent actor of so-
cial change in low-asset settings is a definite and sobering finding. Of course, the extent of 
social change depends on the degree by which microinsurance substitutes other risk manage-
ment arrangements. It is unlikely that substitution will be quick and complete. Similarly to the 
findings on microcredit which has not managed to replace moneylending, for a long time to 
come people may want to put their eggs in several baskets and maintain access to several risk 
management options. However, I claim that the substitutive effect of microinsurance is more 
salient than for microcredit. While informal financing, for example moneylending, can well 
survive in a contracted market, informal risk management is weakened every time the size of 
the risk and resource pool becomes smaller.  
In short, the impact process of Payung Keluarga as a particularly simple microinsurance was 
astoundingly complex and heavily context-dependent, especially with regards to the ongoing 
and omnipresent clout of religious and cultural norms. The impact of Payung Keluarga did 
not unfold in a linear chain of actions and reactions. It rather appears as a conglomerate of 
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intertwining preferences, reasoning and actions of actors within a multidimensional socio-
cultural setting. The observation and deconstruction of this complex process was challenging 
and is certainly far from complete, but a number of revealing findings and challenging issues 
for future discussion have nonetheless come to light. The fact that most of the observed im-
pact has been unintended is certainly due to an insufficient understanding of context during 
the product planning phase. With microinsurance, especially in case of life insurance, there is 
an obvious need for thick contextualization before a development intervention is planned. 
Thick contextualization might reveal that in some cases, such as Payung Keluarga, the assis-
tance by way of microinsurance is actually not needed.  
This leads to the question of in how far my findings can be generalized. First and foremost, 
my research has been exemplary and moreover exploratory. I only claim representativeness of 
findings and “validity by tendency” for the small section of Indonesia’s low-asset population 
which I have surveyed. Nonetheless, I hold several of the more general findings to be applica-
ble to almost any microinsurance context, not the least based on complementary evidence 
provided by other authors: (1) First of all is the realization, that microinsurance impact is 
strongly dependent on context. In case of Payung Keluarga, culture and religion made their 
influence felt at every twist and turn. I go so far as to claim that understanding the context 
means understanding the impact. (2) Second comes the realization that microinsurance is an 
interventionist development approach that induces social change, whether intended or not. 
While the impact of microinsurance is heavily influenced by context, microinsurance does not 
leave the context unchanged either. (3) Thirdly, the ideal of perfect complementarity of mi-
croinsurance with existing informal arrangements and social protection is illusory. Microin-
surance cannot precisely fill the “protection gap” left by other measures. A certain amount of 
crowding out will always occur, for the better or worse. (4) Fourthly, microinsurance is par-
ticularly susceptible to undermining balanced reciprocity in favor of general reciprocity, not 
the least because microinsurance itself is based on conditional general reciprocity. (5) Lastly, 
one additional realization forcefully brought to light by my own research, as well as by other 
authors such as Moser (1998; 2007a) can certainly be generalized: Low-asset people are 
savvy asset managers of complex and multidimensional asset bases. Their resourcefulness, 
resilience and adaptability particularly in times of crisis should not be underestimated; nota 
bene net of microinsurance. The risk managagement strategies build upon these asset bases 
are intricate and definitely reasonable when seen from a contextualized perspective. 
If by way of this entire thesis on microinsurance and its impact, microinsurance appears to be 
a major factor in the general process of modernization and social change in societies, this 
perspective of course needs to be relativized. The influence of microinsurance on societal 
trends is minor. Microinsurance is just one of many examples of processes of financialization, 
commoditization, and formalization. Microinsurance pales in importance compared to large-
scale processes such as migration and urbanization, which can naturally also be deconstructed 
into lower-level processes. Next to the fact that the impact of microinsurance in form of 
Payung Keluarga was “micro” in a developmental sense, it is therefore also “micro” in a so-
cietal sense. These two realizations are connoted in the title of this thesis. 
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With my findings I hope to contribute to the further evolvement and improvement of microin-
surance discourse and practice. I acknowledge again that the sobering impact of Payung Ke-
luarga is my responsibility as the critical person for the product’s conceptualization and im-
plementation. A better, thicker ex-ante contextualization would have certainly helped to fore-
cast and plan its eventual impact more accurately, even if perfect prediction is impossible. 
This serves as an encouragement to do it better next time; - and there will definitely be a next 
time. Microinsurance is bound to grow and expand further, on a global scale, but also at Al-
lianz and in Indonesia. This leads to the last question, namely the outlook for microinsurance.  
Why am I so sure that microinsurance will continue? The high demand from customers for 
more products points to this direction. Their emic perspective on microinsurance is much 
more positive than my own. Critical reflections of the social consequences of microinsurance 
are virtually absent among customers, loan officers, and even most experts whom I inter-
viewed. Especially among customers, a down-to-earth and pragmatic search for ways how to 
possibly manage life better prevailed. Satisfaction with Payung Keluarga was also high 
among the involved MFI partners and at Allianz, which further promotes the programs conti-
nuity and expansion. Particularly for Allianz in Indonesia, microinsurance has proven that it is 
a potentially profitable business which increases customer numbers and brand awareness.  
I see it as an irony that this “social business” is bound to make the micro-businesses of the 
supported women less social and more economic by way of the “double fortune / double 
blow” dilemma. I also consider it ironic that microinsurance by way of further undermining 
balanced reciprocity arrangements leaves those that need most protection, namely very low 
asset people not reached by microcredit and microinsurance, less protected, and microinsur-
ance thereby furthers social inequality. Nonetheless, from a business perspective, microinsur-
ance has a clear business potential. In this light, also the strategy to tackle death risk first has 
proven beneficial to the establishment of microinsurance as a sustainable business activity, 
even if from a developmental perspective this was counterproductive (which is hopefully off-
set by future endeavors). As far as Payung Keluarga is concerned I would therefore recom-
mend abolishing the extra payouts and insuring the spouses instead.  
Seen from a developmental perspective, for future projects those areas and risks should be 
considered where traditional risk management arrangements have broken down or not devel-
oped yet, and where moreover the risk of crowding out public social protection is lowest. Ac-
knowledging once more that perfect complementarity is not possible, potential areas could be 
rural areas presumably depleted of social capital by migration, and low-asset urban areas with 
a particularly high rate of social fluctuation. Potential risks to be tackeled are education and 
health. These two risks are by far in highest demand and show the least prevalence of infor-
mal collective risk management. Of course, it may be critically argued in line with Bourdieu 
(1986) that education financing will further social diversification and social inequality. How-
ever, at least tackling education through insurance does not attack social cohesion as head-on 
as Payung Keluarga has done. In addition, it is definitely in widespread demand and presents 
the best business prospects. Eventually, health insurance may appear as the most sensible 
choice in terms of positive developmental impact, but it also presents the greatest challenges 
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in terms of risk, product complexity and administration. In any case, whenever microinsur-
ance is approached from a developmental perspective, a thick ex-ante contextualiztion should 
be done first of all. This call goes far beyond the usual demand assessments. It encompasses 
an analysis and in-depth understanding of the cultural and socio-demographic context. As this 
thesis has shown, even after a product has already been launched this is easier said than done. 
If the impact process of simple Payung Keluarga was already highly complex, the situation 
will certainly not get any easier in case of more complex products. I therefore consider it 
doubtful if the developmental impact of a microinsurance intervention can be accurately 
planned and predicted, especially with regards to wider social impact and social change. 
However, as microinsurance is driven on by business considerations anyway, it is well worth 
to continue trying to make microinsurance as context-adapted and beneficial for the custom-
ers’ asset base as possible. This way, microinsurance can at least be hoped to assume more of 
a “smoothing” role in processes of social change rather than accentuating its “pushing” role.63
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
63 I am thankful to Profesor Emil Salim for incentivizing me towards this train of thought during an interview in 
Jakarta on 25 June 2008. 
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ANNEX 1: USED QUESTIONNAIRES 
The questionnaires underwent several revisions during research. They are displayed here in 
their latest versions. Questionnaires for expert component and MFI management component 
are not included as these were semi-structured. 
 
A Customer component questionnaire (ex-ante) 
B Customer component questionnaire (ex-post) 
C Beneficiary component questionnaire 
D Loan officer component questionnaire 
E Group Leader component questionnaire 
F Written demographic questionnaire (sample from ex-post customer component) 
 
 
 
 
A Customer component questionnaire (ex-ante) 
 
Duration: approximately 80 minutes 
Table 29: Customer component questionnaire (ex-ante) 
# Question Working instructions Answer 
options 
Insurance Know-How & Experience 
1 Have you ever heared of Allianz before?   Yes: 
No: 
2a Have you ever had insurance, either paid 
by you or someone else, e.g. employer? 
Including social insurance like Askes & Jam-
sostek 
Yes: 
No: 
2b If yes, what kind of insurance? Including social insurance like Askes & Jam-
sostek 
  
2c If yes, why did you take insurance? Minimum one comment from each person 
who said “yes” 
  
2d If no, why not? Minimum one comment from each person 
who said “yes” 
  
3 How would you consider your knowledge 
about insurance? 
  Good: 
A bit: 
Not much: 
4 In general, would you think that insurance 
is something that is cheap, mid-prize or 
expensive? 
To explain, you can work with an example 
such as: Mercedes -> Expensive, Instant 
noodles -> Cheap, 
Cheap: 
Mid-prize: 
Expensive: 
5 If nothing happens to you, i.e. you didn’t 
need the insurance, would you expect your 
premium to be returned to you? 
  Yes: 
Maybe part-
ly: 
No. 
6 Which of the shown insurance brands do 
you know - and how good an impression do 
you have of them? 
(logos: Allianz, AIG-Lippo, Askes, Bank 
Danamon, BRI, Bumiputera, Jamsostek, 
Jasindo, Jiwasraya, Prudential) 
a) Draw four symbols onto post-it notes and 
put them on the ground: 
 - "+" stands for "This company is good" 
- "0" stands for "I know the logo but don't 
know if the company is good or not (neutral) 
- "-" stands for "This company is not good" 
- "?" stands for "I don't know this company" 
b) Hand out insurance brand logo cards to 
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everybody 
c) Ask participants to simultaneously put 
cards onto respective symbol (maybe ask 
one pioneer to do it first) 
Risk Perception and Risk Management 
7 What do you think are the biggest problems 
that your family (under same roof) faces, 
e.g. high school fees, business failure etc.?  
a) Collect ideas first. Note all ideas on post-it 
notes. 
b) Distribute three post-it notes to each par-
ticipant, with numbers "1","2", and "3" written 
on them respecitvely 
c) Ask participants to simultaneously rank the 
top risks by using their post-it notes, i.e. "1" 
should be put on personal top-1 risk etc. 
(maybe ask one pioneer to do it first) 
d) Decide with particpants which of the risk 
appears to be most important 
e) Later, after finish, each "1" gets 3 points, 
each "2" gets 2 points, each "3" one point. 
Thus, a more precise ranking can be done. 
Top 1 risk: 
Top 2 risk: 
Top 3 risk: 
8 After the recent natural disasters (Tsunami 
in Aceh, earthquake in Yogyakarta, Jakarta 
floods etc.), do you think more often now 
that this could happen in your area as well? 
Do you feel more at risk? 
  Yes, definite-
ly: 
A little bit: 
No: 
9 Would you say you are: 
a) a risk taker who takes business oppor-
tunities as they come and doesn’t worry too 
much about the future?  
b) a more cuatious person who needs time 
to think for some time before taking busi-
ness decisions and who also thinks what 
may happen in the future? 
c) are you definitely a cautious person who 
likes to do business as they already know 
well and sometimes or often worries about 
what the future may bring? 
Giving a number of real life examples may be 
needed here to illustrate the question. 
Risk taker: 
More cau-
tious: 
Definitely 
cautious: 
10a Have you experienced death, critical illness 
or loss of house/flood in the close family? 
What happened?  
    
10b What was done to overcome the loss of 
income or pay for expenses (if any)? 
    
11 Is it okay to use insurance to make sure 
your family can continue without you in the 
event you die? 
  Yes: 
Don't know: 
No: 
12 If you had a life insurance, would this be 
something you would talk about with your 
friends? 
  Yes: 
Maybe: 
Rather not: 
Sharia Part: The following questions are only for focus groups with at least 1 Muslim member 
13a For those of you whose religion is Islam, do 
you think your current loans are Sharia 
compliant? 
  Yes: 
Not sure: 
No: 
13b Those who answered “yes”, why do you 
believe so? 
    
13c Those who answered “no”, why not?     
14 Would you prefer sharia compliant loans to 
non-sharia loans? 
  Yes: 
It doesn't 
matter: 
No: 
15 What is needed to make you trust a prod-
uct is really sharia compliant: 
a) It is enough if my MFI assures you it is 
sharia compliant. 
b) I need confirmation from my MFI and the 
local ustaj. 
  MFI only: 
 
MFI & ustaj: 
 
MFI, ustaj & 
Nat. Sharia 
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C) I need confirmation from my MFI, the 
local ustaj, and the seal of the National 
Sharia Board. 
Board: 
Socio-Demographics / Migration / Group Memberships 
16 Are you from this area?   Yes: 
No: 
17a Are you the main income generator for your 
family? 
  Yes: 
No: 
17b Do other family members contribute to your 
family’s income? 
  Yes: 
No: 
18a Do you have close family members living 
more than half day travel away (excluding 
plane)? 
  Yes: 
No: 
18b Do you receive regular financial support 
from those family members? 
  Yes: 
No: 
18c Would you receive financial support in 
times of emergency from those family 
members? 
  Yes: 
No: 
19a Have you ever received any assistance 
from the government e.g. food, money, free 
vaccination? 
  Yes: 
No: 
19b If yes, what kind of assistance?     
20a Are you member of one or more arisan?   Yes: 
No: 
20b If yes, what kind of arisan (savings group, 
social, help in times of emergency)? 
    
21a Are you a member of any other group (ex-
cluding this loan group), e.g. prayer group, 
qu'ran study group? 
  Yes: 
No: 
21b If yes, what kind of groups?     
22 In the last 10 years, how has the level of 
solidarity in your community has changed 
(e.g. feeling of togetherness, gotong 
royong, support in times of crisis)? 
  Increased: 
Same: 
Decreased: 
Product 
Explain product first 
23 How much premium would you consider 
fair for a 1 mio loan for 1 year 
a) Participants write estimate on post-it 
notes. 
b) Participants show post-it notes at the 
same time. 
c) Note all given values and their frequency 
d) Calculate average (at least roughly) 
Min: 
Max: 
Average: 
Demographics 
24 Filling of short demographic questionnaire Distribute pens and questionnaires (7 ques-
tions) and collect again 
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B Customer component questionnaire (ex-post) 
 
Duration: approximately 60 minutes 
Table 30: Customer component questionnaire (ex-post) 
# Question Working instructions Answer options 
1 Does your loan come with insurance 
or not? 
Open question to get a general 
feeling of awareness level of group. 
  
2 Do you know what is insured? Open question to get a general 
feeling of awareness level of group. 
  
Short written and anonymous multiple-choice questionnaire (10 minutes) 
3 Have you been interviewed last year? Ask group members not to talk dur-
ing filling 
Yes: 
No: 
4 What is the name of the organization 
that gives you the credit life insur-
ance? 
 [MFI Name]: 
Jamsostek: 
Allianz: 
Government: 
5 What is the name of the insurance 
product? 
  Payung Jiwa: 
Payung Keluarga: 
Has no name: 
Payung Kasih: 
Life insurance: 
6 What benefits does the product pro-
vide? 
  A) 2x loan amount of which 
outstanding balance is de-
ducted: 
B) 2x loan amount and be-
sides this the outstanding 
balance is waived: 
C: 1x loan amount and be-
sides this the outstanding 
balance is waived: 
Verbal discussion 
Discuss written questionnaire questions first and clarify product 
7 Who has seen the product brochure?   Yes: 
Don't remember: 
No: 
8 If you could choose for your next 
loan, would you prefer a loan without 
insurance and rather save the pre-
mium? 
a) Distribute “yes”, “maybe” and “no” 
cards 
b) Group members put their chosen 
card face down on floor 
c) Mix and reveal cards 
Yes, I would prefer loans 
with insurance: 
 
Don't know yet: 
 
No, I would prefer loans 
without insurance: 
9 Has anyone taken out additional 
insurance in the last year? If yes, 
what type and why? 
including Askeskin, Askes, Jamsos-
tek 
Yes: 
No: 
10 Have you heard about any claims 
actually being paid by your organiza-
tion? What happened? What was 
your impression? 
  Yes: 
No: 
11 How would you consider your know-
ledge about insurance? 
- Same question as ex-ante 
- Separate those who were inter-
viewed before from those newly 
joined 
Interviewed before: 
Good: 
A bit: 
Not much: 
Newly joined: 
Good: 
A bit: 
Not much: 
12 Do you know, why the premium is not 
returned to you after the end of the 
- Open question to get a feeling 
- If no (correct) ideas forthcoming, 
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credit? give hints 
- If still no correct idea, explain in-
surance mechanism 
13 Did you actually tell your friends and 
neighbors about this insurance? 
- Direct follow-up question from ex-
ante 
- Separate those who were inter-
viewed before from those newly 
joined 
Interviewed before: 
Yes: 
Can't remember: 
No: 
Newly joined: 
Yes: 
Can't remember: 
No: 
14 How happy are you overall with the 
insurance program on the elementary 
school scale from 0 to 10? 
a) Give 1 post-it note to each partic-
ipant  
b) Each participants writes his rating 
on the post-it note 
c) Participants lay post-it notes face 
down in the middle 
b) Mix and reveal votes 
Very good 
10: 
9: 
8: 
7: 
6: 
5: 
4: 
3: 
2: 
1: 
0: 
Very bad 
15 Which of the shown insurance brands 
do you know - and how good an 
impression do you have of them? 
(logos: Allianz, AIG-Lippo, Askes, 
Bank Danamon, BRI, Bumiputera, 
Jamsostek, Jasindo, Jiwasraya, Pru-
dential) 
- same question as ex-ante 
a) Draw four symbols onto post-it 
notes and put them on the ground: 
 - "+" stands for "This company is 
good" 
- "0" stands for "I know the logo but 
don't know if the company is good or 
not (neutral) 
- "-" stands for "This company is not 
good" 
- "?" stands for "I don't know this 
company" 
b) Hand out insurance brand logo 
cards to everybody 
c) Ask participants to simultaneously 
put cards onto respective symbol 
(maybe ask one pioneer to do it first) 
  
16 Would you say you are: 
a) a risk taker who takes business 
opportunities as they come and 
doesn’t worry too much about the 
future?  
b) a more cuatious person who needs 
time to think for some time before 
taking business decisions and who 
also thinks what may happen in the 
future? 
c) are you definitely a cautious per-
son who likes to do business as they 
already know well and sometimes or 
often worries about what the future 
may bring? 
- Same question as ex-ante 
- Giving a number of real life exam-
ples may be needed here to illu-
strate the question. 
Risk taker: 
More cautious: 
Definitely cautious: 
17 What are reasons for you to be happy 
/ unhappy with the insurance pro-
gram? 
    
18 Do you feel more “peace of mind” 
now that you are insured? Any com-
ments? 
  Yes, definitely: 
A litte bit: 
No difference: 
Less safe: 
19 If the insurance premium were to 
increase from 1.2% per year to 1.8% 
per year would this still be acceptable 
a) Give some concrete Rupiah ex-
amples first 
b) Distribute “yes”, “maybe” and “no” 
Yes, I would prefer loans 
with insurance: 
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for you? cards 
c) Group members put their chosen 
card face down on floor 
d) Mix and reveal cards 
Don't know yet: 
 
No, I would prefer loans 
without insurance: 
20 If you could, would you insure your 
spouse with the same product? 
  Yes: 
Maybe: 
No: 
21 What would you expect your benefi-
ciary to spend the payout on? 
a) Collect potential usage ideas first, 
write them on post-it notes and put 
on the ground 
b) Distribute 3 post-it notes with 
numbers “1”, “2” and “3” to each 
participant 
c) Ask participants to put their post-it 
notes on the recommended usages, 
with “1” being the most pressing of 
all etc. 
 
22 What term would you prefer to de-
scribe your social strata? 
  
23 Anything else you would like to ask, 
anything else you need or that we 
can improve? 
   
Demographics 
24 Please fill the short demographic 
questionnaire 
a) Distribute pens and questionnaire 
(10 questions) and collect again 
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C Beneficiary component questionnaire 
 
Duration: approximately 50 minutes 
Table 31: Beneficiary component questionnaire 
# Question Working Instructions Answer options 
Warm-up and Socializing 
1 Please tell the claim story? What 
were the circumstances of death 
and claim payment? 
- To gain understanding and show 
empathy 
- To refresh memory and do socializ-
ing before going to the technical 
questions 
  
2 Did the insured ever tell you that 
she had insurance? 
  Yes: 
Maybe: 
No: 
3 Did you know what was the 
benefit of the insurance before 
the insured died and you made a 
claim? 
  Yes: 
I had some idea: 
No: 
4a Was a public claims ceremony 
held? 
- A big ceremony means 10+ people A) Yes, a big ceremony: 
B) Yes, but only with group 
members and family: 
C) No, the claim was paid 
privately at home: 
4b Would you have preferred a 
public or a private ceremony? 
  Private: 
Doesn't matter: 
Public: 
Claim Payment 
5 Before the claim was actually 
paid, how sure were you that it 
would be paid? 
  Absolutely sure: 
Not so sure: 
I did not believe it: 
6 How much money did you re-
ceive? 
Should be exactly two times the 
original loan amount of the credit that 
the insured took out from the MFI 
  
7 Was any money deducted at 
payment or afterwards by the 
organization 
Should not happen Yes, IDR ________ 
 
No: 
8 Do you feel you received the 
insurance benefit fast enough? 
  A) No, it took a very long time: 
B) Yes, it was ok: 
C) Yes, the benefit was paid 
fast: 
9 Were there any difficulties to 
make the claim? 
E.g. bureaucracy, getting death certif-
icate, bribes 
  
10 How easy did you find the claim 
process? 
  Very easy: 
Easy: 
OK: 
Somewhat difficult: 
Very difficult: 
11 How helpful was the MFI in han-
dling the claim? 
  Very helpful: 
Somewhat helpful: 
Not helpful: 
Claim Effect 
12a What was the money used for? Open question first   
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12b Can you specify further? Gather as much specific information 
as possible 
A) Social purposes, e.g. sela-
matan, amal  
IDR ____________ 
B) Invested in exsisting / new 
business 
IDR ____________ 
C) Education of children 
IDR ____________ 
D) Cover living expenses 
IDR ____________ 
E) Savings / not spent yet 
IDR ____________ 
F) Distribute to family mem-
bers 
IDR ____________ 
G) Paying of the remaining 
outstanding MFI debt 
IDR ____________ 
H) Paying of any other out-
standing debt 
IDR ____________ 
I) Others: 
IDR ____________ 
13a If money was used for invest-
ment, please describe invest-
ment and result. Was new in-
come generated? 
    
13b If money was NOT used for 
investment, why not? 
    
14a How much did you spend on the 
funeral activities in total? 
    
14b Would you have spent the same 
amount if there hadn’t been 
insurance? 
  Yes: 
No, less: 
No, more: 
Don't know: 
14c If yes, where would you have 
gotton the additional money 
from? 
    
15 Did you have to mobilize any 
extra funds or sell assets to 
cover post-death expenses? 
What exactly? 
    
16 What would you have done 
without the insurance benefit? 
Counterfactual question   
17 In summary, was the amount 
sufficient to help you through this 
difficult time? 
  A) More than enough: 
B) Yes, definitely enough: 
C) Helped somewhat but could 
have been more: 
D) Helped only a little bit: 
E) Did not help at all: 
18 If you would have to or actually 
had to receive money from fami-
ly and friends, how do you feel 
about this? 
    
19 If you are Muslim, would you 
consider more leaning towards 
NU or Muhammadiyah? 
  NU: 
Muhammadiyah: 
Neutral: 
20 According to you, is it prohibited 
(haram) to use insurance funds 
for anything else than the “sela-
matan” and “debt repayment”, 
i.e. proceeds are exclusive own-
ership of the deceased? 
  A) It’s okay to use funds for 
needs of the living: 
B) I am not sure: 
C) It is haram to use funds for 
needs of the living: 
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21a Please describe the financial 
relationship of the insured to 
you? 
    
21b Did you have your own indepen-
dent income? 
  Yes: 
No: 
21c Did you receive financial support 
from the insured? 
  Yes: 
No: 
22 Is your own source of funds still 
the same as before? If not, 
what’s the change and why? 
  A) Yes, still the same: 
B) No, has changed to 
______________ 
23 Was there any request from 
other family members and 
friends or even pressure to 
share the money? 
  Yes: 
No: 
24 Has the attitude of friends and 
family towards you changed 
because of the money you re-
ceived? 
  A) No, there is no change in 
the quality of the relationship: 
B) Maybe a little bit: 
C) Yes, there has been the 
following changes: 
______________ 
25 Did you tell your friends openly 
about the claim or did you keep 
quiet? 
Cross-check question for the earlier 
question on open/private claim cere-
mony 
A) I talked openly and shared 
my experience: 
B) I only told my close family: 
C) I tried not to let anyone 
know: 
26 How much has the insurance 
helped you overall (on the ele-
mentary school scale from 0 to 
10)? 
   
Insurance Know-how 
27 According to you, where did the 
money for your claim come 
from? 
    
28 According to you, who is the 
insurance provider? 
    
29 If you could, would you insure 
yourself now with the same 
product? 
Cross-check question to earlier satis-
faction questions 
Yes, definitely: 
Maybe: 
No, no need: 
No, I am already insured: 
30 Is it okay for you if your MFI and 
Allianz use your story to social-
ize and promote the idea of 
insurance? 
Use example of journalist asking on 
microinsurance and interviewer rep-
lies: “Yes, just yesterday I visited this 
family in …..” 
Yes: 
No: 
Demographic Questionnaire 
31 Please fill the short demographic 
questionnaire 
All family members and bystanders 
who contributed to the interview 
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D Loan officer component questionnaire 
 
Duration: approximately 40 minutes 
Table 32: Loan officer component questionnaire 
# Question Working instructions Choice Answer 
Anonymous up-front questionnaire (20 minutes) 
1 How is the program received 
and accepted by your cus-
tomers? 
  A) Very well: 
B) Good: 
C) Overall OK: 
D) Overall OK, but sometimes 
difficult: 
E) Frequent criticism and resis-
tance: 
2 Regarding the premium, how 
do your customers feel about 
it? 
  A) All clients are happy with the 
premium: 
B) Most clients are happy with the 
premium, but some clients com-
plain about it: 
C) Many clients are ok with the 
premium, but many also complain 
about it: 
D) Most clients feel the premium is 
an extra burden for them: 
E) All clients complain about the 
expensive premium: 
3 How do you think MI has 
affected your organization’s 
customer numbers? 
  A) Positively. Customers see in-
surance program as additional 
benefit to join: 
B) Neutral. No effect: 
C) Negatively. Customers tend to 
drop-out because of issues related 
with the insurance program: 
4 When explaining the pro-
gram, what is your most 
successful strategy to explain 
it? What is your trick? 
    
5 What is the most difficult 
obstacle when socializing 
microinsurance? 
    
6 What are the 3 most fre-
quently asked questions you 
encounter? 
  1. ______________? 
2. ______________? 
3. ______________? 
7 What other noteworthy ques-
tions are asked by the cus-
tomers? 
    
8 Would you recommend your 
management to continue the 
microinsurance program? 
  A) Yes: 
B) Yes, but only with improve-
ments: 
C) It makes no difference to con-
tinue or not: 
D) No, I would recommend to stop 
it: 
9 What improvements would 
you recommend? 
    
10 Any other comments / sug-
gestions you would like to 
share with your management 
and Allianz on the insurance 
program? 
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Verbal Discussion 
11 Did you encounter any cul-
tural, religious, social ob-
stacles or superstitions? 
- Possible repeat from written ques-
tionnaire, but here there is a chance 
to discuss and explain 
- E.g. afraid of dying faster / ill wish-
ing 
- E.g. haram 
- E.g. Taboo to talk about death 
  
12 Did you encounter people 
saying “takut cepat mati” 
(fear of dying prematurely)? 
Why do they say so? 
    
13 Are your customers still more 
fatalistic (100% takdir) or are 
they action driven? 
    
14 Why do customers take out a 
loan? 
a) Draw a matrix with (on y-axis):  
(1) Help support family income to 
make ends meet,  
(2) Pastime, 
(3) Pass on to husband, 
(4) Consumption, 
(5) Building a really big and success-
ful business, 
and (on x-axis) 
(A) none, (B) few, (C) some, (D) 
many, (E) all 
 
b) Have each loan officer cast his 
votes for each category 
  
15 Is it socially acceptable if the 
woman earns more than the 
husband? 
    
16 Do you think brochure is a 
good marketing tool? Espe-
cially when there is a claim 
photo on it? 
    
17 Do you think “claim stories” 
make for good promotion or 
scare people away? Would 
you tell it? 
    
18 Were customers ever asking 
for more insurance? If yes, 
what kind? 
  Yes, often: 
Yes, sometimes: 
No: 
19a Have you ever personally 
handled a claim? 
  Yes: 
No: 
19b If yes, were there any difficul-
ties when processing the 
claim? 
    
19c How was claim payment 
organized and received by 
the community? 
    
19d Do you think the claim has 
prevented the family from 
falling deeper into poverty? 
Why so? Why not? 
  A) Yes, definitely: 
B) A little bit: 
C) I do not know what happened 
after the claim payment: 
D) No, the claim payment didn't 
help the family. 
19e What effect did the claim 
have on the credit group and 
the community at large? 
E.g. drop in solidarity (for slametan) 
or increased pressure on group or 
better popularity? 
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V Open discussion 
20 Any other comments and 
suggestions you would like to 
make openly? 
    
VI Demographic Questionnaire 
21 Please fill a short written 
demographic questionnaire 
on your personal data. 
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E Group leader component questionnaire 
 
Duration: approximately 90 minutes 
Table 33: Group leader component questionnaire 
# Question Working instructions Answer 
options 
Profiling 
1 Why have you and your credit group 
members decided to take a loan? 
Pay special attention on kesibukan (pastime) 
motive 
  
2 Can you describe the financial situation of 
your family, especially who is contributing 
to your family income and how much? 
A general picture of income flows is desired 
here, not necessarily exact Rupiah amounts 
  
3 What term would you use to describe your 
socio-economic level? 
    
4 Now on expenses: Who generally decides 
what to do with the money in your family? 
I.e. how much to give to arisan, etc.? 
   
5 Could you generalize this for your group 
members or do you see differences? 
    
6 How much extra income do you get out of 
your loan (the portion that is invested)? 
- To discern an average rate of return 
- No ready made figure expected 
- Discuss height and usages of loan and result 
of investment in detail 
- Get some form of monetary return value (i.e. 
extra per day, per week) 
  
7 Would it be okay, if you and your credit 
group members were earning more than 
the husband/wife? 
    
Insurance Know-How & Satisfaction 
8 Do you think you have received enough 
information on the insurance you got from 
the MFI? 
  Yes: 
Don't know: 
No: 
9 A customer said: Kalo tidak jelas tidak 
puas ("If it [the product] is not clear, I am 
not satisfied"). How do you think about 
this? 
    
10 Is there any connection between how 
much you know about the product and 
how you promote/explain it to other group 
members and friends? 
Because I found that customers still openly 
shared information on their insurance although 
they had not fully understood it 
  
11 If you were still a non-customer, would 
this insurance be one reason for you to 
join the credit program? 
  Yes: 
Maybe: 
No: 
12 What do you like and dislike about this 
insurance? 
    
13 How do you comment on frequent the 
takut cepat mati (fear of dying premature-
ly) concern? Were such concerns raised 
in your group? 
   
Death and Insurance 
14 Most insurance payout is used for slame-
tan and tahlilan. Why is this so important?  
    
15 How much would you say a slametan 
costs in total up to the 100th day? 
    
16 Do you believe that a slametan and tahli-
lan give extra benefits for the afterlife? For 
who? The deceased and/or yourself? 
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17 Do you feel these costs are rising or de-
creasing? Why so? 
    
18 What is your local ustadj saying regarding 
funeral costs? 
    
19 In addition, many borrow from friends and 
family? Can you describe this more close-
ly? Under what conditions do you borrow, 
receive a gift? If, how and when do you 
need to repay? Do you feel malu to bor-
row? 
Optional question   
20 Another big portion is used for debt re-
payment. Why is this so important? How 
are your local customs on non-bank debt 
repayment? 
   
21 So far, not a single formal loan was taken 
out to arrange death ceremonies. Why 
would that be? 
   
22 When is community support strongest: for 
education, illness or death? Why? 
   
23 What would you actually expect your 
beneficiary to spend the payout on? 
a) Collect potential usage ideas first, write them 
on post-it notes and put on the ground 
b) Distribute 3 post-it notes with numbers “1”, 
“2” and “3” to each participant 
c) Ask participants to put their post-it notes on 
the recommended usages, with “1” being the 
most pressing of all etc. 
  
New products & Arisan 
24 In how many arisan are you members? 
What types? 
Ask every participant individually for an an-
swer. 
>4: 
4: 
3: 
2: 
1: 
0: 
25 How do the arisan work exactly in which 
you participate? 
How much is paid? 
What happens if you don't pay? 
Are men members, too? 
  
26 How could these arisan help you in times 
of urgent needs? 
    
27 If there was an attractive education insur-
ance for your children with contribution of 
Rp. 50,000 per month in which you are 
interested. How would you raise this 
money? 
E.g. would you scale back on arisan?   
28 How about sharia insurance? What would 
you prefer sharia insurance over conven-
tional insurance? Would you prefer sharia 
in any case, even if more expensive? 
    
29 In you group, is NU or Muhammadiyah 
more dominant? Does this distinction still 
play a role in daily life? 
    
30 Anything else you would like to ask, any-
thing else you need or that we can im-
prove? 
    
Demographics 
31 Please fill the short demographic ques-
tionnaire 
Distribute pens and questionnaire (9 questions) 
and collect again 
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F Written demographic questionnaire (sample from ex-post customer component) 
 
Duration: approximately 8 minutes 
Table 34: Written demographic questionnaire (sample from ex-post customer compo-
nent) 
# Question Answer options 
1 Name:   
2 Credit Group Name:   
3 Have you been interviewed last 
year (ex-ante)? 
Yes: 
No: 
4 Have you ever received insur-
ance with your credit? 
Yes: 
No: 
5 Age:   
6 Sex: F: 
M: 
7 Your primary occupation? A) Trader: 
B) Farmer: 
C) Food stall (warung): 
D) Food production: 
E) Good production: 
F) Housewive: 
G) Others: ___________ 
8 Religion: A) Islam: 
B) Protestant: 
C) Catholic: 
D) Hindu: 
E) Buddhist: 
9 Marital status A) Single: 
B) Married: 
C) Widowed: 
C) Divorced: 
10 Last attained education1: A) None: 
B) SD: 
C) SMP: 
D) SMA: 
E) D1-D3: 
F) S1-S3: 
1 For abbreviations, see list of abbreviations at the end of the thesis. 
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ANNEX 2: DATA AND PHOTOS OF RESPONDENTS 
A Customer component data 
B Beneficiary component data 
C Loan officer component data 
D Expert component data 
E Group leader component data 
F MFI management component data 
G Customer component photos 
H Beneficiary component photos 
I Loan officer component photos 
J Group leader component photos 
 
 
A Customer component data 
Table 35: Logistic and demographic data of customer component participants1 
# Name Sex Age Principal 
occupation 
Religion Satus Last 
attained 
educa-
tion2 
Group 
code 
Phase2 
1 Agus F 28 Trader Catholic Single SMA BAS6 a 
2 Ahmad Dasuki M 20 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN3 a 
3 Aisah F 38 others Islam Married SD BAS1 a 
4 Aksa F 40 Trader Catholic Married None BAS6 a 
5 Alexander M. Malana M 44 Farmer Protestant Married SMA MMS4 a 
6 Anaci Lessi Lasboi F 29 Trader Protestant Married SMP BAS5 ap 
7 Ance Tahun F 35 Trader Protestant Single SD BAS5 ap 
8 Anisia F 44 Teacher Catholic Married D1-D3 MMS2 a 
9 Anna Aletha Beri Eluama F 39 Trader Protestant Married SMA BAS5 p 
10 Ari F 37 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS3 a 
11 AS. Yuliana Yublina 
Malelak 
F 40 Housewife Protestant Married SMA MMS7 p 
12 Bet Waang F 62 Trader Protestant Married SMP BAS5 a 
13 Betty TC F 49 Food Stall Islam Married SMP BAS2 a 
14 Betty TC F 38 Goods 
production 
Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 ap 
15 Bodu Tera M 55 Farmer Protestant Married SMA MMS3 a 
16 Cendy Pa Pilaja F 50 Trader Protestant Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMA DIMAN1 a 
17 Dahlia F 27 Food pro-
duction 
Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
18 Dahlia F 40 Trader Islam Married SD DIMAN3 a 
19 Diana Dada Kasa F 41 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS6 p 
20 Dina Orance Nomleni F 35 Housewife Protestant Married SMA BAS6 p 
21 Djunah F 42 Housewife Islam Married SMP DIMAN3 p 
22 Dor Heppy Hutabarat F 45 Housewife Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 p 
23 Eem Fatmawati F 27 Housewife Islam Married SMA BISWA3 p 
24 Ela F 25 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS3 a 
25 Eliyana F 39 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
26 Elpi F 24 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 a 
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27 Emirensiana T. Embu F 37 Trader Catholic Married SMA MMS2 ap 
28 Endang Mulyati Ningsih F 36 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS3 ap 
29 Endang Sugianti F 35 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 a 
30 Endang Susilowati F 26 Trader Islam Married SMA WKP2 a 
31 Endrawaty F 36 Trader Islam Married SMP MMS5 p 
32 Engkar F 43 Housewife Islam Married SMP BAS4 a 
33 Erna Fatimah F 23 Housewife Islam Married SMP BISWA3 a 
34 Ernawati F 28 Trader Islam Married SMP WKP2 a 
35 Ernesta Niga Pare F 33 Trader Catholic Married SMA MMS2 ap 
36 Ester Magi Diala F 42 Others Protestant Married S1-S3 MMS3 ap 
37 Eti Sumarsih F 32 Housewife Islam Married SMP BISWA3 ap 
38 Etty F 38 Trader Catholic Married SMA BAS6 a 
39 Euis Rosida F 39 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD BAS2 p 
40 Ewalda Olla F 25 Trader Protestant Married D1-D3 BAS6 p 
41 Farida F 48 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN1 a 
42 Ferderika Tahun F 31 Trader Protestant Married SMP BAS5 ap 
43 Fransina V. Lirik F 36 Trader Protestant Married SMA BAS6 ap 
44 Fride Risma F 42 Housewife Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 p 
45 Goling Laga M 48 Farmer Protestant Married SD MMS4 a 
46 Hadijah Radia F 45 Farmer Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMP MMS2 ap 
47 Haryati F 39 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
48 Henry F 36 Trader Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 a 
49 Herlina F 50 Food pro-
duction 
Protestant Married SMP BAS4 a 
50 Hermin F 41 Housewife Protestant Married S1-S3 DIMAN4 p 
51 Heru Nursanti F 40 Housewife Islam Married SMP BISWA3 a 
52 Herwinah F 35 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN3 p 
53 Hj. Sukasni F 55 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD DIMAN3 ap 
54 Husnawati F 45 Trader Islam Married SMP WKP2 a 
55 I Gede Ketut Raiyasa M 37 Farmer Hindu Single SMA MBM1 ap 
56 I Gede Saja M 66 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 a 
57 I Ketut Kardi M 53 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
58 I Ketut Sabda M 53 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
59 I Ketut Sukaja M 75 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
60 I Made Sondra M 35 Farmer Hindu Married SMA MBM1 ap 
61 I Made Sumiada M 35 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
62 I Nengah Kandra M 44 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
63 I Nengah Raka M 40 Farmer Hindu Widowed 
/divorced 
SMA MBM1 ap 
64 I Nyoman Desin M 49 Farmer Hindu Married None MBM1 p 
65 I Nyoman Godang M 50 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
66 I Nyoman Koming M 41 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 ap 
67 I Nyoman Nurjana M 36 Farmer Hindu Married SMP MBM1 p 
68 I Nyoman Sadia M 54 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
69 I Wayan Cadra M 51 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 ap 
70 I Wayan Kondra M 65 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
71 I Wayan Sukada M 33 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 p 
72 I Wayan Tantra M 39 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 ap 
73 I Wayan Weter M 43 Farmer Hindu Single SMA MBM1 a 
74 Ida Royakit F 34 Trader Islam Married SMA BISWA3 a 
75 Ida Royani F 32 Housewife Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 a 
76 Ida S. F 41 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS8 p 
77 Iis Sugianti F 25 Trader Islam Married SMA WKP1 a 
78 Ika F 25 Trader 
(Textiles) 
Islam Married SMA BAS1 a 
79 Ika F 25 Goods Islam Married SMA MMS5 p 
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production 
80 Ike Komalawati F 36 Trader Islam Married SMA BAS4 ap 
81 Ira F 45 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
82 Iroh F 37 Housewife Islam Married SD DIMAN3 p 
83 Ison F 33 Housewife Islam Married SMP WKP2 p 
84 Iti F 40 Trader Islam Married None DIMAN3 ap 
85 Jasrip M 50 Trader Islam Married SD DIMAN3 a 
86 Johana Gholo F 48 Food Pro-
duction 
Catholic Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD MMS6 p 
87 Johanis Rehi Gheda M 57 Farmer Protestant Married SMA MMS6 p 
88 Julaeha F 35 Trader / 
Food pro-
duction 
Islam Married SMA MMS8 p 
89 Julaeha F 29 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS4 ap 
90 Juriah F 47 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
91 Karwati F 33 Trader Islam Single SMA MMS1 a 
92 Katrina K. Magi F 43 Trader Protestant Married SD MMS7 p 
93 Kd Sumiasih F 32 Food stall / 
Food pro-
duction 
Hindu Married SD WKP2 a 
94 Koni Wolka F 64 Trader Protestant Widowed/ 
divorced 
D1-D3 MMS3 ap 
95 Kusmiati F 37 Food Stall Islam Married SMA MMS8 p 
96 Kustiyatni F 44 Goods 
production 
Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
97 Lady Angel Amelia F 22 Housewife Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 a 
98 Letty Emma H. Waangsir F 57 Trader Protestant Married SMA BAS6 a 
99 Lisa F 38 Trader Islam n.a. SMA DIMAN3 a 
100 Lodia F 65 Trader Protestant Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD BAS5 a 
101 Lola Alice Juliani F 41 Trader Islam Married SMA DIMAN4 p 
102 Lucia F 55 Farmer Catholic Married SD MMS2 a 
103 Magdalena Bili F 39 Housewife Protestant Married SD MMS7 p 
104 Magdalena Tulle F 28 Housewife Protestant Married SMA BAS6 ap 
105 Mahdalena HS F 27 Trader Islam Married SMA DIMAN4 p 
106 Margaretha Niga F 35 Trader Catholic Single SMA MMS6 p 
107 Margaritha Sipa Eluama F 45 Trader Protestant Married SMA BAS5 ap 
108 Maria Aloysia Waga F 33 Trader Catholic Married SMA MMS2 ap 
109 Maria Banoet Banfatin F 54 Trader Protestant Married SD BAS5 ap 
110 Maria Biaf F 35 Trader Protestant Married SD BAS6 ap 
111 Maria Bulu F 40 Housewife Protestant Married SMA MMS7 p 
112 Maria Goreti Niut F 37 Housewife Catholic Married SMA BAS6 ap 
113 Maria Imakulata Bela F 55 Housewife Catholic Married SD MMS6 p 
114 Maria Magdalena Toto F 39 Teacher Protestant Married SMA BAS5 p 
115 Maria Wimi Porli F 40 Farmer Catholic Married SMP MMS6 p 
116 Marni F 40 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD DIMAN3 p 
117 Marni F 30 Housewife Islam Married SD DIMAN3 p 
118 Marsalina Lin Banoet F 38 Trader Protestant Married SD BAS5 p 
119 Marsiti F 43 Food Stall Islam Married SD BISWA3 a 
120 Martha Likn F 39 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS3 ap 
121 Martheda Lassa F 51 Trader Protestant Married SMA BAS5 ap 
122 Marthen Boru Dedy M 46 Farmer Protestant Married SMA MMS4 a 
123 Marthen Saefatu M 34 Farmer Protestant Married SMA MMS4 a 
124 Maryam F 35 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 a 
125 Maryati F 37 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS1 a 
126 Maryati F 44 Food pro-
duction 
Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
ap 
127 Masniatun F 34 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 ap 
128 Mateus Deta M 42 Farmer Catholic Married SD MMS6 p 
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129 Melda F 50 Trader Catholic Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD BAS6 a 
130 Meri L. Tara Wini F 35 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS3 ap 
131 Meri Tloen F 35 Trader Protestant Married SD BAS5 a 
132 Mina F 34 Housewife Catholic Married SD BAS6 a 
133 Misripah F 49 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 a 
134 Mufidah F 32 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN4 p 
135 Muji Haririyani F 41 Trader Protestant Married SMA MMS7 p 
136 Murni F 17 Goods 
production 
Islam Single SD DINARI
1 
a 
137 Nanik Maryati F 30 Food Stall Islam Married SMA DINARI
1 
ap 
138 Netti F 25 Trader 
(Textiles) 
Islam Married SMP BAS1 a 
139 Ni Luh Ayu F 26 Trader Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
a 
140 Ni Luh Sriani F 43 Trader Hindu Married SD WKP2 ap 
141 Ni Made Ayu F 33 Goods 
production 
Hindu Married SMA WKP2 p 
142 Nia M 28 Farmer Hindu Married SMA MBM1 a 
143 Nini Sumini F 53 Trader Islam Married SMA DIMAN1 a 
144 Nining Sariningsih F 30 Food Stall Islam Married SMA BAS4 ap 
145 Nova Fatimah F 40 Food Stall Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD BISWA3 a 
146 Novi Is Tanti F 20 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
147 Novi Maulida Ningsih F 22 Housewife Catholic Married SD MMS7 p 
148 Nunung Sumarni F 38 Trader Islam Married SMP BISWA3 ap 
149 Nur Adlah F 32 Trader Islam Married SD DIMAN3 a 
150 Nur Rodiyah F 34 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS8 p 
151 Nur Yujani F 41 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS1 p 
152 Nur'adaniah F 34 Trader Islam Married SMP MMS5 p 
153 Nurhasanah F 33 Goods 
production 
Islam Married SMP MMS2 ap 
154 Nurlela F 31 Housewife Islam Married SMP BISWA3 a 
155 Nurningsih F 41 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS1 ap 
156 Nuryani Z F 39 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS8 p 
157 Orsina Toto F 35 Teacher Protestant Married D1-D3 BAS5 ap 
158 P. Dandi M 30 Farmer Hindu Married SMA MBM1 ap 
159 P. Sri M 31 Farmer Hindu Married SMP MBM1 ap 
160 P. Suartama M 39 Farmer Hindu Married SD MBM1 ap 
161 Pan Wilianta M 35 Farmer Hindu Married None MBM1 a 
162 Pan Winastre M 65 Farmer Hindu Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD MBM1 a 
163 Pansamotan F 37 Food stall Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 a 
164 Parman M 30 Trader Islam Married SD MMS1 a 
165 Pasta M 37 Farmer Hindu Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMP MBM1 a 
166 Paulina Bera Tinus F 27 Trader Catholic Married SMP MMS6 p 
167 Pinki F 41 Trader Islam Married SMP BISWA3 p 
168 Pipih Sunarti F 46 Trader Islam Married SD BAS2 ap 
169 Pujiati F 30 Housewife Islam Married SD WKP2 p 
170 Ragil F 30 Housewife Protestant Married SMP BAS6 a 
171 Rarabodu F 39 Farmer Protestant Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMP MMS4 a 
172 Rastini F 40 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD DIMAN2 a 
173 Rati F 41 Food Pro-
duction 
Islam Married SMA BAS4 p 
174 Raymond R. Toka M 46 Farmer Protestant Married D1-D3 MMS4 a 
175 Retno Sari F 23 Trader Islam Single SMA DIMAN1 a 
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176 Riris Parhusip  F 39 Trader Protestant Married SMA DIMAN1 p 
177 Ro F 41 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS2 a 
178 Roliah F 40 Food Stall Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD DIMAN3 ap 
179 Rosalima Tefa F 45 Trader Protestant Married SD BAS6 ap 
180 Rosmawati F 30 Housewife Islam Married D1-D3 BAS2 a 
181 Rosmini A. Rahman F 41 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS2 ap 
182 Rubi Walyati F 32 Others 
(Employee
) 
Islam Married S1-S3 MMS8 p 
183 Rudyanto W. Bora M 33 Farmer Protestant Married SMP MMS4 a 
184 Saima F 40 Trader Islam Married SD WKP2 a 
185 Sakinah F 40 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 a 
186 Sampe Sayang Parhasip F 30 Food Stall Protestant Married D1-D3 DIMAN1 p 
187 Sari F 43 Trader 
(jamu) 
Islam Married SMP MMS1 a 
188 Sarifah F   Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD MMS2 p 
189 Sarmah F 50 Goods 
production 
Islam Single SMP DIMAN3 ap 
190 Satinam F 50 Trader 
(jamu) 
Islam Married None MMS1 a 
191 Sisi F 59 Teacher Catholic Married D1-D3 MMS2 a 
192 Siti F 31 Goods 
production 
Islam Married SD BAS4 p 
193 Siti Aranah F 40 Trader Islam Married SD BAS2 a 
194 Siti Nurain F 27 Trader Islam Married SMA DIMAN2 a 
195 Siti Rochani F 36 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 ap 
196 Siti Setiawati F 36 Housewife Islam Married SMA BAS4 p 
197 Sopiah F 40 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD DIMAN3 p 
198 Sri Astuti F 32 Others Islam Married SMP WKP1 ap 
199 Sri Kasima F 33 Housewife Islam Married SMA BAS1 a 
200 Sri Rahayu F 53 Others 
(Transpor-
tation) 
Islam Married SMA DIMAN1 a 
201 Sri Rohati F 49 Trader Islam Married SMP BISWA3 p 
202 Sriarti F 46 Housewife Islam Married SD BISWA3 a 
203 Stefanny F 20 Food pro-
duction 
Islam Married SMA DIMAN4 p 
204 Sudini F 32 Housewife Islam Married SMP BISWA3 a 
205 Sufia Nahak F 48 Trader Protestant Married SD BAS5 p 
206 Sugiyah F 28 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS1 a 
207 Sugiyem F 15 Goods 
production 
Islam Single SD DINARI
1 
a 
208 Suhani F 58 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
None BAS2 ap 
209 Sulistianawati F 33 Trader Protestant Single SMA DIMAN4 p 
210 Sumarnik F 28 Food stall / 
Trader 
Islam Married SD WKP2 a 
211 Sumartik F 35 Goods 
production 
Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
a 
212 Sumiyati F 52 Trader Islam Married SMA WKP2 ap 
213 Suparmi F 19 Trader / 
Food pro-
duction 
Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
a 
214 Suparmi F 40 Trader Islam Married SMA DIMAN4 p 
215 Supiati F 54 Food stall Islam Married SD WKP2 a 
216 Supiati F 46 Food Stall Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
ap 
217 Suratmi F 27 Housewife Islam Married SD DIMAN1 p 
218 Suryanah  F 36 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN2 a 
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219 Suryantis M 34 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS1 a 
220 Suryati F 53 Food Stall Islam Married SMP MMS5 p 
221 Susiani F 41 Trader Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
ap 
222 Sutini F 45 Trader Islam Married None WKP2 a 
223 Suyati F 33 Trader Islam Married SD WKP1 a 
224 Tati S. F 35 Trader Islam Married SMP BAS4 a 
225 Taxoci Tualaka F 41 Housewife Protestant Married SD BAS6 p 
226 Theresia F 60 Trader Catholic Married SD MMS6 p 
227 Tini Kurniati F 37 Housewife Islam Married SMP BAS4 p 
228 Titin F 31 others Islam Married SD BAS1 ap 
229 Tiwarma Simbolon F 37 Housewife Islam Married D1-D3 BISWA3 a 
230 Tri Wulan Susilowati F 49 Trader Islam Married D1-D3 DIMAN1 a 
231 Tuda Lona M 37 Farmer Protestant Married SD MMS4 a 
232 Tursinah F 26 Trader Islam Married SD DIMAN2 a 
233 Tursinah F 42 Trader Islam Married SD BISWA3 p 
234 Usup Supandi M 32 Trader Islam Married SD DIMAN3 ap 
235 Warliah F 48 Food Stall Islam Married SD BAS1 a 
236 Warsini F 39 Others Islam Married SMP BAS1 ap 
237 Wasiah F 42 Trader Islam Married SD DINARI
1 
ap 
238 Wehelmus Mulyono M 50 Farmer Protestant Married SMA MMS4 a 
239 Wiwik Winarti F 31 Food Stall Islam Single SD DINARI
1 
ap 
240 Wiwin F 32 Trader Islam Married SMP DIMAN3 a 
241 Yanni F 25 Trader Islam Married SD MMS8 p 
242 Yati F 50 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
None DIMAN3 a 
243 Yati F 33 Trader / 
Food stall 
Islam NA SD DIMAN3 a 
244 Yayah Yuliana F 37 Housewife Islam Married SMP BAS4 ap 
245 Yohamah F 43 Food Stall Islam Married SD BISWA3 ap 
246 Yuliana F 40 Trader Protestant Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD WKP2 a 
247 Yuliana Tilna F 41 Farmer Catholic Married SMA MMS6 p 
248 Yus F 40 Trader Protestant Married SMA BAS5 a 
249 Yusmandiar F 56 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMA BAS2 a 
250 Yusmiati F 32 Trader Islam Married SMA BAS2 ap 
251 Yustina F 34 Trader Islam Married SD WKP2 a 
1 For demographic data of repeat participants (ap), ex-post data is displayed. 
2 “a” = ex-ante, “ap” = ex-ante and ex-post (repeat participants), “p” = ex-post. 
3 For abbreviations, see list of abbreviations at the end of the thesis. 
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B Beneficiary component data 
Table 36: Logistic and demographic data of beneficiary interviews 
# Interview 
code 
Interview 
Date 
Name Relation Sex Age Principal 
occupation 
Religion Marital 
status 
(before 
claim) 
Last 
attained 
educa-
tion1 
1a DIMAN1b 08. Aug 07 Entus 
Mulyadi 
Insured M 22 Others (TV 
station 
employee) 
Islam Single   
1b DIMAN1b 08. Aug 07 Rasnya Father M 63 Farmer Islam Widowed SD 
2a DIMAN2b 08. Aug 07 Sukiman Insured M 52 Others 
(freelance 
electrician) 
Islam Married   
2b DIMAN2b 08. Aug 07 Sarima Wife F 40 Others 
(household 
maid) 
Islam Widowed SD 
3a DIMAN3b 09. Aug 07 Musa 
Markani 
Insured M 55 Trader (dried 
fish) 
Islam Married   
3b DIMAN3b 09. Aug 07 Asinah Wife F 47 Trader (dried 
fish) 
Islam Widowed SD 
4a DIMAN4b 14. Aug 07 Nariah Bt 
Kesah 
Insured F 38 Trader (texti-
les) 
Islam Married   
4b DIMAN4b 14. Aug 07 Tarmuji Husband M 42 Others (dri-
ver) 
Islam Widowed SMP 
5a DIMAN5b 14. Aug 07 Sunarni Insured F 49 Trader (tex-
tiles and 
staple food) 
Islam Married   
5b DIMAN5b 14. Aug 07 R. Djoko 
Djuharyanto
ko 
Husband M 51 Others 
(unemployed
) 
Islam Widowed SMA 
6a DIMAN6b 20. Aug 07 Saminem Insured F 55 Food Stall Islam Married   
6b DIMAN6b 20. Aug 07 Sutiman Husband M 60 food stall Islam Widowed SD 
7a DIMAN7b 08. Okt 07 Juhana Insured F 58 n.a. Islam Widowed   
7b DIMAN7b 08. Okt 07 Ibnu Lokita Son M 30 Others (of-
fice boy) 
Islam Single SMA 
8a DIMAN8b 14. Dez 07 Yuliana Insured F 37 Others (sa-
lon) 
Islam Married   
8b DIMAN8b 14. Dez 07 Niman Husband M 45 Others 
(constructor) 
Islam Widowed SMP 
9a DIMAN9b 18. Dez 07 Eris Novita Insured F 35 Trader (food) Islam Married   
9b DIMAN9b 18. Dez 07 Zulkifli 
Siregar 
Husband M 36 Others (taxi 
driver) 
Islam Widowed D1-D3 
10a DIMAN10b 18. Dez 07 Rumyati Insured F 35 Trader Islam Married   
10b DIMAN10b 18. Dez 07 Toto 
Sukanto 
Husband M 45 Others (taxi 
driver) 
Islam Widowed SMP 
11a DIMAN11b 18. Dez 07 Erliana 
Tinambuna
n 
Insured F   Trader Islam Married   
11b DIMAN11b 18. Dez 07 Gunung 
Siregar 
Husband M 44 Trader Islam Widowed SMA 
12a MMS1b 19. Dez 07 Siti 
Muhibah 
Insured F 50 Trader Islam Married   
12b MMS1b 19. Dez 07 Zakiyah Daughter F 29 Trader Islam Married SMP 
13a DIMAN12b 24. Jan 08 Fitriani Insured F 30 Food Stall Islam Married   
13b DIMAN12b 24. Jan 08 Moh. Jafar Husband M 38 Trader (fish) Islam Widowed SMP 
14 DIMAN13b 12. Mai 08 No permision for publication given 
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15a DIMAN14b 12. Mai 08 Rohani Insured F 52 Others (ae-
robics trai-
ner) 
Islam Married   
15b DIMAN14b 12. Mai 08 Hadji 
Mustani 
Husband M 58 Others (dri-
ver and 
garage) 
Islam Widowed SMP 
16a DIMAN15b 12. Mai 08 Martini Insured F 38 Trader 
(shoes, 
sandals, 
bags) 
Islam Married   
16b DIMAN15b 12. Mai 08 Aznar 
Efendi 
Husband M 36 Goods pro-
duction 
Islam Widowed SMP 
17a MBM1b 21. Mai 08 I Made 
Sudiatmika 
Insured M 29 Others (staff 
of Synode) 
Protes-
tant 
Married   
17b MBM1b 21. Mai 08 Komang 
Sudarsini 
Wife F 28 Housewife Protes-
tant 
Widowed SMP 
18a WKP1b 26. Mai 08 Eka 
Wahyuliani 
Insured F 28 Food Stall Islam Widowed   
18b WKP1b 26. Mai 08 Kartini Mother-
in-Law 
F 40 Trader  
(jamu)  
Islam Married SD 
19a DIMAN18b 02. Jun 08 Buntu 
Simanjunta
k 
Insured M 52 Trader Protes-
tant 
Married   
19b DIMAN18b 02. Jun 08 Romida 
Sinurat 
Wife F 45 Others  
(teacher) 
Protes-
tant 
Widowed D1-D3 
20a DIMAN19b 02. Jun 08 Amanah Bt. 
H. 
Hasanudin 
Insured F 44 Trader Islam Married   
20b DIMAN19b 02. Jun 08 Ismet 
Apriyanto 
Son M 23 Others (uni-
versity stu-
dent) 
Islam Single SMA 
21a BISWA1b 09. Jun 08 Pariah Insured F 44 Housewife Islam Married   
21b BISWA1b 09. Jun 08 Sugeng 
Mulyadi 
Son M 24 Others (uni-
versity stu-
dent) 
Islam Single SMA 
22a BISWA2b 09. Jun 08 Sulistini Insured F 37 Housewife Islam Married   
22b BISWA2b 09. Jun 08 Yeni 
Meyanti 
Sister-in-
Law 
F 37 Others 
(employee in 
clinic) 
Islam Married SMA 
23a DIMAN16b 12. Jun 08 Sadia Insured F 48 Trader Islam     
23b DIMAN16b 12. Jun 08 Lulu 
Setiawan 
Son M 23 Others (fac-
tory worker) 
Islam Married SMP 
24a DIMAN17b 12. Jun 08 Marsiti Insured F 52 Trader Islam Married   
24b DIMAN17b 12. Jun 08 Ratna 
Wulan 
Daughter F 28 Trader Islam Married SMA 
25 DIMAN20b 30. Okt 08 No permision for publication given 
26a DIMAN21b 31. Okt 08 Lenih Insured F 43 Trader 
(vegetables) 
Islam Married   
26b DIMAN21b 31. Okt 08 O'O Suparji Husband M 57 Others 
(freelance 
construction 
worker) 
Islam Widowed SD 
1 For abbreviations, see list of abbreviations at the end of the thesis. 
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C Loan Officer component data 
Table 37: Demographic data of loan officer component 
# Name Sex Age Religion How long with 
organization 
(years) 
Last 
attained 
education1 
1 Adrianus Lassa M 31 Protestant 5.5 SMA 
2 Agus B. Sugiarto M 26 Buddhist 0.2 SMA 
3 Andreas Ola Tokan M 34 Catholic 0.2 D1-D3 
4 Anton Endio M 49 Catholic 0.8 S1-S3 
5 Anwar M 24 Islam 0.7 SMA 
6 Ariati F 44 Hindu 7.9 S1-S3 
7 Ayu Diah Somawati F 24 Hindu 4.9 SMA 
8 Christian N. Rumayon M 29 Protestant 2.2 D1-D3 
9 Daniel Tri Laksono M 28 Protestant 0.4 S1-S3 
10 Dewi Janna Puspa Ningrum F 20 Islam 0.8 D1-D3 
11 Dewi Kartika F 23 Protestant 2.5 SMA 
12 Dina F 38 Protestant 9.1 S1-S3 
13 Ebenhaezar M 23 Protestant 0.2 S1-S3 
14 Elpita R. F 31 Protestant 4.3 D1-D3 
15 Ezra Fransisca F 24 Protestant 1.0 SMA 
16 Ferdinand M 27 Protestant 0.2 S1-S3 
17 Florentina F 26 Protestant 3.5 D1-D3 
18 Florentina F 28 Protestant 4.7 D1-D3 
19 Gede Panca Hartana M 35 Protestant 0.2 D1-D3 
20 Gunawan M 21 Islam 0.9 SMA 
21 Gusti Ayu Wirayudani F 39 Hindu 2.5 S1-S3 
22 I Gede Mustika M 47 Protestant 21.4 S1-S3 
23 I Gede Widya Udayana M 36 Protestant 9.9 S1-S3 
24 I Gusti Agung Dwiatmika M 25 Protestant 0.1 D1-D3 
25 I Ketut Sumiasa M 41 Protestant 0.9 SMA 
26 I Made Agus Eddy Saputra M 39 Protestant 0.4 S1-S3 
27 I Made Suparta Yasa M 39 Protestant 4.9 S1-S3 
28 I Made Winaja M 28 Hindu 2.9 SMA 
29 I Made Wiyasa M 40 Protestant 2.2 S1-S3 
30 I Nyoman Pastya M 38 Protestant 4.1 SMA 
31 I Nyoman Putra Sukasana M 25 Protestant 3.9 S1-S3 
32 I Putu Widyana M 31 Hindu 0.2 D1-D3 
33 Iwan M 39 Protestant 3.7 S1-S3 
34 Iwan Darmawan M 23 Islam 0.9 SMA 
35 Joseph Sony M 29 Catholic 1.5 S1-S3 
36 K. Ferdinand Huru S. M 26 Protestant 0.9 D1-D3 
37 Ketut Ardi Budi Sucanya M 36 Protestant 3.9 SMA 
38 Marlina Adelina Sianaan F 30 Protestant 4.3 S1-S3 
39 Masita Vera Basauli Sirait F 29 Protestant 4.3 S1-S3 
40 Ngurah Sukaadnyana M 36 Hindu 2.5 S1-S3 
41 Ni Kadek Sunariati F 36 Protestant 8.1 SMA 
42 Ni Ketut Miasi F 38 Hindu 3.9 SMA 
43 Ni Luh Roji F 42 Protestant 0.8 S1-S3 
44 Ni Made Jeniari F 20 Hindu 0.6 SMA 
45 Ni Nyoman Narki F 39 Hindu 10.9 SMA 
46 Ni Nyoman Sri Aryani F 39 Hindu 8.0 S1-S3 
47 Ni Nyoman Yulia Wiratni F 37 Protestant 4.9 S1-S3 
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48 Nikolas Metom M 27 Protestant 0.1 SMA 
49 Peter Marga Wiyara M 36 Protestant 4.9 S1-S3 
50 Pisna D. F 23 Islam 0.5 SMA 
51 Putu Cahya Hernayanti F 28 Protestant 4.9 D1-D3 
52 Putu Hans Widiatmika  M n.a. Protestant 4.9 S1-S3 
53 Ratih F 43 Protestant 11.9 S1-S3 
54 Ria Sirait F 27 Protestant 2.3 D1-D3 
55 Ristia Lestari F 24 Protestant 3.9 SMA 
56 Rita Lianti H. F 30 Protestant 0.4 D1-D3 
57 Saefullah, ST. F 28 Islam 1.1 S1-S3 
58 Sahat Marbun M 30 Catholic 4.5 S1-S3 
59 Sitem Wasma R F 25 Islam 0.3 S1-S3 
60 Teti Sri Haryati F 20 Islam 0.9 SMA 
61 Theresia Tiurma Parulian F 36 Protestant 1.3 SMA 
62 Tini F 24 Hindu 4.5 SMA 
63 Tri Tistiyanto F 27 Islam 1.1 S1-S3 
64 Tuana Robert Manupung M 27 Protestant 0.9 S1-S3 
65 Widodo M 40 Islam 2.4 S1-S3 
66 Yoel Tabun M 30 Protestant 1.3 SMA 
1 For abbreviations, see list of abbreviations at the end of the thesis. 
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D Expert component data 
Table 38: Logistic and demographic data of expert component 
# Name Classifica
tion 
Organization Responsibility Address Interview 
date 
1 Abdul Mujib, 
Dr. 
Academic Al-Azhar Univer-
sity Indonesia 
Head of Heal-
ing & Counsel-
ling Unit 
Universitas Al Azhar Indo-
nesia 
Fakultas Agama Islam 
Kompleks Masjid Agung Al 
Azhar 
Jl. Sisingamangara, Jakarta 
18-Jan-08 
2 Agus Haryadi Microfinan
ce expert 
TAKMIN Working 
Group 
Head of TAK-
MIN working 
group 
Ruko Ananda Tour 
Jl. Sindangbarang Loji, No. 
252 
Bogor 16117 
1-Nov-08 
(joint in-
terview 
with 11) 
3 B. Munir 
Sjamsoeddin 
Academic STIMRA 
(Sekolah Tinggi 
Manejemen Risi-
ko dan Asuransi) 
STIMRA chair-
man, former 
head of Dewan 
Asuransi Indo-
nesia 
Bina Sentra 
Arimbi R-102 
Kompleks Bidakara 
Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto 
Kav.71-73 
Jakarta Selatan 12870 
11-Feb-08 
4 Emil Salim, 
Prof. Dr. 
Politician 
and 
activist 
Association for 
Community Em-
powerment 
(ACE) 
Chairman of 
ACE; UN advi-
sor; former 
environment 
minister,  
Kuningan 
Jakarta 
25-Jun-08 
5 Fahmi Religious 
teacher 
Islamic boarding 
school "Al-
Futuwah" 
Ustaj Pesantren Al-Futurwah 
Jl. H. Tolib 
Cipete Utara 
Jakarta 
7-May-08 
6 Fauzan 
Abschuetz 
Social 
activist 
Lembaga Infor-
masi Perburuhan 
Sedane (LIPS) 
Executive Di-
rector 
Jl. Dewi Sartika 52F 
Bogor 16212 
Indonesia 
18-Oct-08 
7 Frans Magnis 
Suseno, Prof. 
Dr. 
Academic Sekolah Tinggi 
Filsafat 
Driyarkara 
Head of Driyar-
kara University, 
Scholar 
Jl. Cempaka Putih Indah 
100A, Jembatan Serong 
Rawasari - Jakarta 10520 
26-Mar-08 
8 I Nyoman 
Putra 
Sukasana 
Microfinan
ce expert 
Wahana Kria 
Putria (WKP) 
Micro-Credits 
Program Ma-
nager 
Jalan Tukad Saba no 10A, 
Denpasar 80225, 
Bali 
24-May-08 
9 Ishaq Thoyib Religious 
teacher 
PT. Asuransi 
Allianz Life Indo-
nesia 
Alternative 
Distribution 
Manager 
PT. Asuransi Allianz Life 
Indonesia 
Summitmas II, 20th floor 
Jl. Jend. Sudirman, Kav.61-
62 
12190 Jakarta 
3-Nov-08 
10 Jenny Microfinan
ce expert 
Mitra Masyarakat 
Sejahtera (MMS) 
Branch Mana-
ger 
Jl.Udayana no.19 RT 
001/002  
Kelurahan Kampung Sawah 
Waikabubak 
87212 Sumba Barat 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 
18-Jun-08 
11 John Wipf Microfinan
ce expert 
Garand & Asso-
ciates 
Consultancy 
Microinsurance 
consultant 
Puerto Princesa 
Palawan 
Philippines 
01-Nov-08 
(joint in-
terview 
with 2) 
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12 Karna Sutisna 
Priatna 
Academic University of 
Passau 
Indonesian 
lecturer 
University of Passau 
Department of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
Innstarße 43, ITZ 105 
94032 Passau 
Germany 
24-Jun-09 
(joint in-
terview 
with 19 
and 22) 
13 Mardalenna 
I.F. 
Philantrop
hist 
Rahmania 
Foundation 
Managing Di-
rector 
Jl Mesjid III No. 3 
Pecompongan 
Jakarta 
19-Oct-08 
(joint in-
terview 
with 17) 
14 Nurcahya Microfinan
ce expert 
GTZ-ProFI Senior 
Microfinance 
Advisor 
GTZ-ProFI office 
Bank Indonesia Office 
Denpasar 
Bali 
23-May-08 
15 Nurhayati 
Djamas, Dr.  
Academic Al-Azhar Univer-
sity Indonesia 
Dekan Universitas Al Azhar Indo-
nesia 
Fakultas Agama Islam 
Kompleks Masjid Agung Al 
Azhar 
Jl. Sisingamangara, Jakarta 
8-Jan-08 
16 Nurjamil Religious 
teacher 
"Miftahul Ulum" 
mosque and 
foundation 
Ustaj Jl. Yayasan Miftahul Ulum 
RT07/08 No2 
Gandul 
Jakarta 
18-Oct-08 
17 Rahman Ab-
bas 
Philantrop
hist 
Rahmania 
Foundation 
Executive Di-
rector 
Jl Mesjid III No. 3 
Pecompongan 
Jakarta 
19-Oct-08 
(joint in-
terview 
with 13) 
18 Rianto A. 
Djojosugito 
Insurance 
expert 
PT. Asuransi 
Allianz Life Indo-
nesia 
Chief Financial 
Officer and 
Vice-President 
PT. Asuransi Allianz Life 
Indonesia 
Summitmas II, 20th floor 
Jl. Jend. Sudirman, Kav.61-
62 
12190 Jakarta 
15-Oct-08 
19 Seto Hardjana Academic University of 
Passau 
Master student University of Passau 
Department of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
Innstarße 43, ITZ 105 
94032 Passau 
Germany 
24-Jun-09 
(joint in-
terview 
with 12 
and 22) 
20 Siti Mustach 
Mulia 
Social 
activist 
Indonesian Con-
ference on Reli-
gion and Peace 
(ICRP) 
ICRP 
chairwoman 
Jl. Cempaka Putih Barat 
XXI, No 34 
Jakarta 
25-Jun-08 
21 Sukron Kamil, 
Dr. 
Academic Center for the 
Study of Religion 
and Culture 
(CSRC) 
Program 
Coordinator 
Universitas Islam Negri 
Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya, 
lt. 2 
Kampus 2 
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5 
Pisangan 
Ciputat Jakarta 15419 
6-Feb-08 
22 Umar Abdul 
Aziz 
Academic University of 
Passau 
Master student University of Passau 
Department of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
Innstarße 43, ITZ 105 
94032 Passau 
Germany 
24-Jun-09 
(joint in-
terview 
with 12 
and 19) 
23 Werner Kraus, 
Dr.  
Academic none Freelance art 
consultant and 
university lec-
turer 
Passau, Germany 23-Jun-09 
24 Zarkasih Afif Religious 
teacher 
"Baitul Ihsan" 
mosque at Bank 
Indonesia 
Ustaj Bank Indonesia 
Jl. M.H. Thamrin No. 2 
Jakarta 
20-Feb-08 
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E Group leader component data 
Table 39: Logistic and demographic data of group leader component 
# Name Sex Age Occupation Religion Marital sta-
tus 
Last attained 
education1 
Group code 
1 Aan Irawati F 33 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS1kt 
2 Amsi Efendi M 40 Trader 
(jamu) 
Islam Married SMA DIMAN1kt 
3 Dadat Suwayi F 54 Food stall Islam Married SMP BISWA2kt 
4 Dewi Yulia Sari F 31 Trader (me-
dicine and 
shoes) 
Islam Married SMA BISWA1kt 
5 Eka Inda Toresia F 31 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS1kt 
6 Elisa Purnawati F 49 Trader Protestant Married D1-D3 BISWA2kt 
7 Heni Rohaeni F 53 Housewife Islam Married SMA BISWA2kt 
8 Hindun F 45 Housewife Islam Married SD BISWA2kt 
9 Hj. Atik F 47 Others (cate-
ring) 
Islam Married SMA DIMAN1kt 
10 Ica Ramadhanis F 29 Housewife Islam Married SMA BISWA1kt 
11 Komariah F 36 Housewife Islam Married SMA BISWA1kt 
12 Margaretha 
Sumari 
F 50 Trader Protestant Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMA BISWA2kt 
13 Mariani Sibarani F 41 Housewife Protestant Married SMA BISWA1kt 
14 Murtini F 46 Trader / 
Masseur 
Protestant Married SD DIMAN1kt 
15 Neli Juangsih F 26 Trader 
(Cookies) 
Islam Married SMA DIMAN1kt 
16 Neneng Nur'aini F 38 Trader / food 
stall 
Islam Married SMA MMS1kt 
17 NY Endang 
Ismawati 
F 45 Trader Islam Married SD BISWA1kt 
18 Puryandariningsih F 49 Trader Islam Married SMA DIMAN1kt 
19 Rosdiana F 31 Housewife Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMA MMS1kt 
20 Rubi Walyati F 32 Others 
(employee) 
Islam Married S1-S3 MMS1kt 
21 Sawiyah Bt Saweh F 55 Trader Islam Married SD BISWA1kt 
22 Siswaeni F 31 Housewife Islam Married SMA BISWA2kt 
23 Siti Jjulaeha F 38 Trader Islam Married SMA BISWA2kt 
24 Sri Maryati F 38 Trader Islam Married SMA MMS1kt 
25 Sri Mulyani F 55 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SMP BISWA2kt 
26 Sukartina F 58 Trader Islam Married SD BISWA2kt 
27 Sukijemi F 62 Trader Islam Married SMP BISWA2kt 
28 Tjayah F 53 Trader Islam Widowed/ 
divorced 
SD BISWA2kt 
29 Wahyuni F 40 Trader Islam Married SD BISWA1kt 
30 Y. Yayu Yuliati F 35 Housewife Catholic Married SMA MMS1kt 
31 Yulnita F 43 Goods pro-
duction 
Islam Married SMA DIMAN1kt 
1 For abbreviations, see list of abbreviations at the end of the thesis. 
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F MFI management component data 
Table 40: Logistic and demographic data of MFI management component 
# Name Responsibility Organization Address Interview date 
1 Bona Accounting 
manager 
LKM Bina 
Arta 
LKM Bina Arta 
Komp. Rukan Artha Gading 
Niaga  
Blok B No. 6 
Kelapa Gading 
Jakarta 14240 
20-Oct-08 
(joint interview with 2 
and 6) 
2 Didit Wijayanto Chief financial 
officer 
LKM Bina 
Arta 
LKM Bina Arta 
Komp. Rukan Artha Gading 
Niaga  
Blok B No. 6 
Kelapa Gading 
Jakarta 14240 
20-Oct-08 
(joint interview with 1 
and 6) 
3 Dino V. 
Hadjarati 
Exectuive di-
rector 
Koperasi 
Serba Usaha 
Dian Mandiri 
(DIMAN) 
Dian Mandiri 
Ruko Liga Mas 
Blok A2 No. 10-11 
Karawaci 
Tangerang 15115 
Banten 
30-Oct-08 
(joint interview with 
5) 
4 Mickey Felder Operational 
manager 
Mitra 
Masyarakat 
Sejahtera 
(MMS) 
Mitra Masyarakat Sejahtera 
(MMS) Head Office 
Jl. Cawang Baru Utara No.10 
RT 001/ 011 
Kel. Cipinang Cempedak 
Kec. Jatinegara 
Jakarta Timur 13340 
20-Oct-08 
5 Victor Director Koperasi 
Serba Usaha 
Dian Mandiri 
(DIMAN) 
Dian Mandiri 
Ruko Liga Mas 
Blok A2 No. 10-11 
Karawaci 
Tangerang 15115 
Banten 
30-Oct-08 
(joint interview with 
3) 
6 Yoseph Arihadi Chief executive 
officer 
LKM Bina 
Arta 
LKM Bina Arta 
Komp. Rukan Artha Gading 
Niaga  
Blok B No. 6 
Kelapa Gading 
Jakarta 14240 
20-Oct-08 
(joint interview with 1 
and 2) 
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G Customer component photos 
 
Abbreviations such as “DIMAN1” indicate the respective MFI and the sequence of groups 
with the MFI. Ex-ante groups are shown on the left, the respective ex-post group on the right. 
 
Photo 5 
 
 DIMAN1 ex-ante 
 Tangerang, 24 July 2006 
 Photo 6 
 
 DIMAN1 ex-post 
 Tangerang, 7 August 2007 
 Photo 7 
 
 DIMAN2 ex-ante 
 Tangerang, 24 July 2006 
  
 
Photo 8 
 
 DIMAN3 ex-ante 
 Tangerang, 26 July 2006 
Photo 9 
 
 DIMAN3 ex-post 
 Tangerang, 6 August 2007 
 
  
 
No ex-post follow-up for DIMAN2. 
The credit group had meanwhile dissolved. 
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Photo 10 
 
 DINARI1 ex-ante 
 Bali, 9 March 2007 
 Photo 11
 
 DINARI1 ex-post 
 Bali, 28 May 2008 
 Photo 12 
 
 WKP1 ex-ante 
 Bali, 19 May 2007 
 Photo 13 
 
 WKP1 ex-post 
 Bali, 24 May 2008 
 
Photo 14 
 
 WKP2 ex-ante 
 Bali, 19 May 2007 
Photo 15
 
 WKP2 ex-post 
 Bali, 24 May 2008 
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Photo 16 
 
 BISWA1 ex-ante 
 East Jakarta, 28 May 2007 
 Photo 17 
  
  BISWA1 ex-post 
  East Jakarta, 9 June 2008 
 Photo 18 
 
 BISWA2 ex-ante 
 East Jakarta, 29 May 2007 
 Photo 19 
 
 BISWA2 ex-post 
 East Jakarta, 10 June 2008 
 
Photo 20
 
 BISWA3 ex-ante 
 East Jakarta, 30 May 2007 
Photo 21 
  
  BISWA3 ex-post 
  East Jakarta, 11 June 2008 
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Photo 22
 
 BISWA4 ex-ante 
 Bandung, 4 June 2007 
 Photo 23 
  
  BISWA4 ex-post 
  Bandung, 10 June 2008 
 Photo 24 
 
 MMS1 ex-ante 
 East Jakarta, 15 June 2007 
  
 
Photo 25 
 
 MBM1 ex-ante 
 Bali, 3 July 2007 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  MBM1 ex-post 
  Bali, 19 May 2008 
  
 
No ex-post follow-up for MMS1. 
The credit group had meanwhile dissolved. 
 
No photo available. 
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Photo 26 
 
 MMS2 ex-ante 
 Tambulaka, Sumba, 9 July 2007 
 Photo 27 
  
  MMS2 ex-post 
  Tambulaka, Sumba, 16 June 2008 
 Photo 28 
 
 MMS3 ex-ante 
 Waikabubak, Sumba, 10 July 2007 
 Photo 29 
 
 MMS3 ex-post 
 Waikabubak, Sumba, 17 June 2008 
 
Photo 30 
 
 MMS4 ex-ante 
 Warnukaka, Sumba, 10 July 2007 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
No ex-post follow-up for MMS4. 
The credit group had meanwhile dissolved. 
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Photo 31 
 
 BISWA5 ex-ante 
 Soe, West-Timor, 13 July 2007 
 Photo 32 
  
  BISWA5 ex-post 
  Soe, West-Timor, 20 June 2008 
 Photo 33 
 
 BISWA6 ex-ante 
 Soe, West-Timor, 13 July 2007 
 Photo 34 
 
 BISWA6 ex-post 
 Soe, West-Timor, 20 June 2008 
 
 Photo 35 
 
 MMS5 ex-post 
 East Jakarta, 12 June 2008 
 
  
 
MMS5 was an “ex-post only” group. 
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  Photo 36 
  
  MMS6 ex-post 
  Waitabula, Sumba, 16 June 2008 
  Photo 37 
 
 MMS7 ex-post 
 Waikabubak, Sumba, 17 June 2008 
 
 Photo 38 
 
 MMS8 ex-post 
 East Jakarta, 20 October 2008 
 
  
 
MMS8 was an “ex-post only” group. 
 
MMS7 was an “ex-post only” group. 
 
MMS6 was an “ex-post only” group. 
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  Photo 39 
  
  DIMAN4 ex-post 
  Tangerang, 30 October 2008 
 
  
 
DIMAN4 was an “ex-post only” group. 
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H Beneficiary component photos 
Photos are ordered chronologically. The relationship to the insured is stated in brakets. 
Photo 40 
 
 Beneficiary 1: Rasnya (father, absent), represented by  
 Suhana (mother, middle) 
 Tigaraksa, Banten, 8 August 2007 
 Photo 41 
  
  Beneficiary 2: Sarima (wife, 3rd from left, in the back) 
  Tigaraksa, Banten, 8 August 2007 
 Photo 42 
 
 Beneficiary 3: Asinah (wife, 3rd from left) 
 North Jakarta, 9 August 2007 
 Photo 43 
 
 Beneficiary 4: Tarmuji (husband, 2nd from left)  
 Tangerang, 14 August 2007 
Photo 44 
 
 Beneficiary 5: Djoko Djuharyantoko (husband, 4th from left) 
 Tangerang, 14 August 2007 
Photo 45 
  
  Beneficiary 6: Sutiman (husband, 2nd from left) 
  South Jakarta, 20 August 2007 
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Photo 46 
 
 Beneficiary 7:  Ibnu Lokita (son, 1st from the right) 
 West Jakarta, 10 October 2007 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Beneficiary 8: Niman (husband) 
  South Jakarta, 14 December 2007 
 Photo 47 
 
 Beneficiary 9: Zulkifli Siregar (husband, 2nd from left) 
 Tigaraksa, Banten, 18 December 2007 
 Photo 48 
 
 Beneficiary 10: Toto Sukanto 
 Tigaraksa, Banten, 18 December 2007 
 
Photo 49 
 
 Beneficiary 11: Gunung Siregar (husband, right) 
 Tigaraksa, Banten, 18 December 2007 
Photo 50 
 
 Beneficiary 12: Zakiyah (daughter, 2nd from right) 
 East Jakarta, 19 December 2007 
 
  
 
No photo available. 
 
281 
 
Photo 51 
 
 Beneficiary 13:  Mohammad Jafar (husband, right) 
 North Jakarta, 24 January 2008 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Beneficiary 14: anonymous 
  Bekasi, West Java, 12 May 2008 
 Photo 52 
 
 Beneficiary 15: Haji Mustani (husband, left) 
 Tangerang, 12 May 2008 
 Photo 53 
 
 Beneficiary 16: Aznar Efendi (husband, middle) 
 West Jakarta, 12 May 2008 
 
Photo 54 
 
 Beneficiary 17: Komang Sudarsini (wife, left) 
 Bali, 21 May 2008 
Photo 55 
 
 Beneficiary 18: Kartini (mother-in-law, 2nd from left) 
 Bali, 26 May 2008 
 
  
 
No permission to publish photo given. 
 
282 
 
Photo 56 
 
 Beneficiary 19:  Sugeng Mulyadi (son, 2nd from right) 
 Cileungsi, West Java, 9 June 2008 
Photo 57 
 
 Beneficiary 20:  Yeni Meyanti (sister-in-law, right) 
 Bogor, 9 June 2008 
 Photo 58 
 
 Beneficiary 21: Lulu Setiawan (son, left) 
 West Jakarta, 12 June 2008 
 Photo 59 
 
 Beneficiary 22: Ratna Wulan (daughter, left) 
 Bekasi, West Java, 12 June 2008 
 
Photo 60 
 
 Beneficiary 23: Romida Sinurat (wife, 2nd from left) 
 Tangerang, 2 June 2008 
Photo 61 
 
 Beneficiary 24: Ismet Apriyanto (son, 2nd from right) 
 Tangerang, 2 June 2008 
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 Beneficiary 25:  anonymous 
 Central Jakarta, 30 October 2008 
 Photo62 
  
  Beneficiary 26: O'O Suparji (husband, right) 
  East Jakarta, 31 October 2008 
 
  
 
No permission to publish photo given. 
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I Loan officer component photos  
Photos are ordered chronologically. 
Photo 63 
 
 DIMAN loan officer group questioning (1 of 2 at DIMAN)  
 Tangerang, 10 August 2007 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  MBM loan officer group questioning 
  Bali, 19 May 2008 
 Photo 64 
 
 WKP loan officer group questioning 
 Bali, 24 May 2008 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  DINARI loan officer group questioning 
  Bali, 26 May 2008 
Photo 65 
 
 BINA loan officer group questioning 
 East Jakarta, 20 October 2008 
Photo 66 
  
  DIMAN loan officer group questioning (2 of 2 at DIMAN)    
  Tangerang, 31 October 2008 
  
 
No photo available. 
 
No photo available. 
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J Group leader component photos 
Photos are ordered chronologically. 
Photo 67 
 
 MMS group leader group questioning 
East Jakarta, 20 October 2008 
Photo 68 
 
 DIMAN group leader group questioning 
 Tangerang, 30 October 2008  
Photo 69 
 
 BISWA group leader group questioning (1 of 2 at BISWA) 
 East Jakarta, 4 November 2008 
Photo 70 
  
  BISWA group leader group questioning (2 of 2 at BISWA) 
  East Jakarta, 4 November 2008 
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ANNEX 3: EXAMPLES OF EXCHANGES 
Table 41: Examples of exchanges in a three-variable-matrix 
Type of ex-
change 
Timing of 
counter-
gift 
Recipient of coun-
ter-gift 
Example 
Negative  
reciprocity 
direct direct Theft 
indirect direct Marrying with the intention to later provoke a finan-
cially beneficial divorce agreement 
Balanced  
reciprocity 
direct direct Changing land for cattle 
indirect Parents treating a manager for lunch so their child 
gets hired by that manager 
indirect direct Contributions given for someone's wedding to be 
returned at one's own wedding 
indirect Accomodating a friend from a different city for a 
night so that later another family member, should 
she pass through the friend's city, can also stay at 
the friend's place. 
General  
reciprocity 
indirect direct Caring for one's children so that some of them may 
care for oneself at old age 
indirect Caring for one's children so that they will also take 
care of their own children 
Redistribution direct (conditionally) 
direct 
Playing tombola 
indirect German pension system where present contribu-
tions pay for present pensions 
indirect (conditionally) 
direct 
Taking out formal insurance 
indirect Tax money invested for the benefit of future gener-
ations (e.g. to counter climate change) 
Market direct direct Shopping at the supermarket 
direct indirect Paying a nursery service to take care of one's par-
ents 
indirect direct Contributing to one's private pension plan 
indirect indirect Contributing to a child's or grand-child's education 
savings plan 
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ANNEX 4: ESSAY ON MALU AND GENGSI 
I frequently encountered the terms malu and gengsi during my field research. They are perva-
sive in everyday colloquial language in Indonesia. On the other hand, I found no ready-made 
explanations of these particular terms in the non-Indonesian literature (I did not investigate 
the Indonesian literature). This is why I became interested in them.  
Very roughly malu can be translated as awkward, shy, and afraid of feeling shame, or in fact 
already being ashamed. Gengsi is even harder to fathom. Some people recommended to trans-
late it as pretentious, but although certainly still not fully accurate I prefer actions motivated 
out of improper self-interest as a first working translation.  
Both terms represent profound social concepts, which is why such direct translations can only 
scratch the surface of the terms’ full meaning and leave their multilevel implications in the 
obscure. Both terms are often simultaneously used, but are obviously not synonymous. While 
malu still seems familiar to foreign scholars on Indonesia, this seems less the case for gengsi, 
although some of my Indonesian counterparts insisted that particularly the preoccupation with 
gengsi in everyday life is ever increasing, sometimes “beyond all rationality”, as one Indone-
sian observer put it. Here, I therefore outline some thoughts on the matter as collected on the 
sidelines of my research on microinsurance. This is a tentative first scoping and a pointer at a 
potential research gap rather than a full blown authoritative investigation.  
Malu 
Malu is the one of the two terms which is easier to explain. Malu stands for the fear of not 
performing according to socially accepted standards. Examples for socially accepted good 
standards are honesty, humbleness, unpretentiousness, clamness, selflessness, generosity, 
doing ones work well (more input than output related), but importantly also behaving accord-
ing to ones social status. This short sample list already indicates that the various socially ac-
cepted norms are not always perfectly complementary. In fact, to a certain degree fulfillment 
of one status may decrease fulfillment of another.  
Malu describes the risk of exposing and embarrassing oneself or others. If a person does not 
fulfill those standards although it could be expected of her or him, or if the fulfillment of 
those standards is a must and the person does not comply, then this person is bound to feel 
malu, and potentially the social surrounding will feel malu as well. Malu is always two-sided. 
It affects the individual and the respective counterparts.  
Malu is not necessarily connected to active affirmations of social status, power, and economic 
interests. Malu is about preserving face and eventually about preserving one’s social status. 
The concept has a preventive, protective, and almost passive character.  
Sample situations for malu are: (1) If I do not know how to get to a place and I ask a casual 
bypasser on the street for the way, I do not expect this person to definitely know the way. In-
stead, asking the bypasser is a chance try. So this person does not need to feel malu if she or 
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he really does not know the way. This is because it is not expected of her or him. However, if 
the street is nearby and the person is a local and still doesn’t know the way, then this would be 
a reason for malu, because such knowledge could justly be expected of her or him. (2) If I am 
hanging out with friends for a karaoke night and my friends ask me to sing along, but I am 
really sure that I am an awful singer and decline, this would prevent a situation of malu. Sing-
ing along is not necessarily expected, so non-fulfillment does not cause anyone to feel malu. 
But singing along awfully would be an embarrassment and therewith a malu situation. 
Due to the many social norms prevalent in embedded moral societies, of which modern Indo-
nesia still appears to retain a lot, the risk of a social faux-pax is always imminent. Malu situa-
tions create disharmony and disrupt social harmony (rukun). The consequent preoccupation of 
Indonesians with etiquette and preservation of face has been widely noted. That this constant 
preoccupation is epitomized by the autochthonous concept of malu has been less noted and 
may by itself already be worthwile reiterating. However, the real intricacies start if malu is put 
into relation with gengsi, because gengsi cannot be fully understood without reference to ma-
lu. 
Gengsi 
As noted, gengsi can generally refer to an action motivated out of improper self-interest. It is 
more negatively connoted than malu. By and large, it is also a more promotive and active 
concept than malu. For gengsi to “materialize”, such improper self-interst needs to be unco-
vered or at least suspected. This can be tacitly done by the gengsi person herself, but usually 
the gengsi lable is assigned by others. Even more than malu, gengsi is therefore a social de-
nominator. Uncovered gengsi will almost invariably cause the “accused” to feel malu. Gengsi 
bears obvious similarities to the old Javanese concept of pamrih, which refers to a person, 
often a ruler, amassing material wealth and power out of excessive self-interest with the im-
mediate consequence of the downfall of such ruler. However, very different from gengsi I 
have never encountered anyone using the term pamrih while living and researching in Indone-
sia.  
Gengsi seems to appear in two basic types. The first type (A) refers to being dishonest about 
one’s true condition in order to pursue some improper self-interested. The second variety (B) 
refers to actually being honest about one’s elevated status but thereby violating other good 
standards.  
For gengsi of type (A) type three different situations are imaginable:  
Situation 1: I intentionally show less than I have. For example, if I hide my economic wealth 
in order to protect it from the claims of other family members, I am not being honest, because 
honesty would lead to demands for generosity, but instead I am self-interested. However, if I 
am not displaying my wealth in order not to be boastful, this is not gengsi but humble (rendah 
hati). A variation of this theme would be the non-showing of wealth where this is absolutely 
expected as a good standard. A top manager who uses a second-hand car and a second-hand 
mobile phone may arise suspicions of being gengsi; that is, hiding her or his true condition for 
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some improper purpose, although this may actually not be the case. Such situations are rare 
among Indonesians. They tend to arise in dealings with foreigners who are sometimes unfami-
liar with what is socially expected of them. 
Situation 2: I intentionally do not show that I do not have enough money. For example, I do 
not admit that I cannot pay for my children’s education, because this would violate a socially 
accepted good standard, lower my public image or status, and therefore make me feel malu. In 
this situation, I try to hide this “shortcoming” as good as possible and do not ask my relatives 
to lend me money. Indonesians refer to this situation as gengsi hutang.  
Situation 3: I actively try to show more than I have. This is the clearest case of gengsi and the 
one that can best be translated as pretentious. One example would be to borrow money from 
friends in order to buy a status accruing state-of-the-art mobile phone, although I could actual-
ly not afford to buy one. Indonesians refer to this situation as berhutang demi gengsi, as bor-
rowing in order to fufill one’s personal boastful needs. 
Gengsi of type (B) is strongly connected to preservation of social status. It stands especially 
close to malu, where behavior according to one’s social status is a socially accepted and even 
expected good standard. For example, a manager who does not clean litter from the floor in 
the bathroom although he could technically do so without much hassle honestly behaves ac-
cording to his social status. Cleaning bathrooms would be far below her or his social status. 
However, by affirming social status the equally prevalent standards of humbleness and sel-
flessness are violated. If a manager is plainly observed with such behavior, she or he may be 
denounced as being gengsi. A similar example would be a manager not apologizing for a mis-
take to a subordinate. This would unravel her or his social status so honestly displayed. At the 
same time this would nonetheless violate the good standard of honesty and humbleness. 
As noted, Indonesians are not only concerned with avoiding malu situations for oneself, but 
also for others. In some situations, this may lead to a conscious incurring of gengsi. For ex-
ample, if a microinsurance customer tells the insurance staff that she is satisfied with the 
product although in reality she is not, this is done in order to avoid that the insurance staff 
feels malu for not having having done a good job, especially after probably having put a lot of 
effort into it. Here, the customer is being dishonest about her true condition, but her self-
interest is actually translated onto the counterpart. 
Conclusion 
Malu and gengsi are both highly socialized and multidimensional, even ambivalent concepts. 
They are overlapping in practice. An exact standardization of these terms is difficult and 
going by the fluidity of cultural concepts in Indonesia probably impossible. Above categoriza-
tion is already highly idealized and far from all-encompassing. Presented with different poten-
tial malu and gengsi situations, my Indonesian counterparts almost always showed at least 
slight differences in their interpretation of whether a situation was malu, gengsi, both or noth-
ing of the two. Things become especially intricate if people act to prevent others from feeling 
malu.  
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What is clear is that the less one is concerned with social norms and social status, the less one 
is affected by notions of malu and gengsi. However, the fact that malu and gengsi are so pre-
valent concepts in everyday life indicates that Indonesian society is still particularly hinged on 
ideas of collectivity and the definition and construction of the self through others. Moderniza-
tion in Indonesia has therefore not (yet) led to a far-reaching social individualization in the 
sense of social atomization. The observation that the preoccupation with gengsi appears to be 
increasing rather indicates that a growing number of people are concerned with actively man-
aging and promoting their social status, and that the number of conflicts between what one is 
and possesses with what one expects or is expected to be and to possess are increasing. Such 
development is only possible in a highly socialized environment. 
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Glossary 
 
 
All terms are Indonesian (including Arabic foreign words) unless otherwise stated. 
No particular spelling system is used.  
Terms are spelled as I encountered them most frequently in Indonesia. 
 
adat customary law; tradition 
adik younger sibling 
ajal predetermined lifespan 
akhirat afterworld 
al-iklas Sincerety (Sura 112) 
amal charity 
anak child 
anak yang sholeh well behaved and grateful children 
aneh strange 
arisan Indonesian ROSCA; lit: cooperative endeavor 
ayat al-kursi Throne Verse (Sura 2,225) 
Bahasa Indonesia Indonesian; lit: Language of Indonesia 
baskom open bawl for collecting cash contributions 
bawon harvest share 
campur-campur all mixed 
de facto in effect; the actual state of affairs (Latin) 
desa village 
desakota  Intermediary area with geographic attributes of both village and 
city (cf. McGee 1991) 
dibungkus being wrapped 
dikubur being burried 
dimandikan being washed 
dikafani being wrapped 
disholat being prayed for 
dunia present world 
ekonomi menengah middle class; lit: middle economic level 
ekonomi menengah ke bawa lower middle class; lit: lower middle economic level 
ekonomi lemah lower class; lit: weak economic level 
faqir destitute 
fard kifayah collective duty 
gharar uncertainty; risk 
gali lobang tutup lobang  repaying debt with debt; lit: dig a hole, fill a hole 
gengsi pretentious (see annex 4) 
gotong royong mutual assistance; doing things together 
guthi religious and cultural association of the Newar in Nepal 
hantu ghost 
haram religiously prohibited 
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homo oeconomius (exclusviely) economically thinking person (Latin) 
homo socius (exclusively) socially thinking person (Latin) 
ibu (married) woman 
ibu-ibu (married) women 
idealtypus ideal (stereo-)type 
iklas state of willed unaffectedness; alternatively spelled ikhlas 
ilmu knowledge; science 
isah 5th prayer of the day (approx. 19:30) 
istirahat taking a break (e.g. from microcredit taking) 
jamu traditional medicine 
jeenazah corpse 
kakak older sibling 
kalau rezeki when sudden fortune befalls someone 
kampung (low-asset) urban neighborhood 
kas operational kitty for operational costs 
kaya raya (very) rich 
kepala desa village head 
kepala keluarga family head 
kepala lurah head of an urban quarter 
kesibukan pastime; occupation; business 
ketuhanan yang maha esa single divine power; (belief in) one God 
khaul anniversary 
konsumsi consumption 
kota city 
la ilaha illa’llah  there is no god but Allah (Arabic) 
lebih ramai more lively 
longue durée long duration (French) 
magrib 4th prayer of the day (approx. 18:00) 
malu shame, akwardness (see annex 4) 
mati lancar smooth death 
maysir gambling 
miskin poor 
nafs soul 
orang miskin poor people; the poor 
pahala credit for the weighing of scales on Jugdment Day 
pamrih (excessive) self-interest 
pancasila Indonesian state ideology; lit: five principles 
Payung Keluarga family umbrella 
pengajian Muslim prayer group 
per se through itself 
potlatch ritual of total prestation among North American Indians  
 (Chinook language; cf. Mauss 1954: 4) 
rakyat kecil lower class; lit: small people 
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rezeki (sudden) fortune 
riba interest 
roh spirit 
rukun (communal) harmony 
salamah safety; peace (Arabic) 
santri fervent orthodox Muslim 
sawah rice paddy 
syariah Islamic law (lit: path to the watersource) 
slametan communal feast at special occasions; alternatively spelled  
 selamatan 
slametan ngujuh slametan 14 days after death 
sosialisasi socialization 
sumbangan contribution 
syarat-syarat terms and conditions 
tahlil denominator for the expression of faith (la ilaha illa’llah)  
tahlilan post-mortem prayer session in the early evening 
takaful Islamic insurance 
takdir (predetermined) fate; destiny 
takut cepat mati fear of dying prematurely; lit: fear of quickly dying 
terpercaya trusted 
tidak salah guna not making wrong use of something 
tolong menolong mutual help 
tradisi tradition 
tujuh seven 
uang jelas clear (clean) money 
uang kurang jelas unclear (unclean) money 
uang mati death money 
ustaj Muslim religious teacher 
warisan negatif negative inheritance (debt) 
warisan positif positive inheritance 
warung food stall 
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Exchange rate 
 
Unless otherwise stated, the applied exchange rate is as of 30 September 2008, which is the 
end of the reference period for this thesis (1 September 2006 until 30 September 2008): 
US$ 1 = IDR 9,506 
Source: www.oanda.com 
 
